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During volcanic eruptions, fragile transportation networks can have grave consequences for local 
populations. They also delay the effective potential for those affected to help themselves and impede 
relief provided by local authorities or from abroad. 
 
Developing the resilience of transportation networks is crucial to substantially reduce damage and 


























Text: adapted from the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (UNISDR 2015), and World Risk Report 
2016 (UNU-EHS 2016). 
 
Photo: Auckland City, New Zealand, with Harbour Bridge in the background, taken from Mt. Eden, one of the volcanic cones in 







Volcanic eruptions can cause a variety of impacts on critical infrastructure through a multitude of 
accompanying hazards. Impacts from volcanic ash can be highly disruptive, widespread and long-
lasting, with substantial consequences for society. With a growing worldwide population and 
associated expansion of complex critical infrastructure networks in volcanically active areas, volcanic 
risk assessments are more important than ever. However, there are many challenges, particularly as 
research developments in the discipline are relatively recent; many opportunities for improved 
understanding remain. Transportation is arguably the most crucial type of critical infrastructure during 
volcanic eruptions as it may be required for a variety of response and recovery activities, including the 
maintenance and restoration of all other critical infrastructure. In long-lasting eruptions, people may 
live with volcanic ash for months to years and use transportation networks affected by ash on a daily 
basis. Although there are many observations of surface transportation impacts following previous 
eruptions, vulnerability data has been largely qualitative and there has been a lack of reliable 
quantitative data, particularly to assess network functionality. Advancing our understanding of 
volcanic ash vulnerability will enhance management strategies and improve the resilience of 
transportation networks. 
This thesis provides quantitative empirical results for vulnerability assessments of volcanic ash 
impacts on surface transportation, primarily through laboratory experimentation under controlled 
conditions that investigate three key impact types: 1) skid resistance on ash-covered roads and 
airfields, 2) road marking coverage by volcanic ash, and 3) visibility in airborne volcanic ash. Surface 
transportation functionality for thin (mm-cm) ash deposits forms the primary focus of this research due 
to limited existing knowledge, and as thin deposits often cover extensive areas and are readily re-
suspended with potential repeated disruption. Various ash characteristics (e.g. thickness, particle 
size, soluble components, and ash wetness) are investigated in laboratory studies to assess the 
implications of different hazard intensity metrics on surface transportation functionality, with a focus 
on the transportation network in Auckland, New Zealand. Laboratory findings are used to identify 
thresholds for particular impacts, which are subsequently used to refine existing, and propose new, 
fragility functions for surface transportation and volcanic ash. Recommendations for clean-up and 
other mitigation measures to deal with volcanic ash on surface transportation networks are also 
suggested. Finally, new and previous impact findings are applied to a scenario focused on a 
hypothetical eruption in the Auckland Volcanic Field, New Zealand. Here, Level-of-Service metrics are 
developed to describe the disruption encountered by transportation end-users when networks are 
affected by volcanic ash, effectively providing a measure of transportation vulnerability. Overall, the 
findings of the thesis allow improvements to future volcanic impact and risk assessments and guide 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) 
Risk information provides a critical foundation for managing disasters (GFDRR 2014). Insurance, 
government and infrastructure groups, as well as the end-users of systems, all require disaster risk 
assessments to determine the nature and extent of risk (UNDP 2010) and inform decisions and 
strategies that ultimately reduce impacts from adverse events. Despite substantial international efforts 
to reduce impacts in recent years however, economic losses from disasters are rising – from US$50 
billion per annum in the 1980s, to around US$200 billion per annum in the last decade (World Bank 
and GFDRR 2013, GFDRR 2014). The recently established Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (2015-2030) sets out to “substantially reduce disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods 
and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, 
businesses, communities and countries” (UNISDR 2015, p.36).  
 
Risk can be expressed qualitatively and/or quantitatively where it is derived as a combination of the 
likelihood / magnitude of the hazard and its consequences (UNISDR 2009). For the purpose of 
disaster risk assessments, risk is typically broken down into three principal components: 
1. Hazard – potentially damaging phenomena that may cause loss of life or injury, property 
damage, social and economic disruption, or environmental degradation. 
2. Exposure – elements at risk such as people, land and infrastructure. 
3. Vulnerability – the susceptibilities and capacities of the elements impacted by hazards 
(Crichton 1999, UNISDR 2004, Bouchon 2006). 
In order to achieve the goal of DRR, integrated and inter-disciplinary measures that prevent and 
reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and 
recovery, and strengthen resilience1 should be implemented at all levels (UNISDR 2015, Few and 
Barclay 2016, Stewart et al. 2016). The research documented in this thesis investigates the impacts 
of volcanic ash on surface transportation networks. It helps inform DRR measures, specifically 
contributing to the following global target of the Sendai Framework for DRR (2015-2030) in relation to 
volcanic risk assessment: 
                                                     
1 There are various definitions of resilience. The definition provided by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction is used for the purpose of this thesis: “The ability of a system, community or society exposed to 
hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient 
manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions” 
(UNISDR 2009). 
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“To substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic 
services through developing their resilience” (UNISDR 2015, p.12). 
 
This, in turn, helps to reduce the number of people affected by volcanic hazards and associated 
economic loss. The broad framework for this thesis, illustrating how the components are integrated 
with risk management and DRR, is shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
Figure 1.1   Conceptual framework for the thesis (adapted from UNDP 2010). Italicised text indicates how this 
thesis contributes to volcanic risk management for surface transportation. 
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1.2 Risk Assessment Considerations 
Risk assessments are fundamental for effective DRR policies and practices, as they determine the 
nature and extent of risk, by considering hazard, exposure, and vulnerability in combination; they 
analyse hazard characteristics and evaluate existing conditions of vulnerability that together could 
potentially harm exposed people, property, services, livelihoods and the environment on which they 
depend (UNDP 2010, UNISDR 2015). Risk assessments provide opportunities before disaster events 
to estimate deaths, damages, disruption, and losses (direct and indirect) that will result.  They can 
also assess the value of actions to reduce impacts on individuals, communities and governments 
(GFDRR 2014). Once the risk has been assessed, it can be used to inform management strategies 
before, during and/or following disasters, such as exclusion zones, hazard/risk maps and signs, land-
use planning (e.g. Fitzgerald et al. 2016), and advice to end-users of critical infrastructure2. Therefore, 
risk assessments are used by many stakeholders and, because of their importance, have been 
developed over a number of years. The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery highlight 
that the earliest records of risk assessments relate to practices of minimising financial risk from 
shipping, and the origins of property insurance practices can be traced back nearly 350 years 
(GFDRR 2014). More recently, technological advances such as increased computational power and 
resources have led to the rapid development of modern risk assessments which link exposure and 
vulnerability data with hazard models (GFDRR 2014). Substantial progress on each element of the 
risk assessment process has been made since, including during the timeframe of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (2005-2015), and tools and models for identifying, analysing, and managing risk 
have grown in number and utility (GFDRR 2014).   
 
Risk assessments are not the conclusion of the process however; rather they provide a foundation for 
long-term engagement focused on the use of risk information (GFDRR 2014). Many of the responses 
to new information derived from risk assessments, such as developing new emergency management 
policies and engineering-focused improvements to infrastructure, are effectively a form of increasing 
resilience. Indeed, reducing risk, in terms of the ability of people or assets to withstand a disruptive 
scenario (reducing vulnerability) and to recover (increasing recoverability), can also be achieved as a 
result of developing resilience (Barker and Ramirez-Marquez 2016). As such, resilience is an 
important and compatible component of DRR, as it means targeted systems are able to absorb 
unexpected and potentially high consequence shocks and stresses, and adapt to adverse events 
(NAS 2012, Linkov et al. 2016, Palma-Oliveira and Trump 2016).  
 
Despite their advantages, some risk assessments today still adopt relatively traditional approaches, 
especially in that they strive for systems that are completely fail-safe in nature by focusing on short-
                                                     
2 Critical infrastructure is defined here as “infrastructure so vital that its incapacitation or destruction would have a 
debilitating impact on defence or economic security” (Moteff et al. 2003). In some countries, critical infrastructure 
may also be referred to as critical utilities or lifelines. 
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term system hardness and physical damage that occurs during adverse events (Linkov et al. 2016). 
However, this approach is often too rigid, inflexible, data-intensive, and expensive, especially given 
the increasing interconnectedness of systems (GFDRR 2016a, Linkov et al. 2016, Palma-Oliveira and 
Trump 2016). Risk assessments also need to consider events that could cause long-lasting and 
widespread damage to society, such as through the loss of functionality of systems. This is 
particularly true for events where there has been a lack of focus by previous risk assessments, and 
for high uncertainty or low probability events. For example, volcanic eruptions have often been 
ignored in reinsurance and other global risk assessment models because of low risk awareness, 
insufficient resources, and/or a perceived low priority compared to other events. This is despite the 
potentially catastrophic consequences for society should an eruption occur (NAS 2012, Merz et al. 
2009, Park et al. 2013, Linkov et al. 2016, Palma-Oliveira and Trump 2016, Stewart et al. 2016). 
Integrating resilience into risk assessments is an appropriate solution as it encompasses dynamic 
properties such as the temporal components of adaptation, response and recovery and regards risk 
management as a socially constructed process (Lalonde and Boiral 2012, Vugrin 2016). Resilience 
strategies enable effective preparatory measures for the disruption of critical infrastructure services 
such as energy and transportation (Linkov et al. 2016). 
 
Rarely do countries or communities face potential risks from only one hazard. Our complex and 
interconnected systems, which rely on novel technologies, are such that multiple hazards with 
cascading risks are of increasing importance (Lalonde and Boiral 2012). Despite this understanding, 
many risk assessments currently adopt a single hazard approach, often with a particular focus on a 
hazard which has substantial existing (or newly discovered) knowledge of likely impacts. 
Subsequently, some policies, guidelines and codes have little consideration for lesser-known or 
emergent hazards and, in many cases, it is not possible to account for all threats to all critical 
infrastructure all of the time (Vugrin 2016). However, individual hazards should not be discounted 
altogether, and adopting a multi-hazard risk approach leads to better land-use planning, better 
response capacity, greater risk awareness, and increased ability to set priorities for mitigation actions. 
Indeed, failure to consider the full hazard environment can lead to maladaptation (GFDRR 2014). 
Indeed, many governments recognise the importance of a multi-hazard risk approach. For example, 
the US government highlights this through Presidential Directive 21 (White House 2013) which states 
that critical infrastructure “must be secure and able to withstand and rapidly recover from all hazards” 
(Barker and Ramirez-Marquez 2016). Combining community observations and knowledge with 
scientific expertise can assist the development of multi-hazard risk assessments. Successful critical 
infrastructure resilience activities should focus on the ability to continue providing goods and services, 
even in uncertain and multi-hazard environments (Vugrin 2016). Considering the needs of 
infrastructure users and overall impacts and consequences to the system is therefore paramount. 
 
Although an important component of risk assessments, vulnerability data related to some hazards 
remains scarce, particularly for volcanic hazards. This is in part due to often infrequent occurrence of 
volcanic eruptions and associated impacts in the past (Wilson et al. 2012), particularly in the 
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developed world, and also the labour- and resource-intensive nature of data collection, which often 
focuses on vulnerability types specific to a certain country or region (Jenkins et al. 2014a). 
Furthermore, the multiple hazards that occur during most eruptions and multi-faceted nature of 
individual volcanic hazards themselves (Stewart et al. 2016) (e.g. different volcanic ash 
characteristics and dynamic pressure variations within PDCs), mean that the overall vulnerability can 
be difficult to decipher. As such, most vulnerability assessments are often simplified, focusing on one 
hazard in particular and physical damage from that hazard, sometimes dismissing functional loss 
considerations altogether. However, with an increasing focus on DRR globally, and following recent 
high-profile eruptions, such as the Eyjafjallajökull (2010) eruption in Iceland, and their impacts, 
attitudes to vulnerability assessment are changing. The somewhat challenging components of 
vulnerability form major themes of this thesis. There is a strong focus on volcanic ash, including 
considering the vulnerability resulting from different ash characteristics, but a broader multi-volcanic 
hazard approach is undertaken in the form of a scenario to demonstrate new findings. 
 
1.3 Resilience of Critical Infrastructure during Disasters 
Critical infrastructure is of particular relevance to DRR; it is of such vital importance in both a societal 
and economic context that its failure or degradation can result in sustained supply shortages, 
significant disruption of public safety and security, and/or other dramatic consequences (BBK 2016, 
UN-EHS 2016). However, some infrastructure and services are extremely fragile in the face of 
unanticipated shocks (Hughes and Healy 2014), and can themselves become a driver of risk (Bach et 
al. 2013, Kadri et al. 2014, UN-EHS 2016). Internationally, there is thus a growing demand to improve 
the resilience of critical infrastructure. For example, in the USA following the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks in New York and devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, resilience 
emerged as a complimentary goal to the previous prevention-focused activities (Vugrin 2016). In New 
Zealand, the 2010-11 Canterbury earthquake sequence caused extensive critical infrastructure 
damage and disruption in Christchurch; liquefaction and ground deformation severely affected power, 
water, wastewater, and transportation networks (CCC 2011, Giovinazzi et al. 2011, Seville et al. 
2014). The core vision of the most recent New Zealand Treasury National Infrastructure Plan is that 
“by 2045 New Zealand’s infrastructure is resilient and coordinated and contributes to a strong 
economy and high living standards” (NIU 2015). As Godschalk (2002) suggest, there are two key 
reasons behind the importance of resilient critical infrastructure: 
1. The vulnerability of technological, natural and social systems cannot always be predicted. 
Therefore, the ability to accommodate change without catastrophic failure in times of disaster 
is critical. 
2. People and infrastructure fare better in resilient cities when struck by disasters – fewer 
buildings collapse, fewer power outages occur, fewer businesses are put at risk, and fewer 
deaths and injuries occur (Godschalk 2002). 
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During disasters, critical infrastructure is often in high demand and existing resources may be 
disrupted. For example, in the 1994 Northridge earthquake in Los Angeles, Gordon et al. (1998) 
estimated that around 25% of business interruption losses could be attributed to the failure of highway 
bridges (Chang et al. 2014). Hence, a system’s ability to perform without immediate maintenance or 
repair would be a desirable resilient feature (Vugrin 2016). However, in assessing resilience, it is 
necessary to define the critical function/s of a system, and stakeholders play a key role in this process 
(Linkov et al. 2016). Vulnerabilities and resilience to disasters must be characterised to allow the 
prioritisation of mitigation efforts to improve resilience (Burby et al. 1999, Mileti 1999, Chang et al. 
2014). There have been various suggestions for the most appropriate way to measure critical 
infrastructure resilience (Ayyub 2014) including: 
 Developing metrics which describe expected degradation in the quality of the infrastructure by 
quantifying robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and time to recovery (Bruneau and 
Reinhorn 2007). 
 Calculating the percentage of infrastructure network links and nodes damaged versus the 
network performance (Garbin and Shortle 2007). 
 Assessing the functionality of an infrastructure system after an external shock including the 
time it takes to return to its initial level of performance (i.e. expected recovery time) (Tierney 
and Bruneau 2007). 
For the purpose of this thesis, measuring resilience particularly utilises the last approach, with a 
strong focus on critical infrastructure functionality, particularly in relation to end-user needs. 
Additionally however, an understanding of impact thresholds is required to forecast whether a system 
is able to absorb a shock, and to provide knowledge on alternative functional regimes following 
disruption (Linkov et al. 2016). Although such thresholds have previously been determined for 
infrastructural components when they encounter select natural hazards (e.g. bridge failure from 
seismic shaking; power line damage from high winds), they remain unexplored for other hazards such 
as volcanic ashfall. The work in this thesis strives to determine thresholds that characterise the 
impacts on surface transportation functionality during volcanic hazards, particularly ashfall – a 
previously under-researched topic. In order to achieve this, the key vulnerable components of surface 
transportation networks must first be derived to allow detailed quantitative studies to be conducted in 
the relevant areas. Such work will improve the resilience of surface transportation (and indeed other 
critical infrastructure through interdependent properties) by enabling more suitable and targeted risk 
management practices to deal with volcanic eruptions – it is also likely that this will improve resilience 
in the face of other shocks. 
 
1.4 Volcanic Eruptions  
Volcanoes are commonly associated with catastrophe and devastation (Scarth 1994). However, the 
effects of volcanic eruptions on society are not always as explicit – a result of the multiple and 
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distinctive but complex hazards associated with such phenomena. Hazards include those that 
generally occur in areas close to the vent, such as lava flows and pyroclastic density currents (PDCs), 
through to widespread tephra fall (Magill and Blong 2005) (Figure 1.2), which can disperse hundreds 
to thousands of kilometres from the source (Wilson et al. 2012). A range of secondary hazards such 
as earthquakes, tsunami, lahars, fire and drought can also be triggered by an eruption, or at least 
associated with increased volcanic unrest. Proximal volcanic hazards generally cause relatively 
severe and direct damage. Volcanic ash however (i.e. tephra particles with a diameter <2 mm), 
although not necessarily as damaging, can lead to widespread and complex disruption through 
interactions with infrastructure components (Blong 1984, Johnston 1997, Wilson et al. 2012, Wilson et 
al. 2014). Ash can originate from different eruption styles; it can be produced by explosive activity in 
eruption columns and PDCs, as well as by effusive eruptions in lofting plumes associated with dome 
collapse or basaltic fire-fountaining (Figure 1.2) (Lindsay and Peace 2005). Volcanic ash can also 
lead to major concerns for human and agricultural health (Horwell and Baxter 2006, Stewart et al. 
2013), as well as accidents and injuries in ash-laden environments (e.g. ICAO 2007, Jenkins et al. 
2013, Tamaki and Tatano 2014). The widespread and wide-ranging effects of ash on utilities, 
infrastructure, and health were observed during the infamous Mount St. Helens (1980) eruption, with 
many impacts to transportation networks in particular (Blong 1984). 
 
 
Figure 1.2   Potential volcanic hazards that can damage or harm assets and people (adapted from USGS 
2010). 
 
During the last 500 years over 250,000 people have been killed either directly by eruptions or by 
some of the indirect hazards they produce (Alexander 2002, Auker et al. 2013, Loughlin et al. 2015). 
In terms of loss-of-life, one of the worst examples of a volcanic disaster in the last 200 years occurred 
in 1902 when the town of St Pierre on the Island of Martinique, Caribbean, was hit by PDCs from 
Mount Pelée. The eruption killed 28,000 people, including all but two of the town’s inhabitants 
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(Boudon and Gourgaud 1989, Alexander 2002). Many cities around the world are vulnerable to the 
potentially devastating effects of volcanic hazards (e.g. Auckland City, New Zealand; Mexico City, 
Mexico; Naples, Italy; Yogyakarta, Indonesia; Kagoshima, Japan) due to their close proximity to active 
volcanoes (Figure 1.3). The cities are often particularly vulnerable to the effects of ashfall, which can 
disperse tens to hundreds of kilometres from vents. An increasing number of people inhabit such 
areas as the world’s population grows (Woo 2009) and urbanisation continues (UN 2014). 
Development associated with such growth, and technological advances in recent years, has led to the 
increasing exposure of complex critical infrastructure networks such as transportation. The Global 
Volcano Model (GVM) Network estimate that 800 million people in 86 countries currently live within 
100 km of a volcano that could potentially erupt (Loughlin et al. 2015). The infrastructure networks 
associated with such populations are understandably extensive. Furthermore, volcanic ashfall is 
associated with increasingly large economic impacts (Loughlin et al. 2015). Such substantial 
economic effects were demonstrated by the relatively modest eruption of Eyjafjallajökull, Iceland, in 
2010 which caused serious disruption to air traffic across Europe and resulted in cumulative global 
economic losses of around US$5 billion (Ragona et al. 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1.3   Volcanically active areas (red) and cities with more than 750,000 people (black) worldwide. 
[City data sourced from the UN population division (UN 2007) via Nordpil (2010). Volcano data sourced from 
Cccarto (2016)]. 
 
In recent years, there has been an increasing number of studies on the impacts of volcanic hazards 
on society, including those which focus on the effects of tephra fall, particularly ash, which can cause 
especially complex interactions with the built environment (e.g. Blong 1984, Wilson et al. 2009, 
Barnard et al. 2009, Wardman et al. 2012a, Weber et al. 2013, Wilson et al. 2012, Wilson et al. 2014, 
Hampton et al. 2015, Zorn and Walter 2016). Many of these ash-focused studies have demonstrated 
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that although ashfall rarely endangers human life directly, threats to public health and disruption to 
critical infrastructure can lead to significant societal impacts (Wilson et al. 2012). The properties of 
volcanic ash and environmental conditions at the time of, and following, ashfall will determine whether 
there are significant impacts (Wilson et al. 2011). Even relatively small eruptions can cause 
widespread disruption, damage and economic loss. For example, the 1995/96 eruptions of Ruapehu 
volcano in New Zealand were relatively small (VEI 3) but still covered over 20,000 km2 of agricultural 
land with volcanic ash and caused significant disruption and damage to critical infrastructure (Cronin 
et al. 1998, Johnston et al. 2000). Thick tephra deposits are often constrained to proximal vent areas 
because coarse-grained material quickly settles out of the atmosphere under the force of gravity. 
Conversely, thin deposits often cover wide swathes of land because fine-grained ash disperses 
further, and this is thus the most likely volcanic hazard to affect critical infrastructure networks. 
However, previous studies have often focussed on very large eruptions and impacts associated with 
ash falls >10 mm thick, rarely reporting on the effects from ashfall <2 mm thick (Wilson et al. 2012). 
This presents a source of uncertainty for emergency management planning and risk assessments 
(Wilson et al. 2012). Furthermore, the relatively fresh state of volcanic impact research means that, 
while some topics have seen considerable advancements in knowledge (e.g. impacts of ash on 
electricity distribution networks and roof structure loading), others remain relatively understudied with 
opportunities for improved knowledge that will inform DRR. This includes the impacts of ash on 
surface transportation networks, particularly in relation to functionality, on which this thesis is based. 
 Contemporary volcanic risk assessment 
In this subsection, the core components for assessing risk, as outlined in the conceptual framework 
(Figure 1.1), are covered in detail in relation to volcanic eruptions. 
Determining the characteristics of volcanic hazards (including the probability of occurrence, degree of 
warning, and extent, duration and intensity of impacts; Bouchon 2006) has traditionally been the 
dominant focus of risk assessments in the past. However, volcanic risk assessments that also fully 
consider the exposure of assets and populations, as well as their vulnerability in the face of all 
hazards (not just those that cause severe damage or complete destruction), are important to fulfil 
stakeholder needs. Such contemporary risk assessments more appropriately account for critical 
infrastructure end-users than traditional approaches, and are more compatible with the goal of 
increasing resilience through striving for optimum system functionality. Probabilistic assessments best 
incorporate uncertainty, both in terms of the physical processes and the current state of scientific 
knowledge, and there is a growing expectation to incorporate probabilistic approaches when 
assessing volcanic risk (Woo 2009, Magill et al. 2006, Hurst and Smith 2010, Jenkins et al. 2012). 
However, it is impossible to eliminate uncertainty altogether in models and is thus essential for 
uncertainties to be conceptually integrated into the framework of volcanic risk assessments and 
consequently into estimates of damage and functional loss (GFDRR 2014). 
A variety of data sources is ideal for compiling contemporary volcanic risk assessments, and, in most 
cases, a combination of quantitative and qualitative data types is optimal. The most fundamental is 
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post-eruption empirical data that defines historical events (e.g. Baxter et al. 2005, Jenkins et al. 
2014a), in particular the date, geographical location and extent, and maximum intensity (GFDRR 
2014, GFDRR 2016a). Such data may be applied in a deterministic or probabilistic sense, either 
assessing the impact of past events given current exposure, or estimating the probability of a hazard 
occurring at a given site with a specific intensity. Sometimes, the lack of observational data (due to 
inaccessibility and relatively low frequency of volcanic hazards impacting urban areas), means that a 
combination of theoretical and other empirical knowledge is required to inform the components of risk 
assessments (e.g. Petrazzuoli and Zuccaro 2004, Jenkins et al. 2014a). Such data can be derived 
from laboratory experimentation (e.g. Zuccaro and Gregorio 2013) or expert judgment (e.g. Chang et 
al. 2014), and both of these data types strongly inform the work in this thesis. 
The information used to develop exposure datasets can be derived at various resolutions, depending 
on the risk that is being considered: 
 Local – councils and local governments, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 
household surveys, aerial photos. 
 Regional – state-based agencies, NGOs, statistical offices, census data, GIS data. 
 National – statistical agencies, census data, global databases, NGOs, remote sensing 
(GFDRR 2014, GFDRR 2016a). 
Exposure to volcanic hazards is commonly dynamic and characteristics change over time; they may 
change slowly as a result of development (Alexander 2000) but may also change very quickly due to 
a sudden disaster (Bouchon 2006). It is also important to consider population and demography 
characteristics due to the potential temporal variation in exposure. For example, the population and 
movement of people and goods within cities are often very different in the day compared to at night 
(Tomsen et al. 2014), and substantial variations in impacts from adverse events can occur as a result. 
Vulnerability information is typically described in terms of damage and/or loss, assessed using 
functions that relate to hazard intensity. In the past, vulnerability analyses for volcanic eruptions have 
sometimes simply discounted distal areas and assumed high impact to any people residing within 
proximal areas to vents, whether rich or poor, landowner or landless farm labourer, man or woman, 
young or old (Blaikie et al. 2000). However, beyond areas of any total destruction, vulnerability forms 
a crucial factor in determining risk. Vulnerability assessment varies greatly depending upon the type 
of exposure being considered (e.g. people, infrastructure), the resolution of exposure (e.g. local, 
regional, national), and the information available. Vulnerability data is usually derived in three ways: 
empirically (from post-eruption observations and experimental studies), analytically, and/or using 
expert judgment (GFDRR 2016a). However, opportunities are often missed in the collection of 
damage and functional loss data following volcanic eruptions – information that is critical to assessing 
vulnerability (GFDRR 2014). Furthermore, as with exposure, vulnerability is dynamic and evolves over 
time. A good example worldwide is the general shift of populations towards cities (GFDRR 2016a); by 
2050, 66% of the world’s population is expected to reside in cities, an increase of around 12% from 
2014 (UN 2014). Many cities have evolved in locations with favourable economic conditions such as 
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near coasts and fertile volcanic soils, but these often correlate with hazard-prone areas (Bilham 
2009). An awareness of current vulnerability through continued data collection is thus essential to 
allow risk assessments that relate to such dynamic changes in environments. This in turn supports 
policies that promote resilient societies in urban settings (GFDRR 2014, GFDRR 2016b). 
 Application of volcanic risk information  
Risk information can be used by a variety of stakeholders to inform preparedness and mitigation 
activities. It may help facilitate effective communication between stakeholders during times of crisis, 
which enables the implementation of successful response and recovery strategies (Jolly and Cronin 
2014, Stewart et al. 2016).  
Preparedness and mitigation activities include the implementation of warning systems, installation of 
protective shelters, evacuation planning, emergency response strategies and training exercises, and 
land-use planning (Fitzgerald et al. 2016). Many activities can be conducted well in advance of 
volcanic eruptions, during times of heightened volcanic activity, or indeed during and following an 
eruption itself. Such processes may also act as sources of risk information to many people (e.g. 
through the transfer of advice in publically available evacuation and emergency management plans 
and signage). Hazard/risk maps are another source of risk information, displaying spatial extents of 
volcanic hazard, exposure, vulnerability and risk through geological evidence and/or modelling 
(Sparks et al. 2013, Fitzgerald et al. 2016). Such maps are often one of the most widely accessed 
resources for warnings and emergency response (Leonard et al. 2014).  
Scenario development based on previous or analogous eruptions is a common risk management 
activity. Although scenarios may not capture all possible future events with the risk information 
available (Wilson 2015), they present an opportunity to study the effects of multiple volcanic hazards 
on critical infrastructure networks and cascading effects for society, particularly when they integrate 
both spatial and temporal components of risk. Once a range of possible scenarios is established, 
stochastic models can be developed to find a sub-set of permutations and combinations of possible 
effects (Zuccaro et al. 2008).  
 
1.5 Transportation Networks and Impacts from Volcanic Hazards 
Transportation systems comprise physical man-made infrastructure in geographic and socio-
economic contexts, which interact with the surrounding social, economic, financial, political, 
manufactured, and ecological environment. They have evolved over time into a patchwork of physical 
networks consisting of varied links and modes (World Bank 2015). Functional transportation networks 
are critical for society, both in normal operating conditions and emergencies. They enable commerce, 
and the movement of people and goods. Strong links between road, rail, shipping and aviation are 
often vital for moving people and freight around and between nations (NIU 2015). In urban 
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environments in particular, enhancing the resilience of transportation networks is imperative for two 
primary reasons: 
1. They provide critical support to every socio-economic activity and are themselves one of the 
most important economic sectors. 
2. The paths that convey people and services are the same paths through which risks are 
propagated (Bellini et al. 2016). 
During adverse conditions, the ability of transportation networks to function, and then quickly recover 
to acceptable levels-of-service is therefore imperative to the wellbeing of communities (Hughes and 
Healy 2014). 
Transportation that occurs on the surface of Earth (henceforth named surface transportation) is the 
primary focus of this thesis – that is road, rail and maritime transportation, as well as ground 
transportation at airports. Transportation by airborne aircraft is highlighted in places within but not 
investigated in detail; the reader is referred to other sources for further information on this subject, 
including Ajtai et al. (2010), Gislason (2011), Dunn (2012) and Harris (2014). Generic impact models 
for surface transportation group impacts by their principal effect along with some of their causal 
relationships. In general, surface transportation impacts can:  
 compromise the quality of the surface 
 block or damage infrastructure  
 compromise end-user visibility  
 compromise mobility, and / or  
 create a temporary obstacle (Cover and Conger 2003). 
However, transportation vulnerability is not uniform across people, vehicles, traffic flow, infrastructure 
or the environment. Vulnerability  is a complex combination of end-user vulnerability, the potential for 
an incident to decrease the serviceability of the transportation system, and overall network reliability.  
Use of surface transportation routes and facilities contaminated by pyroclastic material including ash 
may be required a) if evacuations are necessary, b) if an eruption continues for a prolonged period of 
time, c) to allow re-entry, and d) to allow immediate and long-term recovery of the impacted area. This 
can result in potentially large populations being exposed to volcanic hazards, especially in urban 
locations. Historical eruptions, including recent activity at Etna, Italy (2013); Sakurajima, Japan 
(2013); Kelud, Indonesia (2014); Culbuco, Chile (2015), and Sinabung, Indonesia (2014-16), have 
demonstrated that there are several issues associated with volcanic hazards and surface 
transportation (Figure 1.4).  
The resilience of transportation networks to volcanic ashfall is poorly understood; there is limited 
knowledge of thresholds for when functional loss occurs. Furthermore, although transportation 
functionality investigations and modelling have been conducted for other natural hazards (e.g. 
earthquakes, dust storms, fog), volcanic hazards have many unique properties, which can result in 
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substantially different impacts. For example, PDCs exhibit varying dynamic pressures (Jenkins et al. 
2014a), and volcanic ash, unlike mineral dust from most wind-blown soils, often has particularly 
abrasive properties (Langmann 2013). Therefore, a thorough understanding of all components for 
volcanic risk management (including the spatio-temporal hazard, vulnerability, capacity and exposure 
characteristics associated with critical infrastructure functionality loss) is urgently required for DRR 
policies and practices associated with transportation to be successful, and for achieving more resilient 
transportation networks (UNISDR 2015).  
Moteff et al. (2003) show that not all components of transportation networks are equally critical. They 
highlight that, although congestion on surface transportation routes is common in urban areas, 
redundancy in networks means that there are usually alternative transportation routes or facilities 
available. There are few instances where this is not the case and these are perhaps the true “critical” 
pieces of transportation infrastructure (Moteff et al. 2003). Such critical infrastructure locations are 
often termed pinchpoints (Opus 2007, AELG 2014, NIU 2014, NIU 2015) to indicate converging 
networks and particularly heightened utility service disruption. However, surface transportation 
vulnerability is often not consistent over time; networks may be extended or upgraded with improved 
connections, and new components such as electric or autonomous vehicles may be introduced, 
sometimes over relatively short timeframes. Subsequent cascading effects for transportation may 
include intelligent transportation system improvements from big data collection on travel patterns, and 
different accident rates across the network leading to variations in the number of casualties and 
fatalities (NIU 2015, UN-EHS 2016). Static transportation infrastructure may also change in response 
to such new components. For example, road markings may be better maintained, and different traffic 
signals may be installed so that they can be seen by autonomous vehicle sensors. A consideration of 
resilience, which considers potential dynamic spatio-temporal shifts in functionality, is thus important 
for volcanic risk assessments on surface transportation, and investigations must clearly specify the 
state of transportation networks under consideration. 
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Figure 1.4   Examples of known volcanic hazard impacts to surface transportation (information from: Warwick 1981, Blong 1984, Johnston 1997, Nakada 1999, Durand 
et al. 2001, Nairn 2002, Barnard 2004, Cole and Blumenthal 2004, Cole et al. 2005, Horwell and Baxter 2006, Leonard et al. 2006, Wilson et al. 2007, Barnard 2009, Wilson et 
al. 2011, Barsotti et al. 2010, Sword-Daniels et al. 2011, Wardman et al. 2012b, Magill et al. 2013, Wilson et al. 2012, Wilson et al. 2013, Wilson et al. 2014). Health hazards 
are included because of the effects on transportation personnel.
Chapter 1 – Introduction and background 
 
 15 
In the following subsections, the key volcanic impacts to each surface transportation mode considered 
in this thesis (i.e. roads, rail, and transportation at airports and at sea) are highlighted, largely drawing 
from post-eruption observations.   
 Volcanic hazards and roads 
Impacts to road transportation from volcanic hazards are relatively common around the world. 
Proximal hazards such as lahars, lava flows and pyroclastic density currents often cause severe 
damage or closure (Blong 1984, Johnston 1997, Nairn 2002, Wilson et al. 2014). However, the impact 
of volcanic ash on roads is frequently disruptive and widespread (Blong 1984, Barnard 2009, Wilson et 
al. 2014). Most records of volcanic tephra impacts to road transportation occur post-1980, probably a 
result of the high profile impacts from the 1980 Mount St Helens eruption triggering further 
observations and studies, but also in part likely attributable to growing worldwide populations and 
associated increased exposure to volcanic hazards. The majority of tephra effects are associated with 
widespread distal deposits, which usually comprise relatively thin (mm-cm) layers of low-density 
(pumiceous) silicic ash (Nairn 2002). Vehicle drivers can be affected by reduced visibility during 
volcanic ashfall; occasionally, “near-total darkness” is reported (e.g. Blong 1982, Wilson et al. 2012), 
although there have been no investigations to date to quantify the impacts of airborne ash on visual 
range. Indirect visibility effects may also occur from damage to vehicle windscreens. Ash caught 
between windscreens and wiper blades will scratch and permanently mark the windscreen glass when 
the wipers are used (e.g. Johnston and Neall 1995, Johnston 1997, Leonard et al. 2006) and vehicles 
may experience cracking of windscreens from the impact of lapilli and blocks ejected from the vent 
(e.g. Magill et al. 2013).  
Ash deposits can cover road markings and reportedly reduce skid resistance, reducing braking ability 
and handling, and increasing stopping distances and accident rates (Barnard 2009, Wilson et al. 
2012). Despite these potentially severe consequences for road transportation functionality, there have 
been no detailed studies that attempt to quantify the ash characteristics responsible for such impacts. 
As such, risk assessments may take a very precautionary approach at present, and road closures may 
be enforced in the absence of specific vulnerability information. For example, state highways were 
closed multiple times following light ashfall during the Ruapehu 1995-96 eruption, New Zealand, partly 
due to concerns of slippery surfaces (Johnston 1997). Closure effectively results in no service and 
severe consequences for end-users, even through routes may be traversable if they were open. 
Further studies are clearly required to improve our knowledge of road transportation functionality in 
ashfall and to minimise functionality loss, but must simultaneously account for variations in accident 
rate and life-safety considerations.  
If ash accumulates to sufficient thicknesses, roads can become physically impassable. For example, 
during the Rabaul eruption in 1994, up to 1 meter of ash fall caused some roads to be impassable, 
even for four-wheel drive vehicles (Stammers 2000). Road vehicles themselves are also vulnerable to 
volcanic ash. Ash can clog filters and brake systems, thicken oil and abrade moving parts and seals 
within engines. However, severe mechanical impacts to vehicles can often be prevented through the 
frequent changing or cleaning of filters and other affected components. 
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Unconsolidated dry ash is readily remobilised by wind and fluvial processes, vehicle movement or 
other human activities, affecting areas further from the source than the original deposits, even after the 
eruption itself has ceased. This often makes clean-up of ash from roads logistically challenging and 
costly (Wilson et al. 2012, Hayes et al. 2015), with particular problems arising in on-going eruptions 
and substantial remobilisation events. Improved knowledge of thresholds for when clean-up is 
required, in order to maintain surface transportation functionality but minimise unnecessary clean-up 
efforts and expenses, would be highly beneficial to emergency and transportation management 
authorities. 
 Volcanic hazards and rail 
There have been several reports of impacts to rail as a result of proximal volcanic hazards, particularly 
lahars and lava flows, such as the Tangiwai 1953 rail disaster (Ruapehu, New Zealand, 1945), and 
blockage of the Circumvesuvian Railway (Vesuvius, Italy, 1906 and 1944; Blong 1984). Rail track 
displacement by ground deformation has also occurred (e.g. Usu, Japan, 1944, and Kīlauea, U.S.A, 
1968; Blong 1984). In contrast to roads however, there have been few recorded ash impacts to rail 
during historical eruptions, likely in part due to the less extensive (or absence of) rail networks in 
volcanically active areas. Despite few records, the impacts of ash on signaling and potential train-to-
track communication disruption for electric rail may be particularly problematic. For example, following 
the 2011 Shinmoedake eruption at the Kirishima volcanic complex in Japan, trace quantities of both 
wet and dry ash led to the mechanical failure of switches due to loss of electrical contact between 
trains and track, stopping services on the network (Magill et al. 2013). As such, electric rail 
infrastructure appears vulnerable to volcanic ash, and any impact to electricity networks could also 
have cascading effects on rail systems in the absence of alternative diesel-powered fleet or back-up 
power supplies. Like roads, for tephra impact to rail, there appear to be minimal pre-1980 records. In 
fact, only one was identified in a literature search – that of derailment following the eruption of La 
Soufrière, Saint Vincent in 1902 (Blong 1984). However, the derailment was on a tram network, and 
these typically have different construction and operating features to conventional rail. 
 Volcanic hazards and airports 
Volcanic ash is extremely hazardous to aircraft, particularly those with jet engines, due to potential for 
engine failure and/or damage (ICAO 2012, Prata and Rose 2015). Since 1953, there have been ~100 
confirmed encounters with volcanic ash by in-flight aircraft, at least 80 of which incurred airframe or 
engine damage (e.g. Guffanti et al. 2009). The International Civil Aviation Authority advises that 
aircraft should avoid volcanic ash encounters altogether (ICAO 2012).  
On the ground, which is the primary focus of this thesis for aviation, airports have been directly and 
indirectly impacted by volcanic hazards (Guffanti et al. 2009). The mere threat of an eruption can 
impact airport operations; aircraft may be redistributed and physical modifications at the airport may 
be undertaken. For example, before the 1979 Karkar and 1983 Tavurvur eruptions in Papua New 
Guinea, nearby airport runways were extended due to potential evacuation requirements (Blong 
1984). The 1979 Karkar impact was the only pre-1980 tephra-related impact to airports identified 
through literature analysis. As with other transportation modes, proximal hazards often cause severe 
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damage to airports. For example, the abandonment of airports has occurred following ground 
displacement near Iwo-jima, Japan, 1957 (Corwin and Foster 1959, Guffanti et al. 2009), and 
pyroclastic density currents from Soufrière Hills, Caribbean, 1997 (Guffanti et al. 2009). Lava flows 
shortened the runway of an airport near Nyiragongo, Democratic Republic of Congo, 2002 (Guffanti et 
al. 2009). Even if airports are not abandoned, it is likely that no, or minimal, operations (i.e. no level-of-
service) will occur given proximal impacts until the immediate threat has diminished and material is 
cleared from airfield surfaces.  
Direct tephra impacts from ash span from ~1 mm thick ash, which must be removed from airport 
surfaces to avoid reduced runway friction and visibility impairment (ICAO 2001), to ash accumulations 
up to several meters thick, which can result in the abandonment or relocation of airports (Blong 1984). 
However, the ~1 mm threshold is often used quite loosely in aviation policy and, like for roads, there 
appears to be little information regarding the degree of functional loss (e.g. thresholds for reduced skid 
resistance or road marking coverage) should airfields remain operational when thicknesses are <1 
mm; additional empirical data could help to fill these gaps in knowledge. Indirect impacts are usually 
temporary airport closure due to closed airspace over the airport, sometimes with no ash accumulation 
on the ground itself (Guffanti et al. 2009), as occurred at many north western European airports during 
the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption, Iceland and associated ash plumes (Bolic and Sivcev 2011, Weber 
et al. 2012). 
 Volcanic hazards and maritime transportation 
There have been several recorded impacts to maritime transportation, particularly from highly 
explosive eruptions since the 17th century. These impacts have predominantly consisted of pumice 
rafts following explosive eruptions causing obstruction to navigation (e.g. Sakurajima, Japan, 1779; 
Blong 1984, Tambora, Indonesia, 1815; Oppenheimer 2003, Chaitén, Chile, 2008; Wilson et al. 2012). 
There have also been some cases of tephra sedimentation in channels reducing navigability (Mount St 
Helens, U.S.A, 1980; Blong 1984, Hudson, Chile, 1991; Wilson et al. 2011), and extensive 
accumulation of tephra on ships, which required removal to avoid excessive loading (e.g. Krakatau, 
Indonesia, 1883, and Vesuvius, Italy, 1944; Blong 1984). If ports themselves are severely impacted, 
they will not be able to fulfil their primary role of sending and receiving goods, and are effectively 
closed. 
 Interdependencies 
Transportation networks are arguably the most important type of critical infrastructure in emergencies 
because of their vital role in the provision of access for restoration of all other infrastructure (Cova and 
Conger 2003). Emergency managers must route personnel to an accident site, restore services, 
relocate threatened populations, and provide relief, all of which rely on transportation. Transportation 
in emergencies is of high importance for such reasons. However, it should be noted that transportation 
also depends on other infrastructure for its optimum functionality, and is thus more than a simple 
aggregation of its individual components. Typically as large sets of components are brought together 
and interact with one another, synergies emerge. They exhibit interdependent properties and can be 
seen as systems of interacting agents (Bouchon 2006). An understanding of how each infrastructure 
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type is connected with others is therefore critical for fully addressing problems (Sword-Daniels et al. 
2015). Indeed, many complex interdependencies between modern infrastructure networks exist, with 
multiple failure modes, all of which can affect infrastructure functionality (Hughes and Healy 2014). 
Complex, interconnected systems create benefits and efficiencies during times of normal operation, 
yet can bring vulnerabilities and operational challenges, especially when natural hazards are 
encountered (Hughes and Healy 2014). Therefore, in addition to being ‘at risk’, each critical 
infrastructure contributes a degree of risk itself, since its partial or complete disruption constitutes a 
potential impact for other infrastructure and society (Bouchon 2006). For example, the banking and 
finance industry may be severely impacted by transportation disruption as the ability of staff to travel to 
their place of work is reduced.  Systemic risks such as these may spread further from the original 
hazard source (IRGC 2006), and widely affect different infrastructure and systems that society 
depends on. Many relationships are bidirectional in nature. For example, the electricity network may 
rely on transportation for the supply of fuel for generators, but transportation may rely on continuous 
electricity for traffic signals to function (Rinaldi et al. 2001). 
 
1.6 Transportation Vulnerability to Volcanic Hazards: Requirements  
For transportation, as with all critical infrastructure, operators strive to ensure that assets and services 
are resilient in that they function continually and safely in the face of a range of existing and emerging 
hazards (Hughes and Healy 2014). Vulnerability assessments are key for volcanic risk modelling for 
transportation as they provide descriptions of impacts to individual components or the broader network 
for different hazard intensities. They differ from vulnerability assessments conducted for conventional 
buildings and structures in that transportation networks consist of spatially distributed components 
which are physically and functionally connected (Stergiou and Kiremidjian 2010). The following 
subsections outline some of the key considerations required for the assessment of surface 
transportation vulnerability to volcanic hazards. 
 Multi-hazard 
For volcanic activity, challenges for vulnerability assessments may arise due to the multi-hazard 
component. Some areas of the network may experience multiple impacts of different intensities and 
with various hazard and infrastructure characteristics responsible for damage or disruption. For 
example, dynamic pressures from PDCs may cause damage to bridge structures, with further damage 
possible from loading by thick tephra or ballistic impact. However, few studies have been conducted to 
assess the vulnerability of surface transportation networks to volcanic ashfall, let alone to consider the 
effect of multiple hazards, which is important for DRR strategies (UNISDR 2015).  
 Functionality  
The impact on surface transportation functionality during eruption crises has not been well constrained 
by existing vulnerability models, particularly in distal areas affected by ashfall. For example, it is often 
unknown how much transportation end-users will be affected by slippery roads or impaired visibility 
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following ashfall. Few impact thresholds exist to inform emergency and transportation management 
decisions during such conditions or indeed planning activities beforehand. In contrast, operational 
decisions in areas affected by proximal volcanic hazards are often relatively straightforward. For 
example, emergency management officials may simply make the call to completely close routes due 
to life-safety implications. A better understanding of surface transportation functionality in areas 
affected by volcanic ashfall is required for future vulnerability assessments and to inform operational 
decisions. 
 Fragility function development 
Sometimes, simple vulnerability assessments in the form of qualitative descriptions of infrastructure 
vulnerability based on hazard intensity thresholds, or indeed the mere existence of a hazard (Wilson 
2015), are sufficient for certain applications. However, fragility functions are presently the crux of more 
complex vulnerability assessments – they are probabilistic vulnerability models that describe the 
chances of damage or functional states being reached or exceeded for given hazard intensities 
(Singhal and Kiremidjian 1996, Choi et al. 2004, Rossetto et al. 2013, Tarbotton et al. 2015). Fragility 
functions thus allow the quantification of risk and provide a basis for improving mitigation strategies 
and strengthening resilience in many applications (Jenkins et al. 2014b, Wilson et al. 2014). They may 
relate to relatively local conditions and specific characteristics, but such detail must be recognised and 
highlighted for the appropriate determination of measures to reduce disaster risk (UNISDR 2015). 
Recent studies, including those by Wilson (2015) have made considerable progress at developing a 
framework for volcanic fragility functions for critical infrastructure including surface transportation 
networks. However, due to the somewhat coarse approach taken (necessary in order to cover the vast 
number of infrastructure types considered), previous research has generally focused on physical 
damage. Some aspects of infrastructure functionality have also been developed but many 
opportunities remain to progress this work further, and this forms one of the key goals of this thesis.    
 Vulnerability data: post-eruption impact assessment and experimental 
approaches 
In the context of surface transportation impacts, there have been many observations (including 
anecdotal, qualitative and semi-quantitative) following previous eruptions, particularly through critical 
infrastructure impact assessment studies which have involved specialists travelling to specific 
locations (e.g. Tungurahua, Ecuador, 1999-2010 – Sword-Daniels et al. 2011; Merapi, Indonesia, 
2006 – Wilson et al. 2007; Pacaya, Guatemala, 2010 – Wardman et al. 2012b; Shinmoedake, Japan, 
2011 – Magill et al. 2013). In addition to direct field observations, data is frequently collected through 
interviews with staff at emergency management and critical infrastructure authorities during such 
studies – hence, involving a degree of expert judgment and inherent limitations associated with data 
derived from interviews (Opdenakker 2006). Such field studies and interviews have allowed the 
extensive development of impact data in a variety of worldwide locations over the past 20 years or so. 
Opportunities to obtain data from new impact assessment trips should certainly not be overlooked as 
new impacts may be discovered and larger qualitative datasets can complement and support 
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quantitative data that is used to inform risk assessments. Chapter 2 summarises the findings from new 
field studies and interviews conducted near Kelud volcano, Indonesia. 
Data from field studies and interviews is mostly in qualitative form and there have been few targeted 
experimental studies to investigate such impacts quantitatively and systematically in detail. 
Conducting detailed quantitative studies using high specification equipment is a logical next step in 
advancing vulnerability assessments for surface transportation affected by volcanic ashfall. Such 
studies could occur during and after eruptions, but there are many difficulties associated with 
conducting work in the field, including equipment set-up requirements/practicalities and life-safety 
considerations. Undertaking experimental studies in controlled laboratory environments solves many 
of these difficulties and is possible during times of volcanic quiescence. Experimental studies have 
proved successful in other natural hazard disciplines including earthquake engineering (e.g. Mehrabi 
et al. 1996, Sims 1999, Ricles et al. 2002) and flood risk management (e.g. De Sutter et al. 2001, 
Jackson et al. 2008), as well as for other critical infrastructure types affected by volcanic ash (e.g. jet 
engines – Drexler et al. 2011; electricity - Wardman et al. 2012a; roof loading – Hampton et al. 2015). 
Data from such studies for surface transportation would inform fragility functions, and thus vulnerability 
assessments, through the consideration of specific infrastructure features at different hazard 
intensities and in different locations. Additionally, a more extensive and reliable quantitative data set 
for transportation impacts allows for advanced numerical modelling, and existing models can also be 
verified using experimental data (Maqsood et al. 2014). Additionally, previously unknown impacts, or 
properties attributable to such impacts, can be discovered and understood. Much of this thesis 
focuses on laboratory experimentation to expand quantitative data associated with surface 
transportation functionality and assist future vulnerability assessments.  
 
1.7 Auckland, New Zealand Context 
Auckland, New Zealand is selected as a case study for much of the work in this thesis. Laboratory 
studies are based on the city’s surface transportation network and environmental properties, and 
some aspects of the locational setting are carried through to fragility function development, although 
most functions are applicable across the developed world. The scenario used to test and demonstrate 
the findings is also based in Auckland, and thus the volcanic eruption styles, geographical features, 
and societal characteristics of the city are important to consider. In this section, key background 
material is introduced, outlining aspects of volcanic risk in Auckland associated with both proximal 
volcanic hazards and distal sources of ashfall. 
 Auckland geography and volcanic risk  
Auckland is located in the North Island of New Zealand with a regional population of ~1.6 million (and 
increasing), accounting for ~34% of the national population (Statistics New Zealand 2015a). Auckland 
City is built directly on top of a basaltic volcanic field (the Auckland Volcanic Field; AVF); it is exposed 
to future eruptions within the AVF itself (Section 1.7.2), as well as from tephra originating from 
elsewhere in New Zealand (Section 1.7.3) (Figure 1.5).  





Figure 1.5   Auckland Volcanic Field (AVF) and potential distal sources of ash in New Zealand (inset). 
Andesitic stratovolcanoes are shown in blue and rhyolitic calderas in yellow. (Data provided by Auckland Regional 
Council, 2009). 
 
Although the likelihood of eruptions is relatively low, the potential consequences of an AVF eruption or 
very large eruption elsewhere in New Zealand are considered major-to-catastrophic for the country 
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(DPMC 2011; Figure 1.6). The continued functionality of critical infrastructure is paramount in such 
events, and therefore, many national policies and acts (e.g. New Zealand’s Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management Act (2002)) specify transportation as one of the critical infrastructure sectors. 
Managers of transportation organisations in New Zealand have a direct interest in understanding and 
developing resilience to hazards, with a desire to enable transportation networks to function at their 
fullest possible level-of-service (Hughes and Healy 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1.6   Indicative risks in New Zealand from a national security perspective (adapted from DPMC 
2011). 
 
The Lloyd’s City Risk Index (2015), which analyses the economic exposure from 18 threats over ten 
years from 2015, ranks a volcanic eruption as the fourth largest threat to Auckland City, with an 
estimated US$ 0.54 billion GDP at risk. In Auckland, the latest emergency management group plan 
available at the time of writing (Auckland CDEM 2011), assigns a distant source volcanic eruption a 
risk ranking of ‘very high’ (the highest possible category) and a local AVF eruption a risk ranking of 
‘high’ (the second-highest category) in its comparitive analysis of likelihood and consequence for 36 
individual hazards in Auckland. Various societal challenges stem from both an increasing population 
and the geographical constraints of the area: the Waitemata and Manukau Harbours (to the north-east 
and south-west of the city respectively; Figure 1.5), restrict all land-based infrastructure through two 
isthmuses and limit evacuation routes (Auckland CDEM 2015). The southern isthmus is just ~2 km 
wide at its narrowest point and in order to enter or leave the city on the state highway network, one of 
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two key motorway bridges must be traversed in the area (Tomsen et al. 2014). This presents many 
challenges for transportation, and congestion across the road network is becoming more frequent 
(Edbrooke et al. 2003).  Substantial transportation improvement projects are underway and planned 
for the city, including the NZ$1.4 billion Waterview Connection linking two key state highways (due: 
2017), Auckland Manukau Eastern Transport Initiative (AMETI) (partially complete), and NZ$2.5 billion 
City Rail Link (under construction) (Auckland Transport 2016a, Auckland Transport 2016b, NZTA 
2016). With alterations in network redundancy as a result of such projects, vulnerability is highly 
dynamic. However, with potentially heightened current exposure to volcanic hazards (through inward 
population flux), and major transportation network and geographical challenges with consequences for 
eruption vulnerability, understanding the expected impacts of volcanic hazards on transportation is 
more important than ever to increase preparedness, response and recovery efforts, and thus 
strengthen resilience. 
 Auckland Volcanic Field (AVF) 
With more than 50 volcanoes in and around the city, the Auckland Volcanic Field (AVF) (Figure 1.5) 
forms many distinctive landmarks in Auckland. Cones, maars and other surficial features created by 
~200,000 years of past volcanic activity (Kermode 1992, Shane and Sandiford 2003, Lindsay and 
Leonard 2009, Molloy et al. 2009, Lindsay et al. 2011, Le Corvec et al. 2013) dot the Auckland 
landscape, covering around 360 km2. The geologically recent eruption of Rangitoto (~550 years ago; 
Needham et al. 2011), comparison with lifespans of analogue volcanic fields, and the presence of a 
mantle anomaly at depths of about 70–90 km beneath Auckland that has been interpreted as a zone 
of partial melting (Horspool et al. 2006), all suggest the field will erupt again (Lindsay 2010).  
Before an eruption in the AVF, volcanic-induced earthquakes (up to around MM6) present the most 
danger to infrastructure (Smith and Allen 1993). Earthquakes of this intensity would be felt by the 
majority of the population but likely only cause little to minor damage close to the epicentres (Sherburn 
et al. 2007), especially on ground with low strength. Eruptions in Auckland typically start with an 
explosive phreatomagmatic phase (~83% in the past; Kereszturi et al. 2014) resulting from the 
fragmentation of magma due to interaction with water. Given that the AVF now encompasses an area 
that is either below seawater or with a high water table in soft sediments, the potential for 
phreatomagmatic activity is very high (Németh et al. 2012, Agustín-Flores et al. 2014). At high water to 
magma ratios (≥ 0.3; Wohletz 1983), phreatomagmatic eruptions are dominated by the formation of 
explosion craters and vertical eruption columns of lithic rock fragments and ash with pyroclastic 
surges. If groundwater and surface water become excluded from the active vent and the magma 
supply is sufficient for continuation, then activity becomes wholly magmatic and can include fire-
fountaining and tephra fall, forming scoria cones (Allen and Smith 1994, Kereszturi et al. 2014). The 
latter stages of some Auckland eruptions are characterised by extensive lava flows (e.g. Rangitoto, 
Three Kings and Mt. Eden). Individual vents often display several different eruption styles (Allen and 
Smith 1994, Houghton et al. 1996, Kereszturi et al. 2014) but Auckland eruptions have tended to be 
small in volume, typically producing 0.1 to 1.0 km3 of ejecta and lava (Johnston 1997).  
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Despite considerable research efforts, especially in the past 20 years or so, no conclusive spatial or 
temporal patterns in AVF eruptive activity have been identified. Previous activity across the entire field 
has generally been random but sometimes episodic (Molloy et al. 2009, Bebbington and Cronin 2010) 
and is simply constrained by outer geological boundaries such as the uplifted greywacke basement 
rocks to the east of Rangitoto (Allen and Smith 1994). Repose periods vary from around 500 to 20,000 
years, although >2,000 is more characteristic of the field (Allen and Smith 1994, Molloy et al. 2009, 
Hurst and Smith 2010)  Evidence suggests that the AVF is generally monogenetic (Allen and Smith 
1994, Sherburn et al. 2007, Kereszturi et al. 2013), with most eruptions lasting a few months, possibly 
a few years. However, eruptions at other volcanic fields (e.g. Jorollo and Parícutin volcanoes in the 
Michoacan Guanajuato volcanic field, Mexico; Fries 1953, Luhr and Simkin 1993, Rowland et al. 2009, 
De la Cruz-Reyna and Yokoyama 2011) suggest that single eruptions could continue for around a 
decade (Sherburn et al. 2007). Additionally, episodic eruptions from individual volcanic vents may 
occasionally occur (e.g. Crater Hill; Houghton et al. 1999, Motokorea; McGee et al. 2012, Rangitoto; 
Needham et al. 2011, Shane et al. 2013, Linnell et al. 2016), although some of this behaviour may be 
attributed to intermittent water-magma interaction, changes in magma supply rate and/or degassing, 
with no hiatuses in activity, and is therefore not all considered truly polygenetic (Houghton et al. 1999, 
Spargo et al. 2007, Hopkins et al. 2015). This does however have major implications for hazard 
assessment, such that when a future eruption occurs in the AVF, it will be necessary to consider the 
conduit a possible pathway for another eruption for up to several decades afterwards following a 
period of quiescence (Lindsay 2010, Needham et al. 2011). 
 Tephra fall in Auckland from distal eruptions  
There are two main volcano types in the central North Island that may affect Auckland (Figure 1.5): 
1. Andesitic stratovolcanoes including Taranaki, the Tongariro complex (including Ngauruhoe), 
Ruapehu and White Island. Eruptions at these volcanoes occur on average every 50 to 300 
years from approximately the same vent area, and are typically characterized by a succession 
of small to moderate-sized eruptive episodes over a long period of time (weeks to months or 
even years) (Wilson et al. 1995, AELG 2001, Lindsay and Peace 2005). 
2. Rhyolitic calderas including Taupo, Okataina, Rotorua and Mayor Island. Activity at caldera 
volcanoes is characterised by far less frequent (on average every 1,000 to 2,000 years) 
moderate to large-sized eruptions, which generate huge quantities of tephra (Lindsay and 
Peace 2005). 
Tephra ejected from any of the vents can be distributed over areas extending many hundreds of 
kilometres. The extent and severity of tephra fall in Auckland will depend on wind directions and 
speeds during eruptive episodes, as well as the magnitude and duration of eruptions and eruption 
column height (Lindsay and Peace 2005, Shane 2007). 
Drill coring at several sites in Auckland has revealed around 40 ash layers that have erupted over the 
past 27,000 years originating from five distal North Island volcanoes (Sandiford et al. 2001, Shane and 
Hoverd 2002, Shane 2005, Lindsay and Peace 2005, Molloy et al. 2009, Zawalna-Geer et al. 2016). 
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Molloy et al. (2009) determine the average fallout frequency of ash in Auckland from ~80,000 years of 
data. They found 52 Egmont events at one per 1.5 ka; 21 Taupo volcanic zone rhyolite (Okataina and 
Taupo) events at one per 3.8 ka; 24 AVF events at one per 3.5 ka; seven Tongariro events at one per 
11.4 ka; and two Mayor Island events at one per 40 ka. More recently, Zawalna-Geer et al. (2016) 
analyse the combined macro- and crypto-tephra record from Pupuke sediment for the Holocene 
epoch. They determined that the Taupo Volcanic Centre is the most frequent contributor of tephra to 
Auckland (one event per ~1.3 ka), followed by Tongariro (one per ~2.2 ka), Okataina, Egmont and 
AVF (one each every ~3.0 ka) and Mayor Island (one tephra event in the Holocene). This suggests 
that Auckland has been inundated by tephra at least once every 424 years on average (Zawalna-Geer 
et al. 2016). Zwalana-Geer et al.’s (2016) fallout frequencies are likely more representative of current 
predominant wind directions and profiles than those reported by Molloy et al. (2009), although a less 
complete eruptive record was considered. Any calculated recurrence rates (and probabilities) must be 
considered with caution as not all eruptions will be preserved in the geologic ash record, and certainly 
not all eruptions will be represented by ash at specific coring sites. For example, the 1995-96 eruption 
of Ruapehu caused light ash fall, resulting in the closure of Auckland International Airport on 18 June 
1996, but no record of ash fall was preserved from this particular eruption (Lindsay and Peace 2005). 
 Volcanic risk assessment for transportation in Auckland 
Volcanic risk assessments are actively used to inform emergency management and planning in 
Auckland. For example, the Auckland Evacuation Plan (Auckland CDEM 2014) presents an all-
hazards approach for conducting evacuations around, out of, and into Auckland, and the AVF 
Contingency Plan (Auckland CDEM 2015) sets out the planning arrangements specifically for the 
management of an eruption within the AVF. However, previous volcanic risk assessments for 
Auckland have largely focussed on building structures and loss of human life. In Magill and Blong’s 
(2005) risk ranking for Auckland, tephra produces the highest risk by an order of magnitude in terms of 
physical infrastructure damage, followed by lava flows and pyroclastic surge. Pyroclastic surges with 
high dynamic pressures are seen to present the highest risk in terms of loss-of-life in the AVF (Magill 
and Blong 2005, Sherburn et al. 2007, Brand et al. 2014). Houghton et al. (2006) suggest that rapid 
cone growth during future eruptions will define a region of some 30 to 100 ha where complete 
destruction will occur. The cost of such destruction was calculated at between NZ$ 200 million and 
NZ$ 1.4 billion (Houghton et al. 2006). Magill et al. (2006) place the loss due to structural damage at 
NZ$ 1 billion at an average recurrence interval of around 35,000 years (taking the AVF and five other 
volcanic centres into consideration). The Auckland Lifelines Group (ALG) recognise that an eruption in 
the AVF is likely to have severe infrastructure impacts within a few kilometres from the eruption vent, 
stating that “ash will hamper movement on road networks, with particular issues for the movement of 
people for evacuation as well as access for lifelines to critical infrastructure for repairs and 
maintenance” (AELG 2014).  
In Auckland, it is unlikely that volcanic ashfall alone will require large-scale evacuations. However, 
other hazards associated with the eruption, and coincident unrelated hazards such as storms, tsunami 
or fire, may require evacuations using transportation networks compromised by ash. As part of an 
initial risk assessment following a change in seismicity in the AVF, Auckland Civil Defence and 
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Emergency Management (CDEM) use radial distances from an identified vent zone to inform primary 
(0-3 km) and secondary (3-5 km) evacuation zones (Auckland CDEM 2015). Due to the lack of viable 
transportation alternatives, the primary method of evacuation over large distances in New Zealand is 
likely to be by road (Cole et al. 2005, Cole and Blumenthal 2004), particularly as many people have 
easy access to a vehicle. According to the most recent census data from March 2013, 92% of 
households in New Zealand have access to at least one motor vehicle (Statistics New Zealand 
2015b). Recent modelling of the Auckland road network suggests evacuation clearance times of one 
to thirteen hours at best, based on evacuating a 5 km radius area in the central city and assuming no 
direct impacts to transportation infrastructure from volcanic hazards (Tomsen 2010, Baker and Cox 
2014). With transportation networks affected by ashfall, evacuation and recovery efforts could be 
severely disrupted and damage to other critical infrastructure or cascading effects may slow the efforts 
further (Wilson et al. 2012). For example, many issues were encountered during the evacuation for 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 when cars ran out of fuel or had other mechanical problems (Litman 2006). 
Besides evacuation, surface transportation will be required for emergency service access and 
maintenance / repair of key facilities and networks by critical infrastructure staff. Additionally, during 
recurring or prolonged eruptions in the AVF, or indeed ashfall from distal eruptions with potential 
repetitive effects due to ash remobilisation, normal societal activities may be conducted on 
compromised transportation networks. Therefore, it is crucial to improve risk assessments by better 
understanding the impacts of volcanic ash on such networks, particularly with regards to the topics 
outlined in Section 1.6.  
 
1.8 Thesis Objectives 
The fundamental goal of this thesis is to improve volcanic risk assessments through investigating and 
quantifying the impacts of volcanic ash on surface transportation; Auckland City is used as a case 
study throughout. Impacts on surface transportation have frequently been observed and reported 
following previous eruptions worldwide. However, information to date has been largely qualitative and 
there is currently a lack of quantitative empirical data to describe transportation functionality. The 
primary objectives of this thesis are to: 
1. Identify and address key unknown or uncertain consequences of volcanic ash impacts 
on surface transportation following a synthesis of existing information. 
The initial objective involves the analysis of known consequences for surface transportation 
network damage and functionality during and after all volcanic hazards. Any gaps in 
knowledge that would likely aid the strengthening of transportation resilience when filled, will 
be addressed primarily through extensive laboratory experimentation, adopting novel 
approaches to investigate specific impact types. 
2. Improve existing thresholds for transportation functional loss (for ash thickness) and 
identify new thresholds for alternative hazard intensity metrics.   
This will be achieved by applying the results of laboratory experiments and through 
considering new observations of volcanic ash impacts to transportation (objective 1). The 
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relative importance of hazard intensity metrics to surface transportation will also be 
considered. 
3. Assess the vulnerability of Auckland City’s transportation infrastructure to volcanic 
hazards and consider international applicability. 
Here, the research will focus on the vulnerability of transportation networks in Auckland to 
functionality disruption and damage as determined in objectives 1 and 2. This will be achieved 
through the development of a volcanic hazard scenario in the AVF that can be used to assess 
risk to multiple critical infrastructure types. Although all stakeholders will be considered, 
addressing end-user needs in particular will form an important part of this objective. 
 
1.9 Thesis Structure and Declarations 
The subsequent content of this thesis forms six core chapters comprising published scientific report 
content or submitted manuscripts to academic journals. One manuscript was published at the time of 
writing this thesis. 
 Chapter 2 summarises key findings from post-eruption impact assessment studies conducted 
following the February 2014 eruption of Kelud volcano, Indonesia. The full findings, published 
as a GNS Science Report, can be found in Appendix A, but considerations for transportation 
have been extracted and compiled in Chapter 2 to address objective one and demonstrate the 
breadth of research undertaken. Three of the key impacts to surface transportation observed 
during eruptions such as Kelud, where volcanic ash deposits occur, are reduced skid 
resistance on paved surfaces, road marking coverage, and visibility impairment during the 
initial ashfall and re-suspended ash. These impacts, and investigation of associated hazard 
intensity thresholds, form the focus of the next three chapters in the thesis.  
 Chapter 3 contains a version of a submitted manuscript that investigates the impact of 
volcanic ash on road and airfield surface skid resistance. An experimental approach, using the 
standardised British pendulum test, is adopted to test the skid resistance on paved surfaces 
covered by ash with a variety of characteristics. Recommendations for road safety and 
effective road cleaning techniques are also discussed.  
 Chapter 4 comprises a version of a separate manuscript (recently published), which adopts 
another experimental approach, in this case with the addition of digital image analysis, to 
investigate road marking coverage by volcanic ash. Risk management measures are also 
suggested based on the key findings. 
 Chapter 5 consists of a version of the third and final manuscript related to laboratory 
experimentation, on the topic of visibility in airborne volcanic ash. Here, a novel set-up is used 
to reproduce potential ash-settling rates and other characteristics for Auckland City to 
calculate expected visual ranges. Potential implications for surface transportation disruption 
are discussed, particularly in relation to transportation and emergency management planning. 
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 Chapter 6 illustrates how the findings of the laboratory experiments (outlined in Chapters 3-5) 
can be applied to improve volcanic ash fragility functions, thus fulfilling objective two of the 
thesis. The chapter comprises a submitted manuscript, which is heavily based on initial 
fragility functions that were recently developed for surface transportation (and other 
infrastructure), and which is outlined in Appendix D. Existing transportation fragility functions 
for volcanic ash thickness are refined in Chapter 6, and new fragility functions with ash-settling 
rate as the core measure of hazard intensity (based on the work in Chapter 5) are proposed. 
The chapter particularly highlights the importance of considering different hazard intensity 
metrics besides ash thickness when assessing disruption to surface transportation. 
 The final core section of this thesis, Chapter 7, uses a scenario approach to provide insights 
for transportation network damage and functionality during volcanic eruptions, covering all 
volcanic hazards that could occur given an AVF eruption. This chapter is the second in a 
series of submitted manuscripts based on the hypothetical “Māngere Bridge” eruption in South 
Auckland, New Zealand. The first manuscript of the series outlines the geophysical hazard 
sequence of the scenario and is included in Appendix E1. The studies largely stem from initial 
work developed for both an internal workshop held by the EQC, and the Economics of 
Resilient Infrastructure (ERI) Programme. A published report on the latter is included in 
Appendix E2. A key component of Chapter 7 is the development of Level-of-Service (LoS) 
metrics that consider transportation network end-users, which highlight the importance of 
considering end-user needs in volcanic impact and risk assessments in the future. 
Interdependencies with transportation are briefly considered within. The work in this chapter 
successfully fulfils objective three of the thesis. 
 The final chapter of the thesis (Chapter 8) concludes by summarising the key findings in 
relation to the original thesis aims. It also outlines recommendations for future work, which 
largely stem from the recent contributions to the discipline covered in this thesis. 
The content of all chapters in this thesis directly result from my own research and studies. Co-authors 
made invaluable contributions and their associated inputs are declared in the signed co-authorship 
forms at the beginning of each chapter. Others who assisted with the work are acknowledged in the 
acknowledgement sections of the individual chapters. I am the co-author of Appendix D, E1 and E2, 
and am the lead author of all other appendices in this thesis including the GNS Science Report 
(Appendix A); my contribution to the content of each is outlined accordingly in signed co-authorship 
forms which accompany each Appendix. 
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2. THE 2014 ERUPTION OF KELUD VOLCANO, INDONESIA: TRANSPORTATION 
IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
2.1 Abstract 
The February 2014 eruption of Kelud volcano in East Java, Indonesia, produced multiple and 
extensive impacts to critical infrastructure including transportation networks. It provided opportunities 
to increase the understanding of critical infrastructure vulnerability to volcanic hazards, including that 
related to surface transportation functionality following volcanic ashfall – a feature where current 
knowledge gaps hinder the development of contemporary volcanic risk assessments. 
Physical damage and functionality loss in the proximal areas to the volcanic vent (i.e. the Kelud flanks 
extending ~30 km radially) and the distal locations (with a particular focus on Yogyakarta Special 
Region Province in Central Java, ~220 km west of Kelud) are considered in this study. In the proximal 
areas, impacts were severe with a range of hazards including ballistics, pyroclastic density currents, 
lahars, and heavy tephra fall responsible for the destruction of bridges and ~3 km of road. These 
impacts disrupted access to the crater and created knock-on societal consequences for communities 
in nearby villages. In the distal areas, widespread reduction in transportation functionality resulted 
from government advice to stay off roads, along with reduced skid resistance and impaired visibility 
encountered by those who travelled on ash-covered routes. Other distal consequences from ash 
included disruption to bus services and aviation, and some impacts were prolonged following ash 
remobilisation. The diesel rail network demonstrated resilience to volcanic ash, with the network’s 
capacity even increasing at times in response to the increase in rail demand resulting from the 
negative effects on other transportation.  
The study allows the identification of differences and similarities between proximal and distal impacts, 
and highlights potential hazard intensity metrics for ash (e.g. thickness, particle size) responsible for 
impacts. The range of effects from different hazards demonstrates the importance of adopting multi-
hazard approaches for volcanic risk assessments. Additionally, the study highlights how volcanic ash 
can cause long-lasting and multi-faceted impacts to transportation, particularly in the form of 
functionality reduction. Complex interactions between different infrastructure and societal effects are 
also discussed, including considerations of the level-of-service encountered by transportation end-
users, which are increasingly important for transportation and emergency management planning. 
 
2.2 Introduction  
Contemporary volcanic risk assessments require a thorough understanding of impacts to society, 
specifically through knowledge of exposure and vulnerability to multiple hazards (Crichton 1999, 
UNISDR 2009). Volcanic hazards can occur both close to the vent (e.g. pyroclastic density currents, 
lava flows, lahars) or extend much further afield, particularly in the form of ashfall (Magill and Blong 
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2005, Wilson et al. 2012). With the widespread nature of ashfall, and often disruptive consequences 
for critical infrastructure, urban areas are more likely to be affected by ash than any of the other 
volcanic hazards. As such, it is especially important to have detailed information on the likely impacts 
of volcanic ash on critical infrastructure, which can allow for improved DRR strategies before, during, 
and following future eruptions.     
Post-eruption data is the most fundamental information to compile volcanic risk assessments (Baxter 
et al. 2005, Jenkins et al. 2014). Impact assessment trips allow the collection of such data and have 
been a common approach adopted in recent years (e.g. Barnard 2004, Leonard et al. 2005, Sword-
Daniels et al. 2011, Wilson et al. 2011, Wardman et al. 2012, Jenkins et al. 2013, Wilson et al. 2013). 
They enable improved knowledge on the exposure of infrastructure including surface transportation to 
volcanic hazards, as well as on components of vulnerability and resilience that influence the overall 
impact. Despite the frequency of recent impact assessment studies, vulnerability data for volcanic 
hazards remains relatively sparse and new eruptions present opportunities to add to the global 
knowledge base (Magill et al. 2013). Furthermore, many previous studies have focussed on physical 
damage to critical infrastructure, sometimes with little regard for the overall functionality of networks 
and implications for end-users. New impact assessment trips can help fill such knowledge gaps and 
also provide insights into previously unidentified impacts. 
The 2014 eruption of Kelud volcano, Indonesia, provided a prime opportunity to observe proximal and 
distal impacts from a short-lived, explosive (VEI 4) volcanic eruption on society. This thesis chapter 
presents findings from an impact assessment trip to Central and East Java, Indonesia (Figure 2.1), 
which investigated the impacts from the 2014 Kelud eruption. Impacts to transportation networks from 
the Kelud 2014 eruption form the primary focus of this chapter, although impacts to all critical 
infrastructure can be found in Appendix A – the full GNS Science Report, from which the content in 
this chapter has been extracted and modified. The impact assessment focuses on two distinct 
locations – proximal areas to the volcano up to ~30 km radially from the vent, and a distal location 
~220 km from the vent where ashfall was the only volcanic hazard to affect infrastructure and society. 
As such, the impacts of ashfall on transportation network damage and functionality are spatially 
compared, allowing analysis of vulnerable components and identification of potential hazard intensity 
metrics (HIMs) responsible for such impacts.  
 Study areas 
Both the proximal and distal areas to Kelud contain high populations; the population density in 
Yogyakarta Special Region Province (Figure 2.1) is ~2,000/km2, and the mean population density in 
the three regencies surrounding Kelud is ~1,000/km2 (BPS 2010). Proximal and distal areas contain 
many infrastructure similarities with multiple transportation modes (road, rail and airports) in both. 
There are also multiple risk management strategies in both locations associated with adjacent 
volcanoes (Merapi volcano is located approximately 28 km to the north of Yogyakarta City; (Figure 
2.1). For example, hazard maps and land use plans covering areas potentially affected by proximal 
hazards provide a way to manage development and minimise disaster risk in both areas (Mulyana et 
al. 2004, Sagala 2009), and there are active monitoring and warning systems in place on the flanks of 
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both volcanoes, as well as physical mitigation strategies such as sabo dams and ‘sand mining’ in river 
beds to minimise the impact of lahars (De Bélizal 2014).  
Eruptions at Merapi, occur more frequently than those at Kelud (recently every ~2-3 years as opposed 
to every ~20 years; Fadeli 2012, GVP 2014 a,b). Therefore, the communities on the flanks of Merapi 
have been more frequently exposed to volcanic hazards, but may not be as familiar with the distal 
effects of ashfall. There were few complications introduced by hazards from other eruptions (such as 
from Merapi volcano) at the time of the Kelud impact assessment trip. The last major eruption at Kelud 
was ~24 years earlier, and the last at Merapi was in 2010. Additionally, the short-lived eruption of 
Kelud in 2014 allows the study of impacts that can be easily assigned to discrete volcanic hazards. 
Despite the short timeframe for direct hazards during the Kelud eruption, there were various cases of 
people travelling on affected transportation networks, which allows substantial investigation into the 
impacts (both functionality and physical damage), including the vulnerability of infrastructure and risk 
management strategies that were implemented. 
 





Figure 2.1   Location of East and Central Java in Indonesia and the regencies in proximal (blue) and distal 
(yellow) areas to Kelud where the field visits occurred. Also shown are cities and locations in Central and 
East Java of importance to the chapter, and location of Merapi volcano. (Data sourced from diva-gis.org (2014) 
rtwilson.com (2014)) 
 
 Transportation in Java 
The road, rail and domestic airline network (Figure 2.2) are used extensively throughout Java, with key 
shipping ports for connections to other Indonesian islands located mainly on the northern coast. A 
wide variety of vehicles are used for road transport. Buses operate within and between the larger cities 
with minibuses servicing many of the smaller towns. Motorbikes are by far the most popular vehicle in 
Java (71% of motor vehicles in 2003; World Bank 2013) with many adapted to transport a variety of 
goods in addition to passengers (Figure 2.3). Taxis and cycle rickshaws, called becak are common in 
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most cities. Private cars are becoming more popular, especially with the increasing purchasing power 
of Indonesians and liberalisation of import motor vehicle rules. However, vehicle growth outpaces the 
construction of new roads and congestion is common, particularly on the major roads through cities 
(World Bank 2013). 
There are two major rail lines running the length of the island in addition to several minor lines. Air 
transport serves as an important way to connect the thousands of Indonesian islands and cities with 
passenger and flight numbers having increased drastically over the past two decades (Picquout et al. 
2013), particularly since the advent of low-cost flights. 




Figure 2.2   Major transportation routes of Java (Mau Ke Mana 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2.3   Motorbikes in Java (a) Motorbike adapted for transporting poultry. (b) Motorbikes and other traffic waiting at a railway crossing in Yogyakarta.
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 Volcanic risk management at Kelud 
The information in this subsection provides a brief summary of risk management strategies at Kelud, 
which can influence impacts to transportation. Specifically, it relates to decisions that affect 
evacuations and transportation use. Various organisations, which are mentioned throughout the 
chapter, are also introduced. More detailed information on emergency management activities can be 
found in Appendix A. 
During volcanic eruptions and other crises, risk assessments at a national level in Indonesia are 
primarily achieved through a Presidential Decree. The decree requires the analysis of certain 
indicators such as the number of victims, loss of properties, destruction of infrastructure, area affected, 
and socio-economic impacts. The impact of volcanic hazards on transportation thus forms a critical 
component of the assessment process. Different administrative divisions and groups (which operate in 
the regencies bordering the Kelud vent – Figure 2.4, and further afield) have key risk management 
roles during heightened volcanic activity at Kelud volcano, including: 
 The Kelud Volcano Observatory (KVO) located 7.5 km west of the crater (Figure 2.5) who 
make regular visual observations of the volcanic activity (CVGHM 2014a) and send reports to 
the CVGHM (Centre for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation)3 and surrounding 
chiefs of settlement (De Bélizal et al. 2012). 
 The CVGHM who analyse information received and provide advice to BPBDs (Badan 
Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah – the provincial Disaster Management Agencies) and 
BNPB (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana – the National Agency for Disaster 
Management).  
 The BNPB and BPBDs who issue information about the status of alerts and implement 
measures including evacuation zoning. 
 Various community groups who contribute to volcanic risk management at Kelud. For 
example, JANGKAR Kelud (Jangkane Kawula Redi Kelud), which is a platform of 
representatives from the community, teachers and local government in the three regencies 
surrounding Kelud, directly assist with evacuations and the communication of information 
between villages. 
A hazard map is used to communicate some of the hazard and risk information at Kelud (Appendix A). 
However, there are some concerns that the map does not accurately depict the true threat from some 
hazards (Indonesian Session 2014), suggesting that new risk assessment data may be beneficial.   
Transportation network impact information, such as that outlined in this chapter, could assist future 
risk assessments and hazard map development.  
                                                     
3 The CVGHM is also known by its Indonesian name, PVMBG (Pusat Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi Bencana Geologi). 






Figure 2.4   The three regencies (Malang, Kediri and Blitar) surrounding Kelud’s summit and neighbouring regencies. Also shown (in yellow) are the districts on the flanks of 
Kelud where field studies, observations and/or interviews were conducted. (Data sourced from diva-gis.org (2014) and rtwilson.com (2014)). 





Figure 2.5   Location of villages (grey areas) surrounding the Kelud summit and the hamlets (orange points) within, which were visited during the impact assessment trip. 
The two dams and KVO shown on the map were also visited. (Data sourced from diva-gis.org (2014) and rtwilson.com (2014)).
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 Kelud 2014 eruption chronology 
A chronology of the February 2014 eruption of Kelud volcano including unrest episodes, volcanic 
hazards, and key emergency management activity is provided in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1   Chronology of the February 2014 Kelud eruption. (Data sourced from BPBD Blitar Regency 
2014a, BPBD DIY 2014a*, BPBD DIY 2014b, CVGHM 2014a, CVGHM 2014b, CVGHM 2014c, CVGHM 2014d, 
CVGHM 2014e, GVP 2014c, GVP 2014d, Indonesian Session 2014, Irvine-Brown 2014, Kalikuning 2014*, KVO 
2014*, Munjang 2014a*, Muryanto & Susanto 2014, Sunstar 2014). 
 
Date Time (WIB) Event 
June 2009 - 2 February 2014 - Alert Level 1 ('Normal') status 
10 September 2013 - 9 February 2014 - Crater lake water temperature increase 
1 January 2014 - 2 February 2014 - Shallow volcanic (VB) and deep volcanic (VA) 
earthquakes increase 
2 February 2014 14:00 Alert status raised to Level 2 ('Advisory') 
3-10 February 2014 - Deep and shallow volcanic earthquakes increase 
(some 3 km below summit) 
10 February 2014 - Inflation detected at one tiltmeter station, crater 
lake temperature decrease 
10 February 2014 16:00 Alert status raised to Level 3 ('Watch'). 5 km radius 
exclusion zone 
10 February 2014 16:00 Some residents evacuate area up to 10 km from 
vent 
13 February 2014 00:00-22:49 Increase in number of VB, VA and low frequency 
(LF) earthquakes 
13 February 2014 21:15 Alert status raised to Level 4 ('Warning'). 10 km 
radius exclusion zone 
13 February 2014 21:15 Evacuations within 10 km of crater in response to 
new alert status 
13 February 2014 22:46 Start of Eruption 
13 February 2014 22:50 Evacuation of some Pandansari residents in 
response to eruption 
13 February 2014 23:30 Large explosion at vent, three seismic stations 
destroyed (one remaining) 
14 February 2014 ~03:00 Ash fall starts in Yogyakarta (220 km west of 
Kelud) 
14 February 2014 ~03:00 Volcanic acitivity at vent decreases 
14 February 2014 (morning) Military evacuate some Pandansari residents who 
sheltered overnight 
14-15 February 2014 (daytime) Some farmers returning in exclusion zone to check 
on properties, crops and livestock 
15-20 February 2014 - Amplitude of tremors decreased and white plumes 
(rather than grey) from vent 
16 February 2014 - End of ash fall in Yogyakarta (some may have 
been from substantial remobilisation) 
17 February 2014 (daytime) Many farmers returning to check on properties, 
crops and livestock 
19 February 2014 - Concern from KVO over future lahar threat 
20 February 2014 11:00 Alert status lowered to Level 3 ('Watch'). 5 km 
radius exclusion zone 
20-28 February 2014 - Further reduction in tremor amplitude 
28 February 2014 16:30 Alert status lowered to Level 2 ('Advisory'). 3 km 
exclusion zone advised 
7 August 2014 12:00 Alert status lowered to Level 1 ('Normal') 
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2.3 Research Methods 
Data collection was conducted using several approaches. At the time of the eruption, collection and 
analysis of online emergency management and other official reports, maps, news and media articles 
was undertaken. Care was taken to verify these resources, especially the media reports, either by 
cross-checking or subsequent follow up. Where this was not possible, resources were excluded from 
analysis. A reconnaissance trip to observe primary impacts immediately after the eruption to collect 
perishable observational data was proposed, but was postponed due to difficulties finding appropriate 
local Indonesian collaborators, which is a key recommendation by volcanic crises best practice 
guidelines (e.g. IAVCEI 1999). The field visit was deferred by 7 months until the immediate crisis 
period had subsided, when it was possible to partner with Muhammad Hendrasto, the Head of 
CVGHM, and his team. This assessment trip was undertaken between 08 September and 23 
September 2014 following University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee approval, to two areas: 
“proximal” which extended ~30 km radially from the vent (Figure 2.4) and “distal” which was focused 
on Yogyakarta Special Region Province (Figure 2.1). Field data collection consisted of direct 
observations by researchers and interviews with staff at organisations involved with the response 
and/or early recovery. Most interviews were pre-arranged and semi-structured, largely conducted in 
Bahasa Indonesia through experienced English speaking translators from Java, Indonesia. 
Discussions with residents and other stakeholders were also held in the field on a more ad-hoc basis 
when appropriate opportunities arose, taking care to observe cultural and contextual sensitivities. 
These discussions provided additional qualitative and semi-quantitative data on the impacts of 
volcanic hazards, particularly on the vulnerability and capacity of critical infrastructure and agriculture. 
All interviewees that inform the research in this chapter of the thesis are shown in Table 2.2, unless 
they requested to remain anonymous.  
 
Table 2.2   Interviewees who provided information that informs this chapter of the thesis. The column titled 
‘citation’ indicates how the material is subsequently referred to. All information sourced from interviews and 
discussions is cited with an asterisk symbol herein. 
 
Agency/ Business Location Citation 
Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah Kabupaten 
Blitar (the disaster management agency of Blitar Regency) 
Wlingi, East Java BPBD Blitar 
Regency 2014b* 
Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah Istimewa 
Yogyakarta (The disaster management agency of 
Yogyakarta Special Region Province) 
Yogyakarta Special Region 
Province 
BPBD DIY 2014a* 
Disaster Research, Education and Management (DREAM) 
Centre, Universitas Pembangunan Nasional (UPN) 
Veteran Yogyakarta (National Development University, 
Yogyakarta) 
Sleman Regency, 








Direktorat Jenderal Perhubungan Darat (Directorate 
General of Land Transportation) and Direktorat Jenderal 
Perhubungan Laut (Directorate General of Sea 
Transportation), Kementerian Perhubungan (Ministry of 
Transportation) 
Yogyakarta Special Region 
Province 
DJPD & DJPL 
2014* 
Direktorat Jenderal Perhubungan Udara (Directorate Yogyakarta Special Region DJPU 2014* 
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General of Civil Aviation), Kementerian Perhubungan 
(Ministry of Transportation) 
Province 
Kalikuning Village residents / farmers Blitar Regency, East Java 
Province 
Kalikuning 2014* 




Sand miner in Sambong River next to Kalngon Hamlet Pandansari Village, 
Ngantang District, Malang 
Regency, East Java 
Province 
Klangon 2014* 
Warung owners next to Konto River bridge near Kandangan, East Java 
Province 
Konto 2014* 
Kelud Volcano Observatory (KVO) Sugihwaras Village, Ngancar 
District, Kediri Regency, East 
Java Province 
KVO 2014* 
Luwakmas Family Café and Restro Sugihwaras Village, Ngancar 








Dinas Kesehatan Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 
Republik Indonesia (the provincial Health Agency) 




Farmer / Munjang resident in fields to south of Munjang 
Hamlet 
Pandansari Village, 
Ngantang District, Malang 
Regency, East Java 
Province 
Munjang 2014a* 
Residents at a house being renovated in Munjang Hamlet Pandansari Village, 
Ngantang District, Malang 
Regency, East Java 
Province 
Munjang 2014b* 
PT. Jogja Tugu Trans (the Trans Jogja Bus Transport 
Company) 
Yogyakarta Special Region 
Province 
PT-JTT 2014* 




Sand miner in Sambong River, below Selorejo dam Pandansari Village, 
Ngantang District, Malang 
Regency, East Java 
Province 
Selorejo 2014* 
Universitas Pembangunan Nasional (UPN) Veteran 
Yogyakarta, (National Development University, 
Yogyakarta) 
Sleman Regency, 




2.4 Findings: Post-Eruption Observations of Volcanic Hazards 
 Proximal hazards 
The VEI 4 eruption of Kelud on 13-14 February 2014, which started around 90 minutes after the 
highest alert status (‘Warning’) was issued, caused multiple proximal hazards. The initial eruption left 
a large crater around 400 m in diameter and destroyed the lava dome which emerged in 2007-2008, 
along with the parking area and part of Crater Road (Figure 2.6) that previously extended up to the 
summit (GVP 2014c). Around 1.5 hours after the start of the eruption, there were reports of an 
explosion that was heard over 200 km away, including in Surabaya, Surakarta and Yogyakarta (ABC 
News 2014a, BPBD DIY 2014b, Irvine-Brown 2014, SMH 2014). During the explosive eruption, PDCs 
extended up to ~2 km from the vent, particularly to the south and south west, destroying previously 
forested areas (Figure 2.6). 





Figure 2.6   Images from the south of Kelud crater area (a) before (23 August 2012), and (b) after (19 May 
2014) the 13 February eruption (GoogleEarth 2014). The lava dome was removed by the explosive eruption 
leaving a ~400 m diameter crater. In the second photo, PDC deposits can be seen, which extend over 2 km from 
the vent, particularly to the south. Thick tephra deposits are also visible, particularly extending to the north east 




Many ballistic bombs were ejected from the vent with some measuring up to 600 mm in length falling 
up to 3 km away (BPBD Blitar Regency 2014a, KVO 2014*). Lapilli and blocks which fell in the heavily 
Crater 
Crater 
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impacted area of Pandansari Village (extending 7 km from the vent; Figure 2.5) had maximum sizes 
of 50-80 mm in diameter (Baku-APA 2014). Pumice clast sizes of around 50 mm were reported to the 
west of the crater, up to ~8 km from the vent, with clasts up to 80 mm found at the KVO, 7.5 km west 
of the crater. 
Within ~2-3 km of the crater, tephra accumulated up to a metre thick (Volcano Discovery 2014). Areas 
to the north east of the volcano in the Malang Regency (Figure 2.4) were heavily impacted by tephra 
fall, and thicknesses were likely up to 500 mm (but more widely 200 mm) in parts of the Ngantang 
District, including Pandansari Village, 7 km away from the vent (Baku-APA 2014, KVO 2014*, 
Munjang 2014b*). In September 2014, PDC and thick tephra deposits were still evident extending ~2 
km from the vent with little primary vegetation recolonising the area. There was evidence of 
landsliding and gullying due to the newly exposed and unstable conditions. 
Around 6-8 km to the south and west from the vent, in the Blitar and Kediri regencies (Figure 2.4), 
some sites experienced depths of ~100 mm. Overall tephra here was generally coarser than what fell 
in the Malang Regency, mainly consisting of lapilli - (often referred to as ‘coarse sand’) sized pumice 
clasts (BPBD DIY 2014a*, Health Agency DIY 2014*, KVO 2014*, Purwana (pers comm, 2014)*). 
Some individual clasts were up to ~80 mm in diameter in these locations (Kalikuning 2014*, 
Karanganyar 2014*, KVO 2014*, Luwakmas Café 2014*). However, further to the south, including 
Wlingi in the Blitar Regency, residents experienced no tephra fall despite the sky darkening overhead 
at times (BPBD Blitar Regency 2014b*). This may have been a result of low altitude winds blowing 
from the south and ash remaining in suspension in the plume at higher altitudes. 
Heavy rain, particularly torrential downpours from 16 February 2014 onwards (Pitaloka 2014), mixed 
with the fresh pyroclastic deposits on the ground to form lahars. Lahars on Tuesday 18 February 2014 
followed the courses of rivers in all three proximal regencies, causing damage to buildings, bridges and 
agricultural land (BNPB 2014). These included lahars in the Konto (Kediri Regency, 35 km N) and 
Bladak (Blitar Regency, 20 km SW) rivers (GVP 2014c; Figure 2.5).  
 Distal ashfall 
In distal areas, such as Yogyakarta, the ashfall from the Kelud eruption came as a surprise to both 
residents and officials as they did not expect that ash originating from so far away would impact these 
areas. No warning of potential ashfall was received in these areas and the fact that the eruption 
occurred at night, with ash beginning to fall at around 03:00 on 14 February, also added to the 
surprise with many people awaking to unexpected ashfall outside (BPBD DIY 2014a*, Irvine-Brown 
2014, Daniswara (pers comm, 2014)*). 
 Ash dispersion 
Ground reports indicate that ash plumes rose to an altitude of 17-20 km above sea level forming an 
umbrella cloud as wide as ~200 km across (CVGHM 2014a, Nakada 2014). Ash fell in areas NE, NW, 
and W of the vent, with many reports from as far as Yogyakarta (220 km WSW; Figure 2.1), 
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Banjarnegara (320 km WNW), and Banyuwangi (228 km E) (BOM 2014, Dawet (pers comm, 2014)*, 
KVO 2014*). Trace quantities of ash even fell in Bandung, the capital of West Java 550 km away, and 
there were concerns that the ash would fall in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta 650 km away (Laia 
2014, Jakarta Globe 2014). Analysis by the Darwin Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC) determined 
that the ash cloud reached 85,000 ft (25.9 km) with the majority of the cloud at 57,000 feet (17.4 km) 
(BOM 2014).  
 Ash accumulation and characteristics 
Figure 2.7 shows the approximate tephra thickness in different locations. This map includes lapilli 
(2-64 mm diameter) and ash (<2 mm diameter) sized tephra; volcanic bombs or ballistic clasts (>64 
mm diameter) are not accounted for in the thicknesses. The total estimated tephra volume from the 
eruption is likely around 105 million m3 (EDSM 2014), but potentially up to 160 million m3 (Jakarta 
Post 2014a). 
In Yogyakarta, fine-grained tephra accumulated to average depths of 20-30 mm, and up to 50 mm in 
places (BPBD DIY 2014a*, BPBD DIY 2014b, DJPD & DJPL 2014*, Volcano Discovery 2014). Ash from 
the Kelud eruption was said to be more of a problem than that from the Merapi (2010) eruption in 
Yogyakarta as it covered a much larger area (BPBD DIY 2014a*, Daniswara (pers comm, 2014)*, 
Mahjum (pers comm, 2014)*). Merapi ash was mostly directed to the west in 2010. Due to the fine 
nature of the Kelud ash in distal locations, remobilisation by wind, traffic and other human activities was 
a particular issue. As a result, ash was prevalent in Yogyakarta for over one month (BPBD DIY 2014a*) 
and some ash remained on the ground and other surfaces over 7 months after the eruption at the time 
of our field visit. There was light rainfall in Yogyakarta on 14 February, although this was not enough to 
prevent further remobilisation by re-suspension in the atmosphere. No major remobilisation issues were 
reported in the proximal areas where the ash was coarser and not as readily re-suspended. Ash from 
Kelud that fell farther afield in Java, particularly to the north west of Yogyakarta also accumulated to 
measurable depths. At Borobudur temple, around 25 km north-west of Yogyakarta City, 3-5 mm of ash 
accumulated (Antara News 2014a). 






Figure 2.7   Isopach map for tephra thickness (in mm) produced by the Feburary 2014 eruption (Andreastuti et al. 2015)




2.5 Findings: Impacts on Transportation Networks 
Transportation networks are frequently impacted following volcanic eruptions, often in both proximal 
and distal locations from the vent (Section 1.5). The February 2014 Kelud eruption was no exception 
and there were effects on all transportation modes to some degree on the flanks of Kelud and in distal 
cities over 200 km away. The estimated cost of damage and losses associated with transportation 
was Rp 76,500,000 (~NZ$ 1,597,000) in the Blitar Regency alone (BPBD Blitar Regency 2014a). 
However, this only represents a small percentage of the overall loss, particularly as no major airports 
operate within this regency and ash thickness in this regency was relatively low. 
Transportation was used extensively during the evacuations on 10 February 2014 (officially excluding 
residents from a 5 km radius of the crater) and 13 February 2014 (with a 10 km radius exclusion zone 
implemented) (CVGHM 2014c, GVP 2014c, IFRC 2014). Most residents evacuated using their own 
transport, particularly motorbikes, but some by car and on foot. Evacuations were reportedly undertaken in 
a very calm manner with no major traffic problems and JANGKAR Kelud members appeared to be very 
effective for helping disseminate information from village to village and assisting with evacuations. As of 
14 February 2014, the number of internally displaced persons was said to stand at 100,248 (IFRC 
2014). 
 Aviation  
The Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC) in Darwin, Australia issued a series of advisories in 
response to the Kelud eruption, some key points of which are summarised below: 
 The initial volcanic ash advisory (IDD41295) (VAAC  2014) was issued at 17:21 UTC, 13 
February 2014 (00:21, 14 February 2014 Indonesia Western Time / WIB). This summarised 
that a high level eruption with Aviation Colour Code red had occurred. 
 The next advisory was issued around half an hour later and estimated that the plume had 
risen to Flight Level 450 (45,000 feet / 13.7 km nominal altitude) and extended 50 nautical 
miles (93 km) to the west of the crater at 16:32 UTC, 13 Feb (23:32 WIB, 14 Feb). This was 
based on the temperature from the MTSAT-2 IR satellite (available hourly) and the Surabaya 
12:00 UTC atmospheric profile (BOM 2014, GVP 2014c).  
 By 20:32 UTC, 13 Feb (03:32 WIB, 14 Feb), this plume had extended 240 nautical miles (444 
km) west of the active vent and details emerged relating to the plume also spreading at Flight 
Level 200 (20,000 feet / 6.1 km nominal altitude) and extending 80 nautical miles (148 km) to 
the north east (VAAC 2014). 




 The upper plume had reached Flight Level 650 (65,000 feet / 19.8 km nominal altitude)4 to the 
west at 16:32 UTC (23:32 WIB), 14 Feb (VAAC 2014). 
Shortly before 05:00 local time (WIB) on 14 February 2014, a Jetstar Airbus A320 aircraft carrying 
passengers from Perth, Australia to Jakarta, Indonesia entered the Kelud volcanic ash cloud. It was 
reported that the flight crew suddenly heard unusual faint noises with the captain observing green 
sparks outside the cockpit about 30 seconds later. A faint sulphuric smell and light haze also began 
forming in the flight deck (Foo and Tan 2014). The flight crew donned oxygen masks and changed 
direction after diagnosing that the plane had probably flown through volcanic ash (Foo and Tan 2014). 
They landed safely at Jakarta at 05:50. Reports soon after estimated that the cost of replacing the two 
damaged engines could be ~US$ 20 million (~NZ$ 25.8 million) (Thomas 2014). At the time of writing, 
the circumstances surrounding this incident were still under investigation and no International Civil 
Aviation Organisation incident report (ICAO ANNEX 13) was available (Goodwin (pers comm, 2014), 
EASA 2014). 
As ash began to blanket parts of Central and East Java provinces, operations at seven airports (four 
international in Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Surabaya and Semarang, and three domestic in Bandung, 
Malang and Cilacap) were disrupted by closures that were ordered by the Department of 
Transportation (Figure 2.8) (BPBD DIY 2014b). Military air bases at some of the above airports and at 
Iswahyudi airfield in the Madiun Regency were also closed. It appears that these closures were 
ordered in response to the ashfall as few warnings prior to this were received in the distal areas from 
Kelud. Cancellations and delays affected many airlines in Indonesia and further afield including 
Australia (Australian 2014, Gough 2014). There were many impacts considered at airports including 
concerns of reduced skid resistance for aircraft landing, damage to aircraft engines and reduced 
visibility (Australian 2014, DJPD & DJPL 2014, Gough 2014, Sunstar 2014), all of which are common 
volcanic hazard impact types (Guffanti et al. 2009). Clean air announcements from Darwin VAAC 
were required before airports could reopen (DJPU 2014*) but there were also many issues associated 
with ash on the ground. Four airports (those at Surabaya, Malang, Semarang and Cilacap) resumed 
normal operation late on Saturday 15 February (3News 2014) (~2 days after the eruption started) 
(Figure 2.8). Estimated losses at the airport in Surabaya alone were said to have totalled around Rp 3 
billion (~ NZ$ 315,000) (Boediwardhana and Harsaputra 2014). Flights at Bandung resumed on 
Sunday 16 February (Gough 2014) (~3 days after the eruption started) and the international airports 
in Yogyakarta and Surakarta reopened on Wednesday 19 February (~6 days after) (BPBD DIY 
2014a*, DJPU 2014*, KVO 2014*) and Thursday 20 February (~7 days after) respectively (Figure 2.8) 
(Muryanto & Susanto 2014). As operations re-commenced at some of the affected airports, there 
were still some on-going issues due to the challenges of scheduling and plane supply with other 
airports still closed (DJPU 2014*). 
                                                     
4 Post-event analysis by Darwin VAAC indicated that the ash in fact reached a maximum height of 85,000 feet / 
25.9 km (BOM 2014). 





Figure 2.8   Total airport closure times after the eruption (indicated by coloured portion of circles, with 
totally coloured circle representing 7 days closure) where known. 
 
Adisucipto International Airport (AIA), Yogyakarta case study 
It was estimated that 20-50 mm of ash fell at AIA following the eruption of Kelud (DJPU 2014*, 
Jakarta Post 2014a). As the ash started falling at ~03:00 WIB and the normal opening time of the 
airport is at 04:00 WIB, the decision was made to not open AIA to passengers at all on 14 February. 
People arriving at the airport were told that it was closed which led to traffic congestion in the area 
(DJPU 2014*). The airport is used for both civilian and military purposes with a taxiway for each. 
Military planes are kept in hangers and did not come into contact with ash. At least two commercial 
planes however, were outside for the night of the 13 February (e.g. Figure 2.9) and ash infiltrated into 
the engines of the stationary planes despite being covered by plastic sheeting at some stage. 
Subsequently, the engines required dismantling, deep-cleaning and complete oil changes – a very 
expensive process which required specialist technicians (DJPU 2014*). The Directorate General of 
Civil Aviation reported that there were no indications of any damage to paintwork on the two stranded 
planes or to airfield surface line markings resulting from the ash. 
The closure of AIA following the Merapi 2010 eruption was largely due to airborne ash and there was 
little accumulation at the airport as occurred in February 2014 from the Kelud eruption (DJPU 2014*). 
The fine-grained ash from Kelud at Yogyakarta meant that the ash was readily remobilised by wind 
and efforts to reopen the airport were hampered by this (Section 2.5.5.2). Over the course of AIA’s 




closure in February 2014 (based on the loss of five average operating days; DJPU 2014*) it is 
estimated that as many as 600 domestic, 750 military (including training flights) and 20 international 
flights were cancelled. The transportation of cargo was also affected as this is normally carried on the 
above flights. 
 
Figure 2.9   Aircraft covered in ash on 14 February 2014 at Adisucipto International Airport, Yogyakarta 




Severe impacts occurred to ~3 km of asphalt concrete road (within ~2 km radius of the vent) 
immediately following the eruption, particularly from ballistics, PDCs and landslides (Figure 2.10 a-e). 
The largest ballistic impact crater on roads visible in this region was around 3.6 m in diameter (Figure 
2.10 a) and some ballistics completely penetrated bridges with subsequent holes to the ground below 
up to 1.1 m in diameter (Figure 2.10 b). Around 1 km of road was completely destroyed by these 
volcanic hazards with the remainder buried by tephra to a depth of ~1 m in places. At the time of 
observation, 7 months after the eruption, these sections of road remain closed to everyday traffic and 
repair work had not commenced, presumably in part due to the continued instability of the land. Some 
asphalt concrete road surfaces within ~10 km of the crater (particularly to the north east) were 
damaged by vehicles driving over the roads that were covered in lapilli and ash (Munjang 2014b*). 
This is perhaps due to an increased attrition rate caused by the direct impact of tephra on asphalt 
concrete and subsequent layer remaining on the road surface, which could lead to increased fluvial 
erosion and pothole formation. 





Figure 2.10   Road and bridge impacts within ~2 km of the crater (taken 20 September 2014). (a) large 
ballistic impact crater in asphalt concrete road surface (3.6 m along the longest axis). (b) holes in asphalt 
concrete and reinforced concrete bridge (now covered in wood) after being penetrated by ballistics. (c) ballistics 
embedded within bridge surface and damage to edge of bridge. (d) bridge structure and railing damage. (e) 
remaining section of the road near the crater, now cleared of ash. 
 
Around 9 km NE of the Kelud crater, at least two bridges crossing the Sambong River were destroyed 
by a lahar. This lahar may have occurred as soon as 18 February 2014 (BNPB 2014) four days after 
the eruption, immediately forcing the closure of some roads (Pitaloka 2014). The bridge to the north 
east of Munjang Hamlet, which was frequently used by its residents and also used in the evacuation, 




was ~10 m long and was of standard concrete and metal construction with an asphalt concrete deck. 
Seven months after the eruption, this had yet to be rebuilt and vehicles were driving on the now wider 
and aggraded riverbed to cross the river here (Figure 2.11). The bridge, of similar construction style, 
adjacent to Klangon Village was ~35 m long (Selorejo 2014*). Within ~2 weeks of being destroyed by 
a lahar, it was replaced by a small bamboo bridge (Figure 2.12 a) allowing residents to cross the river 
either by foot or motorbike. This was subsequently replaced by a more substantial bridge on loan from 
the Indonesian Army (Figure 2.12 b) which took 6-7 months to install, enabling easy access for all 
vehicles to Klangon. This larger bridge will be replaced with a new permanent bridge when the 
government has funds (Klangon 2014*). 
 
Figure 2.11   Kostrad TNI-AD (the Strategic Reserve Command of the Indonesian Army) help vehicles 
cross the Sambong River at site of old bridge between Munjang Hamlet and Selorejo Dam on Wednesday 




Figure 2.12   Sambong River crossing near Klangon Hamlet, Pandansari Village. (a) Temporary bamboo 
bridge over the Sambong River built ~2 weeks after the lahar and improving access for pedestrians and 
motorbikes to Klangon Hamlet (Adonai 2014). (b) Larger temporary army- bridge built nearby ~6-7 months after 
the lahar (photo taken on 21 September 2014).  
 
The Sambong River (Figure 2.12) is a tributary of the larger Konto River, which was also affected by 
at least one lahar. On the western side of Kandangan (~20 km north of the crater), the lahar was said 




to arrive very slowly and rose gradually until the surface came to ~0.5 m of the road deck (Konto 
2014*) on the major bridge carrying the main road between Pare and Kandangan. A roadside warung 
and many houses lie just above the level of this bridge close to the riverbanks. It is unclear when this 
lahar arrived but according to warung owners nearby, police closed the bridge for 2 hours (18:00-
20:00) on 14 February due to the possibility of structural damage. In fact, there was little damage to 
this bridge apart from scour damage to the upstream side of the central support at the base and some 
subsidence and erosion of the surrounding stone and concrete riverbank structures, although it 
cannot be confirmed that these were a result of lahars alone. 
Some residents, particularly in the Pandansari area to the north east of the crater evacuated as ash 
was falling, and they experienced very low visibility (with a visual range of just a few meters; Gough 
2014), which made driving difficult. There were no reports of direct impacts to vehicles on the flanks of 
Kelud because most were either taken during evacuations or stored under shelters before the tephra 
fall arrived, as occurred in Kalikuning (Kalikuning 2014*). Some areas, such as the road to the west of 
the KVO were mainly affected by light pumice, which was not dense enough to cause any substantial 
vehicle damage (Luwakmas Café 2014*).  
When residents returned to areas affected by ashfall around Kelud volcano, tephra had accumulated 
to depths of around 50-500 mm at 5-35 km from the crater across the north west to north east 
segment of the flanks (KVO 2014*). Although traffic was reported to be light in some areas such as 
Kediri City (Irvine-Brown 2014), there were several accidents due to slippery roads in proximal areas, 
particularly involving residents on motorbikes which had increased stopping distances and skidded 
into one another (KVO 2014*). In some instances, including in Selorejo, this resulted in personal 
injury. It was reported that most vehicle accidents occurred between residents on the first day of 
return, although this cannot be backed-up with accident data. The visual range in Kediri upon return 
may have been around 1000 m (Baku-APA 2014), adding to the driving difficulties. There were no 
reports of engine or other mechanical damage to vehicles in this area, perhaps due to the grain size 
of ash being relatively large. 
 Distal 
In Yogyakarta, the government advised people to stay off roads and to only drive or go outside when 
absolutely necessary and to turn their lights on if they had to drive (BPBD DIY 2014a*, Mahjum (pers 
comm, 2014)*). Most people obeyed this advice and many were reluctant to drive in their vehicles 
anyway because of concerns about vehicle damage including scratched windows and engine 
problems, difficulties driving in ash and impacts on breathing and health (DJPD & DJPL 2014*). Some 
cars were covered in plastic sheeting as a protective measure (Figure 2.13) (BPBD DIY 2014b). As a 
result, the roads in Yogyakarta were relatively quiet for up to a week after the eruption (DJPD & DJPL 
2014*, Irvine-Brown 2014, Mahjum (pers comm, 2014)*), although police were out helping to manage 
traffic flow (BPBD DIY 2014a*). Visibility in Yogyakarta was reduced to a visual range of just 1-3 m at 
times (BPBD DIY 2014a*, BPBD DIY 2014b, DJPD & DJPL 2014*). This was largely due to 
remobilisation from vehicles and worsened in areas where ash was thicker, making it difficult to drive 




(Figure 2.14) (DJPD & DJPL 2014*). Outside of the city, visibility was also very low with a visual range 
of ~7 m near Borobudur Temple reported (Antara News 2014a). 
 
 
Figure 2.13   Cars at Castle Bridge, Yogyakarta covered in plastic protective sheeting (BPBD DIY 2014b). 
 
 
Figure 2.14   Motorbikes driving through ash in Yogyakarta (Washington Post 2014). Remobilisation of fine 
ash in the city meant that visual range was ~3 m at times. 
 
Another complication was from ash covering the solar panels of traffic lights. These solar panels are 
used to power the traffic lights and are near horizontal in the tropics so collect ash easily. When 
covered, the batteries only last for ~1.5 days before needing to be recharged (DJPD & DJPL 2014*). 
The Directorate General of Land Transportation took two key mitigative measures to prevent traffic 
lights from failing: 
1. Near-discharged batteries were replaced with recharged ones. 




2. Solar panels were cleaned every day for ~5 days to prevent ash accumulation. 
This prevented further traffic congestion at intersections. Visibility of functional traffic lights was not 
affected as the cover over each light prevented ash accumulation in front of the lights, stopping them 
from being obscured. There is no evidence that ash stuck to and obscured road signs. 
Despite lower traffic volumes and many people driving more slowly than usual within the city (DJPD & 
DJPL 2014*), there were several traffic accidents, often from motorbikes skidding and colliding on the 
slippery roads (BPBD DIY 2014a*, Mahjum (pers comm, 2014)*). This appears to have been due to 
increased stopping distances rather than sliding on corners, and the failure to see the brake lights of 
motorbikes through the suspended ash (DJPD & DJPL 2014*). The Directorate General of Land 
Transportation reported that some cars experienced braking problems due to brake disks becoming 
scratched. According to hospital figures that were retrieved from the Health Agency of Yogyakarta 
Special Region Province, there were at least 50 injuries as a result of ‘accidents’ (likely traffic-related) in 
Yogyakarta Special Region Province within one month of the eruption (Health Agency DIY 2014*). It 
was also reported that there were at least 12 injuries within 2 days of the eruption at Panembahan 
Senopati hospital in Bantul, in the south of Yogyakarta (Susanto 2014). 
Water rather than wipers was used to clean vehicle windows as previous experience suggested that 
the use of wipers can result in scratched windows (DJPD & DJPL 2014*). Following the Kelud ashfall, 
water was sourced largely from existing stocks of bottled water and from irrigation channels using 
buckets. Many people took a collaborative approach, cleaning their vehicles at the same time and 
helping one another. Discussions with the Directorate General of Land Transportation indicated that 
the cleaning of vehicles and related increase of water on roads may have led to a ‘sludge’ of ash 
forming on some road sections resulting in further nose-to-tail motorbike collisions. However, people 
reacted to this and cleaned roads of wet ash. 
There was rainfall in Yogyakarta within three days of the eruption but this was not enough to wash 
ash from roads and may have made surfaces more slippery (BPBD DIY 2014a*). After one week, 
there was heavy rainfall in Yogyakarta and there were fewer accidents following this. In the weeks 
following the eruption, engine air filters became clogged and required cleaning or changing (DJPD & 
DJPL 2014*). 
Trans Jogja Bus Company, Yogyakarta case study 
The decision was made by the Trans Jogja Bus Company not to operate its fleet of 74 buses in the 
ashy environment and the two buses that were out were called back to the depot during the eruption. 
The decision to stop bus operations was based on concerns about ‘the sharp nature of volcanic ash 
compared to usual road dirt’ and previous experience that the company chairman had gained working 
for the National Bus Company during the Merapi (2010) eruption (PT-JTT 2014*). No Trans Jogja 
buses operated for four days after the Kelud eruption.  




From days 4 to 10 following the eruption, only 50% of buses operated at one time with the other 50% 
being cleaned and serviced by technicians and equipment supplied by PT Jogja Tugu Trans. There 
was also a corresponding ~50% loss of income for the company during this time. There was ~30-40 
mm of ash at the sides of the roads at the start of this operational period and bus drivers travelled 
nearer the middle of the roads where possible to avoid thicker ash. Some bus drivers wore masks due 
to health concerns. There were reportedly no major problems related to reduced skid resistance, 
window abrasion or route diversions during this time (PT-JTT 2014*). 
A total of 20 technicians were employed following the eruption to help clean and maintain Trans Jogja 
buses with each technician responsible for three buses (PT-JTT 2014*). It took around one hour to 
clean three buses. As part of the regular servicing, windows were washed and air filters (both engine 
and air conditioning) were cleaned with compressed air. Some air filters were replaced because they 
were blocked. Air conditioning filters needed particular attention as the units are located on the top of 
buses and therefore susceptible to ash. Vacuums were used to remove ash from the bottom of engine 
bays and radiator systems where it was prone to accumulation. Brakes were also vacuumed via a 
hole in the system due to concerns about ash sticking to brake components where it could then 
thicken and solidify (PT-JTT 2014*). 
Bus operations returned to normal ~10 days after the eruption following the heavy rain in Yogyakarta. 
However, in the months following the eruption, maintenance of buses by Trans Jogja was increased 
to once per two months (usually once per four months). The two buses that were out when the initial 
ashfall occurred experienced engine and turbo-pressure issues around two months after the eruption 
which the staff attributed to driving through the ashfall. 
There were indications that national bus services were also disrupted by ashfall for a time with only 
the routes to East Java from Yogyakarta operating on the first day after the eruption (BPBD DIY 
2014b). 
 Rail 
Diesel trains run on all areas of the rail network that were impacted by ash from Kelud (the only 
electric trains in Java are found in Jakarta) (DJPD & DJPL 2014*). Although there was evidence of rail 
tracks becoming thinly covered in ash from the Kelud eruption (Figure 2.15), there were no reports of 
rail services being delayed or cancelled specifically due to ash impacts. This is difficult to monitor in 
Java as delays and cancellations are relatively frequent, especially to the economy class services. 
However, rail appears to have been the least affected transportation mode with BPBD DIY staff 
claiming that it was ‘the only transportation sector able to penetrate volcanic ash disruption’. 
After interviewing the Directorate General of Land Transportation, it appears that the level-of-service 
on the rail network actually increased at times with extra trains running and some trains lengthened 
with extra cars in certain areas including Yogyakarta Special Region Province. This was a result of 
higher demand caused by cancelled flights, and buses and trains were full with passengers despite 




the increased capacity (DJPD & DJPL 2014*). A similar approach was taken during the Merapi (2010) 
eruption where train numbers on certain routes were increased and all trains were lengthened by two 
cars, although this was in anticipation of an exodus of people living on the slopes and in Yogyakarta 
(Picquout et al. 2013). Some train cars are air conditioned but there were no reported problems to 
these systems due to ash from the Kelud eruption. 
 
 
Figure 2.15   Surabaya to Bandung train passing through ash deposited at Kalimenur, Yogyakarta Special 
Region Province on 16 February 2014, over two days after the eruption (Habibie 2014). 
 
The apparent resilient nature of the diesel rail system to ashfall coincides with the lack of reported impacts 
on similar networks worldwide following other eruptions, with the key exception of the 1980 Mt. St Helens 
event (Blong 1984). This contrasts with electric rail systems which appear more vulnerable to small ash 
accumulations (e.g. following the Shinmoedake 2011 eruption, and Sakurajima eruptions in Japan in 
recent years (Magill et al. 2013)). 
 Ports 
There were no major shipping ports that were impacted by heavy ashfall from the Kelud eruption, with 
the nearest (Tanjung Perak, Surabaya) located over 90 km to the north east. However, there are 
plans for a new port on the south Java coast near Yogyakarta (Daniswara (pers comm, 2014)*) which, 
given the same wind directions as those on 13-14 February 2014 could be exposed to future ashfall. 
 Transportation network clean-up 
Previous studies of tephra-impacted cities have identified efficient clean-up operations as a way to 
mitigate infrastructure impacts and as a fundamental aspect of post tephra fall recovery efforts and 
restoration of economic activities (Wilson et al. 2012). 





In the Kediri Regency alone, approximately 2,500 military and police personnel assisted the 
community with clean-up using whatever suitable tools were available (Antara News 2014b, KVO 
2014*). As occurred in some areas of Yogyakarta, it appears that a coordinated approach was 
adopted with many clean-up activities in proximal areas occurring at the same time and involving 
many people (Figure 2.16). By 04:00 on 14 February (around 5 hours after the eruption), tephra had 
been moved to the sides of some roads in the Ngancar District including the road leading to the KVO 
from Sugihwaras Village (KVO 2014*). This was largely achieved using ongsrok, a wooden implement 
similar in design to a rake but with a wooden plank instead of metal teeth (Figure 2.17). Tephra was 
taken from roadsides to be sold for construction material, which essentially offset the cost of clean-up 
(KVO 2014*). The coarser properties of tephra in proximal areas meant that it was more suitable for 
construction purposes than that in distal regions (Purwana (pers comm, 2014)*).  
 
 
Figure 2.16   A coordinated approach to clean-up was adopted in many areas. (a) Residents cleaning a 
street together in the Kediri Regency (Irvine-Brown 2014). (b) TNI staff help to clear streets in Pandansari Village, 
Ngantang District, Malang Regency (Washington Post 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2.17   Clean-up using ongsrok, a common tool used for clean-up of ash consisting of a wooden 
pole and small plank of wood (Tempo.co 2014). 





On Friday 14 February around 20-30 mm (up to 50 mm in places) of fine-grained tephra fell on 
Yogyakarta from the eruption of Kelud (BPBD DIY 2014a*, BPBD DIY 2014b, DJPD & DJPL 2014*). 
Official clean-up operations, under the control of BPBD DIY, did not begin until the morning of 
Saturday 15 February 2014. BPBD DIY and the Governor asked all parts of the community to join 
government workers to assist with clean-up operations (BPBD DIY 2014a*, BPBD DIY 2014b). Two 
thousand military and police personnel were allocated to assist with clean-up efforts in the city and at 
AIA, Yogyakarta (Muryanto 2014). It was reported that tephra was still falling when the clean-up 
began, although this could have been tephra remobilising out of trees (BPBD DIY 2014a*). A major 
clean-up effort was conducted at the end of the weekend on Sunday 16 February. The clean-up was 
prioritised to remove ash from critical infrastructure facilities (BPBD DIY 2014a*, DJPD & DJPL 
2014*).  
At AIA, The runway, along with all airport buildings had to be completely cleaned before the airport 
could re-open (DJPU 2014*). Clean-up operations began on 15 February and it was hoped that the 
airport would re-open on Tuesday 18 February, but clean-up operations took longer than expected 
and re-opening was delayed until Wednesday 19 February (Muryanto & Susanto 2014). In an effort to 
remove ash from the runway as quickly as possible, it was initially swept into drainage channels on 
the first day of clean-up, largely using ongsrok tools (Figure 2.17). The following day, ash was 
removed from the drainage channels and placed into bags, which BPBD DIY then collected for 
disposal. Shovels were used to remove the bulk of the ash, before brooms were used for the last few 
millimetres (DJPU 2014*). Seven water cannons were sourced from the Yogyakarta Fire Department. 
These were only used for the clean-up at night as they were required for other purposes elsewhere 
during the day. The water cannon belonging to AIA was not used for clean-up purposes as it was 
thought to be too powerful, potentially damaging paved surfaces. Water for cleaning AIA was 
extracted from two nearby rivers using the Fire Department’s water pump (DJPU 2014*). 
BPBD DIY instructed those cleaning up in the city that ash should not be swept into drainage 
networks because it could clog them. They also advised to keep water use to a minimum for the same 
reason and also to prevent surfaces becoming slippery. In Yogyakarta, ash was mainly collected 
using manual tools such as brooms and shovels, and placed into 50 kg sacks. The full bags were 
then collected from the roadside by more than 50 BPBD DIY trucks along with many trucks provided 
by military, the Provincial Public Works Agency, and private operators, and driven to temporary 
storage sites. Clean-up in Yogyakarta came to a total cost of around Rp 3 billion (NZ$ 315,000) with 
around Rp 1 billion (NZ$ 105,000) coming from the nation. 
 Clean-up challenges  
The clean-up in Yogyakarta was initially very difficult because the fine-grained tephra meant it was 
easily remobilised by vehicles (DJPD & DJPL 2014*). This necessitated the spraying of tephra with 
water from hoses and water cannons to consolidate it before it was collected and removed in bags 




(BPBD DIY 2014a*, BPBD DIY 2014b). However, difficulties were experienced when too much water 
was added causing tephra to become cemented and stick to paved surfaces (UPN 2014*). Light rainfall 
(~2-8 mm per day) until 17 February may have added to these difficulties. Ash adhered to the leaves of 
trees and was later dislodged and remobilised by wind, settling onto previously cleaned roads (BPBD 
DIY 2014a*, DJPD & DJPL 2014*). As such, the clean-up was easier in Yogyakarta than in the 
surrounding villages because there are fewer trees for ash to accumulate on in the urban area (DJPD & 
DJPL 2014*). Overall clean-up was aided by the heavy rain (~15 mm) which arrived on Tuesday 18 
February in Yogyakarta, causing most remaining ash in trees and on roofs to fall to the ground (BPBD 
DIY 2014a*, DJPD & DJPL 2014*, UPN 2014*). If this rain had arrived earlier in the clean-up process, 
before the majority of ash had been removed, it may well have led to blocked drains and flooding. 
Heavy rain arrived earlier (~11 mm on 15 February) in Semarang, located ~230 km NW of Kelud. 
However, as only light ashfall occurred in the city, the rain helped to clean ash from the streets without 
any flooding problems reported (Suherdjoko & Ayuningtyas 2014). 
 
2.6 Discussion 
A variety of data is ideal for compiling contemporary volcanic risk assessments. The post-eruption 
impact assessment following the Kelud 2014 eruption has provided contributions in the form of 
qualitative and semi-quantitative empirical vulnerability data in particular. Volcanic tephra fall was 
clearly a key hazard responsible for much of the critical infrastructure damage and disruption. Despite 
the eruption being very short-lived, disruption from ashfall was long-lasting and widespread, 
especially in the distal study area. This emphasises the advantages of considering multiple hazards 
for risk assessments, as incorporating impacts from ashfall, in addition to impacts from proximal 
volcanic hazards, is important for improving DRR strategies (UNISDR 2015) and reducing economic 
loss.  
The importance of transportation functionality and consequences for society during volcanic eruptions 
has been one of the crucial factors highlighted by this post-eruption study. In particular, low visibility 
and reduced skid resistance on ash-covered roads was an issue in several locations and attributed to 
increased accident rates. However, surface transportation networks continued to operate in many 
areas outside of exclusion zones, albeit with a reduced level-of-service in some cases. This indicates 
the importance of incorporating indicators of functionality reduction in future risk assessments to 
account for areas of transportation networks that are disrupted, but not necessarily physically 
damaged or closed. Such indicators are especially relevant in locations such as Java where there has 
traditionally been a strong focus on infrastructure destruction (rather than disruption). Additionally, the 
impacts on functionality, along with the unexpected ashfall impacts in distal locations, suggests that 
operational advice could be useful to mitigate impacts in future eruptions. For example, HIM 
thresholds to represent functionality reduction could act as useful prompts for the initiation of 
mitigation measures by transport operators including speed restrictions and clean-up activities.  




The study has demonstrated the potential influence of particle size as well as ash thickness on critical 
infrastructure functionality. For example, accidents due to slippery road surfaces appeared to be more 
commonplace in proximal areas where the ash was coarse, and visibility impairment was frequently 
reported in distal areas where the fine-grained ash was readily remobilised. However, the hazard 
intensity thresholds (in terms of precise ash thickness and particle size distribution for example) 
attributed to such impacts remain unclear. Such information would enable a better understanding of 
the capacity of infrastructure elements to withstand hazards, strengthening resilience in the future 
(Tierney and Bruneau 2007, Ayyub 2014, UNISDR 2015). A system’s ability to perform without 
immediate maintenance or repair is a desirable resilient feature (Vugrin 2016). From the post-eruption 
study, diesel rail transportation networks appear particularly resilient when they encounter light 
ashfall, suggesting that diesel rail could be a less vulnerable transportation mode during future 
eruptions.  
Effective communication between different groups was evident from the post-eruption studies, an 
important concept to aid risk management. Various risk management successes were demonstrated 
through the mitigation strategies implemented before, during and after the eruption, such as the 
widely obeyed advice by motorists to not travel unless absolutely necessary and coordinated and 
collaborative approach to clean-up. However, the clean-up was clearly very labour and resource 
intensive which is another important consideration for recovery planning during future eruptions. 
 
2.7 Summary and Conclusions 
Post-eruption impact assessment studies enable a better understanding of the components of risk – 
hazard, exposure, and particularly vulnerability. They allow better risk assessments in the future 
through more appropriate estimations of consequences for society, including damage and disruption 
to critical infrastructure. The improved risk assessments can inform management strategies before, 
during and/or following volcanic eruptions, increase preparedness for response and recovery, and 
strengthen resilience (UNISDR 2015).  
The short-lived VEI 4 eruption of Kelud on 13-14 February 2014 produced many volcanic hazards 
including PDCs, ballistics, landslides and lahars close to the volcano itself, in addition to tephra, with 
volcanic ash dispersed by winds up to 600 km from the vent. Relatively thick tephra accumulated in 
proximal areas ~0-10 km to the north east and in a zone ~200-250 km west of the vent. Tephra 
accumulations of 200-500 mm in some proximal areas led to severe consequences for agriculture and 
critical infrastructure including surface transportation. However, impacts to transportation networks, 
particularly in terms of reduced functionality, were extensive in distal areas including Yogyakarta, 
located ~220 km to the west of the vent. The total economic impact of the eruption is difficult to 
calculate, although soon after the eruption, the PMI estimated it could be in the region of Rp 1.2 trillion 
(~NZ$ 122 million) (IFRC 2014). 




In proximal areas, the already established and strong relationships between staff at organisations 
such as the three BPBDs, KVO and community groups (including representatives of the risk reduction 
platform, JANGKAR Kelud), appear to have aided the rapid dissemination of consistent warnings and 
information. Much of the general population reacted quickly upon receiving official advice, not 
hesitating to evacuate. However, not all hamlets in the proximal areas received warning messages in 
advance of the eruption with some evacuating as soon as the eruption began, utilising transportation 
routes affected by fresh volcanic hazards. In Yogyakarta, little to no warning of the Kelud eruption and 
potential impacts was received or disseminated until ash fell, around four hours following the eruption. 
Distal volcanoes to Yogyakarta such as Kelud perhaps receive less focus in terms of preparedness 
measures as they are out-of-sight and often more ‘out-of-mind’ than nearby Merapi volcano. However, 
ash from the 2014 Kelud eruption caused more problems in Yogyakarta than that from the 2010 
Merapi eruption, particularly as it was more widespread and of finer grain size (hence readily 
remobilised). A state of emergency for Yogyakarta Special Region Province was declared in the day 
following the Kelud eruption. Interviews and discussions with staff at various organisations and 
members of the public in distal areas revealed that the Kelud ashfall and associated impacts came as 
a huge surprise to most. 
Impacts to transportation infrastructure in the three regencies on the flanks of Kelud varied spatially 
and with hazard intensity. There was complete destruction to parts of the network from the immediate 
proximal hazards, particularly ballistics, PDCs and landslides. Lahars in the days following the 
eruption caused further destruction, completely destroying some bridges. Some surface flooding due 
to blocked drains occurred in village centres. Severe impacts occurred in many of the hamlets within 
~7-10 km of the vent with tephra causing reduced visibility and skid resistance as it fell, and 
accumulations of up to ~500 mm requiring extensive clean-up. In Yogyakarta, there was substantial 
disruption to the road network in the city, particularly due to reduced skid resistance and impaired 
visibility, making it difficult to drive. Risk management strategies included the cancellation of bus 
services and communication of government advice for people to stay off the roads. Despite fewer 
vehicles however, the number of accidents increased. Effects to aviation were global as four of the 
seven Indonesian airports that were closed usually service international flights. The closure (some for 
up to a week) caused flight cancellations and disruption throughout Java and further afield including 
Australia. One aircraft flew through the Kelud ash cloud around six hours after the eruption and 
sustained heavy repair costs as a result. Resilience to ashfall was evident in the diesel rail system 
where the number of train services and capacity was increased to cater for the higher number of 
passengers resulting from aviation and road transportation disruption. 
Following return of residents, a proactive and collaborative approach was largely taken for tephra 
clean-up and recovery. Various people including workers and staff from the BPBDs, Provincial Public 
Works Agency, military, police, fire brigades, volunteers and many residents worked together to clean 
vehicles, public and residential buildings, trees and streets. Spraying fine-grained ash with water and 
clearing immediately after was deemed effective for minimising ash remobilisation. Some recovery 




processes were temporary, such as the replacement of bridges with river crossings or military-built 
structures until funds permit more permanent structures to be built. 
The impact assessment trip following the Kelud 2014 eruption has highlighted several important 
considerations for future volcanic risk assessments that cover the vulnerability of transportation 
networks: 
 Multi-hazard vulnerability and resilience is key for thorough risk assessments. Qualitative and 
semi-qualitative post-eruption findings demonstrated the importance and widespread and 
long-lasting effects of volcanic ash, in addition to proximal hazards, on transportation impacts. 
 Functionality of surface transportation, particularly road networks, can have substantial 
consequences for society. Although routes may remain operational when affected by volcanic 
ash, level-of-service may be reduced through less skid resistance and impaired visibility and 
associated increases in accident rates. Disruption from volcanic ash could be extensive, 
whereas destruction or severe damage from hazards such as PDCs and ballistics is often 
confined to a smaller areas proximal to vents. 
 Further work is required to determine hazard intensity thresholds responsible for 
transportation impacts. The Kelud study has indicated approximate ash thicknesses that may 
be attributable for specific impacts but further quantitative data is required to refine thickness 
thresholds. In addition to informing impact states, such thresholds would be desirable to 
inform volcanic deposit clean-up strategies. The study has also highlighted that other HIMs 
(besides ash thickness – particularly ash particle size) may also play important roles on the 
level of impact that occurs, so further work should also assess the relevance of such 
alternative HIMs. 
 Many of the risk mitigation strategies implemented at Kelud and in affected areas appeared 
highly successful. For example, the clean-up of transportation routes was conducted in a 
coordinated and collaborative manner, effectively reducing volcanic risk. This was likely a 
result of the effective communication between various stakeholders before, during and after 
the time of crisis, which should be encouraged in other volcanically active areas. 
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Volcanic ash deposited on paved surfaces during volcanic eruptions compromises skid resistance, 
which is a major component of road and airfield safety. This can result in increased stopping 
distances for vehicles and higher accident rates. Impacts can be widespread and long lasting, 
particularly during eruptions that continue for weeks to months and where ash is readily dispersed or 
remobilised by wind, vehicles or other human activity. Despite numerous anecdotal observations to 
this effect, few detailed studies have quantified the impacts of volcanic ash on skid resistance. It is 
important to fill this knowledge gap, as the effects of thin ash deposits in particular present a source of 
uncertainty for impact and loss assessment models. We adopt the British pendulum test method in 
laboratory conditions to investigate the skid resistance of road asphalt and airfield concrete surfaces 
covered by ash sourced from various locations in New Zealand. Controlled variations in ash 
characteristics include type (rhyolite and basalt), depth (up to 9 mm thick), wetness, particle size and 
soluble components. We use Stone Mastic Asphalt (SMA) for most road surface tests. However, we 
also test porous asphalt and line-painted road surfaces, and a roller screed concrete mix used for 
airfields. Due to their importance for skid resistance, SMA surface macrotexture and microtexture are 
analysed with semi-quantitative image analysis, microscopy and a standardised sand patch 
volumetric test, which enables determination of the relative effectiveness of different cleaning 
techniques. We find that SMA surfaces covered by thin deposits (~1 mm) of ash result in skid 
resistance values slightly lower than those observed on wet uncontaminated surfaces. At these 
depths, a higher relative soluble content for low-crystalline ash and a coarser particle size results in 
lower skid resistance. Skid resistance results for relatively thicker deposits (3-5 mm) of non-
vesiculated basaltic ash are similar to those for thin deposits. Although there is initially little difference 
in skid resistance between surfaces covered in dry or wet ash, testing indicates that surfaces covered 
by wet ash remain slippery for longer. There are similarities between road asphalt and airfield 
concrete, although there is little difference in skid resistance between bare airfield surfaces and 
airfield surfaces covered by 1 mm of ash. Based on our findings, we provide recommendations for 




Functional transport networks are critical for society both under normal operating conditions and in 
emergencies. During volcanic eruptions, transport networks may be required for the evacuation of 
residents, to allow sufficient access for emergency services or military personnel to enter affected 
areas and for regular societal activities. Once direct threats have subsided, transport networks are 
crucial for both immediate and long-term recovery, including the clean-up and disposal of pyroclastic 
material, and restoration of services and commerce. Thus, it is imperative that effective and realistic 
transport management strategies are incorporated into volcanic contingency planning in areas where 




society and infrastructure are at risk (e.g., Auckland, New Zealand; Kagoshima, Japan; Mexico City, 
Mexico; Naples, Italy; Yogyakarta, Indonesia). 
Volcanic eruptions produce many hazards. Damage to transport from proximal hazards such as lava 
flows, pyroclastic density currents and lahars is often severe, leaving ground routes impassable and 
facilities such as airports closed or inoperable. Volcanic ash (ejected material with particle sizes <2 
mm in diameter) is widely dispersed and, although not necessarily damaging to static transport 
infrastructure, is generally the most disruptive of all volcanic hazards (Johnston and Daly 1997, 
Wilson et al. 2014). Even relatively small eruptions are capable of widespread disruption on surface 
transport and aviation, which may continue for months due to the remobilisation and secondary 
deposition of ash by wind, traffic or other human activities, even after an eruption has subsided. 
To date studies on the impacts of volcanic hazards to society have focussed on the effects of ash 
(e.g. Guffanti et al. 2009, Wilson et al. 2009, Horwell et al. 2010, Wilson et al. 2011, Dunn 2012, 
Wardman et al. 2012a, Wilson et al. 2012a, Stewart et al. 2013, Wilson et al. 2014). These studies 
and reports suggest four frequently occurring types of volcanic ash impacts on surface transport: 
1. Reduction of skid resistance on roads and runways covered by volcanic ash. 
2. Coverage of road and airfield markings by ash. 
3. Reduction in visibility during initial ashfall and any ash re-suspension. 
4. Blockage of engine air intake filters which can lead to engine failure. 
Despite much anecdotal evidence, there has been little work to quantify the impact of ash on surface 
transport including roads and airfields. Quantitative, empirical evidence could inform management 
strategies in syn-eruptive and post-ashfall environments such as evacuation planning, safe travel 
advice in the recovery phase and recommended clean-up operations.  
Existing studies of exposed critical infrastructure have generally focussed on very large eruptions and 
ashfall deposits >10 mm thick, rarely reporting the effects from ashfall <10 mm thick (Wilson et al. 
2012a). This presents a source of uncertainty for emergency management planning and loss 
assessment models, which is important, as thin deposits are more frequent and often cover larger 
areas (Pyle 1989). Some notable eruptions that have led to reported reduced skid resistance on roads 
in the past are highlighted in Table 3.1. Wilson et al. (2014) suggest that impacts start at ~2-3 mm ash 
thickness, although there have been few studies that have quantified such impacts in detail. Indeed, 
the limited quantitative data available from historic observations generally relates impacts to 
approximate depths of ash, which may not be the best metric: ash characteristics such as particle 
size, ash type, degree of soluble components and wetness, may influence or even control the level of 
skid resistance. We investigate the importance of these alternative characteristics in this paper.  
Here, we present experimental methods and results from the University of Canterbury’s Volcanic Ash 
Testing Laboratory (VAT Lab) on the reduction of skid resistance on surfaces covered by volcanic 
ash. We test the skid resistance on road and airfield surfaces using the British Pendulum Tester 




(BPT), a standard instrument used by road engineers for surface friction testing since its development 
in the 1950s (Wilson 2006), and still used in many countries, particularly at problematic road sites. 
Despite the widespread and frequent use of the BPT by road engineers, we are unaware of other 
studies that have utilised the instrument on ash-covered surfaces. 
 
Table 3.1   Historical reports of reduced skid resistance following volcanic eruptions. There may be other 
instances described as ‘general impacts to transportation’ or which have not been recorded in the literature. 
 
Information from 1Warrick 1981, 9Johnston 1997, 7Stammers 2000, 8Durand et al. 2001, 5Nairn 2002, 2Cole and 
Blumenthal 2004, 3Cole et al. 2005, 11Leonard et al. 2006, 13Wilson (2009 unpublished field notes), 6Barnard 
2009, 10USGS 2009, 14Jamaludin 2010, 4Wilson et al. 2011, 17Wilson (2011 unpublished field notes), 15Wardman 
et al. 2012a, 12Wilson et al. 2012b, 16Wilson et al. 2013, 18Volcano Discovery 2014. 
 
3.3 Skid Resistance 
Skid resistance (i.e. the force developed when a tyre that is prevented from rotating slides along a 
pavement surface (Highway Research Board 1972)) is a fundamental component of road safety and 
should be managed so that it is adequate to enable safe operation (Dookeeram et al. 2014). Skid 
resistance is also essential for airfields to enable sufficient acceleration, deceleration and change in 
direction of aircraft on the surface (ICAO 2013). It has become particularly important since the advent 
of turbojet aircraft with their greater weight and high landing speeds (FAA 1997, Blastrac 2015). Skid 
resistance is essentially a measure of the Coefficient of Friction (CoF) obtained under standardised 
conditions in which the many variables are controlled so that the effects of surface characteristics can 
be isolated (Wilson and Chan 2013).  
Skid resistance of surfaces changes over time, typically increasing in the first two years following 
pavement construction for roads due to the wearing by traffic, and rough aggregate surfaces 
becoming exposed, then decreasing over the remaining pavement life as aggregates become 
polished (Asi 2007).  
Volcano and country Year Ash thickness (mm) Observations related to skid resistance
St Helens, United States of America 1980 17 Ash became slick when wet
1,2,3
Hudson, Chile 1991 not specified Traction problems from ash on road
4
Tavurvur and Vulcan, Papua New Guinea 1994 1000 Vehicles sunk and stuck in deep ash, although passable if hardened
5,6,7
Sakurajima, Japan 1995 >1 Roads slippery
6,8
Ruapehu, New Zealand 1995-96 "thin" Slippery sludge from ash-rain mix (roads closed)
6,9
Soufrière Hills, United Kingdom (overseas territory) 1997 not specified Rain can turn particles into a slurry of slippery mud
10
Etna, Italy 2002 2-20 Traction problems, although damp and compacted ash easier to drive on
6
Reventador, Ecuador 2002 2-5 Vehicles banned due to slippery surfaces
6,11
Chaitén, Chile 2008 not specified Reduced traction caused dam access problems
12,13
Merapi, Indonesia 2010 not specified Slippery roads caused accidents (Figure 2) and increased journey times
14
Pacaya, Guatemala 2010 20-30 Slippery roads with coarse ash
15
Puyehue-Cordón Caulle, Chile 2011 >100 2WDs experienced traction problems (wet conditions)
16
Shinmoedake, Japan 2011 not specified Ladders very slippery
17
Sinabung, Indonesia 2014 80-100 Road travel impracticable in wet muddy ash
18




 Surface macrotexture and microtexture 
Surface friction is primarily a result of the macrotexture and microtexture of road and airfield 
pavements; these are thus intrinsically linked to skid resistance. As defined by the World Road 
Association-PIARC (1987): 
 Macrotexture defines the amplitude of pavement surface deviations with wavelengths from 
0.5 to 50 mm.  
 Microtexture is the amplitude of pavement surface deviations from the plane with wavelengths 
less than or equal to 0.5 mm, measured at the micron scale (Ergun et al. 2005).  
Microtexture, a property of each individual aggregate chip, contributes to skid resistance for vehicles 
at low speed (i.e. the tyre rubber locally bonds to the surface through adhesion). Microtexture varies 
from harsh to polished. When a pavement is newly constructed, microtexture is particularly rough; 
however, once in service, microtexture changes due to the effects of traffic and weather conditions 
(Ergun et al. 2005). Macrotexture, the coarse texture of pavement surface aggregates, helps to 
reduce the potential for aquaplaning and provides skid resistance at high speeds through the effect of 
hysteresis (caused by the surface projections deforming the tyre) (Wilson and Chan 2013, 
Dookeeram et al. 2014). Typically, if the surface binder and aggregate chips have been appropriately 
applied, macrotexture levels should gradually and linearly decrease over time as the aggregate 
surface slowly abrades (Wilson 2006).  
 Road skid resistance 
The minimum recommended values of skid resistance and calculated corresponding CoFs for 
different sites on road networks that are measured with the BPT under typical wet conditions are 
shown in Table 3.2 and are reported in various literature sources internationally (e.g. British 
Pendulum Manual 2000, Asi 2007, Impact 2010). 
 
Table 3.2   Minimum recommended Skid Resistance Values for different road network sites, under wet 
conditions and measured using the British Pendulum Tester (British Pendulum Manual 2000, Asi 2007, 
Impact 2010). 
 
Type of site 
Minimum recommended 
Skid Resistance Value 
Corresponding 
Coefficient of Friction 
Difficult sites such as: 
65.0 0.74 
(a) Roundabouts 
(b) Bends with radius less than 150 
m on unrestricted roads 
c) Gradients, 1 in 20 or steeper, of 
lengths >100 m 




d) Approaches to traffic lights on 
unrestricted roads 
Motorways and heavily trafficked 
roads in urban areas (with >2000 
vehicles per day) 
55.0 0.60 
All other sites 45.0 0.47 
 
Rain, snow and ice are common hazards that compromise the quality of road surfaces (Benedetto 
2002, Andrey 1990, Cova and Conger 2003) by interfering with surface macrotexture and 
microtexture. Bennis and De Wit (2003) and Persson et al. (2005) quantified how surface friction 
varies with time during a short rain shower following a reasonable period of no rain (Figure 3.1). The 
measured skid resistance significantly reduces immediately after rainfall and then recovers to a more 
typical wet skid resistance. However, the effect of individual contaminants, such as vehicle residues 
and atmospheric dust, on surface friction is poorly understood (Wilson 2006).  
 
 
Figure 3.1   Variation in CoF during a rain event (after Bennis and De Wit 2003, Persson et al. 2005, Wilson 
2006, Do et al. 2014). 
 
Many studies have focused on snow- and rain-related crashes in northern states of the U.S. (e.g., Qin 
et al. 2006, Khattak and Knapp 2001, Oh et al. 2009; Abdel-Aty et al. 2011). We propose that 
parallels may be drawn between such hazards and the hazard presented by ashfall on roads. 
Following a review of the literature, Aström and Wallman (2001) summarise typical CoFs for different 
road conditions (Table 3.3).  The effect of hazards such as ice and snow can be substantial with most 




Skid Resistance Values (SRVs) under such conditions falling below the minimum recommended 
levels (Table 3.2). Skid resistance is very limited under black ice conditions.  
 
Table 3.3   Skid Resistance Values and calculated corresponding CoFs for different road conditions 
(adapted from Aström and Wallman 2001). The two measures of friction are related by the equation: CoF = (3 x 
SRV) / (330 – SRV) (Lester 2014). 
 
Type of Site Typical Skid Resistance Value 
Corresponding 
Coefficient of Friction 
Dry, bare surface 69.5-82.5 0.8-1.0 
Wet, bare surface 62.4-69.5 0.7-0.8 
Packed snow 20.6-30.0 0.20-0.30 
Loose snow / slush 
20.6-47.1 (higher value when 
tyres in contact with pavement) 
0.20-0.50 
Black ice 15.7-30.0 0.15-0.30 
Loose snow on black ice 15.7-25.4 0.15-0.25 
Wet black ice 5.4-10.6 0.05-0.10 
 
 Airfield skid resistance 
In addition to the contaminants mentioned in Section 3.3.2, a common and important contaminant on 
airport runway surfaces is tyre rubber. With repeated aircraft landings, rubber from tyres can cover the 
entire surface of landing areas, filling the surface voids and reducing macrotexture and microtexture, 
resulting in loss of aircraft braking capacity and directional control, especially when runways are wet 
(FAA 1997, Blastrac 2015). The extent of rubber tyre contaminant accumulation on runways is 
dependent on the volume and type of aircraft which use the airport (FAA 1997).  
Unfortunately, there is no common index for ground friction measurements on airfields. Currently, 
individual airport operating authorities are responsible for providing any take-off and landing 
performance data as a function of a braking coefficient with ground speed, and relating this data to a 
friction index measured by a ground device (EASA 2010). CoF values measured by Continuous 
Friction Measuring Equipment (CFME) can be used as guidelines for evaluating friction deterioration 
of runway pavements (FAA 1997). The CoFs for three classification levels for FAA qualified CFME 
operated at 65 and 95 km/h test speeds are shown in Table 3.4. There are no airfield guideline 
thresholds for the BPT as it only provides spot friction measurements of the surface (and is not 
classified as CFME). However, BPTs are sometimes used on runways and we thus summarise BPT 
results for airfield concrete surfaces in Section 3.5 
 




Table 3.4   Guideline friction values for three classification levels for FAA qualified CFME operated at 65 
and 95 km/h test speeds (FAA 1997). Note that there are no airfield guideline thresholds for the BPT which is 
not CFME and only provides spot friction measurements.  
 
 Volcanic ash and skid resistance 
Due to its rapid formation, volcanic ash particles comprise various proportions of vitric (glassy, non-
crystalline), crystalline or lithic (non-magmatic) particles (Wilson et al. 2012a) which are usually hard 
and highly angular. Volcanic ash properties are influenced by various factors, including the magma 
source type, distance from the vent, weather conditions and time since the eruption. Important 
volcanic ash properties include:  
 Particle size and surface area 
 Composition and degree of soluble components 
 Hardness and vesicularity 
 Angularity and abrasiveness 
 Wetness. 
Since coarser and denser particles are deposited close to the source, fine glass and pumice shards 
are relatively enriched in ash fall deposits at distal locations (Sarna-Wojcicki et al. 1981). Newly 
erupted ash has coatings of soluble components (Matsumoto et al. 1988, Delmelle et al. 2005) 
resulting from interactions with volcanic gases and their new surfaces. Mineral fragment composition 
is dependent on the chemistry of the magma from which it was erupted, with the most explosive 
eruptions dispersing high silica rhyolite rich in hard quartz fragments (Heiken and Wohletz 1985, 
Wardman et al. 2012b). Volcanic ash is very abrasive (Blong 1984, Labadie 1994, Heiken et al. 1995, 
65 km/h 95 km/h 




Johnston 1997, Miller and Casadevall 2000, Gordon et al. 2005) with the degree of abrasiveness 
dependent on the hardness of the material forming the particles and their shape; high angularity leads 
to greater abrasiveness (Wilson et al. 2012a). Most abrasion occurs from particles <500 μm in 
diameter, with a sharp increase in the abrasion rate from 5 to 100 μm (Gordon et al. 2005). 
Skid resistance from volcanic ash may be different to that expected from other contaminants due to 
cementitious and vesicular properties of the ash. There is also potential for large thicknesses to 
develop on ground surfaces or contamination to reoccur once cleaned due to re-suspension and re-
deposition. There have been several instances where road line markings have become obscured by 
settled volcanic ash (e.g. Mt Reventador 2002, Leonard et al. 2006; Mt Hudson 1991, Wilson et al. 
2011). An ash thickness of only ~0.1 mm can lead to road marking coverage in some cases (Blake et 
al. in review). Drivers can unintentionally drive over road markings, which may have different skid 
resistance properties to unmarked road surfaces. Additionally, with ash accumulation, the vibrations 
that drivers receive from rumble strips incorporated in some markings will likely be subdued or even 
eliminated, decreasing road safety further. Vehicle accidents during or after ashfall (e.g. Figure 3.2) 
are a particular concern where no road closures occur, due to decreased braking ability and 
increased stopping distances caused by low skid resistance.  
 
 
Figure 3.2   Vehicle accident attributed to reduced skid resistance after ashfall from Merapi volcano, 
Indonesia (2010) (Anderson 2010). 
 
At airports, ash accumulation above trace amounts usually requires closure and the removal of ash 
from airfields before full operations can resume, both of which incur considerable expense (Guffanti et 
al. 2009). For example, the eruption of Mt. Redoubt volcano in Alaska in 1989 resulted in a minimum 
loss of US $21 million at Anchorage International airport (Tuck et al. 1992). Many airports face closure 
even before ash settles on the airfield due to potential damage to aircraft by airborne ash, or solely 
the threat of ash in the vicinity. As such, there are limited observations of ash resulting in reduced skid 




resistance on airfields, although Guffanti et al. (2009) note that slippery runways are one of the 
primary hazards to airports from volcanic eruptions. 
 
3.4 Methods 
 Sample preparation 
 Volcanic ash 
Volcanic ash samples derived from four different volcanic sources in New Zealand were used in this 
study to investigate two volcanic ash types (basalt and rhyolite) and to span a range of hardness and 
mineral components. The locations and ash types are shown in Table 3.5. Compositions and 
characteristics were selected as they are representative of ash likely to be encountered in the future 
in New Zealand, but are also common worldwide. For logistical and supply reasons, experimentation 
on basaltic ash was focussed on a proxy ash sourced from locally abundant basaltic lava blocks from 
the Lyttelton Volcanic Group at Gollans Bay Quarry in the Port Hills of Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Ash was physically produced from the blocks by splitting, crushing and pulverisation as described by 
Broom (2010) and Wilson et al. (2012), a method generally found to provide good correlations with 
real volcanic ash grain sizes. Some of the proxy Lyttelton basaltic ash produced was pulverised and 
sieved to 1000 μm and some to 106 μm to investigate the effect of grain size on skid resistance. In 
addition, further basaltic ash was sourced from deposits originating from the Pupuke eruption in the 
Auckland Volcanic Field and Punatekahi eruptions in the Taupo Volcanic Zone. Rhyolitic ash was 
sourced from deposits from the Hatepe eruption in the Taupo Volcanic Zone. These three samples 
were pulverised (splitting and crushing was not necessary due to their smaller original sizes) and 
sieved to 1000 μm (Table 3.5). The grain size distributions for all samples are shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Table 3.5   Ash samples prepared for testing. RCL = Ruapehu Crater Lake, WICL = White Island Crater Lake. 
 
 





Figure 3.3   Mean particle size distribution analysed using a Micromeritics Saturn DigiSizer II Laser-Sizer 
(3x runs per sample). Note that the maximum particle sizes for the four samples that were sieved to 1000 μm 
are in fact <500 μm, likely due to the pulverisation process. Some particles for the LYT-BAS4 sample (sieved to 
106 μm) exceed 106 μm due to the often-tabular nature of volcanic ash particles and their ability to pass through 
the sieve mesh when vertically orientated. 
 
As fresh ash contains adhered soluble components, we dosed a portion of our ash samples with fluid 
from volcanic crater lakes to mimic the volatile adsorption processes which occur in volcanic plumes, 
thus enabling the effects of soluble components on skid resistance to be studied. A dosing method 
using fluids from the crater lakes of Ruapehu and White Island volcanoes, New Zealand, described by 
Broom (2010) and Wilson et al. (2012), was used for a portion of the 1000 μm Lyttelton and 
Punatekahi basaltic ash samples for road testing, and Pupuke basaltic ash sample for airfield testing. 
The following dosing solutions were used as work by Broom (2010) and Wilson et al. (2012) 
established that they produce samples representative of real fresh volcanic ash: 
 100% strength Ruapehu Crater Lake fluid (Appendix B1), i.e. no dilution, mixed at a ratio of 
1:1 (ash to dosing agent) 
 20% strength White Island Crater Lake fluid (Appendix B1), i.e. 4 parts de-ionised water to 1 
part White Island Crater Lake fluid, mixed at a ratio of 4:1 (ash to dosing agent) 
We undertook a water leachate test using the method outlined by Stewart et al. (2013) to measure the 
concentration of dissolved material in solution for all of the samples used and verify the effectiveness 
of dosing. Both 1:20 and 1:100 ratios of ash (g) to de-ionised water (ml) were used. The water 
leachate test findings (Appendix B2) revealed that the soluble components in the samples we dosed 
(LYT-BAS2, LYT-BAS3, PUN-BAS2, PUN-BAS3, PUP-BAS3) were considerably higher than those 





































effects of this characteristic on skid resistance. Additionally, the lowest pH values were generally 
recorded for the dosed samples.   
 Test surfaces 
Stone Mastic Asphalt (SMA) surfaces are commonly used on modern motorways, such as in parts of 
the UK and on the Auckland State Highway Network in New Zealand (Boyle 2005). However, 
concerns have been raised about its use, as initial skid resistance may be low until the thick binder 
film is worn down: it sometimes takes up to two years for the material to offer an acceptable level of 
skid resistance (Bastow et al. 2004, BBC 2005, Daily Telegraph 2008). The desire to have good 
macrotexture led to the development of Open Graded Porous Asphalt (OGPA; Boyle 2005). 
For this study, we focus mainly on tests of skid resistance for SMA surfaces using 300 x 300 x 45 mm 
slabs, newly constructed by the Road Science Laboratory in Tauranga, New Zealand. We also 
conducted some comparative tests on OGPA also constructed by the Road Science Laboratory, and 
on concrete surfaces constructed as 220 x 220 x 40 mm slabs by Firth Concrete. The concrete mix 
was compiled with the same specifications as used for placement via manual labour and a roller 
screed on the airfield (i.e. runways, taxiways and hardstand areas) at Auckland Airport, although we 
note that airfield surfaces vary between countries and airports. However, unless otherwise specified, 
we refer to SMA surfaces in this paper. 
 Painted road markings 
Under typical conditions, road markings reduce accident rates (NZRF 2005) as they provide 
continuous visual guidance of features such as road edges and centres. However, when non-
mechanical markings such as paint and thermoplastics are applied, the microtexture of the road 
surface changes and, with thicker non-mechanical markings, the macrotexture also alters as voids in 
the asphalt become filled. Consequently, localised skid resistance can be substantially reduced. The 
skid resistance of the markings is generally lower than that for the bare pavement, although the 
addition of retroreflective glass beads to the surface can increase skid resistance to more acceptable 
levels (NZRF 2005). As little as 0.1 mm of volcanic ash may obscure road markings (Blake et al. in 
review), meaning that drivers may unintentionally travel over marked road surfaces (e.g. such as 
crossing centre lines). Further accumulation may inhibit the effectiveness of rumble strips which 
normally cause vibrations within the vehicle. 
Paint is the most common form of road marking material used in many countries, including New 
Zealand, and is typically applied by spraying in dry film with thicknesses varying from 70 μm to 500 
μm  (NZRF 2009). In New Zealand, retroreflective glass beads are often applied to longitudinal centre 
line paint but not to paint on the road margins (Howard Jamison, Roading Supervisor, personal 
communication, 2014). Road lines are usually re-painted once or twice a year to account for abrasion, 
with skid resistance decreasing as the paint fills more voids in the asphalt surface. With a typical 
asphalt lifespan of ~10 years, marking paint accumulation can be substantial in places (Howard 




Jamison, Roading Supervisor, personal communication, 2014).  In this study we test skid resistance 
on SMA slabs, machine painted by Downer Group with a typical road paint (Damar Bead Lock oil-
based paint containing 63% solids), in four forms: 
 1x application (180-200 μm thick) without retroreflective glass beads 
 1x application (180-200 μm thick) with retroreflective glass beads 
 4x applications (720-800 μm thick) without retroreflective glass beads 
 4x applications (720-800 μm thick) with retroreflective glass beads. 
The asphalt with one application of paint is used to replicate markings that have been heavily 
abraded, whereas that with four applications mimics typical marking thickness found on New Zealand 
roads (Howard Jamison, Roading Supervisor, personal communication, 2014).  
 Skid Resistance Testing 
The test procedure for the BPT (Figure 3.4) is standardised in the ASTM E303 (2013) method. It is a 
dynamic pendulum impact type test, based on the energy loss occurring when a rubber slider edge is 
propelled across the test surface. The method is intended to correlate with the performance of a 
vehicle with patterned tyres braking with locked wheels on a wet road at 50 km/h (Impact 2010). Since 
the BPT is designed to test the skid resistance of extensive surfaces in-situ, care was taken to ensure 
that the instrument was stable and slabs were aligned before conducting our testing in the laboratory 
environment. Both 3” rubber mounted TRL (55) sliders (used for road testing) and 3” CEN sliders 
(used for airfield testing), purchased from Cooper Technology UK, were used in our study. 
 





Figure 3.4   British Pendulum Tester (BPT) used for surface friction testing. 
 
3.4.2.1 Surfaces not covered by ash 
As the ASTM E303 (2013) method states, the direct values are measured as British Pendulum 
(Tester) Numbers (BPNs). Typically, tests using the BPT are conducted on wet surfaces. However, as 
we are also investigating the effects of dry volcanic ash on skid resistance, we also ran the 
experiments under dry conditions. For surfaces not covered in ash, we adopted the same technique 
as used by the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) (TNZ 2003), whereby for each test surface 
area, results of a minimum of five successive swings which do not differ by more than 3 BPNs are 
recorded. The mean of the 5 BPNs is then calculated to give a value representing skid resistance (i.e. 
the Skid Resistance Value (SRV)). The tests were conducted on every side of each slab to retrieve 
four SRVs (later averaged) for each condition. CoFs for each mean SRV are calculated using the 
equation provided by Lester (2014): 
CoF = (3 x SRV) / (330 – SRV)        (1) 
3.4.2.2 Surfaces covered by ash 
The ash characteristics analysed during experimentation and production techniques are summarised 
in Appendix B3. For the surfaces covered in ash, we use two test methods to replicate different ash 
settling conditions in combination with vehicle movement effects: 




1. A similar procedure as adopted by the NZTA (TNZ 2003) whereby five successive swings 
are recorded, which do not differ by more than 3 BPNs and the SRV calculated. Between 
each swing, ash which has been displaced by the pendulum movement is replenished 
with new ash of the same type (and re-wetted if applicable) to maintain a consistent depth 
(and wetness). This test method mimics to some degree the effect of vehicles driving 
during ash fall, with ash settling on a road surface and filling any voids left by vehicle 
tyres before the next vehicle passes. A mean SRV is calculated by repeating the test on 
all four sides of each asphalt slab.  
 
2. Eight successive swings of the pendulum are taken over each ash-covered test surface 
area but ash is not replenished between each swing. For each swing, the BPN is taken to 
be the SRV, allowing the change in skid resistance to be observed through analysis of the 
individual results. If the original surface has been wetted, further water is applied between 
each swing. To some degree, this method represents vehicle movement over an ash-
covered surface in dry or wet conditions, where ashfall onto the road surface has ceased. 
A mean SRV is calculated for each successive swing by repeating the test on all four 
sides of each asphalt slab where possible. 
In dry field conditions, the impact of remobilised ash might be more substantial than captured in the 
laboratory tests. However, some remobilisation during experimentation is achieved as a result of the 
pendulum arm movement and associated ash disturbance. 
3.4.2.3 Cleaning 
Following testing, the ash was cleaned from the asphalt concrete slabs by brushing and using 
compressed air if dry, or a combination of compressed air, water and light scrubbing if wet. Wetted 
slabs were then left to air-dry for 3-4 days before any further dry tests were conducted.  
3.4.3 Macrotexture 
3.4.3.1 Sand patch method 
This volumetric technique is standardised in the ASTM E965 (2006) method and summarised in 
Appendix B4. It involves a procedure for determining the average depth of pavement macrotexture by 
careful application of a known volume of spherical glass beads on the surface and subsequent 
measurement of the total area covered. The average pavement macrotexture depth is calculated 
using the following equation: 
 MTD = 4V / πD2         (2) 
where MTD = mean texture depth of pavement macrotexture (mm), V = sample volume (mm3) and D 
= average diameter of the area covered by the material (mm). 




We use this approach to determine the macrotexture of new non-contaminated SMA surfaces and 
SMA surfaces that were contaminated by ash but have undergone testing (10x BPT swings) and 
cleaning (Section 3.4.2.3). The method is not suitable for the airfield concrete slabs due to there being 
considerably fewer voids at the macrotexture scale and thus a much larger area would be required to 
conduct the test. 
3.4.3.2 Image analysis 
In addition to the ASTM sand patch method, a visual technique involving digital photography and 
image analysis was adopted to distinguish between ash and asphalt at a macrotextural level on the 
SMA slabs. This provides a proxy for surface macrotexture and allows the relative success of 
cleaning techniques in relation to ash removal and skid resistance reduction to be quantitatively 
assessed through the calculation of remaining ash coverage. The light-coloured rhyolitic volcanic ash 
(sample ID: HAT-RHY) was used to allow easy visual interpretation between the ash and dark-
coloured asphalt concrete. 
 White paint was marked on the edge of the slabs in order to identify the same segment of the 
slab between each testing round. 
 A Fuji Finepix S100 (FS) digital SLR camera (with settings: Manual, ISO 800, F6.4, 10-
second timer) was mounted on a tripod directly above the asphalt slab. 
 Halogen tripod worklights were used to illuminate the surface of the slab and all ambient light 
was blocked out using black sheeting before images were taken to keep lighting levels 
consistent between photos. 
 Images were analysed for percentage coverage of ash by means of ‘training’ and 
‘segmentation’ using ‘Ilastik’ and ‘Photoshop’ software. 
3.4.3 Microtexture – microscopy 
A Meiji EMZ-8TRD (0.7-4.5 zoom) stereomicroscope and Lumenera Infinity 1 digital camera were 
used to capture images of 10 x 10 mm areas on the asphalt slabs and thus enable visual identification 
of remaining ash particles at a microtextural level. The microscope was mounted directly above the 
slab and Leica CLS 100 LED fibre-optic lighting was used to illuminate the section of interest, with all 
ambient light blocked using black sheeting. A portable (300 x 300 mm internal dimension) grid (with 
10 mm squares) was constructed to fit securely over the slab and allow easy identification of specific 
segments between each testing round (Appendix B5). 
 




3.5 Results and Discussion 
3.5.1 Consistent depth 
When ash was replenished between each swing, the skid resistance remained relatively constant with 
time, permitting calculation of a mean SRV for each condition. The mean SRVs and corresponding 
CoFs for the non-contaminated SMA (new and cleaned) and for the SMA covered by three samples 
sieved to 1000 μm are shown in Figure 3.5. Similarly, the SRVs and CoFs for the airfield concrete, 
both clean and covered by two samples sieved to 1000 μm are shown in Figure 3.6. The Pupuke 
volcano sample (PUP-BAS1) was found to have very similar values to the Punatekahi (PUN-BAS1) 
sample. This was expected as they are both scoriaceous basalt. Due to limitations in available ash 
and time constraints, full testing was only conducted with one of the scoriaceous samples on the SMA 
and airfield concrete.  
 
 
Figure 3.5   Mean SRVs and CoFs for the non-contaminated SMA and SMA covered in the three ash types 
sieved to 1000 μm. Wet and dry samples at 1, 3, 5 and 7 mm thicknesses are shown although limitations in the 
quantity of rhyolite (HAT-RHY) meant that testing was only conducted at 1 and 5 mm thickness for this ash type. 
The error bars represent the standard deviation for each data set. Also displayed (as red dashed lines) are the 









Figure 3.6   Mean SRVs and COFs for the non-contaminated airfield concrete and airfield concrete 
covered in the two ash types sieved to 1000 μm. Wet and dry samples at 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 mm thicknesses are 
shown. The error bars represent the standard deviation for each data set. 
  
3.5.1.1 Ash type and wetness 
Anecdotal observations during historical eruptions suggest that skid resistance on roads is reduced 
following dry unconsolidated ash accumulation. This is consistent with our results, which also reveal 
that reduced SRVs are particularly pronounced under dry conditions for a 1 mm thick ash layer on 
asphalt (Figure 3.5). Mean SRVs for all 1 mm thick ash types fall below the minimum recommended 
SRV for difficult sites (an SRV of 65). Wet 1 mm ash-covered surfaces are not necessarily more 
slippery than dry 1 mm ash-covered surfaces and the wet surfaces covered in 1 mm thick ash are 
only slightly more slippery than the wet asphalt without ash contamination.  
For the 3 and 5 mm thick ash-covered asphalt surfaces, we observe different trends. The LYT-BAS1 
sample has similar SRVs to the 1 mm thick ash layer and the mean SRV for 5 mm is near the 
recommended minimum SRV for motorways (SRV 55). Samples PUN-BAS1 and HAT-RHY however, 
have greater SRVs than those for 1 mm of ash, suggesting that these ash types are perhaps less 
slippery when thicker, especially sample PUN-BAS1. The wetted PUN-BAS1 and HAT-RHY >1 mm 
samples have increasing SRVs as thickness increases. SRV values exceed those for bare wet 
asphalt surfaces and are similar to those for dry bare asphalt surfaces when ash is >5 mm thick. The 
(Airfield) 




vesicular nature of these two samples may play a role in increasing SRVs with the individual particles 
perhaps able to effectively interlock with one another and with the asphalt aggregate beneath. The 
pumiceous HAT-RHY sample is more friable than the PUN-BAS1 sample, which may explain the 
slight difference in SRVs between the two. We note that the pendulum arm may be slowed upon initial 
impact with the thicker deposits, producing higher than true representative SRVs. However, the 
comparatively low SRVs for the 5 mm thick LYT-BAS1 sample suggest that other ash characteristics 
are also important. 
Compared to asphalt, there is less difference between SRVs for bare airfield concrete surfaces and 
those covered by 1 mm of ash (Figure 3.6), perhaps due to the initially smooth surface when bare. 
However, as with the asphalt, results suggest little difference in slipperiness between wet and dry 
surfaces with 1 mm of ash deposition. The scoriaceous and vesicular sample PUP-BAS1 exhibits 
especially large SRVs as thickness is increased, reinforcing our hypothesis that ash of this type is 
less slippery when thicker. Following the addition of ash, the apparent increase in SRVs to values 
greater than those for bare surfaces may be a function of the pendulum arm slowing upon contact. 
3.5.1.2  Soluble components 
There are no clear differences in SRVs observed between non-dosed and dosed LYT-BAS ash at 1 
mm thick (Figure 3.7). However, the highly crystalline properties of this ash type may reduce the 
impact that dosing has on SRVs. SRVs for the dosed scoriaceous PUN-BAS ash used on road 
asphalt (Figure 3.7) and dosed scoriaceous PUP-BAS ash used on airfield concrete (Figure 3.8) are 
generally less than those which are not dosed. For all ash thicknesses, the PUN-BAS3 sample (i.e. 
that dosed in WICL fluid) produce lower SRVs than the PUN-BAS2 sample (i.e. that dosed in RCL 
fluid), suggesting that the skid resistance of non-crystalline ash-covered road surfaces decreases if 
the soluble component of the ash increases. This corresponds with Persson et al’s (2005) findings 
from other road contaminants, demonstrating a friction drop at the transition between no rain and rain 
due to the high-viscosity mix of rain water and road debris. As such, only WICL fluid was used to dose 
the PUP-BAS sample (used for airfield concrete) to assess results representative of a ‘likely worse-
case’ SRV scenario. 






Figure 3.7   Mean SRVs and CoFs for the road asphalt covered in non-dosed and dosed LYT-BAS and PUN-BAS ash sieved to 1000 μm. Both samples dosed in RCL 
and WICL fluid under dry and wet conditions are displayed. Due to limitations in dosing fluids and possible interference caused by the crystalline characteristics of the LYT-BAS 
samples, most testing was undertaken using the PUN-BAS samples. Large quantities of freshly dosed ash samples were required for each thick ash test under wet conditions, 
hence only dry conditions were analysed for the 5 and 7 mm thick testing rounds. Also displayed (as red dashed lines) are the minimum recommended SRVs for different road 
network sites (Table 3.2). 
(Road) 







Figure 3.8   Mean SRVs and CoFs for the airfield concrete covered in non-dosed and dosed PUP-BAS ash sieved to 1000 μm. The samples dosed in WICL fluid under 
both dry and wet conditions are displayed. 




3.5.1.3 Ash particle size 
The mean SRVs for fine-grained basaltic ash (LYT-BAS4) are slightly higher than those for the 
coarse-grained ash of the same type (LYT-BAS1) when at 1 mm thickness on roads, with mean 
values for both wet and dry samples above the minimum recommended SRVs for difficult sites 
(Figure 3.9). This concurs with field observations made by the Kagoshima City Office staff following 
frequent volcanic ash deposition on roads from the multiple eruptions of Sakurajima volcano, Japan 
(since 1955). Reports suggest that the finer ash from the recent eruptions at the Showa crater 
resulted in less slippery roads than the generally coarser-grained ash produced during past eruptions 
from the Minami-daki summit area (Kagoshima City Office, personal communication, 08 June 2015). 
We hypothesise that this is due to the finer particles being more easily mobilised and displaced at the 
tyre-asphalt interface, allowing improved contact between the tyre and asphalt. However, no clear 
correlations exist between the fine- and coarse-grained ash when at 5 mm thick, perhaps due to both 
types covering the asphalt surface when the tyre makes contact. 
 
 
Figure 3.9   Mean SRVs and CoFs for the asphalt covered in coarse-grained (i.e. LYT-BAS1, 1000 μm 
sieved) and fine-grained (i.e. LYT-BAS4, 106 μm sieved) samples at 1 mm and 5 mm ash thickness under 
both dry and wet conditions. Also displayed (as red dashed lines) are the minimum recommended SRVs for 








3.5.1.4 Line-painted asphalt surfaces 
SRVs can be reduced substantially as a result of road markings, although the addition of 
retroreflective glass beads can increase values to more acceptable levels (NZRF 2005). This is 
demonstrated in our findings for wet conditions, in which BPT analysis is typically conducted, with 
mean SRVs on line-painted asphalt surfaces with no beads and no ash the lowest of all our results. 
SRVs for these wet surfaces range from 40 to 46, and lie below the minimum recommended skid 
resistance for ‘all other sites’ when 4x coats of line paint have been applied (Figure 3.10). The 
addition of glass beads does increase SRVs (by around 5), although values are still relatively low. 
SRVs for ‘clean’ and dry line-painted asphalt surfaces are very high, but as with non-painted surfaces, 
the addition of a 1 mm ash layer decreases SRVs substantially. Conversely, the SRVs for wet asphalt 
concrete increase with a 1 mm ash layer to similar levels as for dry conditions. With the thicker (5 
mm) ash layer on top of line-painted surfaces, SRVs increase further by around 20 (Figure 3.10).   
 
Figure 3.10   Mean SRVs and CoFs for the road asphalt with line-painted surfaces. Conditions of no ash, 1 
mm thick ash, and 5 mm thick ash (using the LYT-BAS1 ash type) were analysed under both wet and dry 
conditions. Also displayed (as red dashed lines) are the minimum recommended SRVs for different road network 
sites (Table 3.2). 
 
(Road) 




3.5.1.5 Asphalt comparison 
Because of increased macrotexture of the surface, higher SRVs (~5) were measured on the bare 
OGPA than the SMA slabs when wet. Similar differences in SRVs existed between the two asphalt 
types covered by wet volcanic ash (both at 1 mm and 5 mm depths). However, no major differences 
in SRVs were observed between the two asphalt types when dry, whether surfaces were covered by 
ash or not. 
3.5.2 Inconsistent depth  
Where ash was not replenished between each swing, SRVs represent those expected for surfaces 
where ashfall has ceased but where there is some traffic movement. 
3.5.2.1 Ash types and wetness 
SRV results obtained for the samples sieved to 1000 μm (at 1mm and 5 mm ash thickness) and 
deposited on road asphalt are shown in Figure 3.11. Note that tests of other thicknesses (3, 7 and 9 
mm) were also conducted but these have been omitted from the figure for clarity. Despite the large 
standard deviations, the 5 mm thick PUN-BAS1 and HAT-RHY samples initially produced high SRVs. 
However, the SRVs recorded for the first 2-3 swings of the pendulum over 5 mm thick ash should be 
interpreted with caution. This is due to possible interference of the thicker deposit when the pendulum 
slider first impacts the surface; similar circumstances may occur in the field when initial vehicles are 
driven into thicker ash deposits. When wet however, the SRVs are higher than the mean recorded on 
the bare asphalt surface, particularly for the PUN-BAS1 sample, suggesting that thicker layers of 
vesiculated (and especially harder) volcanic ash are perhaps initially less slippery than thin layers of 
ash of those ash types. Observations during our experimentation revealed that the wet 5 mm thick 
vesiculated deposits (PUN-BAS1 and HAT-RHY) consolidated, thus resisting major ash displacement 
more than for dry ash (Figure 3.12), even following several swings of the pendulum arm. The 
consolidated deposits were very firm to touch and, although further work is required to test this, it is 
suggested that light vehicles would be able to drive over the surface without sinking substantially.  
Very similar patterns in skid resistance were observed for the airfield concrete surfaces where ash 
was not replenished between swings. The main difference was that the initially high SRVs for the 
scoriaceous sample (PUP-BAS) decreased more quickly with pendulum swings, most likely due to the 
ash being more easily displaced from the smoother concrete surface than for asphalt. 
 





Figure 3.11   SRVs and corresponding CoFs on asphalt covered by ash sieved to 1000 μm, under (A) dry 
and (B) wet conditions. Also shown are the mean SRVs for bare asphalt, taken from Section 3.5.1. Error bars 
display the standard deviations for each pendulum swing number for the different sample types. Note that the 
first 2-3 swings over 5 mm deposits should be interpreted with caution due to possible impacts on SRVs caused 
by the initial contact between the pendulum slider and surface. 
A (Dry road) 
B (Wet road) 





Figure 3.12   Dry ash displacement from the BPT slider-surface interface after 8x swings of the pendulum 
arm for (a) SMA, and (b) airfield concrete. Dry ash was displaced from the surface more readily than wet ash. 
 
3.5.2.2 Ash particle size 
No major changes were observed for the fine-grained basaltic ash samples (LYT-BAS4) over the 
course of the eight pendulum swings on asphalt, other than a gradual increase in SRVs over time, 
particularly for the dry ash at 1 mm thickness as observed for the coarse-grained samples (Figure 
3.11a). As with the testing where ash was replenished, SRVs for the fine-grained ash samples were 
generally slightly higher than those for coarse-grained samples, suggesting that fine-grained ash is a 
little less slippery than coarser material. 
3.5.2.3 Soluble components 
The testing involving non-replenished dosed ash confirmed the key finding already discussed during 
replenished testing (Section 3.5.1.2): non-crystalline ash containing a higher soluble component 
content generally produces lower SRVs than undosed ash. However, with an increasing number of 
swings of the pendulum, this trend becomes less pronounced, particularly under wet conditions where 
the effect of adding water between each test leaches the samples, thus reducing the soluble 
component content of the ash. 
3.5.2.4 Line-painted asphalt surfaces 
Line-painted asphalt surfaces covered in ash produce relatively low SRVs (Figure 3.13). Although the 
first 2-3 swings involving 5 mm thick ash are not considered, it is evident that wet painted surfaces are 
generally slightly more slippery than painted dry surfaces. The trend of quick SRV recovery (as seen 
in Section 3.5.2.1) is also evident under dry line-painted conditions, when compared to wet conditions 
which remain slippery for longer. Under dry conditions, the addition of retroreflective glass in the line-
paint appears to aid the recovery of skid resistance over time (as shown by the rising green and 
orange lines for the latter swings in Figure 3.13a). However, this trend is not evident for wet 
conditions. 





Figure 3.13   SRVs and corresponding CoFs for line-painted asphalt surfaces covered in 1 mm or 5 mm 
thick LYT-BAS1, under (A) dry, and (B) wet conditions. Only one test was conducted on each surface type 
due to the availability of line-painted slabs. Therefore, no standard deviations were calculated and the results 
should be treated with some caution. Note that the initial 2-3 swings over the 5 mm deposits should be treated 










3.5.3 Surface macro and microtexture  
3.5.3.1 Ash displacement and removal 
The results for mean macrotexture depth calculated using the sand patch method for the bare, clean, 
new asphalt surface and the asphalt surface following dry testing and brushing, and cleaning with 
compressed air after contamination are shown in Table 3.6.  
 
Table 3.6   Mean macrotexture depth of asphalt slab before and after testing/cleaning, calculated using 
the ASTM sand patch method, and percentage ash surface coverage. 
  




Ash surface coverage 
(%) 
Bare, clean and new 1.37 0 
Ashed, 10x BPT swings - 81 
Ashed, 10x BPT swings and 
brushed (10x strokes) 
0.99 40 
Cleaned with compressed air 1.29 <1 
 
The results for the new slab and pre-contaminated slab after cleaning with compressed air suggest 
that there is little difference in macrotexture depth after cleaning using this method. However, cleaning 
using only brush strokes shows a mean macrotexture depth reduction of 0.38 mm, 28% less depth 
than the original new surface. This suggests that cleaning of dry road surfaces using only brushes 
may not be entirely effective and that alternative methods should be considered where possible. To 
confirm this, after brushing and 10x swings of the BPT, some HAT-RHY ash remains - as shown in 
the digital photography macrotexture image sequence (Figure 3.14) and semi-quantitative analysis of 
these images using ‘Ilastik’ and ‘Adobe Photoshop’ gives results of surface coverage (Table 3.6). 
Cleaning using high-pressure water spraying and brushing was more effective than brushing alone at 
removing ash (<1% surface ash coverage afterwards). However, this approach requires large 
quantities of water and the microscope imagery revealed that some small particles of ash remain on 
the surface, which would perhaps still reduce skid resistance somewhat. Field observations from 
Kagoshima, Japan, where high quantities of only low-pressure water are used to clean road surfaces 
indicates that some ash remains on the road surfaces even immediately after cleaning (Kagoshima 
City Office, personal communication, 08 June 2015). Furthermore, clearing ash from roads using 
water may cause some drainage systems to become blocked (Barnard 2009), potentially resulting in 
surface water flooding. 
 






Figure 3.14   Macrotexture image sequence for asphalt. (A) Clean new slab, (B) covered with 1 mm rhyolitic 
ash (100% surface coverage), (C) after 10x BPT swings (81% surface ash coverage), (D) after cleaning with 10x 
brush strokes (40% surface ash coverage), (E) after cleaning with compressed air (<1% surface ash coverage). 
The macrotexture of the surface is visibly affected in images b-d with much ash remaining between the asphalt’s 
aggregate pore spaces, even after 10x BPT swings and cleaning using a brush. 
 
3.5.3.2 Temporal change of skid resistance on bare asphalt surfaces  
In normal conditions, the skid resistance of bare asphalt surfaces changes over time. Typically, during 















aggregate surfaces become exposed, and then decreases over time as the aggregates become more 
polished (Asi 2007). The initial trend of increasing skid resistance was confirmed during our testing of 
the bare wet asphalt and concrete slabs before and after contamination with ash (but following 
cleaning), particularly so for the asphalt (Figure 3.5). We suggest that the abrasive properties of 
volcanic ash accelerates these processes, especially for our testing as all ash particles were <500 μm 
in diameter. Following testing, the SRV of bare wet asphalt had increased by around 5. The 
microscopy imagery showed that the lustrous film on the new asphalt slabs had been removed during 







Figure 3.15   Microscope images on the same segment of asphalt, (A) on the new slab and (B) after 
contamination with volcanic ash and cleaning with compressed air. Much of the shiny film visible on the surface 




3.6.1 Key findings 
Our experiments suggest that the following lead to particularly reduced skid resistance on asphalt 
road surfaces and can thus lead to slippery surfaces following volcanic ashfall: 
 Thin (~1 mm deep) layers of relatively coarse-grained ash, with ash type having little effect at 
this depth (average SRVs of 55-65). 
 Thicker (~ 5 mm deep) layers of hard, non-vesiculated ash (average SRVs of 55-60). 
 Ash of low crystallinity or containing a high degree of soluble components (average SRVs ~5 
lower than for ash that has undergone substantial leaching). 
 Line-painted surfaces that are either dry or wet but covered by thin layers of ash, particularly 
when paint does not incorporate retroreflective glass beads (average SRVs of ~55). 
Importantly, the largest change in skid resistance for surfaces that became covered by ash occurs 
during dry conditions, where SRVs fall to levels just below those for wet non-contaminated surfaces, 
with similar SRVs as the wet contaminated surfaces. This large reduction in skid resistance may not 
A B 
10 mm 




be expected by motorists who may consequently not adjust driving, potentially resulting in high 
accident rates. As time goes on, wet ash deposits on roads are most likely to lead to reduced skid 
resistance, particularly for thicker deposits as these remain slippery for longer (typical SRVs of around 
55).  
Similarities exist for airfield surfaces and the second and third bullet points above are especially true 
for the concrete surface type. The following additional key findings are also drawn: 
 There is little difference in skid resistance between bare airfield surfaces and those covered 
by ~1 mm of ash. 
 Low crystalline ash containing high soluble components may result in SRVs of up to 20 less 
than non-dosed samples, particularly if the ash is thicker (~7-9 mm depth). 
 Ash is more readily displaced on smoother airfield concrete than road asphalt causing SRVs 
to recover to ‘typical non-contaminated’ values at a faster rate with consistent traffic flow. 
3.6.2 Recommendations for road safety 
Based on skid resistance analysis, we make the following recommendations to increase road safety in 
areas with volcanic ashfall exposure of ≤ 5 mm depth: 
 During initial ash fall, vehicle speed (or advisory speed) should immediately be reduced to 
levels below those advised for driving in very wet conditions on that road, whether the surface 
is wet or dry. Wet ash is not necessarily more slippery than dry ash, at least initially. 
 Fresh ash contains more soluble components, which results in lower SRVs than for leached 
ash. Therefore, it is important to advise motorists promptly of any restrictions. 
 Particular caution should be taken on dry surfaces that become covered by coarse-grained 
ash, as skid resistance will reduce substantially from what occurs on dry non-contaminated 
surfaces. The slipperiness of dry surfaces with such contamination may not be expected by 
motorists (SRVs will be similar as for wet fresh ash and slightly less than for wet non-
contaminated conditions).  
 Road markings may be hidden from view, impacting road safety through lack of visual and 
audio guidance of road features. Areas of road that are line-painted and covered in thin ash 
are especially slippery. Motorcyclists and cyclists in particular should take extreme care.  
It is unlikely that road closures will be necessary for thin ash accumulations based on loss of skid 
resistance alone. SRVs rarely fall below the minimum recommended threshold for motorways and 
heavily trafficked roads (i.e. SRV 55) although many values fall between this and the threshold for 
minimum recommended skid resistance for difficult sites (i.e. SRV 65). These results are conservative 
however, because of the typical reduction in skid resistance over the later stages of the pavement life. 
Based on observations from previous eruptions along with work by Barnard (2009), physical 
obstruction to road vehicles may occur once ash deposits exceed ~100 mm, and road closures may 
be necessary. It should be stressed however, that all recommendations given ignore other impacts 




from volcanic ashfall such as visibility impairment, local road authority decisions, breakdowns and 
driver behaviour which often introduce further complexities associated with driving in volcanic ashfall. 
For example, lower thresholds for road closures and lower speed restrictions may be required where 
visibility is reduced. 
3.6.3 Airport safety 
We do not make any specific recommendations for airport safety related to concrete airfield surfaces, 
although it is highlighted that extensive efforts may be required to clean airfield surfaces as has 
occurred following historical eruptions (e.g. Chaitén 2008 (Wilson 2009 unpublished field notes), 
Kelud 2014 (Blake et al. 2015)). It is likely that airports will remain closed until all ash has been 
cleared from runways due to other potential impacts such as damage to aircraft turbine engines. Our 
results suggest that residual ash of minimal depths on concrete airfield surfaces is likely to have little 
effect on skid resistance. However, airport managers should be aware that freshly erupted ash or ash 
that has not been leached (i.e. containing higher soluble components) will likely be more slippery than 
that which has persisted in the environment for some time. As with road asphalt, wet ash is not 
necessarily more slippery than dry ash on airfield concrete and any restrictions implemented should 
thus be in place for both conditions.    
3.6.4 Recommendations for cleaning 
The following advice for road cleaning is given based on our studies of macrotexture and microtexture 
and from the observations during small-scale cleaning conducted on our slabs between skid 
resistance tests:   
 Brushing alone will not restore surfaces to their original condition in terms of skid resistance. 
Following simple brushing practices on asphalt roads, the macrotexture depth may be around 
one third less than the original depth and ~40% ash coverage may occur on the surface.  
 If surfaces are dry and contaminated with dry ash, air blasting combined with suction and 
capture of loosened ash, is an effective way to remove ash from macrotextural pores. Minor 
quantities of ash may remain at the microtextural level although this is deemed too low to 
substantially affect skid resistance. 
 If surfaces are wet, a combination of water spraying and brushing and/or air blasting (with 
suction and ash capture) is an effective way to remove most ash and restore surface skid 
resistance. However, large quantities of water are required and some ash will remain in the 
asphalt pore spaces, especially if low-pressure water is used. Care should be taken if using 
water for ash removal due to the potential for blockage of some drainage systems.  
Ash remobilisation should be carefully considered prior to cleaning. Extensive (and often expensive) 
cleaning efforts may be useless if ash continues to fall or is remobilised from elsewhere and 
deposited onto roads and airfields. 
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Coverage of road markings by volcanic ash is one of the most commonly reported impacts to surface 
transportation networks during volcanic ashfall.  Even minimal accumulation can obscure markings, 
leading to driver disorientation, diminished flow capacity and an increase in accidents. Such impacts 
may recur due to repeated direct ashfall (i.e. during prolonged eruptions) and/or due to the re-
suspension of ash by wind, water, traffic or other human activities, and subsequent secondary 
deposition on the road surface. Cleaning is thus required to restore and maintain road network 
functionality. Previous studies have not constrained ash accumulation measurements to inform road 
cleaning initiation or plans for safe road operations in environments containing ash.  This study uses a 
laboratory approach with digital image analysis to quantify the percentage of white road marking 
coverage by three types of volcanic ash with coarse, medium and fine particle size distributions. We 
find that very small accumulations of ash are responsible for road marking coverage and suggest that 
around 8% visible white paint or less would result in the road markings being hidden. Road markings 
are more easily covered by fine-grained ash, with ash area densities of ~30 g m-2 (estimated at less 
than 0.1 mm surface thickness) potentially causing markings to be obscured. For the coarse ash in 
our study, road marking coverage occurs at area densities of ~1,000 – 2,200 g m-2 (~1.0 – 2.5 mm 
depth) with ash colour and line paint characteristics causing some of the variation. We suggest that 
risk management measures such as vehicle speed reduction and the initiation of road cleaning 
activities, should be taken at or before the lower thresholds as our experiments are conducted at a 




As populations grow worldwide, more people are residing in volcanically active areas, generally with 
associated development and expansion of infrastructure including transportation networks (Loughlin 
et al. 2015). Volcanic ash is the most widely dispersed of all volcanic hazards, often affecting road 
transport potentially hundreds to thousands of kilometers from its source. Common impacts include 
reduced skid resistance and visual range, and engine air filter blockage (Wilson et al. 2014). 
However, perhaps the most frequent and greatest impact during initial ash accumulation is the 
coverage of road markings. Road marking coverage is also recognised as a substantial impact in 
areas affected by duststorms, as experienced for example in parts of the Middle East (Aljassar et al. 
2006) and North America (ADOT 2011). It is of concern, as much of the visual information needed by 
a driver to navigate roads safely is provided by continuous road markings (Gibbons et al. 2004). 
Coverage can lead to driver disorientation (Durand et al. 2001, T.Wilson et al. 2012, USGS 2013) and 
cascading effects on vehicle movement across the road network, such as diminished flow capacity 
and an increase in traffic accidents (Wolshon 2009, Blake et al. 2016). For example, the Automobile 
Association in Australia estimate that if ‘average standard’ road markings are maintained, the 




percentage of crash rates is reduced by between 10 and 40%, depending on the crash type (Carnaby 
2005).  
Road marking coverage by volcanic ash is by no means transient. Impacts may recur due to repeated 
ashfall (i.e. during prolonged eruptions) and/or due to the re-suspension of ash by wind, water, traffic 
or other human activities, and subsequent secondary deposition on the road surface. Road cleaning 
may thus be required to restore and maintain road network functionality. Some authorities (e.g. 
Kagoshima City Office near Sakurajima volcano, Japan) use road marking coverage as a prompt to 
mobilise road sweepers and commence ash removal. In 2014 alone when there were 450 eruptions, 
this led to the removal of 1,274 m3 of ash from the region’s roads (Kagoshima City Office, personal 
communication, June 08 2015). 
Road marking coverage by volcanic ash has been recorded on road networks following a number of 
eruptions, such as Mt St Helens, USA (1980), Hudson, Chile (1991), Ruapehu, New Zealand (1995-
96), Reventador, Ecuador (2002), and during the many ashfall events on Kagoshima City (Japan) 
from Sakurajima volcano (1955-2015) (Becker et al. 2001, Cole et al. 2005, Leonard et al. 2005, 
Barnard 2009, Wilson et al. 2011, Magill et al. 2013). However, a review of available sources reveals 
only limited estimates of volcanic ash thickness that have caused complete coverage, ranging from 
trace amounts to 5 mm. We suggest that other characteristics, such as the size of ash particles, 
colour of ash and road surface texture may account for the range to some extent. At such small 
accumulations however, depths of ash are difficult to measure accurately and other measurements 
such as the area density of ash may be more appropriate. 
In this study at the University of Canterbury’s Volcanic Ash Testing Laboratory (VATLab), we adopt a 
method to replicate volcanic ash deposition on road surfaces by using asphalt slabs painted with two 
thicknesses of line paint. We employ image classification and segmentation techniques to quantify the 
extent of road marking coverage by ash and to determine ash depth and surface area density when 
markings are visually obscured. Based on our findings, suggestions to maintain road safety are made, 
particularly thresholds for road cleaning initiation. 
 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Ash and road surface type 
Stone Mastic Asphalt (SMA), constructed as 300 x 300 x 45 mm slabs (with aggregate particle size 
<13.2 mm and a bitumen content of 5.9 %) by the Road Science Laboratory in Tauranga, New 
Zealand, were placed directly beneath an ash delivery system (Section 4.3.2). Three ash types (a 
basalt of dark colouration, an andesite of medium colouration, and a rhyolite of light colouration) were 
sourced from different ash deposits in New Zealand (Table 4.1) to provide a means of contrast 
comparison (Blake et al. 2016). As the un-modified samples contained coarse material (some up to 
20 mm diameter), all material was dried and then processed using a rock pulveriser and/or sieving to 




achieve three distinct clusters of particle size distributions (Figure 4.1). Spatial distributions of particle 
sizes from ashfall events are often complex. However, ash particle sizes are typically larger closer to 
the vent with smaller particles carried further downwind (Jenkins et al. 2014). 
Particle sizes (Figure 4.1) were determined using a Micrometrics Saturn DigiSizer II Laser-Sizer 
(three runs per sample). We note that the maximum particle sizes for some samples are substantially 
less than the size of the disc measure used for pulverisation or sieve mesh aperture. For example, the 
Pupuke basalt sample in the medium particle size group (Table 4.1) was pulverised with a disc 
spacing of 990 μm and sieved with a mesh aperture of 1000 μm, but all resulting particles are <500 
μm in diameter (Figure 4.1). This is likely due to the process of pulversiation and mechanism of 
breakage. Conversely, the maximum particle sizes for some samples are greater than the size of the 
sieve mesh aperture used (e.g. the fine-grained rhyolite sample, which was sieved at 54 μm but 
contains a fraction of particles up to 280 μm in diameter). This is due to the tabulate form of some ash 
particles and their orientation when passing through the sieve.   
 
Table 4.1   Ash samples used for testing and their characteristics following processing. There is no coarse 





Poutu, Tongariro Hatepe, Taupo 
Time of eruption ~200,000 years BP ~11,000 - 12,000 BP ~1,770 years BP 
Ash type Basalt Andesite Rhyolite 
Colour (determined from 
Munsell Rock Colour 
Chart) 
N4: Medium Dark Grey 
5Y 6/1: Light Olive Grey 
(with a small 10YR 6/6 Dark 
Yellowish Orange 
component when coarse) 
5Y 8/1: Yellowish 
Grey  
SiO2 content 
(determined by Philips 
PW2400 XRF analysis) 
44% (mafic) 52% (intermediate) 70% (felsic) 
Dominant minerals 




Albite, Augite Sanidine, Quartz 
Particle size group  coarse medium fine coarse medium fine medium fine 
Modal particle size 
(μm) (Figure 4.1) 
680 220 40 540 200 40 180 35 
Dry bulk density  
(g cm-3) 
1.1 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.7 
 
Mafic ash such as the Pupuke samples, along with intermediate ash such as Poutu, is relatively 
common from eruptions globally. Eruptions of felsic ash such as Hatepe, are less common (Wicander 
and Monroe 2006), but the high concentration and quantity of lighter elements, high explosivity and 




generally high eruption columns, means that the ash can be dispersed up to hundreds of kilometers 
from the vent (Woo 2009).  
Paint is the most common and widespread form of road marking material in most countries worldwide. 
In this study, Downer Group applied a Damar Beadlock paint, which contains 63% solids, using a 
standard machine on the asphalt concrete slabs. The side of one slab was painted with a single coat 
180-200 μm thick, and the other side with four coats (720-800 μm thick in total) to replicate markings 
that have been exposed to different abrasion or multiple paint applications. The other slab was 
painted with the same thickness lines but with retroreflective glass beads incorporated in the paint 
mix. 
 
Figure 4.1   Mean particle size distributions of samples used in experimentation and their designated 
classification discussed in this article (i.e. coarse, medium and fine). 
 
4.3.2 Ash application and measurement 
The ash delivery system used comprises of a 400 x 400 x 100 mm sieve box with an adaptable mesh 
base (of 1 mm, 500 μm or 125 μm aperture depending on the particle size distribution of the ash) and 
manual-striking hammer which causes ash to fall through when struck. The set-up has been used in 
previous experiments including by G.Wilson et al. (2012) and Hill (2014). The ash delivery system 
produces ash in a consistent and repeatable manner and is calibrated to replicate ash settling 




velocities and accumulation rates that would be expected from real ashfalls. The delivery system has 
been designed using formulas derived from Bonadonna et al. (1998) (equations 1-3) to ensure that 
the majority of ash particles dispensed from the sieve box reach terminal velocity well before ground 
level (Hill 2014): 
Vt ≈ (3.1 g ρ d / σ) 1/2          (1) 
Vt ≈ (g ρ d2 / 18 μ)          (2) 
Vt ≈ d (4ρ2 g2 / 225 μ σ) 1/3         (3) 
where Vt is the terminal velocity, g is the acceleration due to gravity (9.81 m s-2), ρ is the density of the 
particles, d is the particle diameter, σ is the density of the air and μ is the dynamic viscosity of the 
medium (Bonadonna et al. 1998, Hill 2014).  
 
 
Figure 4.2   Experimental set-up for road marking visibility testing (adapted from Blake et al. 2016). 
 
In this study, we incorporate the ash delivery system to investigate failure thresholds (i.e. when road 
markings become obscured by ash). Petri dishes (85 mm in diameter) were placed on the asphalt 
1.50 m 
1.08 m 
Volcanic ash dispersed through 1 mm, 
500 μm, or 125 μm aperture sieves 
Line-painted asphalt concrete 
slab placed beneath falling ash 
with petri dishes on surface 
Striking 
mechanism 
Digital SLR camera & tripod 




surface at the end of each road marking line to enable measurements of ash thickness from a flat 
surface (using a calliper). Ash thicknesses within asphalt aggregate pores of both average and 
distinctively large depth, and from the top of aggregate grains were also recorded (averaged from 5 
measurements for each). Furthermore, the mass of ash collected in the petri dishes was measured at 
each stage in order to calculate the area density throughout experimentation. This was conducted to 
allow a more accurate measure of ash deposition, particularly as the thickness of ash at low 
accumulations is difficult to measure, and also the quantity of ash released by the delivery system 
experiences slight variations between ash types and as the experiment progresses and sieve mesh 
becomes clogged. 
4.3.3 Image collection 
A Fuji Finepix S100 (FS) digital SLR camera was mounted on a tripod 1.5 m horizontally and 1.08 m 
vertically away from the slab (Figure 4.2), 1.08 m being the height of the driver’s eye above the road 
in measuring stopping sight distances (Fambro et al. 1997, Blake et al. 2016). A digital photograph 
was taken at a focal length of 200 mm (under consistent camera and light conditions) and 
observations were noted following strikes of the ash delivery system after the ash had settled. This 
was conducted until five photos after the ash visually appeared to the observer to completely cover 
the markings. The number of strikes between each photo was varied depending how readily the ash 
sample passed through the sieve mesh. The mean depths of ash in the asphalt pores and on the 
surfaces of both the asphalt slab and petri dishes, along with the mass of petri dishes containing ash 
were measured and recorded in conjunction with each photo.  
Other research involving road marking visibility has been conducted in the past, often involving 
participant drivers in simulated driving conditions (e.g. Brooks et al. 2011) or on the road at 
specialised road research facilities (e.g. Gibbons et al. 2004, Gibbons and Williams 2012). 
Specialised technical equipment has also been developed to measure the retroreflective luminance of 
markings (e.g. Carlson and Miles 2011). Most previous experiments have assessed the effectiveness 
of road markings where atmospheric conditions such as rainfall and fog present a hazard to driving. In 
these experiments, the distance between participants or equipment from road markings is often in the 
order of tens of meters. Our experimental set-up enables precise analysis of ash accumulation on the 
road surface and detailed measurements under controlled conditions. We investigate road markings 
at close range (1.5 m horizontal distance) and, due to spatial laboratory constraints, do not directly 
account for viewing road markings >1.5 m away. Additionally, we do not account for visibility 
interference due to airborne volcanic ash, which requires separate investigation. Therefore, our 
results for road marking coverage are conservative, and at greater viewing distances or where the 
atmosphere contains ash, road marking visibility will likely be even less than portrayed. 
4.3.4 Image analysis 
Each image file was opened using Ilastik version 0.5.12 software (Sommer et al. 2011) to conduct 
supervised segmentation by pixel colour; one class was created for the white paint, and another class 




for ash or asphalt (Figure 4.3) (Blake et al. 2016). After segmentation (which displayed the white paint 
as red, and asphalt and ash as green), image registration was achieved in Adobe Photoshop version 
CS6, ensuring that each image was cropped automatically without the geometry of objects changing 
between images. The photographs were intentionally not nadir, and the images were not 
orthorectified as the viewing angle and associated properties of visibility were of particular interest in 
the study. The mean pixel resolution was 1 pixel to 0.088 mm for the cropped area of the 
photographs. A fuzziness setting of 200 was selected to account for the range of colours in the ash, 
asphalt and line paint. This selects all pixels that are the exact same colour as the pixels clicked on, 
as well as all pixels that are within 200 brightness values lighter or darker. The ‘histogram’ function 
was then used to observe and record the pixel count for the white paint (red pixels). The number of 
pixels for the ash/asphalt was then calculated by subtracting the number for the white paint from the 
total pixel count. A total of 142 photographs (i.e. 284 cropped line images) were analysed with a mean 
of nine images analysed for each sample of specific particle size distribution and ash type. 
 
 
Figure 4.3   Generalised steps for the image analysis process. 
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4.4 Results and Discussion 
After the sieve box had been struck 5 times, the subsequent dispersal of ash through the delivery 
system and accumulation on the slabs led to a substantial decrease in the percentage of pixels 
representing white road marking paint for all of our samples (Figure 4.4). This suggests that only very 
small ash accumulations are required for an impact on road marking visibility reduction (Blake et al. 
2016). With further ash accumulation, the road markings continue to become obscured but at a 
decreasing rate. Through physical visual observations in the laboratory and comparisons with raw and 
analysed images (Section 4.3.4), it was decided that when 8% white line paint or less is visible that it 
would be unlikely that drivers could effectively view road markings when driving (Blake et al. 2016). 
Therefore, the measurements of ash area density and depth at this threshold are of interest. It 
appeared particularly difficult to delineate the edges of the markings around this value, although we 
note that the 8% threshold is somewhat subjective and that there are few comparative studies; most 
others adopt instruments such as retroreflectometers, which are used over several tens of meters 
(e.g. Dravitzki et al. 2003, Babic et al. 2014). 
The 8% threshold of pixels for white paint (i.e. 92% pixels for ash/asphalt) was evident through image 
analysis at ash area densities of between 30 g m-2 and 2,150 g m-2 for all ash samples used in 
experimentation (Table 4.2). This equates to ash depths of between trace amounts (taken to be <0.1 
mm in our study) and 2.2 mm, measured from the surface of the asphalt aggregate. The large range 
in measurements is largely due to the influence of particle size, but also ash type and road paint 
characteristics to some degree (Sections 4.4.1 – 4.4.3).  
Our findings correspond well with the ash characteristics and observations of road marking coverage 
at Sakurajima volcano in Kyushu, Japan. In June 2015, the Kagoshima City Office reported that area 
densities were ~300-400 g m-2 when road markings could not be seen and cleaning was required 
(Kagoshima City Office, personal communication, June 08 2015). The ash is typically of andesitic 
type, typically with a SiO2 content of ~59%, and mode particle sizes of 150-200 μm at this distance (4-
5 km) for recent eruptions from the Showa crater (Yamanoi et al. 2008, Matsumoto et al. 2013, 
Nanayama et al. 2013, Miwa et al. 2015). Our summarised results (Table 4.2) suggest that ash 
depths on the roads, measured from the surface of the asphalt aggregate, would have been 
approximately 0.5 mm at the time. 
We highlight the importance of outlining the specifics for depth type measured on road surfaces for 
ash accumulations less than ~10 mm. Depths within the asphalt aggregate voids were found to be 
over five times greater than those measured from the surface of the aggregate in some cases (e.g. for 










Figure 4.4   Percentage of white road marking paint visible and ash area densities for the andesite 
sample with mode particle size of a) 600 μm, b) 200 μm, and c) 40 μm. The results for asphalt slabs covered 
by one and four coats of paint with and without retroreflective glass beads incorporated in the paint mix are 
shown. Also displayed are the thresholds for 8% visible road marking paint (horizontal black dashed lines). We 

















Table 4.2   Measurements of ash area density and depths when it would be difficult for drivers to see 
road markings (i.e. when 8% white line marking paint was visible), determined through image analysis for all of 
the ash samples tested. The range of values is largely due to differences in paint thickness (i.e. number of coats) 
and retroreflective bead content of the paint (see Section 4.4.3), as well as unavoidable but natural variations in 
surface texture across the asphalt slabs.  
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1350 – 2150 g m-2 
 
Depth on surface: 
1.0 – 2.2 mm 
 
Depth in voids: 




1050 – 2100 g m-2 
 
Depth on surface: 
1.0 – 1.4 mm 
 
Depth in voids: 
3.2 – 7.5 mm 
 
(No data as sample not 





















240 – 450 g m-2 
 
Depth on surface: 
0.3 – 0.8 mm 
 
Depth in voids: 




80 – 350 g m-2 
 
Depth on surface: 
0.2 – 0.5 mm 
 
Depth in voids: 




40 – 180 g m-2 
 
Depth on surface: 
0.2 – 0.4 mm 
 
Depth in voids: 
















45 – 80 g m-2 
 
Depth on surface: 
trace – 0.1 mm 
 
Depth in voids: 




35 – 80 g m-2 
 
Depth on surface: 
trace – 0.1 mm 
 
Depth in voids: 




30 – 65 g m-2 
 
Depth on surface: 
trace – 0.1 mm 
 
Depth in voids: 
trace – 0.1 mm 
 
 
4.4.1 Road marking type 
The thickness of surface paint appears to have some influence on road marking coverage. Figure 4.4 
illustrates that the lines with four coats of paint generally become covered more easily than a single 
coated line. This is intuitive because the greater quantity of paint acts to reduce the macrotexture of 
the asphalt surface, causing the voids to fill sooner with the same mass of ash.  
The markings of paint that incorporate retroreflective glass beads in the mix are generally more easily 
obscured. This is perhaps due to the retroreflective beads adding to the overall volume of paint, thus 
reducing the macrotextural depth of the asphalt voids. The rougher microtexture may cause more ash 
to remain on the surface than for road markings without beads (caused by retroreflective beads 
‘trapping’ individual ash particles as they fall). Crystalline ash particles will also act to reflect light, 
potentially reducing the effectiveness of the added retroreflective beads. Therefore, although 
retroreflective beads are added to paint with the overall intention of improving road safety, they act to 




reduce the visibility of road markings when volcanic ash accumulates, reducing road safety in such 
environments.  
The ranges of ash area densities and ash depths shown in Table 4.2 are mainly due to the variations 
in road marking characteristics. Generally, the higher values reflect conditions where there is less 
paint and/or where the paint mix does not contain retroreflective beads, and the lower values in the 
table correspond to road markings formed of multiple paint layers (with little wear) and/or where the 
paint incorporates retroreflective beads. 
4.4.2 Ash particle size 
It is evident that road marking coverage is highly dependent on the particle size distribution of 
volcanic ash falling on textured road surfaces such as SMA (Table 4.2). Ash depth measurements in 
petri dishes and on different locations of the asphalt surfaces, and through visual observations when 
the ash was falling, revealed that this is largely due to the behaviour of individual particles upon 
impact (Figure 4.5). 
A mass of fine ash particles is more effective at covering road markings than the same mass of 
coarse particles. Indeed, for our samples the mass of the ash in petri dishes when the road markings 
became covered (i.e. when only 8% white line paint was visible) ranged from 0.2 g (for fine-grained 
particles) to 14 g (for coarse-grained particles). This is largely because coarser particles bounce into 
the macrotextural voids of the asphalt aggregate and initially accumulate in these spaces, with white 
road marking paint on the upper asphalt surface remaining uncovered and visible to drivers (Figure 
4.5). Even as the ash in the void spaces accumulates to the upper surface of the asphalt, ash 
particles settling on the surface of the aggregate have a tendency to be displaced by further ash that 
falls and collect in areas immediately above the voids where the thicker existing ash limits movement. 
This results in very small mounds of ash immediately above the voids (with white line paint still visible 
in-between) before ash spreads across the entire surface of the asphalt.  
Fine ash particles pack more densely wherever they settle, causing the surface to be easily covered. 
This process is observed on the asphalt and on the flat surfaces of our petri dish bases. It has also 
recently been attributed to the vulnerability of horizontally placed photovoltaic modules and power-
output reduction (Zorn and Walter 2016). Furthermore, the fine ash particles appear to exhibit 
electrostatic properties and adhere more readily to the asphalt surface, successfully covering the line-
covered aggregate at various orientations. Ash with finer particle size distributions, and sometimes 
more triboelectrically charged particles (Aplin et al. 2014) are relatively common in distal volcanic 
plumes. Therefore, our findings indicate that road marking coverage, especially in distal locations 
from volcanic vents, should not be overlooked. 
 
 






Figure 4.5   The process of ash accumulation on textured road surfaces showing the difference between 
ash containing predominantly fine and coarse particles. 
 
 




4.4.3 Ash type and contrast 
Although the mean dry bulk densities for the light-coloured ash were less than those of the darker 
material, less ash is required at intermediate and coarse particle sizes to cover the same percentage 
of road markings. For example, at intermediate particle sizes (i.e. 200-260 μm modal distributions), 
8% of line paint is visible at mean asphalt surface accumulations of 0.55 mm for the basalt (dark-
coloured), 0.35 mm for the andesite (mid-coloured), and 0.30 mm for the rhyolite (light-coloured) 
(Figure 6.4). This suggests that white road markings covered by light-coloured deposits such as the 
rhyolite may become obscured at smaller depths than dark-coloured deposits such as the basalt. 
Although the same trend is suspected for fine ash particle sizes, it is not verified here due to the very 
small accumulations it took for surfaces to be covered (≤ 0.1 mm) and difficulties in measuring and 
estimating ash depths. 
Some of the difference between ash colour types may be due to errors in the image analysis process 
whereby the ash and markings are more difficult to classify when the ash is of lighter colour. However, 
the image analysis findings correspond with the visual observations recorded during experimentation 
in that it was more difficult to distinguish road markings when covered by light-coloured ash compared 
to the same depths of dark-coloured ash (Blake et al. 2016). The findings also align with the mere 
definition of visual contrast (i.e. the difference in colour or brightness between objects that makes 
them distinguishable). With light-coloured ash covering the dark asphalt either side of white road 
markings; the markings will be less distinguishable. Additionally, the farther an object is from a driver, 
the greater the contrast requirements (Gibbons et al. 2004). Therefore a driver’s ability to see road 
markings with distance may be less for light-coloured than dark-coloured ash (Blake et al. 2016). 
 
 






Figure 4.6   Road markings painted on a SMA slab as one coat (left lines) and four coats (right lines), 
both containing no retroreflective beads in the paint mix (adapted from Blake et al. 2016). a) shows the 
markings with no volcanic ash on the surface. b), c) and d) show when ≤ 8% of line paint is visible (i.e. when it 
would be difficult for drivers to see the lines) for basaltic, andesitic and rhyolitic ash of 200-260 μm modal particle 
size distributions respectively. This corresponds to mean thicknesses on the surface of the asphalt aggregate of 




Our experimental findings demonstrate that very low levels of volcanic ash accumulation can cause 
substantial road marking coverage. If ash particles are predominantly fine (i.e. mode particle sizes 
≤45 μm), then road markings may become obscured for drivers when ash area densities are between 
30 and 80 g m-2. This is equivalent to ≤0.1 mm of ash accumulation on the surface of the asphalt.  
Ash particle size distribution is likely the most important characteristic for road marking coverage at 
small depths and a mass of fine particles is much more effective at covering a surface than the same 
mass of coarse particles. This is largely attributed to the ash particle behaviour upon initial impact, 
with coarse particles bouncing into voids between the asphalt aggregate and fine particles generally 
settling where they initially land. For coarse (i.e. mode particle sizes ≥600 μm) ash, depths ≥1.0 mm, 
measured from the surface of the aggregate, or ≥3.2 mm, measured within the asphalt voids, lead to 
road marking coverage. This represents ash area densities at least 13 times greater than for fine ash 
of the same type. These thresholds assume dry and near-pristine atmospheric conditions (i.e. no 
airborne ash) and further work is required to determine the extent of visual range impairment by 
suspended ash particles. 
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Road markings covered by light-coloured ash of the same thickness as dark-coloured ash are more 
difficult to distinguish (due to low contrast). Multiple paint layers (assuming little wear) and paint mix 
that incorporates retroreflective glass beads also make markings more difficult to distinguish when 
covered by ash. Although crucial to consider on all road networks that include line painted surfaces in 
volcanically active regions, our findings especially highlight the susceptibility of road markings being 
covered in distal areas from the vent.  
We recommend thresholds for when road cleaning should occur on asphalt surfaces in order to 
maintain road safety and network functionality. Note that the values assume ‘worse-case conditions’ 
for volcanic ash coverage in terms of paint characteristics:  
1. For fine (~30 – 45 μm mode particle size) ash of all types and felsic ash such as rhyolite up to 
a size dominated by ~300 μm particles, road cleaning should be conducted at or before ash 
area densities of 30 – 45 g m-2. Depths will be extremely difficult to measure at such 
accumulations but will likely be around 0.1 – 0.2 mm from the surface of the upper aggregate. 
2. For intermediate size (up to ~300 μm mode particle size) andesite, road cleaning should be 
conducted at ash area densities of ~100 g m-2. For mafic ash such as basalt of the same size, 
it should be conducted at ~250 g m-2. Surface depths will be around 0.2 – 1.0 mm at this 
stage. 
3. For coarse (mode particle sizes up to ~800 μm) andesite and basalt, road cleaning should 
occur at ash area densities of ~1,000 and 1,500 g m-2 respectively, which is equivalent to 
surface depths of approximately 1.0 – 2.5 mm. 
Due to road safety considerations in environments when there is no volcanic ash, it seems 
counterintuitive to suggest changes to road marking paint mix properties such as changes in 
retroreflective glass bead concentrations or design, so that visibility of road markings is maintained at 
a higher standard solely during ashy conditions. Therefore, we do not suggest that any major changes 
to physical road marking properties should be made in areas prone to volcanic ashfall. Applying new 
coats of paint should only be conducted if existing paint is sufficiently worn and if it is required to 
improve road safety in normal conditions. This is because thicker paint can lead to road markings 
becoming more easily obscured by ash. Changes to the physical structure of the road surface itself, 
such as the application of an aerodynamic profile to promote particle removal from the carriageway by 
wind-driven saltation (as achieved in Kuwait (Aljassar et al. 2006)), may be cost-effective in some 
regions frequently affected by volcanic ash. However, perhaps the simplest technique to improve road 
safety in all areas when road markings become covered is for all drivers to travel at a reduced speed, 
or to avoid driving until the ash is cleared.      
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All modes of surface transportation can be disrupted by visibility degradation caused by airborne 
volcanic ash. Despite much qualitative evidence of low visibility on roads following historical eruptions 
worldwide, there have been few detailed studies that have attempted to quantify relationships 
between visibility conditions and observed impacts on network functionality and safety. In the absence 
of detailed field observations, such gaps in knowledge can be filled by developing empirical data sets 
through laboratory investigations. Here, we use historical eruption data to estimate a plausible range 
of ash-settling rates and ash particle characteristics for Auckland City. However, given the wide-
ranging ash characteristics possible in Auckland, many of our findings are applicable worldwide. We 
then propose and implement a new experimental set-up in controlled laboratory conditions, which 
incorporates a dual-pass transmissometer and solid aerosol generator, to reproduce these ash-
settling rates and calculate associated visual ranges through the airborne volcanic ash. 
Our findings demonstrate that visibility is most impaired for large ash-settling rates (i.e. >500 g m-2 h-1) 
and particle size is deemed the most influential ash characteristic for visual range. For the samples 
tested (all <320 μm particle diameter), visual ranges were as low as ~1-2 m when ash settling was 
replicated for the largest expected rate for Auckland (i.e. ~4,000 g m-2 h-1), and were especially low 
when ash particles were fine-grained, more irregular in shape and lighter in colour. Finally, we 
consider potential implications for disruption to surface transportation in Auckland through 
comparisons with existing research which investigates the consequences of visual range reduction for 
other atmospheric hazards such as fog. This includes discussing how our approach might be utilised 
in emergency and transport management planning. Various possible mitigation strategies to improve 
visibility in environments contaminated with volcanic ash are also summarised herein.  
 
5.2 Introduction 
Reduced visibility may occur during primary volcanic ashfall or through the remobilisation and 
resuspension of existing fall deposits (Sparks et al. 1997, USGS 2013, Folch et al. 2014) into the 
atmosphere by wind, vehicle movement, cleaning processes or other human activities. Both primary 
and remobilised ash may produce potential issues for transportation (Barsotti et al. 2010, Folch 2012, 
Wilson et al. 2014, Blake et al. 2016, Blake et al. in review 1, 2). There have been many cases where 
reduced visibility following volcanic eruptions has impacted surface transportation function, 
particularly road (Table 5.1), but also rail, maritime and at airports, sometimes to near-total darkness 
(Blong 1982, Guffanti et al. 2009). For example, following the Mount St Helens eruption in 1980, “zero 
visibility” (p. 19) caused traffic to come to a standstill in several places including on Interstate 90 near 
Ellensburg in Washington, with visibility so poor that authorities used flares to guide motorists to 
nearby schools and churches (Warrick 1981). Once the initial ashfall was over, it became imperative 
to control traffic movement through speed restrictions, spacing vehicles on roads, and road closures 
to avoid vehicles creating “great clouds of ash” (p. 20) and again reducing visibility on the roads 
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(Warrick 1981). Hundreds of accidents in the affected areas were attributed to the billowing of ash 
behind vehicles and associated loss in visibility (Blong 1984). More recently, following the eruption of 
Cordón Caulle, Chile, in 2011, visibility in neighbouring Argentina, where ash fell, was so low that 
several main roads including Route 40 (linking Bariloche city and the Neuquén province) were 
subsequently closed. This affected the transportation of persons and goods at a national level (Folch 
et al. 2014). Vehicle headlights and brake lights are often reported to be ineffective in such conditions 
and barely visible to other drivers (Cole and Blumenthal 2004, Wilson et al. 2012a, USGS 2013). In 
addition to general disruption on network functionality and effects of safety hazards, accounts indicate 
that access to critical infrastructure is an important consideration during ashfall. For example, Wilson 
et al. (2012a) reported that thick falling fine-grained rhyolitic ash from the Chaitén volcano, Chile, in 
May 2008 “reduced visibility to nil” (p. 16) in places. Staff access to the impacted Fuataleufú dam site 
(Chubut province, Argentina) was inhibited by thick accumulations of ash.  
Disruption to rail and maritime transportation during ashfall, caused by poor visibility resulting in safety 
and navigational issues, has also been documented (Johnston 1997, Wilson et al. 2012a). For 
example, rail operations were shut down during the initial Mount St Helens 1980 ashfall due to 
reduced visibility (as well as health concerns), with substantial speed restrictions and inspections 
necessary in the following days (Warrick 1981, Blong 1984).  
Despite the many impacts to surface transportation that have been described (Table 5.1), there has 
been little quantitative analysis into the effects of airborne volcanic ash on reducing visibility and the 
subsequent consequences for network functionality and safety. Contemporary critical infrastructure 
management increasingly aims to optimise network performance during natural hazards, especially 
for non-damaging events, such as for small ash accumulations (Wilson et al. 2014). However, ash 
thickness has usually been the key measure of hazard intensity adopted in the past (Table 5.1), which 
is likely to be of little relevance when assessing visibility impacts; airborne ash concentration and ash-
settling rates are more important for such impacts. This lack of an evidence base means that surface 
transportation operators typically can only make crude management decisions of either taking a 
precautionary approach of shutting systems down in the presence of ash (or in the event of 
forecasted ash), or a reactive approach if airborne ash causes problems for a surface transportation 
system. However, several contemporary ash dispersion and fallout forecasting models can provide 
outputs that include atmospheric concentrations and settling rates (e.g. FLEXPART – Stohl et al. 
1998, Stohl et al. 2005; VOL-CALPUFF – Barsotti et al. 2008; FALL3D – Costa et al. 2006, Folch et 
al. 2009). Folch 2012 outlines these in more detail. Therefore, the capacity now exists for surface 
transportation vulnerability assessments to adopt these metrics. Furthermore, settling-rate and 
airborne concentration are important metrics to consider for other impacts to transportation. For 
example, it has been determined that concentrations as low as 1x10-4 g m-3 can cause substantial 
damage to aircraft (Witham et al. 2007, Folch and Sulpizio 2010). 
Ash thickness is clearly important for certain impact types such as loss of skid resistance and road 
marking coverage (Blake et al. 2016, Blake et al. in review 1,2). However, other characteristics, which 
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influence or even control the level of damage or function, are often overlooked (Wilson et al. 2012) 
and it is somewhat illogical to associate visibility-induced impacts on surface transportation networks 
with a ground-based measurement. Although ash thickness can clearly influence the duration of 
deposits and subsequent recovery time (e.g. Warrick 1981, Searl et al. 2002, Hincks et al. 2006, 
Wilson et al. 2011), the effect of fall depth on airborne ash concentration and, consequent, impacts on 
surface transportation networks through visibility reduction is debatable, especially since airborne 
concentration of ash will increase before any accumulation on the ground. A review of literature 
suggests that thickness plays a minimal role in controlling airborne ash concentration and initial levels 
of visibility degradation and associated impact to transportation (e.g. Warrick 1981, Blong 1982). 
Others however, indicate that thickness may have a more substantial role (e.g. Thorarinsson 1971, 
Johnston 1997, Searl et al. 2002), most likely for when un-compacted ash becomes resuspended. We 
propose that ash-settling rate (especially for direct ashfall) and airborne particle concentration5 (for 
both direct and resuspended ash) are more appropriate metrics to adopt when assessing visibility 
impairment in environments containing volcanic ash. Therefore, the thicknesses outlined in Table 5.1 
(with additional information in Appendix C1) have little direct link to the visibility observations and 
should only be used as a loose proxy for airborne ash concentration and duration of exposure.  
 
 
                                                     
5 Many countries have well-established networks to monitor airborne particle concentrations in relation to legal 
standards on ambient air quality. Historically, the main parameter measured was total suspended particulates 
(TSP), which includes all airborne particles (typically 0-40 µm). More recently, regulatory standards are based on 
PM10 (the concentration in µg m-3 of particles with a diameter of 10 µm or less), and PM2.5, with the latter being 
considered of greater relevance to public health (WHO 2013). Air quality monitoring networks have been used to 
track volcanic ash plumes (Elliott et al. 2010, Leonard et al. 2014). 
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Table 5.1   Historical records of visibility impacts on roads following volcanic eruptions. Other occurrences described as general impacts to transportation, where 






Initial ashfall visibility 
observations 
Re-suspended ash visibility 
observations 
Mitigation measures Reference 
Ruapehu 1945 “few mm”  Reduced visibility on roads was 
common 
 Ash made streetlights hazy. 
 Bus headlamps blacked out by 
thick ash 
 Recently deposited ash easily 
lifted by passing vehicles 
 Re-suspended ash similar to dust 
produced on unsealed roads. 
 Road closures 
 Drivers reduced speeds (to as low 
as ~25 km h-1 
 Ash removal 
 Rain improved visibility. 
Johnston 1997. 
St Helens 1980 <50  Traffic reduced to a virtual 
standstill because of zero visibility 
 Gravel and sealed roads had 
similar visibility problems 
 Flares had to be used to guide 
people. 
 Ash billowing up behind fast-
moving vehicles reduced visibility 
and likely caused hundreds of 
accidents 
 Bus services shut down and then 
limited services. 
 Road closures 
 Stricter speed limits 
 Convoys 
 Restrictions on vehicle type and 
numbers 
 Advice not to drive except in 
emergencies 
 Speed bumps constructed from ash 
 Ash removal with some dampening 
first. 
 
Sarkinen and Wiitala 
1981, Warrick 1981, 
Blong 1984, Johnston 
1997. 
Hudson 1991 20-50   ~1 m visual range a week after 
eruption (“transport virtually 
closed down”) 
 Poor visibility on main coastal 
highway for up to a month. 
 Road closures 
 Rainfall contributed to ash hazards 
diminishing 
 People avoided going outside 
 Cleaning of streets prioritised. 




  200-300  People couldn’t drive partly due to 
visibility 
 Ashfall blocked sun and visibility 
was as low as 1 m in daytime. 
   
Spurr 1992 3  Ash limited visibility on roads.  Bus services shut down and then 
limited service. 
 City trimmed bus schedules and 
sent 40% of workforce home 
 Rain alleviated issues. 
Johnston 1997, Barnard 
2009. 
Unzen 1992   Visibility reduced on roads by 
suspended ash. 
  Yanagi et al. 1992, 
Barnard 2009. 
Ruapehu 1995-96 “thin”  Reduced visibility.  Visibility on roads commonly 
reduced after ashfalls. 
 Nearby state highway closed 3 
times 
 Diversions 
 Ash removal. 
Johnston 1997, Barnard 
2009. 
Etna 2002 <2   Ash remobilisation by traffic and 
wind caused reduced visibility. 
 Barnard 2009 
Chapter 5 – Visibility in airborne volcanic ash 
 
 148 
Chaitén 2008   Reduced visibility “to nil” meant 
that maintenance crews were 
unable to traverse the access 
road to a hydroelectric dam 
 Visibility issues from vehicles 
travelling too fast (~50 m visual 
range in places). 
 Roads restricted by army to 
emergency vehicle use only 
 Some roads made one-way to 
reduce accidents 
 Permanent crew at dam for 1 month 
(rather than shifts) to reduce 
remobilisation 
 Drivers reduced speeds 
 Headlights used 
 Rain alleviated issues. 




  ~300  10-15 m visibility    
Pacaya 2011 20-30  Difficult to drive due to impaired 
visibility. 
  Ash removal 
 Rain helped consolidate tephra. 
Wardman et al. 2012. 
Cordón Caulle 2011    Low visibility led to difficult driving 
conditions for 2 weeks and 
accidents 
 Visibility reduction meant no urban 
clean-up for a week in places. 
 Road closures 
 Lower speed enforcement & 
recommendations (some 20 km h-1) 
 Ash dampened with water 
 Ash removal. 
Wilson et al. 2013, Folch 
et al. 2014, Craig et al. 
2016. 
  >100  “No visibility” – decreased 
visibility. 
   
Shinmoedake 2011   Reduced visibility.  Visibility problems lasted for some 
time. 
 Roads closed 
 Rapid clean-up operation. 
Magill et al. 2013. 
San Cristóbal 2013   Visibility greatly reduced ~15 km 
from vent. 
  Headlights used. GVP 2013. 
Kelud 2014   Reduced visibility.  Accident rates increased up to 
220 km from vent 
 Bus services shut down and then 
limited service. 
 Advice to not drive if possible 
 Headlights used 
 Drivers reduced speeds 
 Ash removal 
 Rain improved visibility. 
Blake et al. 2015. 
Calbuco 2015 ~50  Visibility reduced to 500 m ~100 
km from vent. 
  AccuWeather 2015. 
 
 




Fog, smoke from wildfires, airborne mineral dust, pollen, sea spray, vog (a visible haze comprised of 
sulphur dioxide emitted from volcanoes plus sulphuric acid and sulphate aerosol), and particulate 
emissions attributed to domestic heating and industrial, agricultural and vehicular emissions are other 
atmospheric hazards that can compromise the visibility for surface transportation. Darkness also has 
an understandably adverse effect on road safety, especially when combined with fog, smoke or dust 
(Cova and Conger 2003). Although smoke, particularly from wildfires, routinely disrupts road networks 
and inhibits operations at airports each summer, it is, like volcanic ash, a relatively under-researched 
topic in transportation hazards (Cova and Conger 2003, Abdel-Aty et al. 2011).  The same can be 
said for particulate emissions although research in this field is growing, particularly as cases of very 
high air pollution in some populous Asian cities become more frequent. However, there have been 
many studies into the impacts of fog and mineral dust on visibility (e.g. Codling 1971, Moore and 
Cooper 1972, Hagen and Skidmore 1977, Summer et al. 1977, Perry 1981, Musk 1991, Taylor and 
Moogan 2010, Abdel-Aty et al. 2011, Weinzierl et al. 2012, USDOT 2013, Ashley et al. 2015).  High 
concentrations of fog droplets and mineral dust particulates are required to cause low visibilities. For 
example, Hagen and Skidmore (1977) highlight that mineral dust concentrations exceeding 50 to 100 
mg m-3 seriously reduce visibility during daylight, with lower concentrations hazardous at night. 
However, the atmospheric occurrence and properties of volcanic ash and other aerosols differ due to 
different source locations and different mobilisation mechanisms (Weinzierl et al. 2012) (discussed 
further in Section 5.3). General consequences for surface transportation are similar for all 
atmospheric hazards though, due to the common effect on visibility degradation. Suggested 
consequences for road transportation include an overall reduction in speed and more demanding and 
relatively dangerous driving conditions (OECD 1986, Musk 1991). Specifically, previous studies 
document that the presence of thick fog or dust influences roads by: 
1. Reducing the volume of traffic. 
2. Increasing the risk of accidents (despite lower traffic volumes). 
Furthermore, accidents in low visibility are more likely to involve multiple vehicles and generally cause 
a higher percentage of severe injuries (Ashley et al. 2015). If a leading vehicle experiences low 
visibility, it may either stop or drive off the road with other vehicles closely following. Head-on and 
rear-end crashes are two of the most frequent crash types in terms of crash risk and severity (Abdel-
Aty et al. 2011). For example, in September 2013, a 150-vehicle crash in fog (with visual range of ~23 
m) on the Sheppey Crossing in the UK led to 69 casualties, 37 of which required hospital treatment, 
and the bridge being closed for several hours (BBC 2013, Hardy 2015), and in June 2015, two people 
died and four others were injured in a multi-vehicle accident during a dust storm in Colorado (Ibrahim 
2015). Rear-end crashes have also been reported during volcanic ashfall (e.g. Bartley 1980, Folch et 
al. 2014, Blake et al. 2015). 
 




Mitigation measures for managing reduced visibility due to airborne volcanic ash may comprise a 
variety of techniques. Observations and reports from road managers suggest that these vary in 
effectiveness and are dependent on the occurrence of further ashfall and remobilisation of ash 
deposits, which is typically influenced by meteorological conditions and vehicle traffic (Wilson et al. 
2012a). Besides the complete removal of ash deposits, which may not be possible or cost-effective 
due to accessibility, spatial extent of the ashfall, or recurring ashfall, common mitigation measures 
include reducing vehicle speed (including the implementation of lower-than-usual speed limits), 
restricting the number, type and/or spacing of vehicles on the network, dampening surfaces with 
water to minimise the resuspension of ash, and closing selected roads through heavily contaminated 
areas (Table 5.1).  
In this paper, we simulate volcanic ashfall in a laboratory setting to investigate the effect of ash 
characteristics and settling rate on visual range. Precise and consistent ash-generation rates (g h-1) 
are produced in a purpose-built container using a Solid Aerosol Generator (Topas SAG 410). We also 
use a dual-pass transmissometer (Dynoptic DSL-460 MkII), an instrument often used within factory 
smoke stacks for the measurement of opacity as a proxy for particulate emissions. We use datasets 
containing ash characteristic and locational information from literature available following worldwide 
historical eruptions to test our methodology. Specifically, we replicate ash types/colour, particle sizes 
and settling rates that can be expected in Auckland City given a future volcanic eruption in the 
Auckland Volcanic Field (AVF) or from the larger volcanoes of the Taupo Volcanic Zone (TVZ) in New 
Zealand (Figure 5.1) as an example of how our methods can be applied. We then suggest evidence-
based, semi-quantitative mitigation strategies that could be implemented in operational environments 
where driving in volcanic ash may be necessary. 





Figure 5.1   Potential sources of volcanic ash in New Zealand that could affect Auckland City (adapted 
from Blake et al. 2016). Fine grey lines indicate territorial authority boundaries. 
 
5.3 Visibility in Airborne Volcanic Ash 
5.3.1 Airborne volcanic ash considerations 
To successfully implement our methodology, an estimation of near-ground atmospheric particle 
concentration and/or ash-settling rate with respect to eruption size and distance from the vent is 
required, allowing the reproduction of realistic conditions in the laboratory. Two processes affect 
airborne volcanic ash concentrations near ground level: 
1. Primary ashfall from the eruptive vent, which is the result of explosive volcanic eruptions 
causing the disintegration of magma or vent material and production of rock fragments 
(Jenkins et al. 2014) (Figure 5.2, Appendix C2). 




2. The remobilisation and resuspension of existing ash into the atmosphere from entrainment by 
meteorological winds or from small-scale atmospheric turbulence caused by vehicle 




Figure 5.2   Eruption and environmental characteristics that influence airborne volcanic ash 
concentrations (eruption column characteristics modified from Carey and Bursik 2015). Note that additional 
information related to this figure can be found in Appendix C2. 
 
The most important ash particles (see Appendix C3) in terms of impact to infrastructure including 
transportation, is generally fine-grained ash (e.g. Wilson et al. 2012a, Blake et al. in review 1) (i.e. 
<500 μm and especially ash <250 μm). Fine ash can disperse for up to hundreds of kilometres from 
the vent before settling due to gravity and therefore generally settles over extensive areas. The 
proportions of ash in these fine fractions (see Appendix C1) increase with increasing eruption 
explosivity (White et al. 2011) and fine ash is more susceptible to remobilisation by the processes 
described in point 2 above (Wilson et al. 2011, see Appendix C2).   
Auckland can experience ashfall from a range of volcanic sources and of a variety of types. Basaltic 
ash may originate from new eruptions in the AVF, on which the city is built (Figure 5.1). Andesite can 
be deposited from eruptions within the Tongariro volcanic centre and from Taranaki volcano, with ash 
from Taranaki being most likely due to the relative frequency of eruptions (Magill and Blong 2005, 




Molloy et al. 2009) and predominant south-westerly winds in New Zealand. Rhyolite may be deposited 
in Auckland from eruptions within the Taupo and Okataina volcanic centres in the central North Island 
with rhyolitic ash from Mayor Island also possible. As such, given new eruptions, Auckland is exposed 
to ashfall with a relatively wide range of airborne concentrations, settling rates, as well as particle 
sizes, densities and shapes. 
Settling rate6, defined here as the mass of particles falling onto a surface over time (g m -2 h-1), is an 
important aspect in many geological phenomena (Komer and Reimers 1978). At present, there is 
limited primary empirical data available for volcanic ash-settling rates, largely due to the absence of 
direct measurement or record of ashfall duration associated with field measurements of ash thickness 
or loading. Due to the limited temporal information for most data, some settling rates are estimated 
based on the total ashfall duration (e.g. Hill 2014 – see Appendix C4), although it is possible that 
pulses of ashfall with periods of quiescence occur during that time. Furthermore, complications from 
plume and atmospheric turbulence, particle-particle interaction, and atmospheric conditions 
(Bonadonna et al. 2011) mean that accurate correlations between total ash thicknesses and settling 
rates are difficult to produce. As accurate source data is somewhat limited, it is hoped that recent 
developments of automated ash sampling instrumentation (e.g. Shimano et al. 2013, Weber et al. 
2013, Andò et al. 2014, Tajima et al. 2015) will soon improve our understanding of settling rates. 
5.3.2 Visual range derivation 
Visibility involves human perception of the environment and thus, no instrument truly measures 
visibility (Malm 1979). Aerosols in the atmosphere, including volcanic ash, interact with light waves 
leading to absorption and scattering. The amount of light energy redirected from its original path is 
referred to as the extinction coefficient (bext) and is equal to the sum of four interactions (Robinson 
1968, Hyslop 2009): 
bext = bscat,p + bscat,g +babs,p + basb,g        (1) 
where bscat,p is the light scattering by particles, bscat,g is that by gases, basb,p is the light absorption by 
particles and basb,g is that by gases.  
The extinction coefficient is thus the optical parameter which is the best proxy for visibility 
assessment. It is commonly used to measure air quality in environmental health studies and, 
combined with the optical effects of the object and illumination, it determines the apparent contrast of 
an object against a background (EPA 2001). Light scattering by particles is the dominant cause of 
reduced visibility in most areas because particles scatter light more efficiently than gases (van de 
Hulst 1957, White 1990, Hyslop 2009). Measurements in non-urban areas suggest that light 
scattering accounts for around 90% of the extinction coefficient (EPA 2001). Once the extinction 
coefficient is calculated, the corresponding visual range (VR) in meters can be estimated, defined as 
                                                     
6 We refer to ash-settling rate in this paper for the mass of ash particles settling onto a surface over time. 
However, it may also be referred to as ash-deposition rate or ash accumulation rate in other literature. 




the longest distance that a large, black object can be seen against the sky at the horizon with the 
unaided eye (Binkowski et al. 2002, Seinfeld and Pandis 2006, Hyslop 2009, Blake et al. 2016): 
VR = 3.912 / (bext)         (2) 
where the value at the numerator is constant. 
Visual range is often used to quantify visibility, as it is effectively an idealised measure of how far one 
can see through the atmosphere. Sometimes, a Rayleigh coefficient of 0.01 is added to the extinction 
coefficient in Equation 2 to correspond to “pristine” conditions (i.e. atmospheric conditions at an 
elevation of about 1500-1800 m) (Barsotti et al 2010). In a Rayleigh atmosphere (i.e. an imaginary 
“pure” atmosphere composed only of gases and devoid of any visible light reflection), visual range is 
391 km (APTI 2000). At sea level, the visual range in a Rayleigh atmosphere is limited to about 296 
km (Seinfeld and Pandis 2006). However, 70 km has historically been taken as representing almost 
perfect visibility as few people are able to distinguish between 296 km and 70 km (MFE 2001). As the 
visibility results in this paper are applied at ground level and in an urban context, we omit the Rayleigh 
coefficient value and use the 70 km visual range as a comparative value for ‘typical’ conditions. VR 
and bext are inversely related by the Koschmieder equation (Koschmieder 1925, MFE 2001, Seinfeld 
and Pandis 2006, Hyslop 2009): 
VR = -In (CL) / bext         (3) 
where CL is the minimum observable contrast (contrast being the ratio of the difference in brightness 
of the black object and the horizon to the brightness of the horizon, and is equal to 0.02 – 0.05 for 
most observers).  
Relative humidity is not considered in the above equations and they thus correspond to dry 
conditions. Observational data concerning the humidity-dependent effect of volcanic ash particles on 
light attenuation is lacking. However, visibility in mineral dust storms is known to decrease if the 
relative humidity is high, particularly if more than 70% (Hagen and Skidmore 1977). It is therefore very 
likely that for volcanic ash, the higher the relative humidity, the greater the light scattering of particles 
and lower the visual range, especially due to the hygroscopic properties that the particles exhibit 
(Malm et al. 2003, Barsotti et al. 2010). Therefore, the equations may produce results, which 
underestimate visibility reduction. 
Although some studies assess the optical properties of volcanic ash at high altitude using remote 
sensing techniques for the purposes of flying aircraft operability (e.g. Weinzierl et al. 2012), to the 
best of our knowledge, there is no existing quantitative analysis of visual range during ashfall near 
ground level. However, if visibility characteristics associated with volcanic ash can be determined 
near the ground, then comparisons with other, more studied hazards such as fog and dust storms can 
be made, and impacts on surface transportation and vehicle mobility estimated. Critically, 
comparisons should only occur when the visual range has been determined, or otherwise be viewed 




in a broad sense, as the characteristics of certain particles and subsequent effect on light attenuation 
may be different. 
5.3.3 Particulate characteristics 
Monitoring of particulate matter concentrations in smoke stacks started during the 1960s (EPA 2000). 
Particulate matter concentrations are a useful adjunct to optical measurements and permit 
assessment of the contribution of anthropogenic and natural sources to visibility degradation (EPA 
2001). Opacity is often used as a surrogate for particulate emissions. For example, in the United 
States it provides qualitative information on the operation and maintenance of particulate control 
equipment for the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) emission regulations (EPA 2000). 
Opacity (OP) and extinction coefficient (bext), and thus visual range, are interchangeable as they all 
relate to transmission (T), the fundamental unit of measurement: 
 OP (%) = 100(1-√T)         (4) 
 bext (m-1) = −ln(T) / 2L         (5) 
where L (in meters) is the path length of transmission (developed from DynOptic 2014). 
Thus: bext = −ln(1-0.01*OP)/L                     (6) 
Particles smaller than the light wavelength (particle diameter <0.05 μm in white light) have little effect 
on opacity. Larger particles (particle diameter >2 μm in white light) however, have a much greater 
effect with characteristics such as size, shape and composition being much more influential (Connor 
1974, EPA 2000). Fog droplets generally have particle diameters of 2-70 μm and are thus relatively 
inefficient at scattering light individually. However, poor visibility may result in fog as droplets often 
occur at very high concentrations. 
A departure of a particle from a spherical shape causes a decrease in its settling rate (Komar and 
Reimers 1978, Wilson and Huang 1979). Volcanic ash particles are often more elongated in shape 
than other particulates. Indeed, Walker et al. (1971) show that it is better to consider volcanic particles 
>5 mm as cylinders than as spheres (Scollo et al. 2005). More recently, Weinzierl et al. (2012) 
compared the physical properties of volcanic ash and mineral dust by using samples from 
Eyjafjallajökull volcano, Iceland and the Sahara Desert. They demonstrate that the median aspect 
ratio of mineral dust is lower than that for volcanic ash (1.6 rather than 2.0 for their samples).  
Transmissometers have been established as reliably measuring opacity as a proxy for particle 
concentration in industrial pollution monitoring. For example, Connor (1974) demonstrates strong 
linear relationships between concentration and opacity for three different sources: a kraft pulp mill 
recovery furnace, a cement plant kiln, and a coal-fired boiler. Tests to correlate opacity and particulate 
matter have also been conducted at Portland cement plants and oil-fired power stations (e.g. Conner 
et al. 1979, Uthe 1980). These show that opacity-concentration relationships depend not only on 




physical characteristics of particulates such as size or shape, but chemical characteristics including 
water content. Indeed, some particles are hygroscopic, particularly those containing nitrate and 
sulphate which may include volcanic ash. Thus, as relative humidity increases, their ability to scatter 




5.4.1 Experimental set-up 
The purpose of our set-up is to simulate conditions in volcanic ashfalls in a controlled laboratory 
environment so that visual range through ash of different settling rates and physical characteristics 
can be calculated. The key equipment used for this are a transmissometer and solid aerosol 
generator, both selected specifically for the purpose and incorporated into a custom-made 
experimental set-up. 
We use a dual-pass transmissometer (Dynoptic DSL-460 MkII) for our experiments, an instrument 
often incorporated within smoke stacks for the measurement of opacity as a proxy for particulate 
emissions. The transmissometer is adopted to measure the optical characteristics over a pre-set path 
length of 1.4 m. It measures a specific amount of green light transmitted from the source/transceiver 
securely mounted to the side of a container, to a reflector mounted opposite, and back to the same 
transceiver (Figure 5.3). This allows the direct and continuous (1 second interval) calculation of the 
extinction coefficient of the air along the path length for light with a wavelength of what the human eye 
observes. A small amount of dust accumulates on the optics of the transmissometer during each test. 
However, following trial tests, this was substantially limited by extracting purge air (which the 
instrument uses to clean the optics during operation) through ducting from an adjacent clean room. 
Following the extraction of purge air from a cleaner source, the accumulation of ash on the optics 
accounted for only ~ 1.0 x 10-6 % of the maximum values recorded which is deemed insufficient to 
affect results. The transceiver and reflector are simply cleaned with compressed air between each 
experiment and results corrected so as to always start with zero values for the extinction coefficient 
and avoid drift. 
Precise and consistent ash-generation rates (g h-1) are produced using a solid aerosol generator 
(Topas SAG 410) (named ash disperser from herein) into the top and centre of a purpose-built 
stainless-steel cylindrical container (Figure 5.3), shaped as such to encourage evenly distributed flow 
because trial tests suggested that cylinders were preferential to cuboids where ash-settling rate varied 
in corners. Two simultaneous methods for calibration of the ash disperser for each ash type of 
particular particle diameter size distribution were used to determine the machine settings required for 
different generation rates and estimated ash-settling rates in the container; a gain-in-weight technique 




where ash dispersed from the instrument is collected in filter bags, and a loss-in-weight technique 
where the whole instrument weight is recorded. 
When the ash enters the container, a purpose-built nozzle on the end of the tube causes the ash to 
be dispersed in all directions before settling under gravity. The height of the container (1.3 m total, 
with a 1 m fall distance to the light beam of the transmissometer) was chosen by considering formulas 
derived from Bonadonna et al. (1998) (Appendix C2), which suggest that the majority of ash particles 
dispersed reach terminal velocity before passing through the measurement level. However, the set-up 
was also constrained by workspace limitations and accessibility requirements to the hopper of the ash 
disperser, which had to be positioned above. Beneath the measurement level of the transmissometer, 
the ash settles at the base of the container (0.75 m2 in area). Half of the area (i.e. 0.375 m2) at the 
centre of the base is dedicated to a board on top of an automated mass balance set to poll and record 
the weight of ash every 10 seconds. The other half around the edge consists of foam, which allows 
the air to evenly escape from the base of the container but the vast majority of ash to be deposited 
and remain static. Trial tests suggested that the solid board at the centre had little influence on ash 
flow currents towards the base of the container and that there was minimal remobilisation of ash that 
would affect results.  
Some radial differences in ash-settling rates were identified for samples, both for individual 
experiments and between experiments. However, the consistent airflow within the container, along 
with the light beam traversing the entire diameter, means that there is negligible effect on the 
transmissometer readings and that the entire transect would appropriately represent a steady ashfall. 
To account for the radial differences in settled ash at the base (i.e. because the board does not cover 
the whole area), a series of 10 petri dishes are equally positioned (5 on the central board and 5 on the 
foam edge). These are weighed after each experiment to analyse the distribution profile for the 
settling ash in our experiments. The results from the petri dishes, in conjunction with the centred mass 
balance weights are used to calculate and record mean ‘actual’ (rather than estimated) ash-settling 
rates (g m-2 h-1) at the base (Section 5.5.2).  
Preliminary test runs revealed that equilibriums between ash generation into the container and ash 
settling at the base occurred within 15 minutes for all ash types. Therefore, every experiment for each 
ash type at a specific generation rate and distribution for particle diameter size is run for a total of 1 
hour where possible (some high generation rates caused ash supply to be exhausted within 45 
minutes). This allows at least 30 minutes of continuous measurement at equilibrium conditions, which 
is sufficient time for a mean value of the extinction coefficient and visual range for each sample and 
ash-generation rate to be calculated. The transmissometer is then left operating for at least a further 
15 minutes after the disperser is switched off to allow continued monitoring whilst all the ash settles 
out. Ash is cleaned from the board, foam and container edges between each experiment and a 
thorough clean of all equipment is conducted, and ash disperser tube disposed of and replaced, at the 
end of testing with each ash sample. 





Figure 5.3   Experimental set-up developed and implemented for visibility testing (adapted from Blake et al. 
2016). 
 




5.4.2 Ash sample selection 
We use Auckland as a case study location to test our methodology due to the relatively large 
population (>1.4 million people (Statistics New Zealand 2013)) and extensive transport networks, as 
well as potential exposure to volcanic ash from a variety of sources. We attempt to replicate ash types 
(Section 5.4.2.1), particle sizes (Section 5.4.2.2) and settling rates (Section 5.4.2.3) that can be 
expected in the city given a future volcanic eruption in the AVF or from the larger volcanoes of the 
central North Island of New Zealand. However, given the range of eruption styles and distances from 
vents, anticipated conditions in Auckland are wide-ranging, with many of our results being applicable 
worldwide. 
5.4.2.1 Ash type 
Basaltic, andesitic and rhyolitic ashfall is possible in Auckland and we conduct experiments with all 
three types; a dark-coloured basalt derived from a deposit of Pupuke Volcano in the AVF, a mid-
coloured andesite sourced from a deposit from the Poutu eruption of Tongariro Volcano, and a light-
coloured rhyolite from the Kaharoa eruption of Tarawera Volcano, in New Zealand (Table 5.2).  
 












Year of eruption ~200,000 BP 
~11,000 - 12,000 
BP 
1314 2008 
Ash type Basalt Andesite Rhyolite Rhyolite 
Colour (determined 
from Munsell Rock 
Colour Chart) 
N4: Medium Dark Grey 
5Y 6/1: Light Olive 
Grey 






Philips PW2400 XRF 
analysis) 
44% (mafic) 52% (intermediate) 75% (felsic) 75% (felsic) 
Dominant minerals 
(determined by 
Philips XRD analysis) 
Diopside, Forsterite, 
Anorthite 
Albite, Augite Albite, Quartz Albite 
Particle size group  a b c b b b 
Mode particle size 
(μm) (see Figure 
5.5) 
12 40 105 22 30 21 
Dry bulk density  
(g cm-3) 
0.92 1.12 1.28 0.89 0.87 0.83 
 
The raw samples were largely selected from sources outside of the AVF, as many of those within the 
AVF have been weathered, contaminated by organic material, and/or disturbed or removed by human 




activity (e.g. Alloway et al. 2004, Cassidy and Lock 2004, Howe et al. 2011, Adams 2013). Our 
samples were modified through pulverisation to achieve a range of particle diameter size distributions 
possible in Auckland and thus likely contain a higher than natural proportion of particles that are 
blocky in nature with a high degree of angularity due to the milling process (Broom 2010). Therefore 
an additional fine-grained sample (sourced from the 2008 eruption of Chaitén in Chile – Table 5.2) is 
also tested to investigate the effects of particle shape on visual range. This sample was not altered 
through pulverisation and only sieved to remove the larger particles that can cause clogging of the 
ash disperser. All samples were dried at 65°C for >48 hours prior to testing.  
5.4.2.2 Particle size 
Following a detailed literature review, we further developed work by Hill (2014) (see Appendix C4) to 
estimate ash particle sizes that can be expected in Auckland from volcanic sources in New Zealand 
(Figure 5.4). Unlike Hill (2014) however, who focussed solely on median data, we incorporate all 
available data for particle size, including individual data or median size recorded at specific locations 
from a vent (shown as points), modes (bold points or bold ranges), full distributions (vertical ‘error 
bars’) and distributions in spatial extent (horizontal ‘error bars’). Triangles in Figure 5.4 denote 
maximum clast sizes of blocks, and black data points show particle sizes and distances from vents 
determined from recent analysis of deposits in six Auckland maars from historical AVF eruptions of 
One Tree Hill, Three Kings and Mt Eden volcanoes (Jenni Hopkins, Victoria University of Wellington, 
pers comm, 19 July 2014). 
Due to the maximum particle size constraints of the ash disperser and likely clogging when particle 
diameters exceed ~300 μm, our experiments focus on samples defined as fine ash by Folch et al. 
(2009) (see Appendix C3), in that mode particle diameters for most samples are <64 μm. All mode 
particle diameters are <110 μm (Figure 5.5). However, we subdivide our samples into three 
categories of mode particle diameter size for ease of interpretation; a. <20 μm, b. 20-50 μm, and c. 
>50 μm (Table 5.2). For the basalt sample we test ash for all three categories to investigate the effect 
of particle diameter size on visual range. For the andesite and rhyolite samples however, we only test 
for the category b range due to ash sample availability. Specific ash particle sizes were achieved by 
means of a trial and error process using a rock pulveriser with different disc separation distance and 
sieves with different mesh aperture sizes, followed by laser sizing to determine the particle diameter 
size distributions. Total particle diameters for all samples used are ~1 – 320 μm (Figure 5.5) which 
corresponds with the mid- to lower-grain sizes of ash particles that can be expected in Auckland given 
a future eruption in New Zealand (Figure 5.4). 
 




Figure 5.4   Particle sizes of ash deposits and their associated distances from 15 worldwide eruptive vents and analysis from maars in the AVF. The distances from 
central Auckland (depicted as 0 km) to New Zealand volcanic ash sources are identified by a series of dashed vertical lines, and approximate maximum axial extent of the AVF 
deposits by a bold dashed vertical line. Solid horizontal grey lines denote the boundaries between ash and lapilli (2 mm) and lapilli and block (64 mm) particle diameters.  
(Data from: 1Andò 2014, 2Wilson et al. 2013, 3Heather Craig, University of Canterbury, pers comm, 17 July 2014, 4Watt et al. 2009, 5Bonadonna et al. 2011, 6Scollo et al. 2007, 
7Bonadonna et al. 2002, 8Scasso et al. 1994, 9Harris and Rose 1983, 10Carey and Sigurdsson 1986, 11Scheidegger and Federman 1982, 12Sarna-Wojcicki et al. 1981, 13Carey 
and Sigurdsson 1982, 14Eto 2001, 15Wilcox 1959, 16Walker 1981, 17Sigurdsson et al. 1985, 18Jenni Hopkins, Victoria University of Wellington, pers comm, 19 July 2014). 




Figure 5.5   Particle diameter size distribution plots for the ash used in experimentation, derived from three tests per sample using a Micromeritics Saturn DigiSizer 
II laser sizer instrument. a-c refers to the mode size categories shown in Table 5.2. All ash samples used generally have a normal distribution for particle sizes, with the 
exception of the rhyolite sample from Chaitén, where particle sizes have a distinctive positive skew. 
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5.4.2.3 Estimated ash-settling rates for Auckland 
It is necessary to obtain estimates of ash-settling rates that can be expected in Auckland to inform the 
experimental set-up. As the generation rate of each ash type and particle size is determined as part of 
the instrument calibration, estimations of settling rate can be made given the known volume of the 
container where the ash is dispersed and replicated under controlled conditions. A detailed literature 
review revealed relatively limited data available for settling rate measurements following worldwide 
volcanic eruptions. As with particle sizes however, all available data was plotted to show a generally 
decreasing settling rate with distance from vent (Figure 5.6).  
Based on the settling rates in Figure 5.6, and the particle sizes adopted for experimentation (Table 
5.2), which represent ashfall in Auckland from distal eruptions or mid to lower particle sizes expected 
from an AVF eruption, we attempt to replicate ash-settling rates between 50 and 1,000 g m-2 h-1 (four 
specific ash-settling rates within this range per sample) for all six of the samples. However, we also 
attempt to replicate settling rates towards the upper limit of what can be expected in Auckland (i.e. 
around 2,000 and 10,000 g m-2 h-1) for the Pupuke basalt and Chaitén rhyolite (category b) samples, 
where more material was available, to determine expected absolute minimum visual ranges from 
direct ashfall in the AVF. Thus, in addition to multiple trial tests, a total of 28 experiments are 
conducted as part of this study. 
We highlight that the ash-settling rates determined at this stage are those forecast using the ash 
disperser calibration results. Actual ash-settling rates at the base of the container are lower; 
particularly for high ash-generation conditions, due to several factors, particularly: 
 Adherence of some ash to the container side and top reducing the airborne concentration 
and settling rate.  
 An increase in pressure within the container acting against more ash entering as compressed 
air continues to enter at the top of the container but the foam at the base becomes clogged. 
 Leakage of some ash from the container altogether, either through the foam or small gaps, 
especially when the air pressure inside is very high.  
Actual ash-settling rates are determined from the centred mass balance and petri dish procedure 
outlined in Section 5.4.1. 
Although the transmissometer records regular measurements of airborne particle concentration, these 
readings are viewed with caution in our experiments, as precise values would require the density 
correction factor (set as 1.00 for our tests) to be adjusted between each sample. In the absence of 
complex isokinetic sampling of the airborne ash in the container, this cannot be achieved (DynOptic 
2014).  
 




Figure 5.6   Ash-settling rates and their associated distances from 8 worldwide eruptive vents. The distances from central Auckland (depicted as 0 km) to New Zealand 
volcanic ash sources are identified by a series of dashed vertical lines, and approximate maximum axial extent of the AVF deposits by a bold dashed vertical line.  
(Data from: 1Andò 2014, 2Bonadonna et al. 2011, 3Bonadonna et al. 2002, 4Scott and McGimsey 1994, 5Harris and Rose 1983, 6Scheidegger and Federman 1982, 7Kienle and 
Swanson 1985, 8Wilcox 1959). 
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5.5 Results and Discussion 
5.5.1 Airborne concentration 
Measurements of airborne ash concentration taken directly from the transmissometer were ~40 – 
1,600 mg m-3 for all experiments, with higher values corresponding to the highest ash-settling rates 
and lowest visual ranges. However, these values should be viewed with caution due to limitations of 
the approach (Section 5.4.2.3), which is why we adopt ash-settling rate as the key unit of 
measurement. The time taken for the airborne concentration to fall to zero upon cessation of ash 
dispersal at the top of the container is of particular interest. It provides an indication of how long 
remobilised ash would take to settle from a 1-meter height above the ground given no on-going 
disturbances such as wind or traffic and in the absence of rainfall. Such information can be used to 
inform transportation management strategies such as the spacing of trains or road vehicles to allow 
sufficient time for ash to settle and reduce impairment to drivers caused by visual range reduction. 
There were no distinct differences between airborne particle concentration reductions for the different 
ash samples or ash-generation rates we used in experimentation. It took 11 minutes (± 2 minutes) for 
airborne concentrations to return to original levels. However, given the exponential decay in airborne 
particle concentration following the cessation of new ash entering the container, values decreased to 
<10% of their maximum values in less than 5 minutes.  
5.5.2 Ash dispersal and actual settling rate 
For the relatively coarse-grained ash samples (particularly size category c, and to some extent b), a 
greater weight of ash and more ash of larger particle size fell towards the centre of the container 
base, with ash becoming more fine-grained towards the edge. Fine-grained ash adhered to the edge 
and top of the container (Figure 5.7). Adherence was prevalent for the ash samples with the finest 
particle sizes (i.e. category a, and to some extent b), and especially so for the Chaitén rhyolite 
sample, causing sometimes large decreases in ash-settling rates towards the extreme edge of the 
base. This is likely explained by the electrostatic charging of ash particles (Bonadonna and Phillips 
2003, Folch 2012).  However, as the light beam of the tranmissometer passes the width of the 
container (1.4 m path length) and because inconsistencies occur in a radial pattern, this allowed the 
accurate calculation of mean ash-settling rates. 
It was evident that the Chaitén sample became highly electrostatically charged with many electrostatic 
discharges occurring when touching the container both during experimentation and subsequent 
cleaning. More specifically, we suggest that the process of triboelectrification, described in relation to 
volcanic ash by Aplin et al. (2014) and Aplin et al. (2015), occurred frequently for the Chaitén sample. 
Triboelectrification is the type of contact electrification that occurs when two materials make contact 
with each other. Some electrical charge transfers from one material to the other with one gaining an 
excess of electrons (i.e. becoming negatively charged) and the other losing electrons (i.e. becoming 
positively charged) (Electrostatic Solutions Ltd. 2000). This process can occur readily in volcanic ash 
Chapter 5 – Visibility in airborne volcanic ash 
  
 166 
with a polydisperse particle size distribution but which exhibits predominantly very fine particle sizes 
(Aplin et al. 2014), such as our Chaitén sample (Figure 5.5). When the particles become more 
separated (as they do following dispersal in the container), they can take the charge with them. The 
charge will try to recombine, or dissipate to earth, which explains the sudden electrostatic discharges 
observed.  
Due to the inconsistencies across the container base, results displayed for ash-settling rates are in 
the form of three values, corrected for a 1-hour period over 1 m2: 
1. A minimum value calculated from the weight recorded on the centred mass balance board 
at the container base multiplied by a correction factor determined by the weight difference 
between ash in the petri dishes on the board and on the foam edges for that particular 
sample. 
2. A maximum value calculated by doubling the weight recorded on the central mass 
balance board at the container base for that sample to assume the same weight falls on 
the foam edge. 
3. The midpoint between points 1 and 2 above, which is deemed the value most likely to 
represent the true ash-settling rate.  
 
 
Figure 5.7   Annotated plan-view photos taken looking down into the container showing (a) petri dishes 
on the central mass balance board and foam edge, and (b) describing general ash accumulation patterns 
across the container base (determined from the mass of ash on the centred board and in petri dishes, and 
through visual observations after each experiment). 
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Based on these values, although ash-settling rates forecast from the ash disperser calibration were 
~50 – 10,000 g m-2 h-1 (Section 5.4.2.3), the actual ash-settling rates for our results are calculated at 
28 – 4,800 g m-2 h-1. The results sufficiently cover the range of settling rates that can be expected in 
Auckland given a future eruption in New Zealand based on correlation with the limited dataset 
available from worldwide eruptions (Figure 5.6). 
5.5.3 Visual range and particle size 
The visual range fluctuates between readings (Figure 5.8), depending on the quantity and 
characteristics of particles between the light beam of the transmissometer at the precise time of 
measurement. However, as values are recorded at one-second intervals and because we calculate 
each mean visual range result from at least 30 minutes of experimentation (Figure 5.8), i.e. >1,800 
data points, our results are deemed reliable. Nevertheless, we display maximum and minimum values 
recorded by the transmissometer, which have greater deviation from the mean for the lowest airborne 
concentrations and ash-settling rates. 
 
Figure 5.8   Unprocessed transmissometer results for the Kaharoa rhyolite sample when ash was 
dispersed at the highest generation rate tested. Annotations show how the mean, maximum and minimum 
visual ranges were determined, as well as time taken for all ash to settle out and airborne concentration and 
visual range to return to original conditions 
 
The clearest trends that emerged from our results were between particle size and visual range (Figure 
5.9). For the Pupuke basalt, which had the highest bulk density of the four ash types used, testing 
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was conducted using three distinct particle diameter size distributions. It is evident that for a given 
ash-settling rate, visual range is less for ash predominantly containing finer particles. This 
corresponds to the findings by Connor (1974), in that the mass scattering efficiency of light decreases 
as particle size increases. Lines of best fit followed inverse power relationships (Figure 5.9) with the 
following formulae: 
y = 4589.1 x-0.893   (for Pupuke basalt with 105 μm mode particle size) (7) 
y = 1031.2 x-0.732  (for Pupuke basalt with 40 μm mode particle size) (8) 
y = 740.84 x-0.779  (for Pupuke basalt with 12 μm mode particle size) (9) 
 
 
Figure 5.9   Visual ranges for the three Pupuke basalt particle diameter size distributions. Each point is for 
the mean visual range when ash flow into the container was at equilibrium with ash-settling rate at the base for 
each experiment. Horizontal minimum and maximum error bar values and the point values correspond to points 
1-3 in Section 5.5.2 respectively. Vertical error bars show the maximum and minimum values recorded by the 
transmissometer during the periods of equilibrium (Figure 5.8). 
 
For Auckland, small ash particle diameter sizes are possible from eruptions in both the AVF and TVZ 
of New Zealand (given appropriate wind directions). Although recurrence rates for AVF eruptions 
estimated from existing tephra layers are highly variable, return periods >2,000 years characterise 
most of the record (Molloy et al. 2009). Similarly, eruptions from the rhyolitic Taupo and Okataina 
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volcanic centres (corresponding to eruption volumes of 1 km3 and 0.5-5 km3 respectively) have a 
return period of ~2,500 years (Stirling and Wilson 2002). Ash-settling rates of ~1,000 g m-2 h-1, 
possibly up to ~4000 g m-2 h-1, may occur in Auckland from any of these eruption locations (Figure 
5.6), and extrapolation of the line of best-fit for the finest grained ash we tested (12 μm mode particle 
diameter) to these settling rates suggest that visual ranges as low as ~1-2 m can occur under such 
conditions. However, ash-settling rates are likely to be higher (resulting in shorter visual ranges) for 
explosive eruptions, which generally also produce a relatively large proportion of fine-grained ash 
(White et al. 2011). 
5.5.4 Visual range and ash type 
Visual range for excellent conditions is typically taken to be >70 km (MFE 2001). Indeed, the mean 
visual range taken over a three year period (from 2001 to 2003) from nephelometer readings over 
Auckland City (Dr Gerda Kuschel, Auckland Council, pers comm, 21 June 2016) is similar, calculated 
at 66.5 km with 95% CI [65.1, 67.8]; the slightly shorter visual range is unsurprising given the city 
environment with likely higher background particulate concentrations than ‘typical excellent’ 
conditions. Even the smallest estimated ash-settling rates in Auckland (~10 g m-2 h-1) during an 
eruption would cause a visibility reduction of over two hundred times from typical baseline visual 
range for ash with characteristics in the range we tested. 
As with the Pupuke basalt, the relationships between visual range and ash settling rates are best 
described by inverse power law relationships for rhyolitic and andesitic ash types (Figure 5.10): 
 y = 1843.2 x-0.822  (for Chaitén rhyolite with 21 μm mode particle size) (10) 
 y = 749.55 x-0.739  (for Kaharoa rhyolite with 30 μm mode particle size) (11) 
 y = 874.22 x-0.875  (for Poutu andesite with 22 μm mode particle size) (12) 
It appears that, despite lying within the same particle size category, differences are somewhat 
attributable to particle size distribution within the categories. Comparing the Pupuke basalt and 
Kaharoa rhyolite, which were pulverised and sieved with the same dimension controls, results 
suggest that the light-coloured rhyolite causes lower visual ranges than the dark-coloured basalt. This 
makes intuitive sense, as there is more reflection from light-coloured surfaces.  Low visual ranges for 
the andesite sample are perhaps explained by augite being one of the dominant minerals (constituting 
~20% of the sample). With two prominent cleavages, meeting at angles near 90 degrees for augite, 
light scattering may be relatively high. Furthermore, the particle sizes for the andesitic ash are low 
compared to the basalt and Kaharoa rhyolite, and fallout of the andesite may be slowed by relatively 
irregular particle shapes (Riley et al. 2003, Pardini et al. 2016). 
The Chaitén sample produced unexpected results with greater visual ranges than all other types in 
the same particle size category, despite being the lightest-coloured ash we tested. The most likely 
explanation is due to the larger positive particle size distribution from the mode than the other 
Chapter 5 – Visibility in airborne volcanic ash 
  
 170 
samples (Figure 5.5), and thus higher proportions of relatively large diameter particles. Additionally, 
the comparatively low processing undertaken when producing this sample led to particles that are 
relatively spherical in shape (Figure 5.11). As such, they reflect less light than the irregular-shaped 
particles of the other samples we tested. In fact, the Chaitén ash is more representative of fresh 
volcanic ash samples and our results for the other samples, which were all mechanically pulverised, 
thus provide a worst-case situation for visual range reduction during intial ashfall in this regard. 
However, as our experiments were conducted using oven-dried samples, they do not fully account for 
potential hygroscopic properties that are encountered outside due to relative humidity effects, which 
would increase light scattering and reduce visual range, thus counteracting the effect of increased 
irregularity to some degree.   
 
Figure 5.10   Visual ranges for the four ash samples in particle diameter size distribution category b (i.e. 
20-50 μm mode diameters). Each point is for the mean visual range when ash flow into the container was at 
equilibrium with ash-settling rate at the base for each experiment. Horizontal minimum and maximum error bar 
values and the point values correspond to bullet points 1-3 in Section 5.5.2 respectively. Vertical error bars show 











Figure 5.11   Microscope images for (a) Kaharoa rhyolite sample, (b) Chaitén rhyolite sample, both in 
particle size group b. The individual particles of the Chaitén sample are generally more spherical in shape. A 
Leica DM2500P microscope (with 40x zoom) and Leica DFC295 camera attachment was used to capture the 
images. 
 
5.5.5 Ash remobilisation considerations 
We recognise the importance of ash remobilisation and that correlations perhaps exist between ash 
depth and other characteristics on the ground, and airborne ash concentration (Thorarinsson 1971, 
Johnston 1997, Searl et al. 2002). However, given that ash deposits are often characterised across 
transects or accessible lines rather than across grids (Folch 2012), and given the number and 
complexity of variables associated with the remobilisation and resuspension of ash (e.g. 
meteorological conditions, ash wetness, particle characteristics, road surface specifics and vehicle 
type), we do not investigate the conditions for resuspended ash in detail. Rather, our calculations of 
visibility impairment largely represent conditions that can be expected during initial ashfall when ash 
accumulation on the ground is minimal. Current developments in resuspension modelling (e.g. Folch 
et al. 2014) will likely aid the future understanding of interactions between ash remobilisation and 
visibility effects. Our results are presently most reliable for road transportation where surfaces are wet 
and for maritime transportation, as atmospheric remobilisation will be minimal due to ash settling on 
water. For on-going eruptions however, our results should be treated as highly conservative for most 
land-based transportation types where cleaning has not occurred.  
5.5.6 Considerations for transportation and emergency management authorities 
Road transportation may be disrupted by reduced visibility from ashfall, with potential effects on the 
volume of traffic, average speed of vehicles and accident rate. Speed restrictions and road closures 
may be implemented as a result, although these are often at the discretion of road authorities and 
local transportation management procedures. As with other atmospheric hazards, in most 
circumstances it is likely that reduced visual range from airborne volcanic ash during initial ashfall will 
have the effect of reducing the volume of traffic and increasing the accident rate. Management actions 
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by authorities may also contribute towards reduced traffic volumes, for example if the public are 
advised to remain indoors because of health concerns (Blake et al. 2015).  
Brooks et al. (2011) used a driver-simulation method to determine how drivers react when driving in 
varying levels of fog and to assess whether drivers are willing to drive at speeds where their lane 
keeping performance is degraded due to the reduced visibility. All participants were instructed to stay 
in lane and drive the speed limit of 55 miles per hour (88.6 km h-1). The visual range for the simulator 
on the straight road ranged from 496 m in the clear condition to 178, 70, 31, 18 and 6m as the level of 
fog increased. Observed speed reductions were as follows (Brooks et al. 2011): 
 For visual ranges of 496-31 m, average speeds decreased from 91.3 to 89.1 km h-1 
 For 18 m visual range, speeds decreased further to 82.9 km h-1 
 In the foggiest condition tested (6 m visual range) speeds decreased to 71.7 km h-1, 
representing a decrease of ~20 km h-1 from clear conditions. 
Despite the speed reductions for the most reduced visibility however, it was calculated that drivers 
would likely be incapable of stopping to avoid obstacles in the roadway (Brooks et al. 2011, Blake et 
al. 2016), a situation that corresponds to what has been recorded on actual roads in inclement 
weather (Edwards 1999). Additionally, lane-keeping ability was reduced when fog resulted in visibility 
distances <30 m (Brooks et al. 2011). Mueller and Trick (2012) also used a driver-simulation method 
and investigated average speeds for young drivers in clear and reduced visibility. Each scenario 
encompassed 6.8 km of road with speed limits of 80 km h-1, with one practice scenario, one scenario 
with clear visibility and one with a fog density causing 600 m visual range (a relatively long distance 
when compared with Brooks et al’s (2011) study). All drivers in this study reduced their speed in fog 
compared to clear visibility with an average speed reduction of 6.4 km h-1 (Mueller and Trick 2012).  
From these studies, it is evident that even the lowest ash-settling rates expected in Auckland and the 
largest particle diameter sizes (<110 μm mode) used in our research would cause disruption to road 
transportation from speed reduction due to visibility degradation (<600 m visual ranges). Speed 
reduction in volcanic ashfall may be even greater than for fog due to additional transportation impacts 
such as road marking coverage by ash and reduced skid resistance (Wilson et al. 2012, Wilson et al. 
2014, Blake et al. in review 1, 2). In the absence of key research on driver behaviour in volcanic 
ashfall and assuming no speed restrictions, based on data available for other atmospheric hazards 
we estimate an average free-flow speed of 30 km h-1 for a visual range of 5 m, with an increased 
chance of accidents due to lack of lane-keeping ability and obstructions hidden from view. With 20 m 
visual range, 50 km h-1 may be possible, but for the lowest expected visual ranges in Auckland (~1-2 
m), driving is likely to become highly impractical and dangerous.   
In an operational environment, roading and emergency management officials may use such 
knowledge of anticipated driver behaviour, along with information on previous mitigation measures 
following historical eruptions (Table 5.1), to appropriately deal with reduced visibility (in addition to 
other impact types) from volcanic ash. We suggest a range of mitigation options in addition to clean-
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up for where it may be necessary to keep roads open in ash-contaminated environments, especially 
relevant in dry conditions or during prolonged eruptions with recurring ashfalls: 
 Ash dispersion and fall models should be used for eruption scenarios to provide estimates of 
ash-settling rates and ash particle characteristics in different locations. Expected visual 
ranges can then be calculated, allowing predictions of free-flow vehicle speeds and 
transportation route ‘hot-spots’ where increased accident rates would be more likely. 
 During eruptions, depending on the road type and existing restrictions, lower speed limits can 
be implemented to minimise the resuspension of ash behind vehicles and reduce accident 
rates. If driving is still possible and the environment is heavily contaminated with ash, speeds 
as low as 20 km h-1 may be necessary in urban locations. This aligns well with speeds that 
have either been enforced or recommended following some historical eruptions worldwide 
(e.g. Ruapehu 1945, Cordón Caulle 2011 – Table 5.1). 
 Implementing one-way systems, particularly on roads with no median barrier to separate 
traffic, may be beneficial to reduce impacts from airborne ash and minimise accidents. 
 Organised spacing of vehicles and slow-moving convoys are other operational techniques 
that should be considered. However, vehicle spacing would have to be substantial to allow 
the majority of resuspended ash to settle between vehicles (typically ~5 minute spacing for 
~90% of ash to settle, assuming no wind or other disturbances). Such spacing aligns well with 
the spacing of vehicles implemented on major routes following the Mount St Helens (1980) 
eruption; as Warrick (1981) states, “although the highways were officially closed, [vehicles] 
were allowed to proceed westward on I-90 and northward on U.S.-97 at a rate of one vehicle 
every 5 minutes and a maximum speed of 25 mph” (p.21). A 5-minute spacing may also be 
important to consider for rail transportation. 
 Regularly dampening road surfaces with water can be highly effective in reducing ash 
resuspension and improving visibility. It should be noted that this may have the undesired 
effects of depleting water supplies and reducing skid resistance, although the skid resistance 
effects will unlikely be substantial as dry ash is often nearly as slippery (Blake et al. in review 
2). Additionally, care should be taken not to wash ash into drains as it may lead to blockage 
and costly clean-up operations (Hayes 2014). 
 If operational, existing roadside infrastructure such as mobile signage, variable message 
signs and monitoring cameras may be useful to provide guidance to motorists encountering 
airborne volcanic ash. 
Besides road, all other forms of surface transportation may be disrupted by reduced visibility from ash 
with local regulations and transportation management policies potentially affecting the level of 
disruption: 
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 Rail transportation: KiwiRail’s heat management procedures specify a 40 km h-1 speed 
restriction, which is also typically introduced during other adverse weather conditions 
including strong wind and dense fog, as well as following earthquakes with large shaking 
intensity (Steel and O’Connell 2011, Peter Ramsay and Mark Goodman, KiwiRail, pers 
comm, 03 August 2015). During initial ashfall, we suggest that such a policy (with a 40 km h-1 
speed restriction) should be enacted when visual range is ~10 m or less; a slightly higher 
speed than the estimated free-flow speed on roads due to the different infrastructure for rail, 
such as more automated controls and fixed paths of travel. However, as for road, rail 
operations are likely to become highly impractical and dangerous when visual range is very 
low (~1 m).  
 For maritime transportation near Auckland City, a “restricted visibility routine” for the area/s 
affected may come into effect when visibility of less than 1 nautical mile from a vessel’s bridge 
is encountered (AC 2014). Under such conditions, vessels with automatic identification 
systems can continue to operate with increased communication between the harbourmaster 
and restrictions on the number of vessels in certain areas. In accordance with Maritime Rule 
22.6, speed reduction may be required so that “a vessel can be stopped within a distance 
appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions” (MNZ 2015, p.4), taking into 
account the state of visibility (AC 2014, MNZ 2015). Stopping at such distances will likely be 
very difficult for some vessels during low visual ranges in ashfall and we anticipate that the 
movement of some vessels may cease until visibility improves.  
 For airport operations at Auckland Airport, assuming no preceding closure due to other 
factors such as potential damage to aircraft engines, the visual ranges expected from most 
initial ashfalls mean that low visibility procedures would be initiated (triggered by <1,500 m 
visual range) (CAA 2008). Only essential ground support traffic directly involved with the 
arrival or departure of an aircraft will be allowed to operate in the manoeuvring area during 
such conditions. As the runway is equipped with a Category III B Instrument Landing System, 
aircraft and pilots with the appropriate ratings can land if the visual range is >50 m (Auckland 
Airport 2008), with a maximum of six aircraft take-off and landing movements per hour (CAA 
2008). With lower visual ranges, operations at the airport would cease, although closure 
would likely be necessary due to other factors by this stage. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
We have developed and implemented a laboratory-based approach to allow the calculation of visual 
range from given ash-settling rates for a range of different volcanic ash samples with different particle 
size and compositional characteristics. Our experiments incorporated only fine-grained ash (all 
particle diameters <320 μm with mode sizes <110 μm) due to limitations of the ash dispersal 
equipment. Compared to most other airborne particulate matter, ash particles are relatively large in 
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size. However, their occurrence in large concentrations, like fog droplets, can cause substantial 
reductions in visibility, although they generally fall to the ground and out of suspension more quickly. 
Our results demonstrate that visibility decreases with increasing ash-settling rate (and thus also 
increasing airborne concentration). Just a ~10 g m-2 h-1 settling rate of fine-grained ash, which could 
occur >200 km from a vent (Figure 5.6), can cause visibility degradation of over two hundred times 
from the typical baseline visual range (i.e. <300 m rather than 70 km visual ranges).  
Of all the ash characteristics, ash particle size has the greatest effect on visual range. For a given 
settling rate, fine-grained ash causes a shorter visual range than coarse-grained ash, a finding that 
aligns with existing research involving other particulate types. For settling rates of ~4,000 g m -2 h-1, the 
largest that can be expected in Auckland based on limited worldwide data, with predominantly fine-
grained ash, visual ranges as low as ~1-2 m may result. We suggest that such large settling rates with 
predominantly fine-grained ash are most likely from either highly explosive eruptions in the TVZ, or 
local and relatively explosive eruptions within the AVF. 
The influence of ash type, colour and shape on visual range reduction is not as clear-cut as for 
particle size. From our experiments, we conclude that samples with a higher proportion of irregular-
shaped particles cause a greater reduction in visual range than those with more spherical shapes. 
Light-coloured ash such as rhyolite appears to result in lower visual ranges than dark-coloured ash 
such as basalt; a trend that makes intuitive sense given increased reflection off light-coloured 
surfaces. However, further laboratory or field-based studies are required to confirm the true extent 
that particle colouration and shape impacts visual range.  
Based on comparisons with other atmospheric hazards, we suggest several implications for surface 
transportation during initial ashfall. 
 Drivers of road vehicles will likely reduce their speeds during ashfall with ash-settling rates of 
10-4,000 g m-2 h-1 and particle size distributions of 1-320 μm: 
o Although based on limited comparative data, speeds of 50 km h-1 for a visual range 
of 20 m and 30 km h-1 for a visual range of 5 m may occur without restriction during 
initial ashfall. 
o Stopping in time to avoid obstacles at such speeds may be difficult and the 
implementation of lower-than-usual speed restrictions may be required to reduce 
accidents and ensure network functionality is maintained.  
 For very short visual ranges (i.e. 1-2 m), driving would be extremely dangerous and road 
closures would likely be necessary. 
 Operations at airports and on rail and maritime transportation networks would be affected by 
the ash-settling rates investigated:  
o Reduced capacity is likely due to lower-than-usual speed restrictions and stricter 
limits on the numbers of aircraft or vessels operating.  
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o Some operations may cease altogether due to visual range reduction alone, perhaps 
for ash-settling rates of ~30 g m-2 h-1 or more.  
We emphasise that our conclusions are for initial volcanic ashfall only and that any remobilised and 
resuspended ash from the ground could result in lower visual ranges for extended periods of time 
post-eruption, exacerbating any transportation impacts. The effect of ash remobilisation was not 
directly investigated as part of this study. However, our experiments provide insights on the length of 
time required for ash to settle out of the atmosphere. It took an average of ~11 minutes for airborne 
concentrations of ash and associated visual ranges to return to their original pre-experiment levels 
and ash-settling rate to decrease to zero from a height of 1 meter. However, given the exponential 
increase in visual range upon cessation of ash dispersal, values returned to 90% of their maximum 
within ~5 minutes with no clear differences observed between samples. Various mitigation measures 
may be implemented by transportation and emergency management authorities to improve visibility 
and/or reduce accident rates during primary volcanic ashfall and times of ash remobilisation, including 
stricter-than-usual speed restrictions, increased vehicle spacing, dampening of surfaces with water, 
and road closures. 
Importantly, our study emphasises the need for rapid syn-eruptive and reliable measurements or 
calculations of visual range and the consideration of different ash characteristic metrics besides ash 
thickness in volcanic eruptions, including particle size distribution. Additionally, contemporary ash 
dispersion and fallout models, which provide outputs of airborne ash concentration and/or ash-settling 
rate given particular eruptions, can be used to produce scenarios of transportation disruption from 
reduced visibility, as well as other assessments including for human and animal health hazards. In 
conjunction with scenarios for other impact types (e.g. reduced skid resistance and marking coverage 
by ash), this would allow the improvement of transportation management strategies during and 
following future volcanic ashfall.  
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6.1 Abstract 
Surface transportation networks are a frequently affected critical infrastructure following volcanic 
eruptions. Disruption to surface transportation from volcanic ash is often complex with the severity of 
impacts influenced by a vast array of parameters including, among others, ash properties such as 
particle size and deposit thickness, meteorological conditions, pavement characteristics, and 
mitigation actions. Fragility functions are used in volcanic risk assessments to express the probability 
of impact (in the form of damage or functional loss) given a range of hazard intensities. Most existing 
fragility functions for volcanic ash adopt ash thickness as the sole metric to assess impact, forming 
the basis of thresholds for functional loss. However, the selection of appropriate hazard intensity 
metrics has been highlighted as a crucial factor for fragility function development and recent empirical 
evidence suggests that ash thickness is not always the most appropriate metric to consider. To refine 
existing thresholds of functional loss for ash thickness, we apply results from a series of recent 
laboratory experiments, which investigate the impacts of volcanic ash on surface transportation (i.e. 
road, rail, maritime and airport). We also establish new fragility thresholds and functions, which adopt 
ash-settling rate as a second core hazard intensity metric. The relative importance of alternative 
hazard intensity metrics to surface transportation disruption is assessed with a suggested approach to 
account for these in existing fragility functions. Our work demonstrates the importance of considering 
ash-settling rate, in addition to ash thickness, as critical measures of hazard intensity for surface 
transportation, but highlights that other metrics, especially particle size, are also important for 
transportation. Future datasets, obtained from both post-eruption field studies and additional 
laboratory experimentation, will provide fresh opportunities to further refine fragility functions. Our 
findings also justify the need for rapid and active monitoring and modelling of various ash 
characteristics (i.e. not ash thickness alone) during volcanic eruptions, particularly as potential 
disruption to surface transportation can occur with only ~0.1 mm of ash accumulation.  
 
6.2 Introduction 
Surface transportation including road, rail and maritime networks (see Table 6.1 for terminology) is 
critical for society, particularly in urban environments with dense populations. Disruption to surface 
transportation can affect commuter travel, access for emergency services, and the distribution and 
provision of goods and services, and may result in cascading consequences for interdependent 
sectors (e.g. electricity systems, water and fuel supplies, tourism) and the economy. Damage and 
loss of function to surface transportation during historical volcanic eruptions worldwide has been 
qualitatively and semi-quantitatively well recorded for roads and airports (e.g. Blong 1984, Nairn 2002, 
Barnard 2009, Guffanti et al. 2009, Wilson et al. 2014). Until recently however, quantitative empirical 
data sourced from historical eruptions or controlled laboratory experimentation has been lacking, 
meaning that there have been limited hybrid datasets to provide robust relationships between hazard 
intensity and impact (damage and disruption) (Wilson et al. in review – Appendix D). 
 
Chapter 6 – Improving volcanic ash fragility functions through laboratory studies 
 191 
Table 6.1   Definitions and context of key terminology used within this paper. 
Term Definition Paper specifics References 
Airport Surface transportation site 
consisting of airfield and facilities 
used to service aircraft. 
Surface and near-surface (<10 
m above ground) 
environmental conditions at 
airfields are considered when 
referring to airports. 
 
Exposure People, property, systems, or other 
elements present in hazard zones 
that are thereby subject to potential 
losses. 
 UNISDR 2009, 
Craig et al. 2016a. 
Fragility 
function 
Probabilistic vulnerability models 
that describe the probability that a 
damage or functional state will be 
reached or exceeded for a given 
hazard intensity. 
Only fragility functions for 




Choi et al. 2004, 
Rossetto et al. 
2013, Tarbotton et 
al. 2015. 
Hazard A phenomenon that may cause 
loss of life, injury or other health 
impacts, property damage, loss of 
livelihoods and services, social and 
economic disruption, or 
environmental damage. 
Hazard is referred to in the 
context of a dangerous 
phenomenon from volcanoes 
(i.e. volcanic tephra, 
pyroclastic density currents, 





A measure used to describe the 
intensity of a volcanic hazard at a 
particular site, which is the 
independent variable of 
vulnerability and fragility functions. 
Ash thickness is often used as 
the HIM for volcanic ash 
fragility functions. Alternative 
HIMs are explored here 
including ash-settling rate and 
particle size. 
Wilson 2015, 
Wilson et al. in 
review. 
Impact The effect a hazardous event has 
on an exposed system. Defined as 
a function of the hazard, and the 
vulnerability and exposure of a 
system (I = H*V*E). 
Multiple impact types are 
inferred when discussing 
impact. 
Jenkins et al. 




States of damage or disruption 
defined by qualitative impact 
descriptions. 
These are numbered 
numerically with 0 being "no 
damage or disruption", and 
increasing numbers referring to 
an increasing level of damage 
or disruption. 
Blong 2003, Wilson 
et al. in review. 
Impact type An individual feature of an 
infrastructure system that can be 
affected by the function of hazard, 
vulnerability and exposure. 
Surface transportation impact 
types include skid resistance 
reduction, visibility impairment, 
road marking coverage and 
engine air inlet filter blockage. 
 
Maritime Surface transportation connected 
with the sea. 
Covers trade shipping, 
recreational boating and ferry 
services. 
 
Mitigation The lessening or limitation of the 
adverse impacts of hazards and 
related disasters. 
 UNISDR 2009. 
Rail Surface transportation on wheeled 
vehicles running on rails. 
Covers electric and diesel 
modes on conventional tracks. 
 
Risk The combination of the probability 
of an event and its negative 
consequences. 
A volcanic hazard is implied to 
be the "event". 
UNISDR 2009. 
Road Surface transportation on dedicated 
sealed or unsealed routes. 
We generally refer to paved 
surfaces, particularly asphalt 
concrete. 
 
Skid resistance The force developed when a tyre 
that is prevented from rotating 
slides along a pavement surface. 
(Often referred to as traction in 
post-eruption literature.) 
Highway research 
board 1972, Blake 
et al. in review a. 
Surface Transportation types on land or Road, rail and maritime  
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transportation water used to convey passengers 
and/or goods. 
transport are covered, as well 
as transport that occurs on the 
ground at airports. 
Visual range The longest distance that a large, 
black object can be seen against 
the sky at the horizon with the 
unaided eye. 
Used as a measure of visibility. Hyslop 2009, 
Binkowski et al. 
2012, Blake et al. in 
prep. 
Vulnerability The characteristics and 
circumstances of a community, 
system or asset that make it 
susceptible to the damaging effects 
of a hazard. 
Largely transportation systems 




A correlation of hazard intensity to 
a component's damage or function 
loss as a value relative to total 
impact or as an economic cost. 
We generally refer to fragility 




Figure 6.1 summarises recorded impacts, caused by various volcanic hazards with a focus on tephra, 
following historical eruptions since 1980 for road, rail and airports. Impacts to transportation can be 
complex, particularly with the potential for multiple volcanic hazards during eruptions and due to 
different impact states resulting for the different hazards. Furthermore, volcanic ash (i.e. the 
component of tephra with particle size <2 mm) is often widespread (Blong 1984) and generally has 
complex interactions with surface transportation. Other volcanic hazards however (shown in the top 
sections of the charts in Figure 6.1) such as pyroclastic density currents (PDCs) and lava flows, are 
generally more geographically constrained. Studies since the 1980 Mount St Helens eruption (e.g. 
Blong 1984, Johnston 1997, Guffanti et al. 2009, Horwell et al. 2010, Wilson et al. 2011, Dunn 2012, 
Wardman et al. 2012, Wilson et al. 2012, Stewart et al. 2013, Wilson et al. 2014, Blake et al. in review 
a & b) demonstrate that volcanic ash frequently reduces skid resistance and covers markings on 
paved surfaces. Reduced visibility caused by airborne ash and the abrasion or cracking of vehicle 
windscreens are also common, and engine failure may result if vehicle air intake filters are not 
adequately maintained. All of these impacts can affect transportation functionality, whether it is by 
reduced vehicle volumes and speed, an increase in accident rates and congestion, or network 









Figure 6.1   Post-1980 reports of (a) road, (b) rail and (c) airport 
impacts following volcanic eruptions worldwide.  
 
There are few recorded impacts to transportation from tephra before 
1980. Note that the only known reported impacts to maritime 
transportation since 1980 are from pumice rafts causing abrasion to 
vessels and obstruction to navigation. These are not shown graphically 
as they cannot be associated with thickness measurements.
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There has previously been limited quantitative data for the impact of ash on surface transportation; 
experimental data is sparse due to the complexities of replicating infrastructural components and 
volcanic ash properties in laboratories (Jenkins et al. 2014b, Wilson et al. 2014). Where quantitative 
data exist, impacts on transportation, as well as other critical infrastructure, have generally been 
related to the thicknesses of ash on the ground. For example, Wilson et al. (in review – Appendix D) 
use the ash thickness variable (defined as a Hazard Intensity Metric (HIM) – Table 6.1) to produce a 
series of volcanic ash fragility functions for different infrastructure types. Although adopting ash 
thickness as a HIM has distinct advantages, particularly in that it is a frequently modelled and often 
relatively readily measured variable following eruptions, it is not always appropriate to consider this 
metric alone. Characteristics such as ash particle size, ash type, the quantity of soluble components, 
wetness and airborne concentration or ash-settling rate may have large effects on overall impact 
intensity and subsequent loss of functionality in some cases. Recent work by Blake et al. (in review a, 
b & c) has focused on investigating common surface transportation impact types for volcanic ash 
under controlled laboratory conditions through a series of targeted experiments. New quantitative data 
available from these studies enables analysis of HIM importance and appropriateness, the refinement 
of thresholds for functional loss (termed Impact State (IS)), and opportunities to improve fragility and 
vulnerability functions. Such approaches, whereby the vulnerability of infrastructure is assessed using 
laboratory studies to supplement field-based empirical observations, has been proven in other 
disciplines including earthquake engineering and for structural loading in tsunami (e.g. Rossetto et al. 
2013, Nanayakkara and Dias 2016). 
In this paper, we summarise existing IS thresholds for surface transportation from previous, largely 
qualitative, post-eruption literature, and using ash thickness on the ground as the HIM. Next we adopt 
the empirical results from Blake et al’s (in review a, b & c) (see Table 6.2 for key findings summary) 
suite of targeted laboratory experiments to refine these established thresholds for thickness, and to 
develop new IS options for visibility impairment based on ash-settling rate as the HIM. The 
importance of additional HIMs (such as ash particle size and colour) as measures of functional loss 
for specific impact types is investigated through relative comparisons to one another. This allows us to 
propose a credible strategy to enhance fragility functions, by means of incorporating related 
uncertainty. We only consider discrete and direct ash fall events and not effects that may occur from 
remobilised ash. Our focus is on road disruption as most garnered data is directly related to road 
infrastructure. However, disruption to airports and rail and maritime transportation are also discussed, 
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Table 6.2   Summary of key findings from recent laboratory experiments to investigate impacts of 
volcanic ash on surface transportation. 
 
Manuscript title Key findings Reference 
Impact of volcanic ash on road and 
airfield surface skid resistance 
Especially reduced skid resistance caused by: 
 Thin (~1 mm thick) coarse-grained ash (on road 
asphalt) 
 Thicker (~5 mm thick) hard ash 
 Ash with high degree of soluble components 
 Line-painted surfaces covered by thin layers of 
ash. 
Blake et al. (in 
review a – 
Chapter 3) 
Road marking coverage by 
volcanic ash: an experimental 
approach 
 0.1 - 2.5 mm ash thickness obscures road 
markings 
 Road markings more easily hidden by fine-
grained, light-coloured ash 
 Multiple road marking paint layers and paint 
containing retroreflective glass beads makes 
markings more difficult to distinguish 
 Ash initially accumulates in ashphalt aggregate 
voids when coarse. 
Blake et al. (in 
review b – 
Chapter 4) 
Visibility in airborne volcanic ash: 
considerations for surface 
transport using a laboratory-based 
method 
 ~10 g m-2 h-1 settling rate enough to disrupt 
transport on roads 
 Fine-grained ash causes lower visual ranges 
than coarse-grained 
 Lower visual ranges when ash more irregular in 
shape and light-coloured 
 Rail 'more resilient' than road due to automated 
systems and fixed paths 
 Maritime transport heavily influenced by vessel 
type and local policies 
 ~4,000 g m-2 h-1 would make most travel very 
difficult 
 Airport closure likely for relatively low ash-
settling rates. 
Blake et al. (in 
review c – 
Chapter 5) 
 
6.3 Background: Quantitative Volcanic Impact Assessments 
Risk assessments may incorporate vulnerability functions to describe the likelihood that infrastructure 
/ an asset will sustain varying degrees of loss over a range of hazard intensities (Rosetto et al. 2013). 
The ‘loss’ may be expressed as economic cost, damage (e.g. physical damage of a sealed road 
surface from ballistics) and/or functionality (e.g. reduced speeds on roads from volcanic ash). 
However, vulnerability functions are less common in volcanic risk assessments than they are in risk 
assessments for many other disciplines such as seismic engineering due to the variety of volcanic 
hazards and associated complexities (Jenkins et al. 2014b). 
Sometimes, stories and qualitative data obtained following eruptions are sufficient to establish and 
communicate necessary information relating to expected impacts during future events. For example, 
exclusion zones may be implemented in the immediate vicinity of the vent due to knowledge about the 
high likelihood of severe damage from proximal hazards such as pyroclastic density currents (PDCs) 
and lahars, and advice can be issued to avoid travel in relatively short-lived and localised ashfall 
events until ash has been cleared. Residents often heed this kind of advice due to health concerns 
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(Stewart et al. 2013) and to avoid potential damage to their vehicles (e.g. Blake et al. 2015). However, 
the volcanic ash hazard can have complex impacts on infrastructure networks causing widespread 
disruption (Johnston and Daly 1997), potentially affecting thousands of kilometres of surface 
transportation routes. Loss of functionality can also be prolonged due to on-going volcanic activity and 
the remobilisation, re-suspension and secondary deposition of ash (sometimes for months to years 
after an eruption has ceased) by wind, fluvial processes, and/or anthropogenic disturbance. As such, 
it is beneficial to establish thresholds from semi-quantitative and/or quantitative data (e.g. ash 
thickness measurements) to indicate when specific impact types (e.g. road marking coverage or 
visibility impairment), and of what severity, occur. These impact thresholds can, in turn, inform 
damage ratios which express the economic cost required to restore infrastructure (i.e. absolute 
damage) by indicating the damaged proportion of the infrastructure (i.e. relative loss) (Reese and 
Ramsay 2010, Tarbotton et al. 2015). Impact thresholds and damage ratios can be adopted by 
emergency management officials and in transportation maintenance guidelines such as for informing 
when to commence road sweeping or implement road closures following volcanic ashfall (Hayes et al. 
2015). Sometimes however, a more gradational approach to assess the vulnerability of infrastructure 
to volcanic ash is required and fragility functions can be used in such situations.  
Fragility functions are probabilistic vulnerability models that describe the probability that a damage or 
functional state will be reached or exceeded for a given hazard intensity (Singhal and Kiremidjian 
1996, Choi et al. 2004, Rossetto et al. 2013, Tarbotton et al. 2015). They allow the quantification of 
risk and provide a basis for cost-benefit analysis of mitigation strategies (Jenkins et al. 2014b, Wilson 
et al. 2014). To date, most volcanic fragility functions have focused on damage, particularly the 
physical damage to buildings and roofs. However, the functionality of infrastructure may be as, if not 
more, important than damage in some cases. The loss of infrastructure functionality can have 
potentially large implications for governments and local authorities (e.g. deciding whether to shut 
down parts of a network) and cause substantial, sometimes unexpected, effects on end-users of 
critical infrastructure such as drivers and residents through a reduced ‘level of service’. It is important 
to note that there are often many impact types, along with factors such as infrastructure 
characteristics and decision-making by authorities, which influence whether networks remain open. 
For example, in New Zealand a main state highway was closed following <3 mm of ash accumulation 
from the 2012 Tongariro eruption (Jolly et al. 2014, Leonard et al. 2014), but in Argentina after the 
2011 Cordón Caulle eruption, many key roads remained open despite receiving up to 50 mm of ash 
(Craig et al. 2016b). Such differences are likely due to duration of disruption, threat of future ashfall, 
criticality of the road, previous experiences with volcanic ash and different tolerance levels in different 
regions (Craig et al. 2016b).  
It is difficult to incorporate all factors which contribute to surface transportation closure (Table 6.3) into 
volcanic fragility functions. However, these variations in damage and disruption can be accounted for 
by introducing estimates of uncertainty within fragility functions. Uncertainties include aleatory 
uncertainties such as natural variations between volcanic eruptions and infrastructure response, and 
epistemic uncertainties such as those associated with limited data or choosing appropriate HIMs and 
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ISs (Rossetto et al. 2014, Wilson et al. in review – Appendix D). These uncertainties are outlined 
more fully by Wilson et al. (in review – Appendix D). Sometimes, HIMs cannot be measured in the 
field in real time (Jenkins et al. 2013, Wilson et al. in review – Appendix D); for example, it may be 
dangerous to measure ash characteristics due to the ash or other volcanic hazards potentially 
impacting health. Laboratory experimentation can be used to reduce epistemic uncertainty through 
the provision of larger impact data sets. Additionally, the controlled nature of laboratory 
experimentation means that particular conditions can be assessed, and uncertainty can often be 
reduced in this respect as well. However, the introduction of new data that differs from previous data 
may reflect either aleatory or epistemic uncertainty. As was conducted by Wilson et al. (in review – 
Appendix D), where possible, we account for uncertainties by calculating the probability that the 
surface transportation mode could be in each IS at each HIM value. Binning the HIM values and 
adopting the median HIMs on each chart accounts for the variation in values (Wilson et al. in review – 
Appendix D). It is important that uncertainties are subsequently transferred across to plans and 
strategies that utilise fragility functions, ideally using probabilistic techniques to ensure that different 
outcomes are considered (Jenkins et al. 2014b). However, as new qualitative field data and 
quantitative data from further laboratory experiments becomes available, existing datasets can be 
reviewed and fragility functions adjusted accordingly, thus reducing overall uncertainty. 




Table 6.3   Factors that can contribute to surface transportation closure during ashfall. This excludes interdependencies from impacts to other infrastructure, as it is 
difficult to consider all factors when producing fragility functions.  
 
   Details for surface transportation mode 
































Thickness, density on ground, settling rate / airborne concentration, particle size, shape / irregularity, colour, wetness, soluble 
components, hardness, friability. 
Meteorological 
conditions 







type and condition 
Priority of infrastructure, requirement for emergency operations (e.g. evacuation, transport of goods), users, capacity, critical 
infrastructure interdependencies. 
Sealed or unsealed surfaces 
and properties, slope of road, 
road marking properties, 
drainage. 
Track and ballast properties, 
overhead line and pylon 
properties (if electric), gradient, 
station facilities, track-
locomotive communications, 
collision avoidance systems. 
Sealed or unsealed surfaces and 
properties, length of runway/s, 
terminal facilities, landing system 
technology. 
Port facilities and 
technology. 
Mobile infrastructure 
type and condition 
Fuel supply, extent of autonomous operation, requirement for emergency operations (e.g. evacuation, transport of goods). 
Petroleum or electric, drive of 
vehicles (e.g. four-wheel drive, 
rear wheel drive), tyres, weight, 
power and torque, ground 
clearance, differential, traction 
control, transmission. 





Aircraft type (e.g. turboprop, 
turbine engine, helicopter), on-
board technology (e.g. volcanic 
ash avoidance systems). 
Vessel type and method 
of mobility (e.g. cargo 
ship, ferry, yacht), size 
and weight, on-board 









Visibility impairment, signage and lighting covered, air filter blockage, engine failure due to ash ingestion, abrasion (bodywork and 
windscreens), cracked windscreens, health concerns. 
Skid resistance reduction, road 
marking coverage, vehicles 
stuck, traffic light and variable 
message sign failures. 
Track grip reduced, ballast 
contamination (potential for 
reduced cushioning), 
signal/switch failure, trains 
stuck. 
Skid resistance reduction, light 
and airfield marking coverage, 
airspace closure. 
Pumice raft obstruction to 
navigation, sedimentation 
in channels, 
accumulation of tephra 
on vessels. 























Population attributes Frequency of ashfall events in area, prior vehicle operation in environments containing ash, knowledge sharing and traditions. 
Organisational 
involvement 
Infrastructure providers, local authorities, regional government, emergency management, national government, scientific research 





Airport operators, Civil Aviation 





Cleaning of static and mobile infrastructure, drainage system changes, air filter maintenance and replacement, light and signage 
alterations, diversions. 
Bridge strengthening, road 
surface and marking alterations, 
vehicle alterations, driving 
advice. 
Bridge strengthening, ballast 
and track alterations, 
locomotive alterations, 
locomotive driver training 
changes. 
Airfield surface and marking 
alterations, terminal facility 
changes, aircraft adaptations, pilot 
training changes. 
Port facility changes, 
vessel adaptations, 
captain / helmsman 
training changes. 
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Selection of appropriate HIMs and establishment of representative IS thresholds are crucial to 
produce robust fragility functions (Rossetto et al. 2013). Wilson et al. (2014) and Wilson et al. (in 
review – Appendix D) highlight that fragility functions in volcanology are poorly developed compared 
to those from other natural hazard disciplines. They also outline that the range of intrinsic volcanic 
hazard properties, such as the particle size of ash, can cause different impacts, leading to difficulties 
in deriving functions. Additionally, much of the data that has informed volcanic fragility functions is 
qualitative or semi-quantitative with limited quantitative empirical, analytical or theoretical data from 
field studies or laboratory experiments. 
To date, the most common HIM for volcanic ash fragility functions to assess surface transportation 
disruption is the thickness of ash on the ground (Wilson et al. 2014), largely due to its extensive use in 
existing impact datasets and applicability to hazard model outputs at the time. Previous IS thresholds 
that have been defined using thickness as the HIM (Wilson et al. in review - Appendix D) are shown in 
our results (Section 6.5.1) for comparative purposes. Of particular note is that IS1 (reduced visibility, 
loss of traction, covering of road markings and/or road closures) was previously identified as occurring 
with thicknesses of ~1 mm or more, due to reduced traction (technically known as skid resistance) 
and impaired visibility disrupting most transportation types. Impacts to maritime transportation have 
not been considered in detail in relation to thickness, as most ash types (with the exception on 
pumiceous material, which can form pumice rafts) do not accumulate, or are readily dispersed, on 
water and are thus difficult to monitor. The majority of data used to inform previous ISs was from 
qualitative post-eruption impact assessments and media reports. Observations from Barnard (2009), 
who conducted a number of semi-quantitative field experiments on Mt Etna, Italy, also informed ISs 
for road transportation where thicknesses exceed 50 mm. 
Blake et al. (in review a, b & c) conducted targeted experiments under controlled laboratory conditions 
to investigate the most frequent surface transportation impact types identified from post-eruption 
assessments: skid resistance reduction, visibility impairment and road marking coverage (see Table 
6.2 for key findings summary). The studies assessed the effect of key HIMs (Table 6.4) on 
functionality and we refer the reader to each of the corresponding papers for detailed information on 
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Table 6.4   Summary of hazard intensity metrics considered during experimental work (1Blake et al. (in 
review a), 2Blake et al. (in review b), 3Blake et al. (in review c)). 
 







Thickness (mm) – related to area density / 






Ash-settling rate (g m-2 h-1)    
Particle size (μm)    
Colour     
Wetness    
Soluble content    
Hardness (proxy: ash type)    
Shape (proxy: ash generation method)    
 
The studies by Blake et al. (in review a, b & c) suggest that ash thickness and ash-settling rate are the 
most critical HIMs for the assessment of surface transportation functionality during initial volcanic 
ashfall events, particularly as they are two of the most readily measured variables in the field. There 
would rarely be impacts to transportation when there is no ground accumulation of ash and no 
suspended ash in the atmosphere, which further emphasises the importance of these two HIMs. 
However, recent laboratory work has also revealed that alternative HIMs to ash thickness and settling 
rate (Table 6.4) should not be underestimated.  
 
6.4 Methodology 
Figure 6.2 summarises previous and current developments to volcanic ash fragility functions for 
surface transportation. Most steps in the diagram indicate anticipated improvements to data accuracy. 
However, as fragility functions are developed, requirements for more impact data are often introduced 
to test and improve new findings and reduce uncertainty.  
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Figure 6.2   Previous and current developments to volcanic ash fragility functions for surface 
transportation. 
 
6.4.1 Impact state thresholds 
Using the key findings of the skid resistance and road marking coverage laboratory studies, we refine 
the IS thresholds for surface transportation established by Wilson et al. (in review - Appendix D) which 
adopt ash thickness as the HIM (Figure 6.2). New thresholds are applied directly from laboratory 
study analysis results but some require rounding to the nearest order of magnitude using expert 
judgement to account for uncertainties such as those associated with the variation in results between 
individual tests and lack of extensive datasets in some cases. We remove previously suggested 
correlations between visibility and ash thickness because, as stated by Blake et al. (in review c), it is 
“illogical to associate an atmospheric-related impact to a ground-based measurement”, especially as 
we do not consider effects from remobilised ash in this paper. Laboratory work using ash thickness as 
the core HIM considered paved surfaces on roads and at airports. Railway tracks were not considered 
in detail, partly because there has been only one recorded instance of track-wheel adhesion loss 
following ashfall (Figure 6.1b) and the effects were complicated by snowfall at the time. As such, we 
do not provide any refinements for rail transportation ISs in relation to ash thickness and the 
previously established thresholds for rail transportation are therefore unchanged by our study.   For 
maritime transportation, a challenge for fragility function development is that due to ash dispersing in 
water, impact mechanisms from tephra cannot easily be linked to deposition thickness as they can for 
road, rail and airports. However, as with other forms of transportation, and as occurs in dense fog, it is 
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likely that navigation by sea can be disrupted or even temporarily halted by visibility impairment during 
ashfall. Therefore, maritime transportation impacts are segregated from the ash thickness HIM and 
assessed solely in relation to visibility impairment.  
As ash deposit thickness has a debatable impact on visibility impairment, and due to recent 
developments in both field monitoring equipment, and ash dispersion and fallout models which 
provide settling-rate outputs (Blake et al. in review c), we consider ash-settling rate as an alternative 
HIM (Figure 6.2) and propose new IS thresholds. Our settling rate IS thresholds are informed by (a) 
direct empirical laboratory results, adjusted using expert judgement and rounding, (b) literature for 
shipping in Auckland’s Waitemata Harbour (e.g. Harbourmaster and Maritime New Zealand 
information for maritime impacts (Auckland Council 2014, MNZ 2015)) and Auckland Airport and CAA 
guidelines for airport impacts (Auckland Airport 2008, CAA 2008), and (c) expert consultation with 
critical infrastructure managers (Deligne et al. 2015). We establish IS thresholds for all modes of 
surface transportation related to visibility impairment. This is achieved by means of comparison with 
guideline information and impact states expected for corresponding visual ranges in foggy conditions, 
the data sources of which are discussed in Blake et al. (in review c): 
 IS thresholds for roads are largely based on comparisons with empirical studies involving 
driver simulations in fog.  
 Comparisons with operational procedures for fog in Auckland are used to establish thresholds 
for airports and maritime transportation, and thus these thresholds should be treated as more 
area-dependent than for road.  
 IS thresholds for rail are the most subjective of the four transportation modes: we implement 
higher threshold values than for road due to the often automated controls for the spacing of 
locomotives along the network and additional technological safety systems which visibility 
impairment does not affect. 
6.4.2 Hazard intensity metric analysis 
We conduct a comparative analysis of additional HIMs by assessing their relative importance to 
surface transportation disruption. Without extensive datasets for all HIMs, this is achieved by applying 
simple rank values to each HIM for the core HIMs of ash settling rate and at different ash thicknesses. 
HIMs are ordered by relative importance to one another and given a rank value of between 1 and 6. 
Although somewhat subjective, the lower the rank value applied, the greater the influence of that HIM 
on surface transportation disruption. HIMs of similar importance are given the same rank value.     
6.4.3 Fragility function development 
We use procedures described by Wilson et al. (in review - Appendix D) for volcanic fragility function 
development, the basic methodological principles of which are summarised as follows: 
 Assign each data point a HIM value and IS value; 
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 Order data set by increasing HIM value; 
 Group into HIM bins, such that each bin has approximately the same number of data points; 
 Calculate probability of being greater than, or equal to, each IS of interest; 
 Obtain discrete HIM values by taking the median of each HIM bin. 
New road and airport fragility functions for ash thickness are established through modification of those 
proposed by Wilson et al. (in review - Appendix D). All points representing median thickness within 
the HIM bins obtained from post-eruption data are retained as the number of post-eruption records 
remains unchanged. New points are added to the chart to appropriately display the new findings from 
IS threshold adjustment following laboratory work, with a focus on improving functions for relatively 
thin deposits (the focus of laboratory work). More substantial updates are made to airport fragility 
functions as we also incorporated the duration of airport closure. However, we stress that some points 
have been corrected using best judgement in order to fit with guidelines outlined by Wilson et al. (in 
review - Appendix D). 
The IS thresholds for ash-settling rate are used to establish separate fragility functions for road, rail 
and maritime transportation, and at airports. Without reliable field data it is difficult to follow Wilson et 
al’s (in review - Appendix D) methodology for fragility function production, especially to accurately 
calculate probabilities of ash-settling rate values equalling or exceeding each IS. However, we 
produce functions using empirical laboratory studies and comparisons to research for fog, to indicate 
expected impact on visibility and vehicles at near-ground level. This is achieved through adopting the 
basic principles and rules outlined by Wilson et al. (in review - Appendix D). As we cannot group data 
into HIM bins and obtain discrete HIM values, specific ash-settling rates are chosen based on key 
changes in impact states instead. We use best judgement to assign probabilities and these are open 
to revision in future. 
6.4.4 Limitations of methodology 
Besides the general limitations outlined by Wilson et al. (in review - Appendix D) for fragility function 
production, our methodology for fragility function improvement through empirically informed data 
contains several additional limitations which may also introduce uncertainty: 
 The laboratory experiments used to inform fragility functions were based on the assessment 
of key impact types previously identified from post-eruption observations. However, 
observations of volcanic ash impacts to transportation are relatively limited (at least compared 
to impacts from other hazards such as earthquake damage to buildings) with an apparent 
increase in frequency of events after 1980. We suggest that this increase is due to 
heightened awareness and land-monitoring of volcanic hazards following the 1980 Mount St 
Helens eruption, and recent increases in the number of motor vehicles and general population 
growth and infrastructure development in volcanically active areas worldwide (TRB 1996, 
Woo & Grossi 2009).  Additionally, there is a higher frequency of impacts recorded for roads 
than for other modes of surface transportation, likely due to more road networks in the areas 
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affected by volcanic activity. Therefore, the relevance of further impact types may be 
underestimated by our study, and future observations and additional laboratory testing will 
verify the extent of this.  
 The empirical datasets we use are constrained by the equipment and set-ups that were 
adopted in the laboratory studies. For example, the skid resistance testing used a Pendulum 
Skid Resistance Tester, which was restricted to investigating small (<10 mm) ash thicknesses 
(Blake et al. in review a). Furthermore, it was unfeasible to investigate all possible ash 
characteristics (e.g. every soluble component option, all moisture regimes) during laboratory 
testing, so our results are limited to those characteristics that we did investigate.  
 Laboratory experiments are generally time and resource intensive. As the experiments by 
Blake et al. (in review a,b,c) were the first to be developed and conducted to specifically 
assess ash impacts on individual transportation components, the datasets are currently 
relatively small. The repetition of laboratory experiments will help to reduce uncertainty in the 
future but our results are limited to those characteristics investigated to date.  
 
6.5 Results and Discussion 
6.5.1 Ash thickness fragility function improvements 
Figure 6.3 shows IS thresholds for surface transportation, which were defined using ash deposit 
thickness as the HIM. It includes thresholds for rail that were unmodified from Wilson et al. (in review - 
Appendix D), and original (grey) and newly revised (red) thresholds for roads and airports; the revised 
thresholds were informed by key findings from recent laboratory experiments that can be directly 
related to ash accumulation (i.e. skid resistance reduction and road marking coverage (Blake et al. in 
review, a, b)), in addition to new post-eruption data where available.  Figure 6.3 illustrates that some 
disruption to roads and airports can occur with an ash thickness of ~0.1 mm, an order of magnitude 
less than previously suggested by most anecdotal data. Figure 6.3 also suggests that larger 
thicknesses of ash may not always result in greater disruption. For example, an ash thickness of ~10 
mm on roads could potentially lead to less disruption than a thickness of ~5 mm as skid resistance 
reduction is more likely at 5 mm. Although the impacts of reduced visibility (accounted for separately) 
may mask such effects overall, we suggest particularly elevated disruption to road transportation from 
ash thicknesses between ~2.5 and 5.0 mm. At this range, all road markings are covered and 
especially reduced skid resistance occurs. Although limited, the post-eruption data available (Blake et 
al. in review a,b,c) indicates that fewer impacts are identified when ash is ~5-20 mm thick, supporting 
the hypothesis of elevated disruption regions on the thickness scale. Fluctuating intensities of road 
transportation disruption with thickness have not been identified in the past, highlighting the 
importance of laboratory testing and the complexities that can be involved in determining accurate IS 
thresholds.  





Figure 6.3   Impact states for expected ground-related disruption to transportation as a function of ash thickness. The existing impact states (shown in black) were 
derived from qualitative post-eruption impact assessments and limited semi-quantitative field studies (adapted from Wilson et al. in review - Appendix D). Impact states that 
were improved in this study are shown in red. 
 
Chapter 6 – Improving volcanic ash fragility functions through laboratory studies 
   
 207 
Figure 6.4 shows corresponding fragility functions for roads, updated from Wilson et al. (in review - 
Appendix D). Two new points (at 0.1 and 5.0 mm ash thickness) have been added to appropriately 
account for new findings from laboratory work for IS1 (i.e. disruption in the form of skid resistance 
reduction (Blake et al. in review a) and road marking coverage (Blake et al. in review b)). The 
decrease in function observed for IS1 when ash thickness exceeds 5.0 mm is due to the potential 
increase in skid resistance; it is largely informed by recent laboratory findings (which do have 
limitations – Section 6.4.4) but is somewhat supported by semi-quantitative field observations. A 
decreasing fragility function breaks one of the core guidelines established by Wilson et al. (in review - 
Appendix D), which states that “functions should not decrease as the HIM value increases”. However, 
this guideline was established for damage rather than functional loss, and for when there is limited 
data to base vulnerability estimates on (i.e. not accounting for detailed empirical studies). 
 
 
Figure 6.4  Fragility functions for road transportation (solid lines) updated from Wilson et al. in review - 
Appendix D (dashed lines). These have been updated with empirical data from skid resistance and road 
marking coverage laboratory experiments. 
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Airports can be closed due to ash in nearby airspace, without any ground accumulation of ash 
(Guffanti et al. 2009). Indeed, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) advise that “aircraft 
should avoid volcanic ash encounters” (p.1-1), although “the operator is responsible for the safety of 
its operations” (p.2-1) and is required to complete a risk assessment as part of its safety management 
system, and have satisfied the relevant national (or supra-national) CAA before initiating operations 
into airspace forecast to be, or at airports known to be, contaminated with volcanic ash (ICAO 2012). 
Aircraft will likely become grounded due to a reduced runway friction coefficient when ash deposits 
exceed 1 mm (ICAO 2001, Wilson et al. in review - Appendix D). Furthermore, severe deterioration in 
local visibility can result when engine exhausts from aircraft taxiing, landing and taking off disturb ash 
on the runway (ICAO 2001). 
We assess functionality loss of airfields by applying the key findings from skid resistance and road 
marking coverage experiments for airfield concrete surfaces covered by ash (Figure 6.1). It is 
important to consider such impact types, as aircraft operation may be possible when airborne ash 
concentrations are below aviation authority, and airline and airport guideline values. Although vehicle 
operation on airfields by ground staff could occur, even when aircraft are grounded, we focus on 
aircraft operations for the fragility function chart (Figure 6.5). These fragility functions estimate the 
temporal duration of airport function assuming that the surrounding airspace is open and prior to any 
clean-up. Some functionality loss of the airport surface is possible between 0.1 and 1.0 mm due to 
markings becoming covered and reduced skid resistance (Blake et al. in review a,b) before the airport 
is likely closed if ash accumulates to >1 mm thickness. We display the temporal component for airport 
closure graphically as separate ISs (Figure 6.5) as such information may be beneficial for end-users 
of fragility functions. 
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Figure 6.5   New fragility functions for airport surfaces developed from post-eruption and laboratory 
experimental data. The previous function for “airport closure” developed by Wilson et al. (in review - Appendix 
D) is shown by the grey dashed lines. Note that some points have been corrected using best judgement in order 
to fit with guidelines outlined by Wilson et al. (in review - Appendix D). 
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6.5.2 New ash-settling rate fragility functions 
Figure 6.6 shows IS thresholds for visibility with ash-settling rate adopted as the HIM. Forecasts for 
visibility disruption are particularly useful for areas where there is minimal ash accumulation on the 
ground (i.e. during initial ashfall events or subsequent events following thorough clean-up), as well as 
for maritime transportation and where surfaces are wet due to any re-suspension of ash into the 
atmosphere being minimised by water. Many of the thresholds established in Figure 6.6, and depicted 
in new fragility function charts in Figure 6.7, are particularly influenced by decisions made by local 
transportation authorities and we stress that our established thresholds are preliminary and open for 
improvement. We use best judgement to determine some thresholds. For example, IS1 starts at 
10 g m−2 h−1 for road, but at 20 g m-2 h-1 for rail, due to the relative resilience of rail to airborne ash, 
which results from more automated controls and fixed paths of travel (Blake et al. in review c). IS 
thresholds may require adaptation to be compatible in other areas, especially where infrastructure 
types and associated technology differ. Thresholds are established for visibility only and do not 
consider other potential disruption caused by airborne volcanic ash such as ingestion into engines or 
the abrasion of windscreens.  
A literature search revealed no quantitative or semi-quantitative data for visual ranges at specified 
ash-settling rates following previous eruptions worldwide. Figure 6.7 shows fragility functions for the 
ash-settling rate HIM, based entirely on empirical laboratory studies and comparisons to research for 
fog, to indicate expected impact on visibility and vehicles at near-ground level. Further extensive 
laboratory testing, in addition to syn- and post-eruption field surveys, will help to refine probabilities. 
Studies of ash remobilisation and re-suspension will likely improve our understanding of potential links 
between ash thickness and settling rate. 
We emphasise that our studies were carried out in the context of transportation infrastructure found in 
New Zealand (e.g. ash characteristics and pavement properties found in the country) and that fragility 
functions may vary in different parts of the world. However, we suspect the trends will remain similar. 
 
 




Figure 6.6   Impact states for expected visibility-related disruption to surface transportation as a function of ash-settling rate. These are determined from quantitative 
laboratory experiments by Blake et al. (in review c), and comparisons to visual range and driver behaviour in fog. Thresholds have been derived in the context of transportation 
in New Zealand. 












Figure 6.7   Fragility function charts for transportation-visibility impacts, with ash-settling rate as the HIM. 
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6.5.3 Multiple hazard intensity metrics 
Figure 6.8 presents the results of comparative analysis of six additional HIMs identified during 
laboratory experimentation as having effects on surface skid resistance and road marking coverage. 
This was achieved by using best judgement considering recent laboratory experiments to apply 
simple rank values to each HIM. The core HIM of ash thickness was used with the values of 
alternative HIMs dependent on relative importance to one another. It is clear from Figure 6.8 that as 
ash increases in thickness on the ground, the effect of different HIMs on surface transportation 
functionality changes. For example, particle size and colour play an important role below ~1.0 mm 
thickness due to the effect of fine-grained and light-coloured ash on road marking coverage, but less 
of a role when ash thickness exceeds ~1.0 mm. However, the wetness of ash is important compared 
to other HIMs when ash thicknesses are >10 mm because it influences how readily ash binds 
together, in turn affecting how easily vehicles can drive through thicker deposits. 
Arguably even more relevant for fragility functions is the relative importance of additional HIMs for 
visibility impairment (Figure 6.9). Unlike ash thickness, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
importance of different HIMs relative to one another changes as settling rate changes. However, 
results from Blake et al (in review c) indicate that, as for thickness, the effect of additional HIMs has a 
lesser effect on functionality loss for greater ash-settling rates. This is likely due to the more dominant 
effect of there simply being more ash particles in the atmosphere. The HIM characteristics 
responsible for greater disruption are largely the same as for ash thickness (Figure 6.8), with the 
exception of ash particle shape; irregular-shaped ash particles may lead to greater disruption when 
airborne due to more light reflectance and subsequently lower visual range, whereas spherical-
shaped ash particles can lead to greater disruption when on paved surfaces as a result of lower skid 
resistance. Particle size is clearly a crucial ash characteristic to consider when assessing surface 
transportation disruption, especially for <10 mm thicknesses. 
Further repeated laboratory experiments to investigate the effect of each ash characteristic on every 
surface transportation impact type, along with detailed post-eruption field sampling and analysis, and 
subsequent computational probabilistic modelling will assist to fill this gap in knowledge. In the 
meantime, and in the absence of extensive datasets, it is difficult to evaluate the precise quantitative 
effect of alternative HIMs (i.e. those other than ash thickness and settling rate) on surface 
transportation disruption from volcanic ash and perform meaningful statistical analysis. However, we 
suggest that the importance of multiple HIMs can be accounted for by considering ‘error boundaries’ 
that illustrate uncertainty around existing functions for ash thickness and settling rate (Figure 6.10) 
(although other uncertainties also exist). The conceptual diagram (Figure 6.10) shows that with thicker 
ash or greater ash-settling rates, alternative HIMs (e.g. particle size, colour, shape) become less 
important with it being more beneficial to solely consider the core HIMs of ash thickness or ash-
settling rate when forecasting impact levels.  
 




Figure 6.8   Relative importance of additional HIMs at key ash thickness intervals (A-E). The charts 
consider the impact types of skid resistance reduction and road marking coverage in combination. Values 
towards the outside of the radar charts indicate lower rank values / greater importance for surface transportation 
disruption. The key shows the particular characteristic of each HIM responsible for greater disruption. 




Figure 6.9   Relative importance of additional HIMs for the impact type of visibility impairment. The key 
shows the characteristic of each HIM responsible for greater disruption to surface transportation. Note that there 





Figure 6.10   Example of fragility function to show the relative importance of 'alternative HIMs’ to ‘core 
HIMs’. The importance of ‘alternative HIMs’ is depicted by the light shading. Used in conjunction with the radar 
charts in Figure 6.9 (which were derived from laboratory experimentation), probabilities (shown on the y-axis) can 
be better estimated using such fragility functions. However, we note that the ‘error extents’ displayed here are 
arbitrary at this stage.  





We conclude that ash thickness and settling rate are the critical HIMs for the assessment of surface 
transportation functionality during volcanic ashfall events. However, due to current difficulties in 
quantifying the impact that ash thickness has on visibility impairment (the key impact type relatable to 
ash-settling rate and relevant for all modes of surface transportation), the two HIMs are not directly 
comparable and should be considered separately. For the ash thickness HIM, we identify the potential 
for fluctuating intensities of road transportation disruption as thickness increases, a feature that has 
not been identified in the past from empirical studies and is a product of experimental data obtained 
from targeted laboratory testing for specific impact types. We highlight that disruption can occur at an 
order of magnitude less than previously indicated (i.e. for thicknesses of ~0.1 mm rather than 1.0 mm) 
due to the potential for surface marking coverage; fragility functions for road and airports have been 
updated accordingly. Although highly subjective, preliminary fragility functions for visibility with ash-
settling rate adopted as the HIM have been established using empirical data alone and by making 
comparisons to impacts previously identified in fog. 
Our analysis of alternative HIMs (i.e. other than the critical HIMs of ash thickness and settling rate) 
and their effect on volcanic ash fragility function development for surface transportation leads to 
several key findings: 
 Although ash thickness and settling rate should be treated as core HIMs for the assessment 
of surface transportation disruption, alternative HIMs should not be overlooked. 
 Ash particle size is identified as the next most important HIM for functionality loss, especially 
when airborne concentrations and accumulations of ash on the ground are relatively small.  
 For different ash thicknesses, the relative importance of alternative HIMs may be different. 
However, for different ash-settling rates there is no evidence to suggest that alternative HIMs 
change in their relative importance to one another. 
 As ash thickness and ash-settling rates increase, alternative HIMs have less of an influence 
on surface transportation functionality loss. This confirms that it is indeed appropriate to 
consider ash thickness and settling rate as core HIMs for surface transportation impact 
assessments. 
 Without extensive datasets, it is difficult to accurately model the effect of alternative HIMs on 
disruption. However, we suggest that they could be incorporated into fragility functions by 
implementing ‘error boundaries’, alongside descriptors for the specific ash characteristic 
features responsible for increased probabilities of impact states being reached or exceeded. 
Our findings support the need to provide forecasts and actively monitor a range of ash characteristics 
in areas that may be affected by volcanic ashfall, especially the thickness of deposits on the ground 
and ash-settling rate, but also other ash properties including particle size distributions, colour, and 
shape. This should be prioritised where there are abundant exposed surface transportation networks 
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and populations: potential disruption can occur with ~0.1 mm ash thickness on the ground, depending 
on the ash characteristics present. Additional (particularly quantitative) datasets derived from new 
eruptions and laboratory tests will assist with the advancement of volcanic ash fragility functions for 
surface transportation, thus allowing further improvements in risk assessments and contingency 
planning in volcanically active regions. 
 
6.7 Acknowledgements 
We acknowledge all the technical and financial support received to conduct the extensive laboratory 
experimentation on surface transportation impacts from volcanic ash. Although the results were not 
directly covered in this paper (they are covered in separate publications), many of the key findings 
would not have been possible without these initial studies. Particular thanks are expressed to the New 
Zealand Earthquake Commission (EQC), Determining Volcanic Risk in Auckland (DEVORA) project, 
Natural Hazards Research Platform (NHRP), University of Canterbury Mason Trust, and GNS 
Science Core Programme funding scheme for their recent support to the authors. Also, the financial 
support from the University of Canterbury Department of Geological Sciences is greatly appreciated, 
which allowed the purchase of key laboratory equipment. Daniel Blake would like to thank his 
additional PhD co-supervisors, Jan Lindsay (The University of Auckland) and Jim Cole (University of 
Canterbury), for their edits, guidance and advice throughout this study.  
  
6.8 References 
Auckland Council (2014) Harbourmaster’s Office Operation of Vessels During Periods of Restricted Visibility: 
Navigation Safety Operating Requirements. Auckland Council, Auckland, New Zealand. 
Auckland Airport (2008) Newsroom: Fog at Auckland Airport and Category IIIB. 19 November 2008, Auckland 
Airport. 
http://www.aucklandairport.co.nz/~/media/3FF843AAFCBB4C23B941EAA7406EAB7B.ashx?sc_database=web. 
Accessed 19 March 2016. 
Barnard, S. (2009) The vulnerability of New Zealand lifelines infrastructure to ashfall. PhD Thesis, Hazard and 
Disaster Management. University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Binkowski, F.S. Roselle S.J. Mebest M.R. Eder B.K. (2002) Modeling atmospheric particulate matter in an air 
quality modelling system using a modal method. IN: Chock, D.P. Carmichael, G.R. (Eds.) Atmospheric modelling. 
The IMA Volumes in Mathematics and its Applications, 130.  
Blake, D.M. Wilson, G. Stewart, C. Craig, H.M. Hayes, J.L. Jenkins, S.F. Wilson, T.M. Horwell, C.J. Andreastuti, 
S. Daniswara, R. Ferdiwijaya, D. Leonard, G.S. Hendrasto, M. Cronin, S. (2015) The 2014 eruption of Kelud 
volcano, Indonesia: impacts on infrastructure, utilities, agriculture and health. GNS Science Report 2015/15, 
139p. [APPENDIX A OF THIS THESIS] 
Chapter 6 – Improving volcanic ash fragility functions through laboratory studies 
  
 218 
Blake, D.M. Wilson, T.M. Cole, J.W. Deligne, N.I. Lindsay, J.M. (in review a) Impact of volcanic ash on road and 
airfield surface skid resistance. Journal of Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment. 
[CHAPTER 3 OF THIS THESIS] 
Blake, D.M. Wilson, T.W. Gomez, C. (in review b) Road marking coverage by volcanic ash: an experimental 
approach. Environmental Earth Sciences. [CHAPTER 4 OF THIS THESIS] 
Blake, D.M. Wilson, T.M. Stewart, C. (in review c) Visibility in airborne volcanic ash: considerations for surface 
transport using a laboratory-based method. Natural Hazards. [CHAPTER 5 OF THIS THESIS] 
Blong, R.J. (1984) Volcanic hazards: a sourcebook on the effects of eruptions. New South Wales, Australia. 
Blong, R. (2003) A new damage index. Natural Hazards, 30, pp.1–23. 
CAA (2008) Low Visibility Operations at Auckland Airport. Vector: Pointing to Safer Aviation, Issue 4. Civil 
Aviation Authority of New Zealand. https://www.caa.govt.nz/Publications/.../Vector_2007_Issue4_JulAug.pdf,  
Accessed 19 March 2016. 
Choi, E. DesRoches, R. Nielson, B. (2004) Seismic fragility of typical bridges in moderate seismic zones. 
Engineering Structures, 26, pp.187-199. 
Craig, H. Wilson, T. Stewart, C. Villarosa, G. Outes, V. Cronin, S. Jenkins, S. (2016a) Agricultural impact 
assessment and management after three widespread tephra falls in Patagonia, South America. Natural Hazards, 
pp.1-63. 
Craig, H. Wilson, T. Stewart, C. Outes, V. Villarosa, G. Baxter, P. (2016b) Impacts to agriculture and critical 
infrastructure in Argentina after ashfall from the 2011 eruption of the Cordón Caulle volcanic complex: an 
assessment of published damage and function thresholds. Journal of Applied Volcanology, 5:7, 31p. 
Deligne, N.I. Blake, D.M. Davies, A.J. Grace, E.S. Hayes, J. Potter, S. Stewart, C. Wilson, G. Wilson, T.M. (2015) 
Economics of Resilient Infrastructure Auckland Volcanic Field scenario. ERI Research Report 2015/03, 151p. 
[APPENDIX E2 OF THIS THESIS] 
Dunn, M.G. (2012) Operation of gas turbine engines in an environment contaminated with volcanic ash. Journal 
of Turbomachinery, 134:5, 18p. 
Guffanti, M. Mayberry, G.C. Casadevall, T.J. Wunderman, R. (2009) Volcanic hazards to airports. Natural 
Hazards, 51, pp.287-302. 
Hayes, J.L. Wilson, T.M. Magill, C. (2015) Tephra fall clean-up in urban environments. Journal of Volcanology 
and Geothermal Research, 304, pp.359–377. 
Highway Research Board (1972) National Cooperative Highway Research Program Synthesis of Highway 
Practice 14: skid resistance. Highway Research Board, National Academy of Sciences, Washington D.C. 
Horwell, C.J. Baxter, P.J. Hillman, S.E. Damby, D.E. Delmelle, P. Donaldson, K. Dunster C, Calkins, J.A. Fubini, 
B. Hoskuldsson, A. Kelly, F.J. Larsen, G. Le Blond, J.S. Livi, K.J.T. Mendis, B. Murphy, F. Sweeney, S. Tetley, 
T.D. Thordarson, T. Tomatis, M. (2010) Respiratory health hazard assessment of ash from the 2010 eruption of 
Chapter 6 – Improving volcanic ash fragility functions through laboratory studies 
  
 219 
Eyjafjallajökull volcano, Iceland: a summary of initial findings from a multi-centre laboratory study. IVHHN and 
Durham University, Durham, UK. 
Hyslop, N. (2009) Impaired visibility: the air pollution people see. Atmospheric Environment, 43:1, pp.182-195. 
ICAO (2001) Manual on volcanic ash, radioactive material and toxic chemical clouds. 
http://www3.alpa.org/portals/alpa/volcanicash/12_Doc9691ManualICAOVolAshRadioactiveMaterial.pdf, 
Accessed 16 June 2016. 
ICAO (2012) Flight safety and volcanic ash: risk management of flight operations with known or forecast volcanic 
ash contamination. International Civil Aviation Organisation. 
http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9974_en.pdf, Accessed 16 June 2016. 
Jenkins, S. Komorowski, J-C. Baxter, P. Spence, R. Picquout, A. Lavigne, F. (2013) The Merapi 2010 eruption: 
an interdisciplinary impact assessment methodology for studying pyroclastic density current dynamics. Journal of 
Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 261, pp.316–329.  
Jenkins, S.F. Wilson, T.M. Magill, C.R. Miller, V. Stewart, C. (2014a) Volcanic ash fall hazard and risk: technical 
background paper for the UN-ISDR Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015. 
http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2015/en/home/documents.html, Accessed 19 April 2016. 
Jenkins, S.F. Spence, R.J.S. Fonseca, J.F.B.D. Solidum, R.U. Wilson, T.M. (2014b) Volcanic risk assessment: 
quantifying physical vulnerability in the built environment. Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 276, 
pp.105-120.  
Johnston, D.M. (1997) Physical and social impacts of past and future volcanic eruptions in New Zealand. PhD 
Thesis. Earth Science, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand. 
Johnston, D.M. Daly, M. (1997) Auckland erupts!! New Zealand Science Monthly, 8:10, pp.6-7. 
Jolly, G.E. Keys, H.J.R. Procter, J.N. Deligne, N.I. (2014) Overview of the co-ordinated risk-based approach to 
science and management response and recovery for the 2012 eruptions of Tongariro volcano, New Zealand. 
Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 286, pp.184-207. 
Leonard GS, Stewart C, Wilson TM, Procter JN, Scott BJ, Keys HJ, Jolly GE, Wardman JB, Cronin SJ, McBride 
SK (2014) Integrating multidisciplinary science, modelling and impact data into evolving, syn-event volcanic 
hazard mapping and communication: A case study from the 2012 Tongariro eruption crisis, New Zealand. Journal 
of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 286:208–232. 
MNZ (2015) Maritime Rules Part 22: Collision Prevention. Maritime New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand. 
https://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/Rules/Rule-documents/Part22-maritime-rule.pdf, Accessed 19 March 2016. 
Nairn, I.A. (2002) The effects of volcanic ash fall (tephra) on road and airport surfaces. GNS Science Report 
2002/13, 32p. 
Nanayakkara, K.I.U. Dias, W.P.S. (2016) Fragility curves for structures under tsunami loading. Natural Hazards, 
80:1, pp.471–486. 
Chapter 6 – Improving volcanic ash fragility functions through laboratory studies 
  
 220 
Reese, S. Ramsay, D. (2010) RiskScape: flood fragility methodology. NIWA Technical Report WLG2010-45, 42 
p. 
Rossetto, T. Ioannou, I. Grant, D.N. (2013) Existing empirical vulnerability and fragility functions: compendium 
and guide for selection. GEM Technical Report 2013-X, GEM Foundation, Pavia, Italy. 
Rossetto, T. D’Ayala, D. Ioannou, I. Meslem, A. (2014) Evaluation of existing fragility curves. IN: Pitilakis, K. 
Crowley, H. Kaynia, A.M. (Eds.) SYNER-G: typology definition and fragility functions for physical elements at 
seismic risk. Springer Dordrecht. 
Singhal, A. Kiremidjian, A.S. (1996) Method for probabilistic evaluation of seismic structural damage. Journal of 
Structural Engineering, 122, pp.1459–1467. 
Stewart, C. Horwell, C. Plumlee, G. Cronin, S. Delmelle, P. Baxter, P. Calkins, J. Damby, D. Mormon, S. 
Oppenheimer, C. (2013) Protocol for analysis of volcanic ash samples for assessment of hazards from leachable 
elements. IAVCEI, IVHHN, Cities on Volcanoes Commission, USGS, GNS Science. 
Tarbotton, C. Dall'Osso, F. Dominey-Howes, D. Goff, J. (2015) The use of empirical vulnerability functions to 
assess the response of buildings to tsunami impact: comparative review and summary of best practice. Earth-
Science Reviews, 142, pp.120-134. 
TRB (1996) Transportation options for megacities in the developing world: a working paper, Transport Research 
Board. IN: NRC (1996) Meeting the challenges of megacities in the developing world: a collection of working 
papers. National Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington DC, United States. 
UNISDR (2009) UNISDR terminology on disaster risk reduction. United Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction, Geneva, Switzerland. http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf, 
Accessed 21 April 2016. 
Wardman, J. Sword-Daniels, V. Stewart, C. Wilson, T. (2012) Impact assessment of the May 2010 eruption of 
Pacaya volcano, Guatemala. GNS Science Report 2012/09, 90p. 
Wilson, G. Wilson, T.M. Deligne, N.I. Cole, J.W. (2014) Volcanic hazard impacts to critical infrastructure: a 
review. Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 286, pp.148-182. 
Wilson, G. (2015) Vulnerability of critical infrastructure to volcanic hazards. PhD Thesis in Hazards and Disaster 
Management. Department of Geological Sciences, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.  
Wilson, G. Wilson, T.M. Deligne, N.I. Blake, D.M. Cole, J.W. (in review) Framework for developing volcanic 
fragility functions for critical infrastructure. Journal of Applied Volcanology. [APPENDIX D OF THIS THESIS] 
Wilson, T.W. Stewart, C. Cole, J.W. Dewar, D.J. Johnston, D.M. Cronin, S.J. (2011) The 1991 eruption of Volcán 
Hudson, Chile: impacts on agriculture and rural communities and long-term recovery. GNS Science Report 
2009/66, 99p. 
Wilson, T.M. Stewart, C. Sword-Daniels, V. Leonard, G.S. Johnston, D.M. Cole, J.W. Wardman, J. Wilson, G. 
Barnard, S.T. (2012a) Volcanic ash impacts to critical infrastructure. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 45-46, 
pp.5-23. 
Chapter 6 – Improving volcanic ash fragility functions through laboratory studies 
  
 221 
Woo, G. Grossi, P. (2009) A new era of volcano risk management. Stanford, CA, Risk Management Solutions 
Inc. https://support.rms.com/publications/Volcano_Risk_Management.pdf, Accessed 20 June 2013.  
  







Chapter 7 – Investigating the consequences of urban volcanism using a scenario approach 
 
 223 
7. INVESTIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF URBAN VOLCANISM USING A 
SCENARIO APPROACH: INSIGHTS INTO TRANSPORTATION NETWORK 
DAMAGE AND FUNCTIONALITY 
 
Daniel M Blake1, Natalia I Deligne2, Thomas M Wilson1, Jan M Lindsay3, Richard Woods2 
 
1 Department of Geological Sciences, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New 
Zealand. 
2 GNS Science, 1 Fairway Drive, Avalon 5010, PO Box 30-368, Lower Hutt 5040, New Zealand. 
3 School of Environment, The University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand.  
 
 
Journal: Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 
Received: 20 October 2016 
Current Status: In Review 
  




Transportation networks are critical infrastructure in urban environments. Before, during and following 
volcanic activity, these networks can incur direct and indirect impacts, which subsequently reduces 
the Level-of-Service available to transportation end-users. Additionally, reductions in service can arise 
from management strategies including evacuation zoning, causing additional complications for 
transportation end-users and operators. Here, we develop metrics that incorporate Level-of-Service 
for transportation end-users as the key measure of vulnerability for multi-hazard volcanic impact and 
risk assessments. 
A hypothetical eruption scenario recently developed for the Auckland Volcanic Field, New Zealand, is 
adopted to describe potential impacts of a small basaltic eruption on different transportation modes, 
namely road, rail, aviation and activities at ports. We demonstrate how the new metrics can be 
applied at specific locations worldwide by considering the geophysical hazard sequence and 
evacuation zones in this scenario, a process that was strongly informed by consultation with 
transportation infrastructure providers and emergency management officials. We also discuss the 
potential implications of modified hazard sequences (e.g. different wind profiles during the scenario, 
and unrest with no resulting eruption) on transportation vulnerability and population displacement. 
The vent area selected for the eruption scenario used in our study is located to the north of the 
Māngere Bridge suburb of Auckland, and the volcanic activity progresses from seismic unrest, 
through phreatomagmatic explosions generating pyroclastic surges to a magmatic phase generating a 
scoria cone and lava flows. Our results show that most physical damage to transportation networks 
occurs from pyroclastic surges during the initial stages of the eruption. However, the most extensive 
service reduction across all networks in fact occurs ~6 days prior to the eruption onset, largely 
attributed to the implementation of evacuation zones; these disrupt crucial north-south links through 
the south Auckland isthmus, and at times cause up to ~435,000 residents and many businesses to be 
displaced. Ash deposition on road and rail following tephra-producing eruptive phases causes 
widespread Level-of-Service reduction, and a degree of disruption continues for >1 month following 
the end of the eruption until clean-up and re-entry to most evacuated zones is complete. Different 
tephra dispersal and deposition patterns can result in substantial variations to Level-of-Service and 
consequences for transportation management. Additional complexities may also arise during times of 
unrest with no eruption, particularly as residents are potentially displaced for longer periods of time 
due to extended uncertainties on potential vent location. We believe the Level-of-Service metrics 
developed here effectively highlight the importance of considering transportation end-users when 
developing volcanic impact and risk assessments. We suggest that the metrics are universally 
applicable in similar environments.  
 




Efficient transportation networks are a prerequisite for future growth of top performing economies 
(NEC 2014), and vital for societies worldwide. However, volcanic activity can cause substantial 
cumulative disruption to transportation, causing a reduction in the ability of networks to convey goods 
and people. This is particularly relevant in urban areas with complex transportation systems, high 
demand and/or little network redundancy. Even before eruptions commence, pro-active strategies to 
reduce exposure such as evacuation zoning can cause transportation disruption through access 
restrictions (Jenkins et al. 2014). Potentially widespread cascading consequences caused by changes 
in demand across the network may also result (Woo 2008, Wolshon 2009). If a volcanic eruption 
ensues, further complexities for transportation end-users may be introduced by damage or disruption 
resulting from proximal volcanic hazards such as pyroclastic density currents and lava flows, and 
distal hazards such as tephra fall which can affect areas up to hundreds of kilometers from the vent 
itself (Wilson et al. 2012a, Wilson et al. 2014). Table 7.1 illustrates the multitude of damage and 
disruption that has occurred on transportation networks in the past due to proximal and distal volcanic 
hazards. 
Roads are particularly important for the movement of people and freight in urban areas due to many 
interdependencies with other critical infrastructure types and often-widespread public use (Daly and 
Johnston 2015). However, rail, aviation and maritime transportation may also have crucial roles 
during volcanic activity in some locations, with all modes potentially affected by volcanic hazards. For 
example, ash from the 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland caused serious disruption to 
aviation across the North Atlantic and Europe, with global economic losses of around US$5 billion 
(Ragona et al. 2011, Louglin et al. 2015).  Once direct volcanic threats have subsided and any 
exclusion zones are lifted, transportation plays a crucial role in both immediate and long-term 
recovery, including the provision of access for clean-up operations and facilitating the restoration of 
other critical infrastructure and businesses in affected areas (Cova and Conger 2003, Hayes et al. 
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Table 7.1   Examples of damage and disruption to transportation from volcanic hazards associated with 
infamous worldwide eruptions. x = road, o = rail, Δ = maritime, ◊ = airport. (Adapted from Blake et al., in review 
a,b,c,d). Note that only transportation activities on land or sea are considered (aircraft in flight are excluded). 
 
Volcano and country Year 
Physical damage from 
proximal hazards 

























































































































































Komagatake, Japan 1640    Δ        
Garachico, Spain 1706  Δ          
Oshima, Japan 1741    Δ        
Sakurajima, Japan 1779         Δ   
Tambora, Indonesia 1815    Δ     Δ   
Cotopaxi, Ecuador 1877   x         
Vulcan, Papua New Guinea 1878         Δ   
Krakatau, Indonesia 1883    xoΔ   Δ  Δ Δ  
Sagir, Indonesia 1891         Δ   
La Soufrière, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
1902           o 
Matavanu, Samoa 1905-07  x  x        
Vesuvius, Italy 1906  o o         
Matavanu, Samoa 1907    Δ        
Novaruputa, U.S.A 1912         Δ Δ  
Sakurajima, Japan 1914  xΔ          
San Salvador, El Salvador 1917  o          
Deception Island, (Antarctic 
Treaty administration) 
1921          Δ  
Kilauea, U.S.A 1924     o       
Etna, Italy 1928  o          
Deception Island, (Antarctic 
Treaty administration) 
1930         Δ Δ  
Tavurvur, Papua New Guinea 1937   x Δ     Δ Δ  
Vesuvius, Italy 1944  o        Δ  
Usu, Japan 1944     xo       
Ruapehu, New Zealand 1945   o    x   x  
Lamington, Papua New Guinea 1951   x         
Bayonnaise Rocks (submarine), 
Japan 
1952          Δ  
Iwo-Jima, Japan 1957     ◊       
South Sandwich Islands, U.K 
(overseas territory) 
1960s         Δ Δ  
Calbuco, Chile 1961   x         
Agung, Indonesia 1963   x         
Irazu, Japan 1964   x         
Kilauea, U.S.A 1968     x       
Mayon, Philippines 1968   o         
Villarrica, Chile 1971   x         
Heimaey, Iceland 1973  Δ          
Ruapehu, New Zealand 1975   x         
Piton de la Fournaise, France 
(overseas territory) 
1977  x          
Nyiragongo, Democratic 1977  x          
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Republic of Congo 
Etna, Italy 1979  x        x  
Lamington, Papua New Guinea 1979 x           
Mount St Helens, U.S.A 1980 x  xo   x xo x xoΔ◊ xo  
Galunggung, Indonesia 1982         ◊   
Miyakejima, Japan 1983         ◊   
(Unknown, South China Sea) 1986         Δ   
Redoubt, U.S.A 1989-90         ◊   
Hudson, Chile 1991      x x x xΔ◊ x  
Pinatubo, Philippines 1991   x      ◊ ◊  
Spurr, U.S.A 1992       x   x  
Unzen, Japan 1991-92 x  xo    x   x  
Tavurvur and Vulcan, Papua 
New Guinea 
1994 x  x   x   x Δ◊ x   
Sakurajima, Japan 1995      x  x    
Ruapehu, New Zealand 1995-96   x   x x x x◊   
Popocatepetl, Mexico 1997         ◊   
Soufrière Hills, U.K (overseas 
territory) 
1997 ◊     x      
Reventador, Ecuador 1999         ◊   
Pichincha, Ecuador 1999         ◊   
Miyakejima, Japan 2000-08     ◊       
Etna, Italy 2002-03  x    x x  x◊   
Reventador, Ecuador 2002      x  x x◊ x  
Nyiragongo, Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
2002  ◊          
Popocatepetl, Mexico 2003         ◊   
Anatahan, Mariana Islands 2003-05         ◊   
Merapi, Indonesia 2006 x           
Home Reef, Tonga (submarine) 2006         Δ Δ  
Etna, Italy 2006         ◊   
Chaitén, Chile 2008   x   xo x  xΔ◊ xΔ  
Okmok, U.S.A 2008          Δ  
Redoubt, U.S.A 2009          x  
Merapi, Indonesia 2010   x   x      
Pacaya, Guatemala 2010      x x ◊ ◊ x  
Tungurahua, Ecuador 2010         ◊   
Cordón Caulle, Chile 2011   x   x x  Δ◊ x   
Sakurajima, Japan 2011      x  x o◊ x  
Shinmoedake, Japan 2011      x x  o xo  
Etna, Italy 2013         ◊ x  
San Cristóbal, Nicaragua 2013       x     
Kelud, Indonesia 2014   x   ◊ x◊  ◊ ◊  
Sakurajima, Japan 2014        x    
Sinabung, Indonesia 2014      x      
Tungurahua, Ecuador 2014         ◊   
Calbuco, Chile 2015       x     
Villarrica, Chile 2015   x         
(Information from: Hurlbut and Verbeek 1887, Corwin and Foster 1959, Tazieff 1977, Sarniken and Wiitala 1981, 
Tyler and Reynertson 1981, Warrick et al. 1981, Labadie 1983, Blong 1984, Hirano et al. 1992, Yanagi et al. 
1992, Bitschene and Fernández 1995, Blong and McKee 1995, Johnston 1997, Casadevall et al. 1999, Nakada 
et al. 1999, Stammers 2000, Anna-Barradas 2001, Becker et al. 2001, Durand et al. 2001, Nairn 2002, 
Oppenheimer 2003, Barnard 2004, Cole and Blumenthal 2004, Cole et al. 2005, Kagoshima City Office 2005 
(pers comm), Leonard et al. 2006, Wilson et al. 2007, Guffanti et al. 2009, Barnard 2009, USGS 2009, Wilson 
2008, Wilson 2009, Wilson et al. 2009a, Wilson et al. 2009b, Barsotti et al. 2010, Jamaludin 2010, Sword-Daniels 
et al. 2011, Surono et al. 2012, Wardman et al. 2012, Wilson et al. 2012b, GVP 2013, Jenkins et al. 2013, Magill 
et al. 2013, USGS 2013, Wilson et al. 2013, Folch et al. 2014, Volcano Discovery 2014, AccuWeather 2015, 
Blake et al. 2015, Craig et al. 2016, Cubellis et al. 2016, Blake et al. in review a,b,c,d.) 
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Vulnerability assessments can be used as part of volcanic risk assessments to describe the likelihood 
that assets will incur loss for a range of hazard intensities (Rossetto et al. 2013). In the past, the 
majority of volcanic vulnerability assessments have focused on direct physical damage to 
infrastructure, especially concerning the structural components of buildings, and associated loss of life 
(e.g. Spence et al. 1999, Magill and Blong 2005, Zuccaro et al. 2008, Jenkins et al. 2013, Hampton et 
al. 2015). However, disruption through the loss of critical infrastructure functionality from volcanic 
hazards may be equally, if not more, important to consider than direct damage in many situations 
(Wilson et al. 2014, Blake et al. in review d). Loss of functionality can cause widespread and 
cumulative effects on society (Jenkins et al. 2015) and subsequent complexities for governments and 
local authorities (Mei et al. 2013). For example, if a pyroclastic surge crosses (or is forecast to cross) 
a section of road, authorities may quickly decide that the affected section should be closed due to life-
safety considerations. However, deciding whether to close the same road section if it is affected by 
light volcanic ash fall may be riddled with complexities; it may be that it remains open, albeit with 
reduced functionality. Importantly, the functional loss of transportation networks during volcanic 
activity, results in the end-users of the system experiencing a degree of disruption to service (Deligne 
et al. companion paper – Appendix E1), such as reduced speeds, temporary traffic management 
systems, congestion, or increased accident rates (Blake et al. in review d). Such disruption can be 
described by the overall usability of the network section or facility of interest, which we term Level-of-
Service (LoS). Many transportation authorities are increasingly focusing on LoS measures, with a 
general shift from maintaining networks primarily through technical solutions to maintenance 
approaches which particularly address end-user needs (e.g. the ‘One Network Road Classification’ 
performance measures implemented by the New Zealand Transport Agency, which “places the 
customer at the heart of every investment decision”; NZTA 2013, p.3). LoS can be expressed 
descriptively as a series of general qualitative metrics, and/or as quantitative metric values that take 
into account site-specific details (e.g. Robinson et al. 2015). However, studies focusing on detailed 
assessments of transportation LoS are rare, especially during and after volcanic activity, despite the 
many multi-hazard impacts that can occur (e.g. Table 7.1). 
The aim of this paper is to design and develop a universally-applicable but location-adaptable impact 
assessment model that incorporates LoS as a key measure of transportation vulnerability. We 
develop LoS metrics by considering the consequences of damage from geophysical hazards and 
evacuations during volcanic activity for the end-users of key transportation modes (road, rail, aviation 
and infrastructure at ports). This contributes to the volcanic risk assessment discipline by considering 
the impact of volcanic hazards on transportation end-users, whether it be from disruption caused by 
the effects of management strategies that act to reduce population and infrastructure exposure (such 
as evacuation zoning or volcanic deposit clean-up), or that from physical damage caused by volcanic 
hazards directly impacting transportation networks.  
We adopt the “Māngere Bridge” scenario of the Auckland Volcanic Field (AVF), New Zealand, 
described by Deligne et al. (companion paper – Appendix E1), as a basis to demonstrate the 
application of LoS metrics. LoS metrics are implemented at key times during the course of the 
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hypothetical eruption and its aftermath. In our application, the conceptual approach for impact 
assessment model development is guided by official emergency management policies, the latest data 
for transportation impacts from post-eruption and laboratory studies, and direct consultation with 
officials from transportation and emergency management authorities. We also consider two 
geophysical adaptations to the established Māngere Bridge scenario – a sequence of volcanic unrest, 
similar to that in the original scenario but with no resultant eruption, and a sequence of events the 
same as the original scenario but with a predominant south-westerly wind direction (the dominant 
wind direction for Auckland; Chappell 2014). This allows us to explore the effects that potential 
alterations in the geophysical hazard sequence may have on evacuations, displaced populations, 
transportation damage and, importantly, LoS. Interdependencies with other critical infrastructure are 
briefly discussed but not analysed in detail. 
 
7.3 Transportation in Auckland 
In Auckland, New Zealand’s largest and most populous city (population ~1.6 million; Statistics New 
Zealand 2015), functional transportation networks are important for the regional and national 
economy (AELP-1 1999). However, Auckland’s geography poses some major challenges as it 
generally acts to constrain transportation networks on the ground; the Waitemata and Manukau 
Harbours act as major obstacles (Figure 7.1), constricting routes through narrow stretches of land. 
There are two main isthmus’ which lie around 10 km from Auckland City; one to the south east (~2.3 
km wide), and one to the south west (~5.2 km wide) (Tomsen 2010). Additionally, Auckland City is 
built directly on top of the 360 km2 basaltic AVF (Louglin et al. 2015), and as transportation routes 
service highly populated areas, the consequences of disruption caused by volcanic activity could be 
substantial and widespread. There are four key transportation modes in Auckland, all of which are 
vulnerable to future volcanic activity in the field: 
7.3.1 Road 
The road network in Auckland is extensive, with multiple highways, arterial (Figure 7.1) and local 
routes, spanning over 8,000 km across the region (NZTA 2008). The majority of trips are made by car 
(Auckland Council 2013a) and the bus network provides the bulk of public transport (ARTA 2009, 
Tomsen 2010). Walking mostly takes place within a transport system that must work for a range of 
road users (NZTA 2009). As Auckland’s geography acts to constrain the road transportation network 
(Figure 7.1), generally one of four highway bridges must be crossed in order to enter or leave the city 
area by highway.  
7.3.2 Rail 
Most rail in the central and suburban areas is electrified (Figure 7.1), with the electric system supplied 
by two connections to the national grid, at Southdown and Penrose substations (Deligne et al. 
companion paper – Appendix E1). At the time of writing, a diesel shuttle service runs between 
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Papakura and Pukekohe on the Southern Line (Figure 7.1). Diesel freight services also operate on 
the rail network through Auckland (Auckland Transport 2013a). In many instances rail routes consist 
of two or three tracks, but their close proximity means that if one is damaged the others are likely to 
be too (AELP-2 2014).  
7.3.3 Aviation 
The main aviation hub (passenger and cargo) is Auckland Airport (Figure 7.1), the largest and busiest 
passenger airport in New Zealand. It is one of only two civilian airports in New Zealand capable of 
handling the largest of passenger aircraft. In the Auckland region there is also an aerodrome at 
Ardmore and Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) base at Whenuapai, both of which have active 
airfields (Beca Planning 2003). 
7.3.4 Maritime 
There are three key port sites in Auckland (Figure 7.1): the Port of Auckland (the main seaport located 
in the Waitemata Harbour with cargo and cruise services), the Port of Onehunga (in the Manukau 
Harbour with a limited cargo service), and the Wiri Intermodal Freight Hub (in Wiri, South Auckland). 
Many ferry terminals, marinas and boat ramps also serve the region.  
 
 




Figure 7.1   Major transportation routes and facilities in the Auckland City area. Inset shows location of 
Auckland City study area within New Zealand. 
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7.4 Methodology and Application 
The approach used to assess transportation LoS and produce time series maps is shown in Figure 
7.2. In our methodology, we first consider the geophysical hazards (Section 7.4.1), using hazards in 
the Māngere Bridge scenario (Deligne et al. companion paper – Appendix E1) as a basis, to consider 
the effect on direct damage to the transportation network (Section 7.4.2). This is required to inform the 
core vulnerability component of our model: LoS metric development for transportation (Section 7.4.3). 
We then consider the latest emergency and transportation management policies for Auckland to 
demonstrate how LoS metrics can be applied in a particular location (Section 7.4.4). 
 
 
Figure 7.2   Summary of methodological approach and processes used to assess transportation Level-of-
Service. White-filled boxes indicate work outlined in Deligne et al. (companion paper – Appendix E1). Grey-filled 
boxes indicate work explored in this paper. 
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7.4.1 Geophysical hazards 
The Māngere Bridge scenario includes an unrest sequence with earthquakes, gas emission and 
ground deformation, followed by an eruption sequence which includes the six volcanic hazards of 
edifice, pyroclastic surges, tephra, ballistics, lava flows, and tsunami – all are described in Deligne et 
al. (companion paper – Appendix E1). Potential secondary hazards such as fire and flooding are 
beyond the scope of this study due to uncertainties in their location and extent. We build upon the 
extent and severity of hazards in the original scenario by also considering the implications on 
transportation of different (south-westerly) wind profiles on tephra deposition (Section 7.4.1.1) and a 
sequence of activity involving unrest with no eruption (Section 7.4.1.2). These additions to the original 
scenario are later used to demonstrate how LoS metrics can be applied in different situations. 
7.4.1.1 Predominant south-westerly wind 
As discussed in Deligne et al. (companion paper – Appendix E1), in the Māngere Bridge scenario the 
tephra dispersal event with the largest hazard footprint has an unusual wind direction for Auckland; 
the scenario adopted wind profiles for specific dates in March 2014 which may be seasonally 
constrained and atypical for the city. Therefore, we consider an additional option to the original 
Māngere Bridge scenario – new wind profiles which represent the predominant wind direction in 
Auckland, south-westerly winds. We perform additional modelling using the TEPHRA2 program 
(Bonadonna et al. 2005, Connor et al. 2011) to model ash deposition from the existing eruptive 
sequence with south-westerly winds prevalent throughout to make comparisons with the previously 
modelled ash deposition (Deligne et al. companion paper – Appendix E1) and discuss potential 
consequences for transportation. 
The first south-westerly wind profile was chosen from the New Zealand National Climate Database 
(NIWA CliFlo) from a random selection of 6-hourly profiles at Auckland Airport within a 10 year period 
between 01 January 1975 and 31 December 1984 – a similar method to that used by Magill et al. 
(2006). The date and time of the wind profile selected was 24 January 1976 (12:00) (Appendix E3). 
This wind profile was adopted for TEPHRA2 modelling for the first tephra plume of the scenario (i.e. 
14 March PM), with subsequent tephra plumes modelled using corresponding dates between the 
scenario timeframe and days following the first wind profile; a random time was selected from the 4 
NIWA CliFlo wind profile options on each day (Appendix E3). Minor adjustments were made to other 
TEPHRA2 input parameters to those used in the original Māngere Bridge scenario modelling to most 
appropriately reflect current knowledge of volcanic ash characteristics that could occur in the AVF 
(often using analogue worldwide eruptions). The new suite of tephra parameters (Appendix E4) was 
adopted for modelling our south-westerly wind addition. The input mass for each eruptive phase was 
kept consistent with the original scenario and all thicknesses below 0.1 mm converted to 0 mm as 
before. 
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7.4.1.2 Unrest with no eruption 
For the purpose of exploring the consequences of volcanic unrest with no eruption, we adopt the 
same unrest sequence that occurred during the original Māngere Bridge scenario from 19 February 
(when small swarms of high frequency non-volcanic earthquakes are detected), through to early on 
14 March (where tremor earthquakes and acceleration of deformation occurs). Although this is 
accompanied by visual observation of cracking near Māngere and an increase in volcanic gases, no 
phreatic eruption follows the sequence. From there onwards, we adopt the general sequence of 
events described in Pallister et al. (2010) for the series of earthquakes that occurred in the Harrat lava 
province of Saudi Arabia (April-June 2009), attributed to a magmatic dyke intrusion. There is currently 
no evidence for shallow dyke intrusions or surface ruptures without subsequent eruptions in the AVF. 
However, we cannot rule out the possibility of this occurring in the future and thus such a scenario is 
important to consider for emergency planning purposes.  
For the unrest scenario, we consider policy outlined in the AVF Contingency Plan (Auckland Council, 
2015) and Auckland Evacuation Plan (Auckland Council, 2014) regarding the establishment of 
Primary Evacuation Zones (PEZs) and Secondary Evacuation Zones (SEZs). 
7.4.2 Physical damage to transportation 
We consider the six volcanic hazards in the hypothetical Māngere Bridge eruption and earthquakes 
associated with prior unrest activity by producing time-series maps that display the physical damage 
to transportation through the scenario. Each transportation mode is considered separately, as is 
damage from proximal volcanic hazards and volcanic ash. Deligne et al. (companion paper – 
Appendix E1) adopted the ‘worst-case’ and ‘average-case’ scenarios for pyroclastic surges, originally 
proposed by Brand et al. (2014) who provide guidance on the physical impact to buildings through the 
consideration of previous studies, but here used for transportation infrastructure. We use expert 
judgment to consider transportation buildings (e.g. rail stations, port facilities) and linear components 
of the network (e.g. rail lines, roads) separately. We classify the physical damage from pyroclastic 
surges using radial distance thresholds (established from dynamic pressures) using expert judgment 
from transportation infrastructure managers. 
For earthquakes, we assume minimal direct damage to infrastructure given the relatively modest 
magnitudes (up to ML4.8) for the Māngere Bridge scenario, and considering that the New Zealand 
building code is deemed adequate at a worldwide scale (Daniell et al, 2014). However, some minor 
blockages from landslides and other debris, and damage to specific components, may occur on the 
ground transportation network during earthquakes which are shallow and with epicenters nearby. As 
such, we take a conservative approach and apply the same damage category (“minor damage and 
blockage possible”) to all roads and rail lines that fall within an area ~5 km from earthquake zone 
boundaries in the scenario, also including all of the central Auckland area between the two isthmus’. 
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In areas beyond the zones affected by the edifice, pyroclastic surges and earthquakes, we apply 
findings from Blake et al. (a,b,c) and Wilson et al. (2014) to evaluate physical damage from tephra fall. 
We designate the same ‘possible damage’ category (Section 7.6.1) adopted for the outer extent of 
surges (i.e. radial extents with relatively low dynamic pressures) to electric rail lines in these areas. 
We do not anticipate any direct physical damage to road networks in this area. However, we allocate 
a distinct category termed ‘minor accumulations of deposits’ to road sections affected by this tephra 
layer, to highlight areas where potential knock-on consequences may exist (for example, subsequent 
physical damage caused by accidents or blockage of stormwater networks). In scenarios elsewhere, 
where tephra accumulation is more extensive in distal areas, additional physical damage categories 
should be considered for tephra fall based on laboratory and observational data. 
Following an eruption, clean-up of the transportation network is required for it to return to full 
functionality, and also for key site access to maintain or restore other critical infrastructure. In this 
study, we adopt the volcanic tephra clean-up model and timeframe examined in Hayes et al. (2015). 
7.4.3 Level-of-service metric development for transportation 
To develop the metric series, we consider the expected disruption resulting from physical damage 
caused by hazards (Section 7.4.2) and operational activities such as evacuation zoning and area 
exclusions outlined in the Māngere Bridge scenario. Expert knowledge from transportation 
infrastructure managers informed the development of metrics. Specifically, LoS metrics for road and 
rail include the consideration of: 
 Destruction of the network by geophysical hazards 
 Deposits on the network from geophysical hazards 
 Inspection and maintenance requirements (e.g. due to ground shaking) 
 Access (e.g. due to evacuation zones or blockage) 
 Use of infrastructure for alternative purposes (e.g. rail stations used as welfare facilities). 
For road transportation, a single suite of LoS metrics is developed to consider the linear part of the 
network (i.e. components such as bridges and traffic signals are not considered separately). For the 
purpose of this study we assume that all road surfaces are sealed, although we recognise that a small 
proportion may be unsealed in reality with potential variations in impact and clean-up characteristics 
(Nairn 2002). LoS metrics are developed around similar principles for the rail line network (i.e. rail 
tracks and overhead lines which are both equally important to end-users and considered as one in 
this study). However, rail stations are also critical components, as stations and lines may be impacted 
and restored differently, and ultimately could affect end-users of rail transportation in different ways; 
we thus develop separate LoS metrics for rail stations. 
We developed LoS metrics for aviation in consultation with the Auckland Airport Compliance and 
Quality Assurance Manager. The aim was to best describe possible partial or complete closure 
scenarios for an international airport. We assumed that the location of the arrival / destination city 
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(e.g. whether it is a domestic or international flight) is correlated with the type of aircraft used and 
scheduling complexities, and that the quantity of flights departing / arriving relative to a benchmark is 
an appropriate proxy for how well the aviation sector is delivering service. In other words, the metric 
had to reflect that different operations at an airport have different response capabilities (e.g. 
international flights will often require more time to change schedules than domestic flights), and that 
different aircraft types have different airfield requirements.  
7.4.4 Level-of-service metric application 
We illustrate how the LoS metrics can be applied using the Māngere Bridge scenario by considering 
the spatial and temporal extents of evacuation zones, damage from geophysical hazards, operational 
priorities, and clean-up that has occurred on sections of the network. LoS metrics in each area are 
informed by expert judgment, with guidance from local infrastructure managers and emergency 
management officials taking priority as they often have the best knowledge of the system. Sometimes, 
overlaying the spatial extent of particular evacuation zones and/or physical damage layer is sufficient 
to designate a specific LoS metric to sections of the network. However, a more manual approach is 
sometimes required – for example, where particular routes and facilities are prioritised for reopening 
to restore vital connections.    
We use the Māngere Bridge scenario to display the LoS for end-users of the Auckland transportation 
network at key stages throughout the hypothetical eruption and its aftermath. We also suggest metric 
values for Auckland Airport as the percentage proportion of ‘typical capacity’ can be estimated.  
7.4.4.1 Road and rail 
Due to the relatively large spatial distribution of road and rail networks, we display maps of LoS for 
these modes of transportation. Road sections are defined as the segments between intersections or 
highway on/off ramps, and therefore differ in length. Where hazard or evacuation zone boundaries 
cross road boundaries, the same LoS calculated within the boundary is often extended outside of the 
zone to the nearest intersection. A similar method is used for rail lines, where the same LoS from 
within zones is extended out to the nearest station. In comparison, LoS for Auckland Airport, the Port 
of Auckland and Port of Onehunga, which are single point sources, are only described in text and 
tables. Following consultation with transportation and emergency management officials in Auckland 
we make the following assumptions when applying LoS metrics and developing maps: 
 Highways and critical arterial roads are prioritised for reopening, especially when restoring a 
north-south link through the southern isthmus is required. 
 Only volcanic hazards are responsible for the destruction, damage or functional loss of 
transportation networks. In reality, particularly for rapid-onset eruptions, substantial human-
induced modification may also occur (e.g. the intentional blockage or destruction of some 
state highway on/off ramps to facilitate contraflow). 
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 All roads and rail networks may be used for the purposes of evacuating residents when an 
evacuation zone is first implemented (rail services would only collect passengers and not 
allow disembarkation from stations within the evacuation zones). 
 In some cases, critical road routes may be opened to allow travel through an evacuation zone 
(with no stopping or exit allowed from the critical routes within the evacuation zone itself). 
 The spatial extent of areas affected by direct tephra fall and pyroclastic surge deposits is not 
extended due to the re-suspension and secondary deposition of deposits (although this is 
discussed in places). 
 Congestion and accidents do not cause any impact on subsequent LoS designations. 
 There are no major cascading effects resulting from other critical infrastructure failure or 
disruption. 
7.4.4.2 Aviation 
To determine aviation LoS metrics, we applied New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) policy for 
airspace management during a volcanic crisis (Lechner 2015) to determine airspace restrictions over 
the course of the Māngere Bridge scenario (Figure 7.3). We then assigned LoS metrics in 
consultation with the Auckland Airport Compliance and Quality Assurance Manager, making the 
following assumptions: 
 There is progressive closure of Auckland Airport during the unrest sequence.  
 Airports are closed when within evacuated zones on the ground (although prioritised 
reinstatement may occur when they lie close to boundaries of these zones). 
 There is minimal aircraft operation within Volcanic Hazard Zones (VHZs), which are 
established in response to VALs of 1 or greater, and corresponding Notices to Airmen 
(NOTAMs)7. 
 Airfields at RNZAF Whenuapai base and Ardmore Aerodrome can accommodate limited 
domestic, trans-Tasman and Pacific island traffic, primarily cargo. 
Our results were then vetted and approved by an Air New Zealand Senior Business Continuity 
Management Advisor to check that they were realistic. We stress that our work should not be taken as 
policy endorsement or an indication of how individual airlines would respond in a similar situation.  
 
 
                                                     
7 Although aircraft are permitted to operate within VHZs during daylight hours and in visual meteorological 
conditions, this only occurs at the specific request of pilots. Otherwise, air traffic control will not clear an aircraft to 
operate on any route or procedure that infringes VHZs, and aircraft under radar control will be vectored clear of 
VHZ boundaries (AIP NZ, 2016). 




Figure 7.3  Hypothetical Volcanic Hazard Zone boundaries for the original Māngere Bridge scenario 
based on VALs (using zone radii of 3, 8, 16, and 27 nautical miles for VAL 0 and 1, 2, 3, and 4 
respectively; Lechner 2015). The legend indicates the Flight Level (FL) below which pilots require specific 
permission to enter VHZs. For example, at VAL 0 or 1, pilots require permission to enter areas below FL 30 
within 3 nautical miles of the volcanic vent. 
 
7.4.4.3 Maritime 
Although we consider the impacts to both port infrastructure and the navigation of ships in harbour 
areas for the development of LoS metrics, the operation of ports themselves is the main focus for the 
Māngere Bridge scenario. This was undertaken using best judgment taking into account post-eruption 
impacts observed elsewhere. Marinas and boat ramps are not considered in this paper. Similar to our 
approach for applying LoS metrics for Auckland Airport, we only describe LoS for the Port of Auckland 
and Port of Onehunga in text and tables (rather than on maps) as they are point sources. 
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7.4.4.4 Evacuation and displaced populations 
As transportation LoS is strongly influenced by the establishment and alteration of evacuation zones, 
we consider the consequences of the evacuations summarised in Deligne et al. (companion paper – 
Appendix E1) with regard to the number of residents impacted and considerations for transportation 
demand. Consultation with emergency management staff in Auckland confirmed that throughout 
eruptions such as in our scenario, the national emergency management body in New Zealand 
(Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management; MCDEM) and Auckland CDEM would work 
alongside infrastructure providers to assess when cordoned areas can be entered for clean-up, repair 
and maintenance (Auckland Council 2015). CDEM, through the provisions of the CDEM Act (2002), 
can grant concessions for staff to access evacuation areas to expedite reinstatement of critical 
services. Thus, while evacuated areas are off limits to residents and businesses, infrastructure 
providers such as transportation management authorities will sometimes be able to temporarily enter 
during lulls in volcanic activity, especially since activity in the AVF could continue for months to years. 
Consultation with transportation infrastructure providers in Auckland highlighted that the Southern 
Motorway (SH1) would remain open whenever possible, albeit at limited capacity with access 
restrictions, even when it is within officially evacuated zones. 
The number or residents displaced by evacuation and exclusion zones is calculated using night-time 
resident population data. For the Māngere Bridge scenario, we use data collected in the 2013 New 
Zealand Census (Statistics New Zealand 2013). Rather than an estimate of those who reside within 
the exact extent of the evacuation zones, we adopt census meshblock8 values using all meshblocks 
that fall within and intersect the zone boundaries and round values to the nearest hundred (Figure 
7.4). This is deemed to be a more accurate representation as the true extent of any evacuation zone 
will likely reach beyond the initially designated extent in places due to features on the ground such as 
roads, potentially isolated neighbourhoods, and large property boundaries. Accounting for the number 
of businesses displaced by evacuation zones is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
                                                     
8 A meshblock is the smallest geographic unit for which statistical data is collected and processed by Statistics 
New Zealand. Meshblocks in Auckland have a median land area of 0.039 km2. 




Figure 7.4   Example calculation of displaced populations using census meshblocks (using the Primary 
Evacuation Zone on 21-30 April for the scenario involving unrest but no eruption). In this case, the thick 
boundaries indicate the census meshblocks which would be used to calculate the population displaced by the 
evacuation zone (i.e. night-time resident populations in the meshblocks either completely inside the evacuation 
zone or which intersect the evacuation zone boundary). 
 
7.5 Level-of-Service Metrics 
The suites of LoS metrics developed for road, rail stations, rail lines and ports are shown in Table 7.2, 
Table 7.3, Table 7.4 and Table 7.5 respectively. 
 
Table 7.2   Road network Level-of-Service metrics. Metrics are descriptive, and the codes are simply used as 




Road Level-of-Service Example situations that could lead to LoS  
I Full service – road fully open  
IIa Reduced service with no direct deposits 
(no access restrictions) 
 Inspection requirements following ground 
shaking.  
 Preparatory road maintenance or traffic 
control measures. 
IIb Reduced service due to direct deposits (no 
access restrictions) 
 Minor tephra accumulations (0.1 – 5.0 mm). 
IIIa Access restrictions with no direct deposits  New evacuation zones being implemented 
(e.g. one-way travel to outside of zone) 
 Critical routes through evacuation zones (with 
hazard thresholds for immediate re-closure). 
IIIb Access restrictions due to direct deposits  Moderate to severe tephra accumulations 




 Pyroclastic surge, lava flow and lahars 
IV Critical infrastructure and maintenance staff 
access only 
 Lulls in volcanic activity before or during an 
eruption (within evacuation zones). 
V No service – road closed to all  Road infrastructure destroyed or severely 
damaged beyond repair 
 Road closed due to being in evacuated area. 
  
Consultation with transportation infrastructure managers suggested that lower speed restrictions may 
be imposed for LoS metric codes II and III, with temporary traffic management measures such as 
additional signage, cones and/or barriers. Metric codes IV and V would require major traffic 
management with well signed diversions and potential presence of officials, such as Police or Military 
staff, and/or physical measures, to ensure compliance. We note that there might be occasional 
overlaps between metrics. For example, as indicated by the italic text for metric IIIa (Table 7.2), 
critical routes may be restored through evacuation zones with access restricted (due to operational 
purposes rather than any deposits) onto and off these routes through the zones themselves. 
However, deposits may also reduce the LoS somewhat in such areas (e.g. tephra may remain from 
previous falls or accumulate through secondary deposition from remobilised material – i.e. metric 
code IIb). Where such overlaps occur, we suggest that the routes of interest be allocated the metric 
with the largest overall LoS reduction. 
 




Rail station Level-of-Service Example situations that could lead to LoS 
I Full service - station fully open  
II Partial service  Evacuations - no exit from stopping trains, i.e. entry-only 
 Limited station facilities due to volcanic hazard damage 
(e.g. shelter, ticketing, retail). 
III Only used for different purpose  Line damage renders station inoperable for rail network 
(other purposes may include shelter from tephra fall, 
evacuation welfare facility, and temporary bus stop). 
IV No service - station closed  Station destroyed or severely damaged beyond repair 
 Station closed due to being in evacuated area. 
 




Rail line Level-of-Service Example situations that could lead to LoS 
I Full service – line fully open  
II Restricted service  New timetabling with fewer services 
 Speed restrictions due to minor airborne ash. 
III Rolling / temporary outage  Temporary damage to components due to ground 
shaking or deposits 
 Inspection requirements 
 Re-distribution of fleet. 
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IV No stopping service  Evacuations require transportation of people through 
evacuated areas 
 Severe damage to stations and surrounding 
infrastructure but lines operable. 
V Evacuation service only  Evacuations require special service to transport 
residents from newly established evacuation zones. 
VI No service – line closed  Line destroyed or severely damaged beyond repair 
 Line closed due to being in evacuated area. 
 
Different suites of metrics are presented for rail stations and lines as the separate components of the 
rail system could affect end-users in different ways. As with roads, there may be slight overlaps 
between LoS metrics. For example, evacuation services may also be non-stopping when travelling 
through much of the evacuation zone. Again, best judgment should be used to determine the largest 
impact on service and most appropriate LoS metric chosen. 
 
Table 7.5   Port Level-of-Service metrics. 
 
Value Port Level-of-Service Example situations that could lead to LoS 
I Full service – port fully open  
II Partial service  Volcanic deposits affect operations at the port or navigation 
of vessels 
 Evacuation zones affect some navigation routes. 
 Staff unable to access port facilities. 
III No service – port closed  Port destroyed or severely damaged beyond repair 
 Severe sedimentation in shipping channels means vessels 
cannot operate 
 Port closed due to being in evacuated area. 
 
For aviation, the LoS is described slightly differently. We consider domestic and international 
destinations separately. As we focus our studies in New Zealand, we also consider ‘trans-Tasman 
and Pacific island routes’ which refers to flights between New Zealand and eastern Australia and 
some South Pacific island nations. For each market, the LoS is the percent capacity of flights relative 
to normal airport operations for the time of year. Thus, a LoS metric for aviation could be 50% 
capacity in the domestic market – this means that half of domestic flights that are normally scheduled 
to land and depart from the airport are able to do so. 
The effects of congestion, accidents and breakdowns on traffic flow are not directly considered for the 
LoS metrics provided in this study. Although we recognise that such impacts could be substantial at 
times, further work is required to more accurately understand travel behavior during ashfall to make 
estimations of traffic demand and flow. Various other constraints will be required to make such 
estimations including the time of day or day of the week (Tomsen et al. 2014), and considerations of 
new transportation projects in the area of interest.  
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7.6 Results and Discussion – Māngere Bridge Scenario 
7.6.1 Physical damage 
The physical damage to road and rail networks from volcanic hazards which occur in the original 
Māngere Bridge scenario is summarised in Table 7.6, with maps to illustrate the damage in Figure 7.5 
(roads) and Figure 7.6 (rail). 
 
Table 7.6   Physical damage to road and rail networks from geophysical hazards examined in Deligne et 
al. (companion paper – Appendix E1). A more detailed version of the table, showing network specifics to 




Event Specifics Road Physical Damage Rail Physical Damage 
22 February VAL increases 














08 March 08 March Primary 
Evacuation Zone 
(PEZ ) 
11 March 11 March PEZ  










 Potential minor damage and 
blockages possible (inspections 
may be required). 
 







 Potential damage and blockage on 
suburban electric network (inspections 
required). 
Southern part more susceptible to 







km from vent and 
some damage 4-6 





 Road infrastructure destroyed or 
severely damaged 0-4 km from 
vent. 
 Some road infrastructure 
damaged with major blockages 
4-6 km from vent. 
 Additional damage/blockage the 
same as 13 March. 
 
115 km destroyed. 
202 km severely damaged with 
complete blockage. 
457 km some damage and major 
blockages 
Rail stations: 
 Two stations close to vent destroyed 
or severely damaged beyond repair. 




 Lines up to 4 km from vent destroyed 
or severely damaged 
 Possible damage to lines 4-6 km from 
vent. 
 Potential damage and blockage on 










(Also see Figure 7.5a) 
 Tephra deposition on some 
minor roads to west of vent.  
 Additional damage/blockage the 
same as 13 March. 
 
163 km outside of the initial surge 
area experiences direct tephra 
deposition. 
 
(Also see Figure 7.6a) 
Rail stations: 
(same as 14 March AM) 
 
Rail lines: 
(same as 14 March AM) 
Tephra fall to west does not directly fall 
on the rail network. Remobilised ash may 
reach some lines but no impacts are 
anticipated.  
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Remobilised ash may extend to 
roads beyond the area mentioned 
but no substantial impacts are 
anticipated. 
 
16 March 11 March PEZ 
and 12 March 
SEZ lifted. 
 
16 March PEZ 
and 16 March 
SEZ implemented 
 Minor accumulation of deposits 
remain on cleaned sections 
including critical routes through 
SEZ. 
 Other sections within initial surge 
area remain destroyed, damaged 
or blocked. 
 Tephra deposition is cleaned-up 
or removed by rainfall beyond 
the SEZ extent. 
 
Any minor damage from previous 
earthquakes has been repaired with 
no further impacts to the road 
network at this stage.  
Rail stations: 
(same as 14 March AM) 
 
Rail lines: 
 Damage within 6 km from vent 
remains same as 14 March AM 
Any damage to components from 
previous earthquakes is repaired with no 
impact to the rail network beyond 6 km 
from the vent at this stage.  
 





(Also see Figure 7.5b) 
 Some further accumulation of 
surge and tephra deposits up to 
6 km from vent. 
 Tephra deposition on roads to 
north west of SEZ  
 
984 km road beyond the initial 
surge area experiences tephra 
accumulation. Thus, a total of 1,758 
km of road is impacted at this stage 
(the largest extent throughout 
the scenario).  
 
(Also see Figure 7.5b) 
Rail stations: 
(same as 14 March AM) 
 
Rail lines: 
 Damage within 6 km from vent 
remains same as 14 March AM. 
 Possible damage to rail components 
on lines affected by tephra fall to north 
west of SEZ. 
Initial damage from ash accumulation 
beyond the SEZ is fixed by late on 22 
March. However, some failures may 
continue due to ash remobilisation on the 
network. 
30 March Tephra fallout to 
south east. 
 
 Only minor accumulation of 
deposits on cleaned critical 
routes. 
 
All other roads within initial surge 
area remain destroyed, damaged or 
blocked to some degree. 
Rail stations: 
(same as 14 March AM) 
 
Rail lines: 
(same as 16 March, before tephra fall) 
05 April Lava flows. 
 
16 March SEZ 
lifted. 
 
(Also see Figure 7.5c) 
 Continued clean-up of 
remobilised tephra, means only 
minor accumulation of deposits 
remains on many critical routes. 
 
All other roads within initial surge 
area remain destroyed, damaged or 
blocked to some degree, although 
are widely accessible from this date 
for clean-up following the lifting of 
the SEZ. 
 
(Also see Figure 7.6c) 
Rail stations: 
 Two stations closest to vent remain 
destroyed by initial surge. 
Previous damage to other stations within 
6 km of vent is repaired. 
 
Rail lines: 
(same as 16 March, before tephra fall) 
Possible damage from tephra continues 
4-6 km from vent until clean-up prevents 
further remobilisation and infiltration. 







 Restoration has occurred beyond 
the extent of the severe damage 
/ complete blockage zone 
caused by the initial surge (0-4 
km from the vent). 
 
The road length in this area at the 
start of the scenario was 305 km. 
 
Rail stations: 
(same as 05 April) 
 
Rail lines: 
 Lines remain destroyed up to 4 km 
from vent 
Demand to reconstruct the infrastructure 
required to reopen this line is expected to 
be low. The stations and line may be 
decommissioned or relocated based on 
rebuild activities. 




Figure 7.5   Physical damage to the road network at a selection of key times during the scenario. Note that 
the full series of physical damage road maps can be seen in Appendix E6. 
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Figure 7.6   Physical damage to the rail network at a selection of key times during the scenario. Note that 
the full series of physical damage rail maps can be seen in Appendix E7. 
 
Most physical damage to road and rail transportation results from the initial pyroclastic surge on 14 
March in the scenario, which was derived from the following radial damage thresholds: 
 Destroyed: <0.5 km (average-case), <2.5 km (worst-case) 
 Severe damage / complete blockage: 0.5 – 2 km (average-case), 2.5 – 4 km (worst-case) 
 Some damage / minor blockages: 2 – 4 km (average-case), 4 – 6 km (worst-case). 
We note that surges in other locations may require the modification of radial distance thresholds, 
considering the dynamic pressures expected from different eruption styles, and specific infrastructure 
types.  
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Other damage and potential blockage of networks in our scenario result from ground shaking due to 
earthquakes and tephra fall. These effects are generally more temporary with road-cleaning and 
inspections occurring soon after each hazard where possible to restore functionality. The general 
priority is to repair and maintain critical north-south links through the southern isthmus. However, the 
effects of ash remobilisation on transportation could be substantial and extend the temporal and 
spatial extent of impacts. Detailed ash resuspension modelling, such as that conducted by Reckziegel 
et al. (2016), would be required to investigate these impacts more fully. 
Auckland Airport does not encounter any direct physical damage from any volcanic hazards over the 
course of the scenario. However, it is indirectly impacted by restricted access (due to evacuation 
zoning, and volcanic hazards affecting roads nearby), airspace restrictions, and physical damage to 
other critical infrastructure such as the wastewater system (Stewart et al. companion paper).  
Only one of the ports in Auckland, the Port of Onehunga, the smallest and arguably least important of 
the facilities, is directly impacted by geophysical hazards in the original Māngere Bridge scenario. 
However, the facilities at the port are closed due to the effects of evacuation zoning (on 08 March) 
before being destroyed by pyroclastic surges (on 14 March), which results in permanent closure. The 
eruption changes the landscape where the Port of Onehunga used to be and also devastates the 
local built environment. A rebuild would not be practical at the same site as the area becomes 
landlocked. However, it is possible that another port elsewhere in the Manukau Harbour, or indeed 
somewhere else in the Auckland region, would be built.  
The Port of Auckland at Waitemata Harbour is not directly impacted in the original Māngere Bridge 
scenario. No major damage or substantial LoS reduction is expected from earthquakes, and tephra 
accumulation over much of the Port of Auckland on 21 March is <1 mm thick, which is not deemed 
substantial enough to close port operations (although indirect impacts such as access restrictions 
may have cascading implications for port operations). However, different wind directional profiles may 
have consequences for tephra thicknesses at the port and subsequent LoS (Section 7.6.4.1). 
7.6.2 Level-of-Service  
Table 7.7 details the considerations for assigning LoS metrics to the road and rail (station and line) 
network, and to Auckland Airport over the course of the scenario. This is followed by a selection of 
associated time-series maps for road (Figure 7.7) and rail (Figure 7.8) to illustrate LoS metrics at key 
stages in the scenario, in addition to a table to show specific LoS metric values (based on capacity 
and guided by policy) for Auckland Airport (Table 7.8). 
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Table 7.7   Level-of-Service descriptions for Auckland’s road, rail and airport transportation networks over the course of the Māngere Bridge scenario. A more 




Event Specifics Road Level-of-Service  Rail Level-of-Service Airport Level-of-Service 
22 
February 






Note. Some self-evacuation and preparation for 
evacuation may lead to increase in traffic 
congestion. 
 
Full service.  
 
Some self-evacuation may lead to increase in 
passengers and delays at stations. 
Auckland Airport starts 
making plans for a potential 
closure. 
08 March 08 March PEZ 
implemented 
 
 Evacuations occur from the PEZ. Access 
becomes restricted for most entering the zone. 
Some critical lifelines staff can still enter.  
 All road transport between north and south 
Auckland is disrupted. 
 
All other infrastructure remains fully operational, 
although some measures may be implemented to 
control evacuation flow. 
 
784 km road affected by 08 March PEZ. 
Rail stations: 
 Partial service within PEZ 
 
Rail lines: 
 Evacuation service only on lines within and 
intersecting PEZ (with speed restrictions) 
 
Restricted service may occur on the remaining 
suburban electric rail network from now onwards due 
to timetable changes and redistribution of fleet. 
 
Auckland Airport issues 
NOTAM indicating airport 
closure.  
 
Minor domestic traffic at other 
airfields. Most domestic traffic 
possibly diverted outside of 
region. 
11 March 11 March PEZ 
implemented 
 
 No access to roads affected by the initial PEZ 
on 08 March except critical lifelines staff. 
 Evacuations occur from a new PEZ section in 
the Māngere area. Access is restricted for 
most. 
 
1019 km road is now affected by the new wider 
(11 March) PEZ. 
 
Rail stations: 
 Stations within 08 March PEZ now closed. 
 Partial service within newly established PEZ area. 
 
Rail lines: 
 Lines affected by 08 March PEZ now closed. 
 Evacuation service only on lines affected by new 
PEZ area 
Diesel freight through-traffic ceases.  
Auckland Airport issues 
NOTAM indicating that the 
airport is within evacuation 
zone. 
12 March 12 March SEZ 
implemented 
 
 No service (roads closed) in area covered by 
11 March PEZ. 
 Evacuations occur from SEZ with restricted 
access for most. 
 Some measures may be implemented 
elsewhere to control evacuation flow. 
 
1415 km road is now affected by evacuation 
Rail stations: 
 Stations affected by 08 and 11 March PEZ now 
closed. 
 Partial service within newly established SEZ. 
 
Rail lines: 
 Lines affected by 08 and 11 March PEZ now 
closed. 
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zones (11 March PEZ and 12 March SEZ). 
 
 Evacuation service only on lines affected by new 
SEZ. 
13 March Volcanic gases detected. 
Shallow earthquakes (up 
to ML4.5). 
 
 No service (roads closed) in area covered by 
11 March PEZ and 12 March SEZ. 
 Reduced service possible on roads impacted 
by ground shaking from earthquakes.  
Rail stations: 
 Stations within evacuation zones closed. 
 
Rail lines: 
 Lines directly affected by evacuation zones closed. 





Pyroclastic surge causes 
complete destruction 0-4 
km from vent and some 
damage 4-6 km from 
vent. 
Shallow earthquakes (up 
to ML4.8). 
VAL increases from 2 to 
3. 
 LoS in morning remains the same as 13 March. 
 
Impact on electricity transmission and distribution 
may affect road LoS for the entire Auckland 
region. 
 
 LoS remains the same as 13 March. 
 






Tephra fallout to west. 
VAL increases from 3 to 
4. 
Clean-up outside of SEZ 
begins (for ~1 day). 
Some critical routes also 
cleaned through SEZ. 
 Tephra in afternoon causes reduced LoS on 
some arterial and minor roads to west of vent. 
16 March  11 March PEZ and 12 
March SEZ lifted. 
16 March PEZ and 16 
March SEZ 
implemented. 
VAL 2 (after reducing to 
3 on 15 March). 
 
 Road service restored on roads beyond new 16 
March PEZ and SEZ extents. 
 Partial road service on some critical routes 
through evacuation zones during daytime.   




 Station within new evacuation zones closed. 
 
Rail lines: 
 Lines within or intersecting new PEZ closed. 
 No stopping (with speed restrictions) occurs 
through new SEZ. 
Some diesel freight services restored with restrictions 
due to operational infrastructure damage. 
New timetabling may be implemented on remainder 
of suburban rail network. 
Auckland Airport issues 
NOTAM indicating it is no 
longer in evacuation zone but 
that airport remains closed. 
21 March  Tephra fallout to north 
west. 
Pyroclastic surge. 
VAL 4 (after increasing 
to 3 on 18 March). 
 No service (roads closed again) through PEZ 
and SEZ due to threat from surge and tephra 
fall. 
 Tephra deposition causes reduced service on 
many roads to north west of SEZ. 
Rail stations: 
 (same as 16 March) 
 
Rail lines: 
 Same as 16 March except for rolling outages and 
Volcanic eruption resumes. 
No air traffic in or out of 
Auckland Airport. 
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22 March Tephra. 
VAL reduces to 3. 
Clean-up outside of PEZ 
and SEZ begins (for ~1 
week). Some critical 
routes also cleaned 
through PEZ and SEZ. 
 LoS remains the same on roads to north west 
affected by 21 March tephra. 
 Partial service restored on major critical routes 
through SEZ from north to south. 
 Some critical lifelines staff can enter SEZ. 
 No service elsewhere within PEZ and SEZ. 
 
speed restrictions on lines affected by new tephra. 
Rolling outages are expected to be short-lived (until 
late on 22 March). However, further outages are 





Tephra fallout to south 
east. 
 
 Full service restored to roads beyond SEZ 
affected by 21 March tephra fall. 
 Service within PEZ and SEZ remains same as 
22 March except some further critical routes 
which are reopened during daytime. 
 
Rail stations: 
 (same as 16 March) 
 
Rail lines: 
 Same as 21 March except restoration of service 







16 March SEZ lifted. 
Major clean-up operation 
within lifted SEZ begins 
(for ~1 month). 
 
 
 Further critical routes through the now lifted 
SEZ are re-established with partial service. 
 Only reduced service due to tephra deposits 
remain on some roads beyond the outer initial 
surge. 
 Very limited access occurs on roads affected 
by the initial surge deposit up to the extent of 
the previous PEZ. 
 No service (roads closed) within PEZ. 
Rail stations: 
 Only stations within PEZ remain closed. 
 
Rail lines: 
 Lines within or intersecting PEZ remain closed. 
 Speed restrictions on lines affected by previous 
SEZ. 
All diesel freight services restored.  
Auckland Airport issues a 
NOTAM indicating it remains 
outside of the evacuation 
zone with new evacuation 
orders in place. 
 
Airport is re-opened with 
minimal service. 
08 April    Auckland Airport resumes full 
operations. 
16 April VAL reduces to 2.   Auckland Airport issues a 
NOTAM that VAL has 
decreased. 




VAL reduces to 1. 
Major clean-up operation 
within lifted PEZ begins 
(for ~1 month). 
 
 Full service restored to all roads beyond 4 km 
from the vent. 
 Very limited access 2-4 km from the vent. 
 No service (remaining roads closed indefinitely) 
0-2 km from the vent. 
 
Rail stations: 




 Some lines closed on 05 April remain closed for 
coming months. 
Auckland Airport partially re-
opened. 
01 June VAL reduces to 0.   Auckland Airport re-opens. 




Figure 7.7   Level-of-Service metrics for the road network at a selection of key times during the 
scenario. Note that the full series of Level-of-Service road maps can be seen in Appendix E9. 
 




Figure 7.8   Level-of-Service metrics for the rail network at a selection of key times during the 
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Table 7.8   Changes in Level-of-Service metric percentage values for Auckland Airport for the 
Māngere Bridge scenario. Percentage values indicate the capacity with 100% = ‘typical’ operating 
capacity and 0% = no capacity. 
 




22 February 100 100 100 
08 March 80 50 50 
11 March 5 0 0 
14 March 0 0 0 
16 March 5 0 0 
21 March 0 0 0 
05 April 10 0 0 
08 April 80 25 10 
16 April 80 30 10 
01 May 80 50 10 
01 June 80 80 25 
15 June 100 100 100 
 
Importantly, the LoS for all transportation modes is affected by evacuation zoning before the 
modes are impacted by geophysical hazards and experience any physical damage. LoS 
reductions occur from 08 March onwards for all modes, the scenario date when the first PEZ 
is implemented. This includes the closure of a major highway (SH20), which is expected to 
lead to increased traffic on alternative arterial and highway routes. In the Māngere Bridge 
scenario road and rail encounter the greatest overall LoS loss on 13 and 14 March, and all 
north-south ground transportation links across the southern isthmus are blocked at this time. 
Some service is restored on 16 March, although subsequent tephra fall and threat of surges 
on 21 March causes secondary temporary disruption. The strength and direction of wind on 
22 March in the Māngere Bridge scenario mean that the impact of tephra fall then is minimal, 
and restoration is possible again from this date forward. However, full restoration takes 
several weeks for most road and rail transportation networks in the area extending 4 km 
radially from the vent, even following the end of effusive activity. Some infrastructure within 2 
km of the vent is permanently destroyed.  
LoS reduction also starts on 08 March at Auckland Airport. From 08 March to 01 May, VALs 
determine the volume of airspace affected by volcanic ash, described by NOTAMs that invoke 
VHZs. During this time, air traffic control will not clear aircraft to operate on routes that 
infringe a VHZ, unless specifically requested by the pilot during daylight hours only (AIP NZ, 
2016). Auckland Airport is only within evacuated areas on the ground from 11-15 March. 
Ardmore and Whenuapai airfields are outside evacuated areas for the duration of the 
scenario and are within VHZs for shorter periods than Auckland Airport; they may be used for 
some aircraft diversions from Auckland Airport at times. As the Auckland Airport runway is 
roughly oriented east-west and the Māngere Bridge scenario vent location is to the north, the 
flight approach shouldn’t be substantially compromised by the VHZ implemented at VAL 1. 
However, airport officials indicated that it would take a few days for international airlines to 
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start flying into Auckland again once they are allowed to land, in part due to the time it would 
take to reorganise schedules and redistribute aircraft.  
Onehunga Port closes on 08 March when it falls within evacuation zones, and all vessels are 
diverted elsewhere (i.e. LoS metric code III). No LoS is restored in the same location as the 
port is subsequently destroyed by pyroclastic surges from 14 March onwards. 
We do not apply metric code III (“only used for a different purpose”) for rail stations for any of 
the timesteps in the scenario. This is because stations that are inoperable for rail operations 
often fall within evacuated areas and would thus not be suitable for any other purpose. 
Additionally, the detailed information required to allocate this metric is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Similarly, metric code II for rail lines (“restricted service”) has only been allocated 
where speed restrictions are expected due to minor airborne deposits; consultation with rail 
network managers suggested that speeds of 40 km h-1 would be typical in such situations on 
Auckland’s network. Restrictions are likely on other sections of the network during this 
scenario. However, often the more severe LoS reduction of “rolling outages” (i.e. metric code 
III) occurs at the same time and we adopted this metric where the two exist simultaneously. 
Timetabling restrictions may occur at times across other parts of the suburban network. 
However, as we do not consider knock-on consequences in detail in this study and as rail 
demand is unknown, the potential for new timetabling is simply noted in Table 7.7 and the 
associated LoS metric (i.e. metric code IV for rail lines) is not displayed on Figure 7.8. In 
future scenarios involving a predominantly diesel fleet, which is impacted by minor tephra fall, 
metric code II should be considered over code III in some situations due to the potentially 
higher resilience of diesel locomotives (over electric alternatives) in such conditions. 
However, observational data of such impacts is limited and we suggest a conservative 
approach be taken (adopting the more severe of the two LoS metrics) in situations where 
epistemic uncertainty is high.   
Specific LoS metric values are not calculated for road or rail networks for the Māngere Bridge 
scenario. Although we do make calculations for the expected numbers of displaced residents 
due to evacuation zones with potential implications for transportation (Section 7.6.3), further 
work is required to more accurately understand the impacts on traffic demand and flow and 
thus allow estimations of proportional network availability from what is typical in Auckland. 
Furthermore, new transportation projects in the city (e.g. Waterview Connection (NZTA 
2016a), City Rail Link (Auckland Transport 2016), East West Link (NZTA 2016b)) may have 
substantial impacts on network capacity with knock-on implications for traffic demand and 
flow. Nonetheless, the allocation of LoS metric descriptors using a scenario approach as 
demonstrated in this study is an important contribution in representing the disruption 
encountered by transportation end-users. 
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7.6.3 Displaced populations and consequences for transportation 
Displaced population numbers during the Māngere Bridge scenario resulting from the 
evacuation zones of Deligne et al. (companion paper – Appendix E1) are shown in Table 7.9. 
We expect some residents beyond official evacuation zone boundaries will also evacuate, 
causing a shadow evacuation effect. The concept of shadow evacuation in Auckland aligns 
with discussions in Tomsen et al. 2014 and with findings from a recent risk perception survey 
conducted in the city (Coomer et al. 2015). As indicated in Deligne et al. (companion paper – 
Appendix E1), there may also be self-evacuations before official evacuation zones are 
established and different evacuation conditions for some patients in major hospitals. 
However, the numbers of self-evacuees and relevant patients is unknown and not shown in 
Table 7.9. 
 
Table 7.9   Displaced populations during the Māngere Bridge scenario. Note that shadow evacuees 
are calculated as the total number of residents within 1 km from the outer evacuation zone boundaries 
to align with the findings in Coomer et al. (2015) where relevant. 
 
Scenario Date Total Evacuees 
21 February 0 
22 February – 07 March (potential for self-evacuation – number unknown) 
08 – 10 March 199,200 
11 March 253,700 
12 – 15 March 434,300 (incl. 72,300 shadow evacuees) 
16 March – 04 April 275,900 
05 - 30 April 57,300 
01 May onwards 8,700 
 
During volcanic activity in the Māngere Bridge scenario, large populations are evacuated, with 
the highest displacement totals on 12-15 March. Emergency management officials may try to 
encourage evacuations in a progressive manner in some eruptive situations, particularly to 
minimise traffic disruption. Auckland road network operators indicated that during evacuations 
from city areas in Auckland, on-ramp signals to highways will likely be set to operate on 
typical peak weekday evening settings with the aim of assisting traffic flow along highways 
but potentially causing additional congestion along arterial routes that lead to highways. 
Evacuation zone boundaries would usually be managed so that residents are prevented 
access to their homes. Business owners and workers would also be prevented from 
accessing their properties, which can have cascading impacts on other businesses due to 
disruptions in the supply chain. Transportation may be impacted in such situations through 
having to relocate headquarters or operation centres, and from disruption to the supply of 
materials or components required for transportation maintenance or repair. Additionally, 
businesses can suffer when staff members are displaced or have uncertainty in their living 
Chapter 7 – Investigating the consequences of urban volcanism using a scenario approach 
 
 256 
situation, an important consideration for all transportation operators and highlighted several 
times through consultation. For example, further transportation disruption would result if there 
are shortages of pilots, train drivers, rail maintenance crew or officials that control traffic flow 
and manage accidents.   
7.6.4 Alternative scenario considerations 
We applied our methods for determining damage and LoS to assess the consequences of 
modifications to the geophysical hazard sequence in the original Māngere Bridge scenario, 
specifically different wind directions and unrest with no eruption. This allows us to assess 
differences in societal outcomes, particularly related to transportation. 
7.6.4.1 Predominant south-westerly wind  
Tephra deposits from the same individual eruptions as in the original Māngere Bridge 
scenario (Deligne et al., companion paper – Appendix E1), but modelled in TEPHRA2 using 
the south-westerly wind profiles (Appendix E3), are shown in Figure 7.9. No change to impact 
or LoS at Auckland Airport is expected from the different tephra deposition, with most 
disruption still resulting from evacuation zoning, VAL changes and VHZ areas (which would 
remain the same). However, the disruption to road and rail networks, as well as operations at 
ports is expected to be more severe, especially because of greater tephra accumulation on 
Auckland City and critical routes. Expected consequences from the revised tephra deposits 
include: 
 Greater physical damage and LoS reduction on 14 March; tephra covers most of the 
central city area rather than being deposited towards the west. This coincides with 
the timing and spatial extent of the largest evacuation zone and area potentially 
affected by earthquakes.  
o Complications managing evacuations and inspecting road and rail networks for 
physical damage from the earthquakes are expected due to the additional tephra 
hazard (up to 50 mm in places outside of the PEZ).  
o A decision may be made to extend the extent and/or duration of evacuation 
zones established on 12 March to reflect increased LoS reduction on 
transportation networks. 
o Critical north-south links through the southern isthmus would likely take longer to 
restore. 
o Substantially more resources will be required for clean-up of tephra in this urban 
area once access to the PEZ is permitted.  
o Unlike the original Māngere Bridge scenario, the Port of Auckland at Waitemata 
Harbour may be affected (by up to 5 mm of tephra). Both the port itself and 
maritime navigation in the Waitemata Harbour may encounter reduced LoS due 
to tephra fall and associated visibility impairment (Blake et al. in review c). 
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 With tephra being dispersed further east on 21 March, the central city area is less 
affected by this event than in the original scenario. However, disruption to road and 
rail is expected to be as, if not more, severe due to critical north-south links receiving 
greater accumulation of tephra. The restoration of any links through the evacuation 
zones would be unlikely before new tephra deposition on 22 March. 
 The new wind profiles on 22 and 29-30 March cause substantially different tephra 
deposition patterns to the original scenario with much more widespread effects. 
o As on 14 March, LoS reduction would occur on transportation routes through the 
city area, again including the Port of Auckland, which may receive up to 5 mm 
ash on 22 March. 
o Further tephra accumulation on north-south links through the southern isthmus 
also occurs. 
o The spatial extent and duration of evacuation zones may be increased and clean-
up activities would take longer than in the original scenario. 
 
Figure 7.9   Tephra deposits for the four tephra plume-producing eruptions during the Māngere 
Bridge scenario, modelled using south-westerly wind profiles. 
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During this scenario modification, it is expected that north-south ground transportation routes 
will be completely blocked (or only partially accessible at best) for a total period of ~2 weeks. 
There may also be a higher number of displaced residents due to the more persistent nature 
of tephra fall over highly populated areas and different evacuation zones. Therefore, in 
addition to expected disruption on maritime and aviation transportation, the provision of 
sufficient accommodation, food and other resources in Auckland City should be carefully 
considered. 
7.6.4.2 Unrest with no eruption 
The geophysical hazard sequence for the alternative to the Māngere Bridge scenario 
involving an unrest sequence with no eruption is shown in Table 7.10. 
 
Table 7.10   Geophysical hazard sequence for the unrest sequence with no eruption. Italicised text 
indicates where the geophysical hazard and monitoring sequence remains consistent with the original 
Māngere Bridge scenario (i.e. Deligne et al. companion paper – Appendix E1). 
 
Scenario Day Geophysical Hazards and Monitoring “Observations” 
 
19 February Small swarms of high-frequency (non-volcanic) earthquakes. 
22 February Swarm of low frequency earthquakes at 39–45 km depth (ML1.8–
2.2). 
01-05 March 125 mostly low frequency earthquakes at 34–45 km depth (ML1.8–
2.2). 
07-10 March Some high frequency earthquakes, increasing in magnitude and 
shallowing. Swarms with up to 300 quakes per day. Ground 
deformation detected. 
11 March Seismic activity becomes focussed in the Māngere area. 
12-13 March Volcanic gases detected. Some high frequency earthquakes, 
increasing in magnitude and shallowing. Swarms with up to 300 
quakes per day. 
14 March (early) Tremor earthquakes, acceleration of deformation. Visual observation 
of cracking near Māngere, Volcanic gases increase. 
14 March (late) – 19 March Number and magnitude of earthquakes decreases. Deformation and 
gas level reduction. 
20-31 March Swarm of ~3,000 earthquakes at 5-10 km depth. Most are <ML3.5, 
but during peak of activity on 29 March, 8 earthquakes of ML4.0 or 
greater occur, including a ML5.3 event (some structural damage from 
the larger earthquakes). ENE-trending 8 km long surface rupture 
accompanies largest earthquakes (with the direction determined 
from the direction of the inferred Manukau fault in the area (Kenny et 
al., 2012)). Gas levels increase slightly. 
01 April Number and magnitude of earthquakes decreases dramatically. 
02-13 April Seismicity remains at relatively constant low level, except for a few 
increases in event rate, which last less than 6 hrs. No gas emissions 
detected. 
14 April Seismicity diminishes to typical background levels. 
 
Damage from the geophysical hazard sequence would thus be very different to that in the 
original scenario, the majority of which would occur due to ground shaking and surface 
rupture. As with the evacuations in the original Māngere Bridge scenario (Deligne et al. 
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companion paper – Appendix E1), we develop evacuation zones for the alternative sequence 
through information derived from the AVF Contingency Plan (Auckland Council 2015) and 
Auckland Evacuation Plan (Auckland Council 2014): 
 The same evacuation zones are used up until and including 15 March.  
 On 16 March, evacuation zones are revised due to continued unrest focused on the 
Māngere area and overall decrease in seismicity, deformation and gas levels.  
o The PEZ consists of a 3 km buffer from the extent of the probable vent location 
area determined on 12 March. 
o Unlike the original scenario, the SEZ now remains the same as on 12 March (5 
km from the probable vent location area) (Figure 7.10d). 
 On 21 April, one week after the decrease in seismicity to around background levels, 
the SEZ is removed (Figure 7.10e).  
 Following seismic inactivity, the size of the PEZ is reduced on 01 May so that 
previously included 1 km buffer is removed (the PEZ now covers the same area as 
the 12 March probable vent location) (Figure 7.10f). 
 One month later on 01 June, the PEZ is removed, allowing the return of residents to 
all areas and use of all transportation routes and facilities.  
We note that some areas where PEZs and SEZs are removed may temporarily transition to 
restricted recovery zones or similar due to the potential effects of previous volcanic activity on 
re-habitation such as inspection and service restoration requirements. These are not 
displayed on Figure 7.10 but may occur on 16 March – 20 April (in the area to the north east 
of the vent) and on 21 – 30 April (in the area where the SEZ is removed). 
 




Figure 7.10   New Primary and Secondary Evacuation Zones established for the modified 
scenario involving unrest but no eruption. Note that the same evacuation zones established for the 
original Māngere Bridge scenario are used up until and including 15 March (7.10a-7.10c – adapted from 
Deligne et al., companion paper – Appendix E1). 
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Figure 7.11 shows the expected population displaced by the original Māngere Bridge 
scenario compared to the modified scenario. We suggest that up to 434,300 residents would 
seek alternative accommodation at times during the eruptive sequence of the original 
Māngere Bridge scenario (accounting for the shadow evacuation effect). However, business 
activities would also be affected and forced to relocate (e.g. Seville et al. 2014). An estimated 
8,700 residents are permanently displaced by the eruption. In the alternative scenario 
involving unrest but no eruption, the maximum number of displaced residents is the same as 
for the original scenario (both on 12 March). However, from 16 March until 01 June, there is a 




Figure 7.11   Displaced populations during the original Māngere Bridge scenario (grey line) and 
alternative (unrest with no eruption) option to the scenario (black-dashed line).  
 
The large number of evacuees during the revised sequence highlights the substantial 
influence that evacuation zoning may have on society during volcanic unrest, even if there 
was no substantial damage from surficial volcanic hazards. In Auckland, the longer duration 
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of larger evacuation zones would have substantial implications for transportation, particularly 
as more of the Southern Motorway (SH1) and north-south rail line are covered by evacuation 
zones for longer. Furthermore, the greater number and magnitude of earthquakes may lead 
to structural damage of some critical infrastructure. Inspections of key transportation routes, 
components and facilities will be required in areas that experienced the greatest shaking, and 
closures may be necessary due to inspections, physical damage and/or blockage. If possible, 
a decision to open some critical transportation routes that lie within the evacuation zones 
close to the boundaries would be likely, especially to maintain crucial north-south links 
through Auckland (albeit with restricted entry/exit points and hazard thresholds for immediate 
re-closure). Most critical routes through Auckland are accessible from 01 May for the 
alternative scenario. However, part of the South western Motorway (SH20) remains firmly 
within the PEZ (since 08 March), which will likely cause greater than usual congestion across 
the Auckland road network, especially with the return of previously displaced residents.  
During the scenario involving unrest with no eruption, according to existing policy (Section 
7.4.4.2) Auckland Airport falls within the PEZ for ~6 weeks, in contrast to 5 days in the original 
Māngere Bridge scenario. However, due to the major LoS implications that would result from 
such a closure, we speculate that social, political and economic pressure may result in 
amendments to the PEZ boundary. This would mean that Auckland Airport and some access 
routes lie outside of the boundary allowing services to be partially reinstated, albeit with 
established hazard thresholds for immediate re-closure. 
7.6.5 Transportation network interdependencies 
Failure or disruption of electricity supply is arguably one of the most important infrastructure 
interdependencies for ground transportation. For roads, traffic signal and variable message 
sign failure may occur (Hughes and Healy 2014), with police support required at major 
intersections and traffic congestion expected as a result. In Auckland, electricity is also crucial 
for the suburban rail network, although there is a limited diesel fleet that could be distributed 
across the network (although not sufficient to maintain typical capacity). Effective business 
continuity measures where electricity is crucial could include the use of emergency 
generators and stockpiles of diesel fuel, as occurs at Auckland Airport. Conversely, the 
electricity sector also depends on functional transportation for access to sites damaged or in 
need of maintenance and for material delivery. In the Māngere Bridge scenario, transmission 
towers will need to be installed when new transmission lines are required (Deligne et al. 
companion paper – Appendix E1), and the restoration of electricity may be required before 
evacuation zones are lifted (Auckland Council 2014).  
Fuel supply is also recognised as a particularly important interdependency for transportation, 
and disruption to critical routes such as in the Māngere Bridge scenario will affect supply to 
fuel stations by tanker, even within non-evacuated areas. We also note that the Refinery 
Auckland Pipeline would be directly impacted by deformation and other hazards in the 
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Māngere Bridge scenario, with severe impacts on aviation and road fuel supply likely for 
weeks (Auckland Council 2013b, Deligne et al. 2015 – Appendix E2). Large changes in 
demand may occur, whether it be due to evacuations or the relocation of residents and 
businesses from impacted areas. Operationally, the aviation sector and ports are reliant on 
fuel. In Auckland, the ports and associated operations account for nearly a quarter of diesel 
fuel used daily by critical consumers in the region (Auckland Council 2013b). Tephra clean-up 
operations will require the mobilisation of a large number of trucks, sweepers, bulldozers, and 
graders (Hayes et al. 2015, Hayes et al. in review), all of which require fuel. Fuel supply 
restrictions could increase the time it takes to clean up, which could have cascading impacts 
on health, infrastructure and economic activities. Additionally, increased demand for water for 
clean-up and potential water restrictions due to eruption impacts (Stewart et al. companion 
paper) may affect the ability to clean ground transportation networks. Without water for 
firefighting capabilities and sewerage, airports may be effectively shut (Stewart et al. 
companion paper). 
Changes in road demand may result from impacts on other transportation infrastructure. For 
example, when rail services cease to operate, some passengers may revert to road transport 
and the diversion of flights from airports will likely increase demand and traffic on roads 
elsewhere. Similarly, rail, aviation and maritime transportation may be affected by impacts to 
roads as they all require staff to operate. Maintaining a roster of additional staff that can be 
called in when required and having alternative sites with suitable capabilities (e.g. immigration 
facilities for international flights diverted to alternative airports) will aid business continuity and 
improve transportation end-user LoS. In some situations following volcanic activity, it may be 
that certain features of all transportation modes are adjusted or react in such a way, that 
overall transportation LoS incurs only minimal reduction, or even improves. However, detailed 
modelling of interdependency relationships is required to more accurately explore impacts on 
overall LoS. 
 
7.7 Summary and Conclusions 
The LoS metrics developed in this paper account for the various disruptive events through 
considering damage from geophysical hazards and operational activities such as evacuation 
and exclusion zoning. The LoS metric development process was heavily informed by 
consultation with transportation infrastructure providers and emergency management officials 
who generally have expert knowledge of particular transportation systems and their operation. 
Although the LoS metrics were formed using an eruption scenario in the AVF as a basis, 
many of the considerations in their compilation are universal and we thus suggest that the 
metrics can be applied in other locations affected by volcanic activity worldwide. We believe 
them to be particularly relevant in urban areas containing relatively advanced transportation 
networks and established emergency and transportation management policies. 
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We have demonstrated how small-scale explosive and effusive basaltic volcanic activity 
within an urban area can result in substantial disruption to transportation networks. Even in 
the absence of surficial volcanic hazards, the implementation of evacuation zones can have 
severe consequences on LoS for transportation end-users. Indeed, activity involving unrest 
episodes but with no, or few, surficial volcanic hazards may lead to equally, if not more, 
disruption for transportation end-users than activity with surficial hazards. This is largely due 
to uncertainties associated with potential vent areas and possibly large evacuation zones 
which could remain for longer durations. Critical routes and transportation hubs may be 
closed as a result with possible cascading consequences on other critical infrastructure which 
rely on transportation, whether it be through staff unable to access key sites or the breakdown 
of supply chains affecting the delivery of resources for maintenance and repair. Additionally, 
there may be large societal implications with normally resident and working populations 
displaced by evacuation zones and forced to find accommodation elsewhere and relocate 
business activities. Such potentially large consequences for LoS based on operational 
decisions such as evacuation boundary delineation highlight the importance of robust policy 
and guidance that can be applied during events.  
We considered multiple volcanic hazards for impact assessment and LoS analysis. Although 
physical damage to transportation networks from proximal volcanic hazards such as 
pyroclastic density currents can be severe, other damage and potential blockage of 
transportation networks may also occur from volcanic hazards that extend further from the 
vent; this includes earthquakes accompanying volcanic activity and tephra accumulation 
which could be substantial in places, especially during highly explosive eruptions and/or with 
consistent wind direction. The impact of tephra fall is generally considered more temporary 
and easily remedied through clean-up operations. However, evacuation zones and ash 
remobilisation may complicate clean-up and repair, and extend the duration and spatial extent 
of LoS reduction. Importantly, even if there is minimal physical damage from hazards such as 
tephra and earthquakes, widespread disruption to end-users can occur due to required 
inspections of networks and components. 
Specifically for the Māngere Bridge scenario, all modes of transportation encounter disruption 
and a reduced LoS before being impacted by geophysical hazards. No service exists on 
some critical north-south road and rail routes across the south Auckland isthmus at times due 
to the restrictions from evacuation zones, and Auckland Airport and the Port of Onehunga 
experience closure. Most LoS reduction for transportation networks starts ~6 days before the 
eruption due to the first PEZ being implemented, although some earlier self-evacuations may 
occur. Overall, LoS experiences fluctuations throughout the scenario due to different eruptive 
episodes and revisions to the extent of evacuation zones. Up to ~435,000 residents, as well 
as many businesses are displaced at times. A degree of LoS reduction continues for several 
weeks after the eruption itself due to clean-up and repair requirements, and 8,700 residents 
are permanently displaced due to the final exclusion zone.  
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For the modified Māngere Bridge scenario involving unrest but no eruption, the estimated 
maximum displaced population is the same as for the original scenario but residents and 
businesses are generally displaced for longer. Auckland Airport and critical transportation 
links are severely affected in this version of the scenario due to the large spatial extent and 
duration of evacuation zones. Relatively minor alterations to the geophysical hazard 
sequence such as different wind profiles can also have major consequences for LoS. 
Different wind profiles for the Māngere Bridge scenario demonstrate potential changes to: 
 Evacuation zone management and network restoration due to different tephra 
accumulation patterns. 
 Spatial and temporal extents of evacuation zones and networks impacted by 
geophysical hazards. 
 The quantity of resources required to manage clean-up and recovery. 
Our findings demonstrate the importance of considering transportation end-users when 
assessing the vulnerability of transportation networks to volcanic activity. LoS metrics account 
for all disruption that may be encountered by transportation end-users and ultimately aid the 
development of robust impact and risk assessments for transportation networks. 
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8.1 Thesis Overview 
The primary aim of this thesis has been to improve volcanic risk assessments for surface 
transportation networks. It achieves this by primarily investigating and quantifying the impacts of 
volcanic ash on individual components of surface transportation systems. The findings help inform 
volcanic Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) measures to reduce damage and disruption of critical 
infrastructure services through developing surface transportation resilience. In the initial stages of the 
project it became apparent that there is a lack of data: (a) quantifying surface transportation 
vulnerability from volcanic ash hazards; (b) analysing the influence of different hazard intensity 
metrics (HIMs) on surface transportation function and damage; and (c) assessing multi-volcanic 
hazard transportation vulnerability in spatial and temporal contexts. The thesis addresses these gaps 
by: 
1. Investigating key unknown or uncertain consequences of volcanic ash impacts on 
surface transportation by analysing existing and new post-eruption observations. This 
includes findings from field studies and interviews on an impact assessment trip to areas 
affected by the 2014 Kelud volcanic eruption, Indonesia (Chapter 2). Three key areas with 
knowledge gaps have been identified from post-eruption observations worldwide, all of which 
relate to the functionality of surface transportation networks during ashfall as opposed to 
physical damage. Experiments in these three areas (listed below) were designed and 
conducted to fill the knowledge gaps: 
 Skid resistance on ash-covered road and airfield surfaces (Chapter 3) 
 Road marking coverage by volcanic ash (Chapter 4) 
 Visibility in airborne volcanic ash (Chapter 5). 
2. Developing vulnerability models for surface transportation functional loss and clean-
up during ashfall. This study establishes or refines hazard intensity thresholds related to 
specific surface transportation impact types (i.e. the effects of different ash characteristics on 
skid resistance, road marking coverage and visibility – Chapters 3-5 respectively).  
Fragility functions have been developed using all available quantitative and qualitative impact 
data to describe the probability of damage or functional states for surface transportation being 
reached or exceeded for given hazard intensities (Chapter 6). This includes improving 
existing fragility functions (from Wilson et al. in review), which adopt ash thickness as the 
HIM, and the development of new functions with ash-settling rate as the primary HIM. The 
new fragility functions are a particularly important advancement because qualitative post-
eruption observations have indicated that ash-settling rate is a more appropriate measure for 
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visibility impairment than ash thickness, and contemporary ash dispersion and fallout models 
can incorporate such atmospheric metrics. 
3. Applying the newly developed vulnerability models to a case study area (Auckland 
City) through the implementation of a scenario involving a hypothetical volcanic 
eruption in the Auckland Volcanic Field (AVF), New Zealand (Chapter 7). The focus here 
is to consider both the physical damage and functional loss expected from multiple volcanic 
hazards during an eruption – physical damage from proximal volcanic hazards such as 
pyroclastic density currents (PDCs) and edifice formation, in addition to the impacts 
associated with ashfall and other distal hazards.  
The scenario approach enables consideration of spatial and temporal aspects through the 
assessment of impacts at key stages in the eruption sequence across the entire Auckland 
metropolitan area. Physical damage and functionality are assessed from the perspective of 
transportation end-users by means of Level-of-Service (LoS) assessment for each 
transportation mode – a highly topical consideration as transportation authorities are 
increasingly approaching network maintenance through the needs of end-users (e.g. SAP AG 
2006, NZTA 2013). 
  
8.2 Research Summary 
8.2.1 Characterisation: surface transportation vulnerability to volcanic ash 
As set out in Section 1.2, hazard, exposure, and vulnerability need to be considered in combination to 
determine the true nature and extent of risk. Prior to this thesis, there was a scarcity of quantitative 
vulnerability data to determine the likely impacts to surface transportation from volcanic hazards. This 
thesis identifies the requirement for a greater understanding of volcanic ashfall impacts to surface 
transportation due to their widespread, multifaceted, and long-lasting effects, and range of intensities. 
It improves our understanding of vulnerability to ashfall for all surface transportation, including 
maritime transport, which has received little attention in the past. It also contributes to a better 
understanding of wider societal volcanic impacts, as surface transportation is a vital component of 
most modern integrated systems. 
As multiple volcanic hazards occur during eruptions, risk assessments are challenging, especially 
when individual hazards interact with one another and/or result in cascading secondary hazards. 
There are often a variety of impact states for volcanic flow hazards (e.g. Jenkins et al. 2013, Jenkins 
et al. 2015) and tephra fall (e.g. T.M.Wilson et al. 2012, Wilson et al. 2014), which complicates 
vulnerability assessments. Although proximal hazards can result in higher numbers of fatalities and 
casualties than ash, they are often more spatially confined than ashfall (Auker et al. 2015), and are 
commonly associated with more clear-cut and decisive actions in terms of life-safety and critical 
infrastructure protection.  
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The adopted approaches for developing vulnerability assessments are largely inter-disciplinary, 
involving contemporary practices and procedures from Earth science, engineering, chemistry and 
physics. Obtaining and applying quantitative empirical data relating to volcanic ash vulnerability by 
means of controlled laboratory experimentation forms a core component of this thesis. However, other 
(qualitative and semi-quantitative) data sources, including post-eruption and theoretical information, 
are also used, as a variety of data types are optimal for compiling contemporary risk assessments 
(Petrazzuoli and Zuccaro 2004, Jenkins et al. 2014). The detailed analysis of ash particle sizes and 
settling-rates at distances from volcanic vents (Chapter 5) is one such example. 
8.2.2 Core research findings from the laboratory 
Detailed and inter-disciplinary laboratory experiments have been developed and conducted to 
investigate specific surface transportation impacts from volcanic ash (i.e. skid resistance on road and 
airfield surfaces, road marking coverage, and visibility). The amalgamation of results from the 
individual laboratory studies and post-eruptive data leads to several over-arching findings that are 
important considerations for future volcanic risk assessments for surface transportation: 
 Thin volcanic ash deposits are important when making vulnerability assessments – laboratory 
experiments indicate that ash <1 mm thick, sometimes even as thin as ~0.1 mm, can lead to 
reduced functionality. Such low thresholds have rarely been reported in post-eruption records 
(although thicknesses are rarely accurately measured). This emphasises the need to consider 
impacts in distal areas where deposits are often thinner than proximal settings. 
 It is inappropriate to directly relate all impacts to ash thickness on the ground. Visibility is 
better associated with ash-settling rate or airborne ash concentration. 
 Different ash particle size distributions, keeping deposit thickness or airborne concentration 
constant, can result in very different impacts to surface transportation. This is especially true 
when deposits are thin or airborne concentrations are low. Although fine-grained ash 
generally causes more severe impacts on functionality, this is not the case for all impact types 
(e.g. skid resistance reduction). However, distal areas are considered more prone to reduced 
functionality from volcanic ashfall than proximal areas because of the predominantly fine-
grained particles in the former. 
 Alternative HIMs (besides ash thickness, airborne concentration and particle size) are also 
important to consider. For example, the wetness of ash and soluble components have an 
effect on skid resistance. However, further laboratory experimentation is required to test these 
effects in detail in some cases – the visibility and road marking coverage tests were only 
conducted using dry ash, for example. 
 Physical parameters for surface transportation are important when considering impacts from 
ashfall. For example, the macro- and micro-texture features of paved surfaces are crucial 
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properties when assessing skid resistance and road marking coverage by thin ash deposits, 
as well as implications for road-cleaning to mitigate such impacts. Also, road marking 
properties can influence how slippery surfaces become and to what extent road markings are 
visible to drivers during ashfall. 
This thesis has integrated quantitative data from laboratory experimentation with qualitative and semi-
quantitative post-eruption data to develop vulnerability models. It builds on previous laboratory studies 
that examine volcanic ash impacts to infrastructure and components (e.g. Dunn 2012, Wardman et al. 
2012a, G.Wilson et al. 2012, Hill 2014), and provides more appropriate and refined fragility functions 
(Chapter 6) that can be incorporated into future volcanic risk assessments, thus assisting DRR 
strategies. 
8.2.3 Multi-hazard and operational considerations 
An important and innovative part of this thesis is the development of LoS metrics for surface 
transportation that account for operational activities such as the implementation of evacuation zones 
and multi-hazard impacts (Chapter 7). A multi-hazard approach is important for many risk 
assessments as critical infrastructure networks may experience several impacts of different intensities 
from different hazards during volcanic eruptions. Such an approach can lead to improved land-use 
planning, better response capacity, greater risk awareness, and increased ability to set priorities for 
mitigation actions. LoS metrics enable more robust risk assessments by accounting for disruption 
associated with multiple hazards including ashfall. Crucially, LoS metrics also consider transportation 
end-user requirements, which is important for many contemporary infrastructure management 
strategies and for analysing the wide societal effects of volcanic eruptions (e.g. displacement of 
residents; accommodation needs). 
Applying LoS metrics to surface transportation networks is successfully demonstrated by developing a 
hypothetical volcanic eruption sequence in the AVF and examining the effects on Auckland City, New 
Zealand. This demonstrates how small-scale basaltic volcanic activity within an urban area can 
severely disrupt transportation networks. The scenario is a particularly useful approach because 
spatio-temporal hazard, vulnerability, capacity and exposure associated with critical infrastructure 
functionality loss are all considered – an important conceptual mechanism to achieving more resilient 
systems (UNISDR 2015). Even in the absence of any volcanic hazards, severe disruption to surface 
transportation can result from the establishment of evacuation zones simply in response to volcanic 
unrest. LoS reduction also results from proximal and distal volcanic hazards with values fluctuating 
due to different eruptive episodes, revisions to evacuation zone extents, and network inspection 
requirements, among other factors. The vulnerability of surface transportation functionality to volcanic 
ashfall, as examined through the laboratory studies, forms an important component of the scenario. 
LoS reduction can also continue for some time after the eruption has ceased due to exclusion zones, 
permanent physical modification to networks, clean-up requirements and ash remobilisation in the 
environment. This part of the study highlights the importance of consulting with staff of critical 
infrastructure and emergency management authorities as they have expert knowledge of particular 
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systems and procedures, and LoS can be strongly affected by the decisions that they make during 
adverse events.     
8.2.4 Limitations of laboratory testing 
The interdisciplinary and novel features of the laboratory work have led to some practical 
methodological challenges. Experts with different disciplinary backgrounds have been consulted 
wherever possible to assist with methodological development, but challenges remain, leading to some 
compromises and limitations: 
 Decisions on the physical location of experiments have been required. Ideally, testing would be 
conducted in the field (i.e. on real transportation networks) to replicate realistic conditions where 
volcanic ash would fall, but environmental and safety concerns restrict this option. Additionally, 
there are issues with obtaining and delivering sufficient quantities of ash (or pseudo ash) for full 
scale testing. Therefore, studies are conducted in the Volcanic Ash Testing Laboratory (VAT Lab) 
at the University of Canterbury. The laboratory focus places limits on some of the methodological 
approaches available (e.g. equipment and set-ups appropriate for the room dimensions), but this 
is also an advantage in that it assists with narrowing down different methodological options.  
 There are some obstacles associated with the samples required for laboratory experimentation, 
particularly: 
o New asphalt and concrete slabs are constructed specifically for experimental studies. The 
new slabs have different properties to worn surfaces (e.g. reflectivity and skid resistance 
characteristics), but this is accounted for by assessing temporal changes during 
experimentation. 
o Relatively large quantities of volcanic ash are required and pseudo ash (often with some 
different characteristics to real ash) is thus created and used (Chapter 3). However, some 
real ash samples are incorporated into testing to provide comparative results. 
 Replicating precise and consistent flow rates for the visibility experiments (Chapter 5) is required 
with new high-tech equipment adopted. There are few previous examples of the equipment being 
used specifically for volcanic ash testing and several modifications are required. For example, the 
plastic piping to deliver the ash abraded rapidly (due to the sharp nature of ash particles) and 
required frequent replacement (Chapter 5). The methodology is limited to relatively fine-grained 
ash because coarse-grained ash can not be dispersed due to the design of the machine.  
 There have been difficulties identifying and sourcing suitable equipment for the studies including 
that required for measuring: 
o Skid resistance on ash-covered surfaces (Chapter 3) – The majority of equipment 
available is not designed for use with thick lose contaminants such as volcanic ash. 
The pendulum skid tester is deemed the most suitable equipment and has extensive 
comparative results from previous studies (in environments excluding ash), and 
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standardised methodologies for its use. Only bare surfaces or those covered by 
relatively thin ash deposits are tested with the equipment. 
o Airborne volcanic ash in order to calculate visual range (Chapter 5) – Most equipment 
is designed for relatively low concentrations of airborne particulates over large 
distances. The opacity meter adopted required some adaptations for use with ash as 
it is typically used for monitoring the effects of smoke particles. 
 Some limitations are evident during the laboratory experiments themselves. For example, the 
thickness value of ash on asphalt surfaces depends on what part of the asphalt aggregate it is 
measured. Standardised ad-hoc measuring techniques were developed to account for this 
(Chapter 3 and 5) and caution is required when taking similar measurements in the future. 
8.2.5 Limitations of risk assessment approach 
 The importance of ash remobilisation is discussed, but the detailed quantitative analysis of its 
effects is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is likely that any remobilisation would amplify the 
spatial and temporal effects of disruption (e.g. Wilson et al. 2011, Reckziegal et al. 2016, Craig et 
al. 2016). Additionally, spatial and temporal effects of disruption may be amplified by long-
duration eruptions. Eruptions at volcanic fields (e.g. Jorollo and Parícutin volcanoes in the 
Michoacan Guanajuato volcanic field, Mexico) suggest that single eruptions could continue for 
around a decade (Sherburn et al. 2007), and episodic eruptions from individual volcanic vents 
may occasionally occur (e.g. Shane et al. 2013, Linnell et al. 2016). Thus, many of the findings in 
this thesis should be treated as conservative in this respect. 
 There may be previously unidentified or uncommon impacts to surface transportation that occur 
during future eruptions and this research is thus constrained by what has been observed in the 
past, as well as by findings from laboratory experimentation. An example of this is the impacts of 
volcanic ash on electric rail – there is only one well-recorded case study from post eruption 
observations, that of rail near the Kirishima volcanic complex, Japan, that was impacted following 
the 2011 Shinmoedake eruption (Magill et al. 2013). Complete network functionality loss occurred 
following trace ash deposits in this case. However, until similar infrastructure is exposed in future 
ashfall, it will remain unclear as to whether an unusual set of circumstances led to functionality 
loss or if such impacts are likely elsewhere.  
 Care should be taken if applying research outputs to other locations (besides Auckland) because 
physical infrastructure parameters can vary across geographical boundaries, and the spatial 
extent of specific impacts should thus be considered with caution. Additionally, for the purpose of 
analysis, it was assumed that environmental conditions were pristine besides the effects from 
volcanic ash (e.g. clean paved surfaces, no additional atmospheric particulates such as smoke, 
fog, sea-spray) so key findings may require modification before use in some impact and risk 
assessments. 
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 Interdependencies between surface transportation networks and other critical infrastructure 
influence vulnerability because cascading failures can cause disruption (Rinaldi et al. 2001, 
Wilson 2015). The importance of interdependencies is highlighted throughout this thesis, but not 
analysed in detail. The complexities involved with assessing all interdependencies are vast, and it 
was deemed most beneficial to gain a better understanding of how vulnerability to single critical 
infrastructure networks (surface transportation in this research) is affected by multiple volcanic 
hazards before introducing interdependencies between different critical infrastructure types into 
the mix.  
Despite the limitations, the thesis expands and improves quantitative empirical information related to 
surface transportation functionality, and the findings are considered robust and highly applicable for 
future volcanic risk assessments and DRR strategies. 
 
8.3 Future Research 
8.3.1 Applicability 
Although Auckland, New Zealand, is used as a case study location for much of the research, many of 
the findings are internationally applicable due to the wide range of ash characteristics possible in the 
city. The research is particularly applicable in developed countries and urban areas where surface 
transportation infrastructure is broadly similar to Auckland (e.g. sealed roads with road markings, 
electronic traffic signals and/or VMS). The research outputs from this project are relevant to many 
sectors including transportation and emergency management, and insurance, especially in other 
developed countries worldwide.  
Advances in volcanic risk management can result from the work, particularly through improved 
volcanic impact and risk assessments. Long-term surface transportation network design 
improvements could include:  
 Land-use and transportation construction project planning, such as the incorporation of 
sufficient network redundancy in areas exposed to proximal and/or distal volcanic hazards. 
This will aid in assessing the vulnerability of both current and planned critical infrastructure to 
volcanic hazards. 
 Transportation response planning activities such as identifying when cleaning of pyroclastic 
material from surface transportation surfaces should commence. 
 Emergency management policy development, including spatial and temporal considerations 
of volcanic exclusion zones in evacuation and recovery plans and resource allocation 
including water and equipment for efficient cleaning of transportation networks. 
 Engineering-focused mitigation strategies such as specific surface line-painting guidelines 
and water sprinkler systems for routes that frequently encounter volcanic ashfall. 
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This research provides opportunities for the development of operational activities during volcanic 
eruptions, including improved: 
 Monitoring of ashfall, including the rapid assessment of multiple HIMs during volcanic crises 
using different equipment such as transmissometers. This will likely prove useful where 
impact forecast maps have large associated uncertainties.  
 Transportation management mitigation strategies, including the delivery of appropriate advice 
for end-users travelling during ashfall, and prompt implementation of appropriate clean-up 
practices. 
 Near-real time ashfall impact forecast maps to be used operationally, and incorporation of 
contemporary fallout and dispersion models (with multiple HIMs). 
 Traffic predictions during volcanic eruptions (e.g. forecast accident rates and speeds) through 
the integration of results from near-real time ashfall and impact models (above) with live traffic 
observations, particularly through monitoring at transport operation centres. 
 Information displayed on hazard/risk maps and signs, especially in areas with extensive 
surface transportation networks. 
In addition, the studies enable better estimations of hazard intensity thresholds for past eruptions 
through knowledge of impacts for those same eruptions. For example, if road markings were known to 
be covered and particle size information is available following a particular eruption in the past, a 
minimum ash thickness can be estimated. 
Such tools and strategies will enable improved network operations during volcanic activity. This is 
important, as resources and staff availability can be limited in a crisis, and strict prioritisation may be 
required. Comparative infrastructure issues may result from other natural hazards such as 
earthquakes and flooding, so inter-disciplinary links can be identified and overall infrastructure 
resilience strengthened. Importantly, the thesis raises awareness of the risk from multiple volcanic 
hazards and impacts to surface transportation functionality, which will lead to better response capacity 
and increased ability to set priorities for mitigation actions (GFDRR 2014). 
8.3.2 Experimental vulnerability data 
This work demonstrates the importance of quantitative empirical data obtained from laboratory 
experimentation to improve our understanding of surface transportation vulnerability and assist with 
volcanic risk assessment and reduction. Due to the wide array of impacts to surface transportation, 
there are many opportunities for further experimental studies including: 
 Vehicle engine air inlet filter testing: Although air filters can be cleaned and replaced to 
minimise engine damage, constraining the thresholds at which they reduce function (e.g. 
become blocked) by volcanic ash would be useful. This would allow more specific advice for 
motorists, avoid unnecessary replacement cost and inconvenience, and help ensure that 
enough resources are available given future eruptions. 
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 Vehicle bodywork and windscreen testing: Post-eruption records suggest that vehicle 
bodywork can be dented, scratched and corroded by tephra fall, and windscreens may crack 
when impacted by material of large lapilli size or greater. Although less of a concern for 
network functionality (as vehicles will remain operational in most cases), determining 
thresholds for such impacts would be particularly useful from an insurance perspective, 
providing financial information on loss/repair. Such information would be especially beneficial 
for urban areas where high numbers of vehicles are exposed. 
 Rail lines: There are few cases where rail has been impacted by volcanic ash, particularly 
modern electric rail. Electric rail networks appear vulnerable to volcanic ash and laboratory 
work would help explore these impacts in detail. Loss of adhesion between a railway wheel 
and track has implications for braking and traction (Gallardo-Hernandez and Lewis 2008). 
Although there appears to be minimal negative effect on adhesion due to the lack of post-
eruption reports, laboratory testing would help confirm this too. 
 Signage and signals: Post-eruption observations suggest that surface transportation signs 
and signals can become covered by volcanic ash, affecting the amount of information 
communicated to end-users and potentially reducing overall network safety. However, the 
properties of volcanic ash and transportation infrastructure that promote or inhibit coverage by 
ash have not been studied. Such knowledge would be useful to transportation and emergency 
management authorities to understand appropriate mechanisms to communicate information 
to end-users travelling during ashfall, in addition to non-crisis safety information. 
 In-flight aircraft: This thesis focuses on surface transportation but the impacts of volcanic 
ash on flying aircraft clearly warrants further investigation (e.g. Guffanti et al. 2009, ICAO 
2012, Carey and Bursik 2015), and is important for surface transportation networks due to the 
interconnectedness of all transportation systems. Laboratory and field testing has been – and 
is continuing to be – conducted by various companies who have the available resources 
required to determine safe operating thresholds of aircraft through volcanic ash (e.g. Airbus 
2013, EasyJet 2013, NASA 2015). The findings from many of these studies have implications 
for aircraft operations on the ground too, and should thus be applied in airfield volcanic risk 
assessments.  
 Combined impacts: The laboratory studies in this thesis focus on the impacts of reduced 
skid resistance, road marking coverage and visibility impairment independently from one 
another (before the findings are considered in combination for the scenario). However, some 
impacts may be affected by other impacts occurring simultaneously. For example, the effects 
on road skid resistance and visibility may be affected by road marking coverage if average 
speed of vehicles reduces due to driver disorientation. Experimental studies on driving 
behaviour that investigate differences between individual and combined impacts could assist 
– either conducted using simulators or on proving grounds.  
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 Indirect impacts: In addition to interdependent effects from other critical infrastructure on 
transportation, a particular area of concern highlighted by transportation operators through 
this thesis was the potential requirement of staff (e.g. train drivers, maintenance and repair 
crews) to work in ash-contaminated environments and associated health and safety 
implications. Laboratory-based experimentation is actively being conducted in this field of 
research (e.g. Horwell 2007), which will assist decision-making and improve volcanic risk 
assessments. Longitudinal studies on the health effects of volcanic ash will also help 
(Bernstein et al. 1986, Horwell and Baxter 2006, Sword-Daniels et al. 2014).  
Data from future laboratory studies, along with that from new post-eruption observations and 
modelling, will help to further refine impact thresholds and fragility functions for surface transportation, 
and improve vulnerability assessments. For example, if thresholds for airborne ash concentrations are 
determined for road vehicle engine air inlet filter blockage, they could be compared to the new fragility 
functions for visibility impairment to better-forecast overall impacts on road network functionality. Even 
repeated laboratory testing using the methodologies developed in this thesis on the same impact 
types investigated (i.e. skid resistance, marking coverage, visibility impairment) would enhance the 
current dataset, reduce epistemic uncertainties, and potentially refine fragility functions.    
8.3.3 Field impact assessment data 
This thesis has emphasised the need for detailed impact assessments following volcanic eruptions. 
Where possible, future impact assessments should incorporate the measurement of multiple HIMs, 
not just ash thickness. For example, there is a current lack of knowledge on ash-settling rates or 
airborne ash concentrations near ground level during volcanic ashfalls, and further field information on 
this HIM could help refine vulnerability assessments related to visibility. Sophisticated equipment such 
as the transmissometer/opacity meter used in this study would be beneficial to collect a range of 
readings in situ, especially for long-lasting eruptions. However, the sudden and short-lived nature of 
some eruptions, as well as other labour demands in the field at the time, may mean that 
comparatively basic hand-held devices such as particle counters are more practical and preferable at 
times. Simultaneous collection of ash samples would then allow correlations between recorded 
impacts (or indeed no impacts) and other HIMs to be estimated at a later date. 
8.3.4 Volcanic impact and surface transportation network models 
The scenario approach adopted is deemed successful to consider both the spatial and temporal 
components of multiple volcanic hazards from a full eruption sequence, and importantly help analyse 
the consequences of physical damage and operational decisions on transportation end-users. It is 
also useful to engage with various stakeholders and receive input from transportation infrastructure 
providers, emergency management authorities, and other volcanic risk specialists, who all assist the 
scenario development process. The scenario is site-specific. In order to investigate the impacts in 
Auckland more fully, further hazard and impact scenarios should be developed in different locations 
across the AVF, which incorporate a broader range of eruption styles and consider multiple HIMs. A 
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suite of different scenarios would also allow for surface transportation (and other critical infrastructure) 
hotspots to be identified if impacts were modelled probabilistically across the entirety of the AVF – 
such scenarios are currently being developed for Auckland. Such an approach could be applied in 
other volcanically active areas worldwide, as long as care is taken to appropriately reflect the eruptive 
and infrastructural characteristics at new sites, as well as local operational policies and practices in 
the areas studied; consultation with experts who have detailed and interdisciplinary knowledge of 
systems in the areas of interest is crucial for the development of realistic scenarios. 
There are opportunities to develop near-real time ashfall impact models that incorporate ash 
dispersion forecasts. With increased knowledge on the importance of different HIMs for surface 
transportation functionality, this would provide many opportunities to use existing research in an 
operational setting during volcanic eruptions. For example, if the airborne concentration and particle 
size distribution of ash is forecast for a section of state highway, VMS signs leading to the area could 
be illuminated to provide advice to motorists (e.g. speed restrictions or recommended diversions) 
based on the expected visual range and ash accumulation rate. Temporary signage or traffic 
management crews could be deployed to the relevant areas and clean-up equipment and staff could 
be put on stand-by. If models suggest that impacts will be particularly severe (e.g. prime conditions for 
reduced skid resistance, road marking coverage and/or severely impaired visibility), an early decision 
could be made to close affected (or soon to be affected) sections of transportation routes, thus 
preventing exposure of infrastructure to ash and minimising vehicle damage and accident rates. 
Detailed modelling could also account for the effects of ash re-suspension and re-deposition on 
transportation impacts in different environments.   
There are also opportunities for detailed transportation analysis such as macro- and micro-scale 
simulation modelling. Such work has the potential to further inform policies such as evacuation and 
recovery planning and can be integrated with key findings from laboratory studies. It is particularly 
important in locations such as Auckland where population growth and geographical constraints 
continue to place challenges on transportation management and end-users. The results from detailed 
modelling can assist with increasing transportation resilience both during emergencies and on a daily 
basis. Dynamic properties of risk must be considered to assist future volcanic risk assessments. For 
example, it is important to account for changes in exposure such as from population growth and 
infrastructure expansion, and to consider vulnerability changes such as from the implementation of 
new mitigation strategies, including those suggested in this thesis. Network models that can 
incorporate alterations to transportation infrastructure and impacts from volcanic hazards can provide 
insights for the implications of dynamic risk properties on end-users.     
There are difficulties when it comes to predicting how people will behave during a volcanic crisis. In 
Auckland, with high rates of immigration and no known volcanic activity having occurred within the 
AVF for several generations, it would be particularly beneficial to better understand likely responses of 
the local population given heightened volcanic activity. General surveys that assess risk perception to 
volcanic hazards provide a benchmark for further work (e.g. MCDEM 2008, Coomer et al. 2016). 
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However, these attempt to cover a wide range of topics, and more specific surveys (e.g. targeting 
travel / evacuation behaviour) could assist future risk assessments and DRR strategies. Knowledge 
gained from societies with similar characteristics and infrastructure overseas when they experience 
volcanic eruptions could also be applied in Auckland and elsewhere. 
8.3.5 Multi-hazard advancements 
Multiple volcanic hazards are considered in the scenario in this thesis – an approach that leads to 
more thorough risk assessments and prevents maladaptation to individual hazards (GFDRR 2014). 
However, little attention is paid to secondary hazards such as fire triggered by lava flows, PDCs 
and/or hot ballistics. New studies could account for such secondary volcanic hazards, which would 
further enhance risk assessments. Additionally, simultaneous natural hazard events may have knock-
on effects on the volcanological risk already considered. For example, heavy rainfall from storms 
could wash minor ashfall from roads and airfields, increasing skid resistance and clearing road 
markings – effectively decreasing vulnerability. However, rainfall could also create additional issues 
such as flooding if it occurs over thick ash deposits, which can become dislodged and block 
stormwater systems (e.g. Pacaya volcanic eruption, Guatemala; Wardman et al. 2012b). Lahars 
(although likely small-scale in Auckland) created by stormwater runoff mixing with ash could cause 
additional impacts to critical infrastructure. Further research is required to more fully understand such 
multi-hazard impacts on critical infrastructure and society. 
8.3.6 Interdependencies 
To account for all possible interdependencies would require highly complex modelling. However, the 
probabilistic scenario-based approach suggested in Section 8.3.4 could allow the identification of 
critical infrastructure pinchpoints where disruption to different infrastructure types could cause 
cascading failures across networks (Sword-Daniels et al. 2015). The consequences of the 
hypothetical AVF eruption on other critical infrastructure besides transportation (e.g. electricity, fuel, 
water supply) allows various interdependent links to be suggested and provides a platform for detailed 
interdependency modelling. Such work could lead to the identification of a wide range of further 
potential infrastructure failure modes and the emergence of previously unidentified hazards that can 
cause failure (Hughes and Healy 2014). 
It may be appropriate to direct vulnerability research that attempts to incorporate interdependent 
effects towards fully understanding the bi-directional effects between two common interconnected 
systems before additional systems are introduced into mix. For example, electricity and surface 
transportation have many interconnected properties; their interdependent effects could be modelled in 
detail before other critical infrastructure systems such as fuel and water supply are introduced. 
Resilience could result from the improved understanding of bi-directional relationships between two 
infrastructure types alone, perhaps inadvertently improving resilience between other infrastructure 
types too. 
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8.3.7 New and emerging infrastructure 
Relatively new, and emerging infrastructure, such as electric vehicles, autonomous vehicles, and 
advances in intelligent transportation systems, may be susceptible to the effects of volcanic hazards. 
For example, solar powered traffic lights in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, were found to be vulnerable 
following ashfall from the 2014 Kelud eruption (Blake et al. 2015), and variable message signs (VMS) 
that incorporate solar technology may also be affected in certain latitudes (Zorn and Walter 2016). 
Conversely, new and emerging infrastructure may also exhibit resilient properties that reduce 
infrastructure vulnerability and assist risk management strategies. For example, car-to-car 
communication may assist with transferring knowledge on areas affected by volcanic ash, thus 
enabling the majority of vehicles to avoid such areas (reducing exposure), and providing rapid advice 
to transportation and emergency management authorities to assist recovery. 
There are also many opportunities to explore the direct and indirect economic consequences of 
surface transportation damage and disruption. Such information would assist DRR strategies and 
improve resilience, such as through cost-benefit analyses and the improved prioritisation of mitigation 
measures (UNISDR 2004, GFDRR 2014, UNISDR 2015). 
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APPENDIX B. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL TO CHAPTER 3. IMPACT OF 
VOLCANIC ASH ON ROAD AND AIRFIELD SURFACE SKID RESISTANCE 
  
Appendix B1. Concentration of elements in the Ruapehu and White Island 
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Appendix B2. Water leachate results showing relative soluble components 
(expressed as Electrical Conductivity (EC) and Total Dissolved Solids (TDS)), 
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Appendix B3. Ash characteristics analysed during experimentation and 
illustrations to show production of each characteristic 
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Appendix B4. Summary of sand patch volumetric technique used to calculate 
the average pavement macrotexture depth (adapted from ASTM E965 2006) 
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Appendix B5. Image capture using stereo-microscope to analyse asphalt at a 
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APPENDIX C. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL TO CHAPTER 5. VISIBILITY IN 
AIRBORNE VOLCANIC ASH: CONSIDERATIONS FOR SURFACE 
TRANSPORTATION USING A LABORATORY-BASED METHOD 
 
Appendix C1. Volcanic Ash Deposit Considerations 
As Macedonio et al (2016) discuss, the total erupted mass of ash is often estimated from field data 
analysis (Pyle 1989, Bonadonna and Houghton 2005, Bonadonna and Costa 2012) or a procedure 
involving best-fit (Scollo et al. 2008, Costa et al 2009, Bonasia et al 2012). The relationship between 
total erupted mass and surface density (g m-2) at ground level would be linear if it were not for other 
parameters such as particle size, aggregation and wind (Macedonio et al. 2016). 
Put simply, the total accumulated thickness of a volcanic ash deposit progressively decreases with 
distance from the vent. However, there are several factors that may lead to spatial variations in 
thickness: 
 There is often a proximal region where fallout from the plume margins results in a more rapid 
decrease in thickness so that a deposit shows two segments on a thickness versus distance 
plot (Sparks et al. 1992).  
 Situations may occur where the downwind thickness of deposits increases away from the vent 
in places. For example, if there is an unusually large proportion of medium sized particles 
erupted relative to larger and smaller sizes, these will fall mainly at intermediate distances 
resulting in an increase in thickness at the respective location (Parfitt and Wilson 2009). 
 Sometimes, additional segments on a thickness versus distance plot can be observed at a 
distance further from the vent than the region of column margin to umbrella cloud transition, 
such as for the 1980 Mount St Helens deposit. This has been attributed to the aggregation of 
fine ash (predominantly <100 μm) (Carey and Sigurdsson 1982, Scasso et al. 1994, 
Bonadonna et al. 1998). Particle aggregation strongly depends on the initial particle sizes and 
can significantly affect deposit thinning, with secondary maxima of mass accumulation 
possible due to small aggregates sedimenting in a wind field (Bonadonna  and Phillips 2003).  
o In wet conditions, aggregation may occur as a result of water film formation on the 
surface of particles causing them to adhere to one another (Parfitt and Wilson 2009).  
o In dry conditions, particles may become electrostatically charged, largely through 
triboelectrification resulting in aggregation.  
Appendix C – Supplementary material to Chapter 5  
 302 
Appendix C2. Primary Ashfall and Resuspended Ash Considerations 
Upon leaving the eruptive vent, volcanic ash, along with coarser material and magmatic gases, is 
erupted upwards into the atmosphere to form the jet region of an eruption column (Figure 5.2). The 
ash-gas mixture continues to rise under convection due to buoyancy forces acting on the hot eruptive 
gases and heated entrained air (Morton et al. 1956, Wilson 1976, Kieffer 1984, Carey and Sparks 
1986, Sparks 1986, Dobran et al. 1993, Costa et al. 2006, Carey and Bursik 2015). Once the particles 
reach a level of neutral buoyancy and enter the umbrella region (Figure 5.2), they may be dispersed 
and transported under the effects of wind and atmospheric turbulence to form ash clouds. The ash 
falls out of suspension with larger, heavier fragments typically deposited closer to the vent and 
smaller, lighter fragments dispersed farther downwind (Jenkins et al. 2014). Ash particles released 
from an umbrella cloud accelerate downward until the air drag retarding them is balanced by their 
gravitational weight, at which point they reach a steady final speed, or terminal fall velocity (Parfitt and 
Wilson 2009, Rose and Durant 2009). The terminal fall velocity of sedimenting particles affects 
airborne concentration near ground level and is mainly dependent on their diameter, densities and, to 
some extent, their shape, which if not spherical, complicates and slows fallout (Riley et al. 2003, 
Pardini et al. 2016).  
Historical experiments have demonstrated that the normal rules of fluid mechanics apply to volcanic 
particles provided due account is taken of their often very irregular shapes. The airflow past falling 
fine ash particles is laminar, and under these conditions, the drag coefficient is inversely proportional 
to a dimensionless number called the Reynolds number. The Reynolds number represents the ratio 
between inertial forces and the viscous forces acting on the particle and is defined by (Parfitt and 
Wilson 2009): 
Re = (d U ρa)/ŋa)        (13) 
where Re is the Reynolds number, d is the average particle diameter, U is the speed of the particle 
through the air, ρa is the density of the atmospheric air and ŋa is the viscosity of the gas. 
Equations derived from Bonadonna et al. (1998) describe the terminal fall velocity of ash, depending 
on whether Re is <0.4 where Stokes Law applies (Equation 14), 0.4 – 500 (Equation 15), or >500 
(Equation 16) (Bonadonna et al. 1998, Hill 2014, Blake et al. in review 1): 
Vt ≈ (g ρ d2 / 18 μ)                       (14) 
Vt ≈ d (4ρ2 g2 / 225 μ σ) 1/3                      (15) 
Vt ≈ (3.1 g ρ d / σ) ½                       (16) 
where Vt is the terminal velocity, g is the acceleration due to gravity (9.81 m s-2), ρ is the density of the 
particles, d is the particle diameter, σ is the density of the air and μ is the dynamic viscosity of the 
medium 
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The quantity of volcanic ash which becomes resuspended is dependent on the particle size, density, 
shape, roughness of the ground material on which it has settled, and the degree of binding and 
compaction (Sivakumar 2005, Wilson et al. 2011). When wind forces above the settled ash exceed 
the static threshold forces of the least stable ground surface particles, some particles begin to vibrate 
and increasing wind speed causes some of them to be ejected into the atmosphere (Fowler and 
Lopushinsky 1986, Wilson et al. 2011). Unconsolidated, fine and low-density ash such as pumice 
deposited after particularly explosive volcanic eruptions are more prone to remobilisation and 
resuspension (Wilson et al. 2011). Water however, either from rainfall or from the intentional 
dampening of ash deposits, acts to suppress atmospheric remobilisation, as do other techniques such 
as reducing vehicle speeds or limiting the number of vehicles on roads or rail networks (Table 5.1). 
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Appendix C3. Volcanic Ash Particle Size Considerations 
Airborne mineral dust often has a homogeneous internal structure, especially when advected with the 
wind across mountains or from land to sea over cool oceanic air (Weinzierl et al. 2012). In contrast, 
volcanic ash is generally inhomogeneous: the size of erupted material may vary by several orders of 
magnitude in one plume, ranging from very fine sub-micron ash to blocks exceeding one meter in 
diameter. The largest material leaves the eruption column at low levels, falling to the ground on 
ballistic trajectories, whereas the finest particles may become entrapped in the atmosphere for 
several months to years (Costa et al. 2006, Folch et al. 2009, Parfitt and Wilson 2009, Folch 2012). 
However, the most important group of material in terms of impact to infrastructure including 
transportation is generally ash of intermediate size range, defined here as fine ash (i.e ash with 
particle diameters <64 μm (Folch et al. 2009)). Fine ash can disperse for up to hundreds of kilometres 
from the vent before settling due to gravity and therefore generally settles over extensive areas. The 
proportions of ash in these fine fractions increase with increasing eruption explosivity (White et al. 
2011).  Indeed, for the infamous Mount St Helens (1980) eruption, although higher than expected 
amounts of coarse ash fell in some locations, the majority of the deposit consisted of fine ash, with 
>90% of the fallout in eastern Washington finer than 100 μm (Moen 1981, Durant et al. 2009) and 
~25% finer than 10 μm in diameter (Horwell 2007). 
Ash particles will only settle to the ground after they are carried to the edge of the eruption column, 
whereby they are then carried in the direction of the wind. The smaller the particle, the greater the 
height to which it is carried above the vent, and because the column expands with height, the greater 
the cross-wind distance that it will land from the vent. Additionally, greater windspeeds cause ash to 
be transported further downwind, suggesting that there should be a unique relationship between 
particle size and position in the final deposit (Parfitt and Wilson 2009). Complexities arise however, 
because at a given height, a range of particle sizes is released from the eruption column due to 
turbulence. Thus, at every location on the ground, an ash deposit will contain a range of particle sizes 
(Parfitt and Wilson 2009). There may also be eruptive pulses or changes in eruption style, which can 
result in alternating fine-grained and coarse-grained ashfall in the same location (Scasso et al. 1994).  
Particle size distributions of volcanic deposits are poorly constrained due to sparse data, variations in 
wind conditions and dimensions of eruption columns, and inconsistencies in the methods of 
measurement. Many particle size analyses carried out for ash deposits are incomplete, lacking data 
below 63 μm (Bonadonna and Houghton 2005). However, given a single eruptive episode and weak 
or negligible cross-wind, particle size distributions generally exhibit patterns of exponentially 
decreasing median diameter with distance from the vent (Sparks et al. 1992) with the square root of 
the area enclosed by an isopach or isopleth contour (Pyle 1989).  
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Appendix C4. Hill (2014) Particle Size and Settling Rate Analysis Summary 
Hill (2014) obtained median ash particle size and settling rate data from eight historical worldwide 
eruptions where field measurement sites were known. Analysis by Hill (2014) demonstrated that 
median particle size and ash-settling rate generally decreases with distance from the vent. Distal 
eruptions were found to cause ash deposits with predominant ash particle sizes of 20 – 250 μm, 
whereas deposits from proximal eruptions can occupy a much greater range of particle sizes (30 – 
2,000 μm). Ash-settling rates were up to ~900 g m-2 h-1 (Hill 2014). Hill (2014) also derived estimates 
of median particle sizes and settling rates for Auckland based on a correlation of distance between 
the city and known eruptive centres in New Zealand.  
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Appendix E3. Wind Profiles Selected for Modelling the Four Tephra Plumes in 
the South-Westerly Wind Scenario Addition in TEPHRA2 (14 March PM, 21 
March, 22 March, 29-30 March) 
 
Wind profile from: 
24/01/1976 (12:00) 
  
SCEANRIO PLUME 1 
(14 MARCH PM) 





33 15.1 225 45 
1022 14.8 194 14 
1502 32 207 27 
2009 36 233 53 
3116 38.9 248 68 
4369 58.7 259 79 
5808 65.5 279 99 
7520 109.1 262 82 
9638 124.2 260 80 
10886 136.4 258 78 
11033 136.8 259 79 
 
Wind profile from: 
31/01/1976 (06:00) 
  
SCEANRIO PLUME 2 
(21 MARCH) 





0 22.7 252 72 
998 51.5 258 78 
1460 55.1 259 79 
1973 50 249 69 
3016 61.6 249 69 
4230 90.4 275 95 
5607 126.4 275 95 
7220 139 280 100 
9181 172.4 293 113 
10402 163.8 289 109 
10800 180 283 103 
 
Wind profile from: 
01/02/1976 (00:00)   
SCEANRIO PLUME 3 
(22 MARCH) 





33 34.2 198 18 
1056 46.8 212 32 
1523 41 218 38 
2011 43.9 215 35 
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3065 63 211 31 
4256 92.2 231 51 
5638 135 226 46 
7271 175.7 227 47 
8133 194.4 228 48 
9262 172.1 233 53 
10457 163.1 239 59 
11914 141.1 251 71 
13774 95 245 65 
16319 68 238 58 
18534 33.8 212 32 
20002 19.4 112 292 
20645 16.2 117 297 
23925 47.5 99 279 
24946 50.8 98 278 
26600 61.2 90 270 
30067 72.4 96 276 
31305 79.6 85 265 
33800 90 102 282 
 
Wind profile from: 
8/02/1976 (00:00) 
  
SCEANRIO PLUME 4 
(29-30 MARCH) 





33 45 209 29 
967 42.1 211 31 
1439 40.7 225 45 
1937 33.8 238 58 
3020 27.4 337 157 
4244 83.9 335 155 
5653 109.8 337 157 
7308 118.4 340 160 
9341 163.1 338 158 
10333 180 336 156 
10565 180.7 337 157 
12064 149.8 336 156 
13916 121 330 150 
16444 55.8 345 165 
18651 40.3 10 190 
20120 31 54 234 
20762 34.2 72 252 
24027 39.6 95 275 
25035 46.8 94 274 
26666 47.5 99 279 
30097 75.6 90 270 
Appendix E – Additional publications and supplementary material for Chapter 7  
 313 
31320 76 95 275 
35000 90 90 270 
35900 97.2 99 279 
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Appendix E4. TEPHRA2 Tephra Characteristic Input Parameters Used for 
Modelling Ash Deposition from the Predominant South-Westerly Wind Profiles 
in the Scenario 
 
Parameter Value Informing References 
Maximum grain size (ϕ) -4.5 Segurstrom 1950, Walker and Croasdale 1971, Self et 
al. 1974, Magill et al. 2006, Rowland et al. 2009, Jenni 
Hopkins, Victoria University of Wellington, pers comm, 
19 July 2014, Johnson et al. 2014, Hopkins et al. 
2015. 
Minimum grain size (ϕ) 6 
Median grain size (ϕ) -1 
Standard deviation grain size (ϕ) 2 
Eddy constant 0.04 Bonadonna et al. 2005, Connor et al. 2011. 
Diffusion coefficient (m2 s-1) 12,000 Hurst 1994, Magill et al. 2006. 
Fall time threshold (s) 100,000 Bonadonna et al. 2005, Connor et al. 2011. 
Lithic density (kg m-3) 2,200 
Fries 1953, Bonadonna et al. 2005, Houghton et al. 
2006, De la Cruz-Reyna and Yokoyama 2011, 
Johnson et al. 2014, Blake et al. in review a,b,c. Pumice density (kg m-3) 1,200 
Column steps 100 
Bonadonna et al. 2005, Connor et al. 2011. 
Plume model 0.2 
Plume ratio 0.2 
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Appendix E5. Physical Damage Descriptions with Auckland Specifics for Road 




Event specifics Road Physical Damage Rail Physical Damage 
22 February VAL increases 












08 March 08 March PEZ 
implemented 
None  None 
11 March 11 March PEZ 
implemented 
None None 
12 March 12 March SEZ 
implemented 
None None 






Potential minor damage to some 
bridges and roadside equipment in 
areas proximal to earthquake 
epicentres (inspections may be 
required). 
 Potential for minor blockage by 
landslides from steep slopes 
onto roads. 
 




 No physical impact expected. 
 
Rail lines: 
 Potential damage to rail and 
components across the suburban 
electric network from earthquakes and 
ground deformation (inspections 
required).Note. Southern part of 
network is perhaps more susceptible 
due to geology (peat and ash).  
 Potential for blockage by landslides 
from steep slopes onto tracks and 







km from vent and 
some damage 4-6 





Road infrastructure destroyed or 
severely damaged 0-4 km from vent 
including sections of: 
 South western Motorway (SH20)  
 George Bolt Memorial Drive 
(SH20A) 
 Arterial and minor roads to north 
and south of Mangere Inlet. 
 
Some road infrastructure damaged 
with major blockages 4-6 km from 
vent including sections of: 
 Southern motorway (SH1)  
 Ellerslie-Panmure Highway and 
South-Eastern Highway 
 Arterial and minor roads 
surrounding Mangere Inlet. 
 
Potential further minor damage to 
some bridges and roadside 
equipment in areas proximal to 
earthquake epicentres (inspections 
may be required). 
 Potential for minor blockage by 
landslides from steep slopes 
onto roads. 
 
115 km road destroyed. 
202 km road severely damaged 
with complete blockage. 
457 km road with some damage 
and major blockages 
Rail stations: 
 Onehunga and Te Papapa stations 
destroyed or severely damaged 
beyond reasonable repair by base 
surge 
 Possible damage to stations on line 
between Greenlane and Otahuhu 
(inclusive) by outer surge (<5 KPa). 
 
Rail lines: 
 Line between Penrose and 
Onehunga, and nearby branch 
destroyed or severely damaged by 
base surge 
 Possible damage to line between 
Remuera and Middlemore, and 
sidings from Westfield by initial outer 
surge (<5 KPa). 
 Potential damage to rail and 
components across the suburban 
electric network from further 





Tephra fallout to 
west. 
Tephra deposition on some minor 
roads to west of scenario vent. 
Rail stations: 
 Onehunga and Te Papapa stations 






Note. Remobilised ash may extend 
to roads beyond the area 
mentioned but no substantial 
impacts are anticipated.  
 
Potential further minor damage to 
some bridges and roadside 
equipment in areas proximal to 
earthquake epicentres (inspections 
may be required). 
 Potential for minor blockage by 
landslides from steep slopes 
onto roads. 
163 km road outside of the initial 




remain destroyed or severely 
damaged 
 Possible damage remains to stations 
on line between Greenlane and 
Otahuhu (inclusive) by initial outer 
surge (<5 KPa). 
 
Rail lines: 
 Line between Penrose and 
Onehunga, and nearby branch remain 
destroyed or severely damaged by 
initial base surge 
 Possible damage remains to line 
between Remuera and Middlemore, 
and sidings from Westfield by initial 
outer surge (<5 KPa) and associated 
deposits. 
 Potential damage to rail and 
components across the suburban 
electric network from further 
earthquakes and ground deformation 
(inspections required). 
 
Note. Tephra fall to west does not 
directly fall on the rail network. 
Remobilised ash may reach the line 
between Glen Eden and New Lynn but 
no impacts are anticipated.  
 
16 March 11 March PEZ 
and 12 March 
SEZ lifted. 
 
16 March PEZ 
and 16 March 
SEZ implemented 
Following clean-up and any 
necessary repair or removal of 
blockages, including on critical 
routes through evacuation zones, 
only minor accumulation of deposits 
remain on section of: 
 Southern motorway (SH1)  
 Ellerslie-Panmure Highway east 
of SH1. 
All other roads within initial surge 
area remain destroyed, damaged or 
blocked to some degree. 
 
Tephra deposition is cleaned-up or 
removed by rainfall beyond the SEZ 
extent – no further impact.  
 
Note. Any minor damage from 
previous earthquakes has been 
repaired with no further impacts to 
the road network at this stage.  
 
Rail stations: 
 Onehunga and Te Papapa stations 
remain destroyed or severely 
damaged 
 Possible damage remains to stations 
on line between Greenlane and 
Otahuhu (inclusive) by initial outer 
surge (<5 KPa). 
 
Rail lines: 
 Line between Penrose and 
Onehunga, and nearby branch remain 
destroyed or severely damaged by 
initial base surge 
 Possible damage remains to line 
between Remuera and Middlemore, 
line from Westfield to Sylvia Park and 
Britomart to Orakei, and sidings from 
Westfield by initial outer surge (<5 
KPa) and associated deposits. 
 
Note. Any damage to components from 
previous earthquakes is repaired with no 
impact to the rail network beyond 6 km 
from the vent at this stage.  
 





Physical impact to the roads within 
0-6 km from the vent remains, 
similar to that on 16 March with 
some further accumulation of surge 
and tephra deposits. 
 
Tephra deposition also occurs on 
roads to north west of SEZ 
including sections of: 
 Southern Motorway (SH1) 
extending onto the Northern 
Rail stations: 
 Onehunga and Te Papapa stations 
remain destroyed or severely 
damaged 
 Possible damage remains to stations 
on line between Greenlane and 
Otahuhu (inclusive) by initial outer 
surge (<5 KPa). 
 
Rail lines: 
 Line between Penrose and 
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Motorway (SH1) over the 
Auckland Harbour Bridge 
 Northern section of South 
western Motorway (SH20) 
 North-Western Motorway (SH16)  
 Arterial and minor roads in 
central Auckland, to the 
immediate west, and north of the 
Auckland Harbour Bridge. 
984 km road beyond the initial base 
surge area experiences tephra 
accumulation. Thus, a total of 1,758 
km of road is impacted at this stage 
(the largest extent throughout 
the scenario).  
 
Onehunga, and Southdown branch 
remain destroyed or severely 
damaged by initial base surge 
 Possible damage remains to line 
between Remuera and Middlemore, 
line from Westfield to Sylvia Park and 
Britomart to Orakei, and sidings from 
Westfield by initial outer surge (<5 
KPa) and associated deposits 
 Possible damage to rail components 
on line between Britomart and 
Otahuhu, and line between Britomart 
and Sturges from ash deposition and 
infiltration to components. 
 
Note. Initial component failures from ash 
accumulation beyond the SEZ are fixed 
by late on 22 March. However, some 
failures may continue due to ash 
remobilisation on the network. 
 
30 March Tephra fallout to 
south east. 
 
Following clean-up, there is no 
further impact from the previous 
tephra accumulation beyond the 
SEZ. 
 
Continued clean-up of remobilised 
tephra on critical routes means only 
minor accumulation of deposits 
remains on the previously affected 
sections of: 
 Southern motorway (SH1)  
 Ellerslie-Panmure Highway east 
of SH1. 
 
New clean-up activity and any 
necessary repair or removal of 
blockages, means only minor 
accumulation of deposits remains 
on the previously affected sections 
of: 
 South-eastern Highway east of 
SH1 
 Arterial and minor roads in a 
zone ~6 km north west of the 
vent. 
 
All other roads within initial surge 
area remain destroyed, damaged or 
blocked to some degree. 
 
Rail stations: 
 Onehunga and Te Papapa stations 
remain destroyed or severely 
damaged 
 Possible damage remains to stations 
on line between Greenlane and 
Otahuhu (inclusive) by initial outer 
surge (<5 KPa). 
 
Rail lines: 
 Line between Penrose and 
Onehunga, and nearby branch remain 
destroyed or severely damaged by 
initial base surge 
 Possible damage remains to line 
between Newmarket and Middlemore, 
line from Westfield to Sylvia Park, and 
sidings from Westfield by initial outer 
surge (<5 KPa) and accumulating 
tephra deposits. 
 
05 April Lava flows. 
 
16 March SEZ 
lifted. 
 
Continued clean-up of remobilised 
tephra, means only minor 
accumulation of deposits remains 
on sections of the: 
 Southern motorway (SH1)  
 Ellerslie-Panmure Highway east 
of SH1 
 South-eastern Highway east of 
SH1 
 Arterial and minor roads in a 
zone ~6 km north west of the 
vent. 
 
New clean-up activity and any 
necessary repair or removal of 
Rail stations: 
 Onehunga and Te Papapa stations 
remain destroyed or severely 
damaged. 
 
Note. Previous damage to stations on 
line between Greenlane and Otahuhu 
(inclusive) by initial outer surge (<5 KPa) 
has been repaired. 
 
Rail lines: 
 Line between Penrose and 
Onehunga, and Southdown branch 
remain destroyed or severely 
damaged by initial base surge 
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blockages along further critical 
routes means only minor 
accumulation of deposits remains 
on previously affected sections of: 
 SH20 (to south) 
 Critical routes extending 
circularly around the east 
through the initial 4-6 km base 
surge area from the airport to 
Newmarket.  
 
All other roads within initial surge 
area remain destroyed, damaged or 
blocked to some degree, although 
are widely accessible from this date 
for clean-up following the lifting of 
the SEZ. 
 
 Possible damage from tephra 
continues to line between Newmarket 
and Middlemore, line from Westfield to 
Sylvia Park, and sidings from 
Westfield until clean-up prevents 
further remobilisation and infiltration to 
components. 
 







Following clean-up, repair of 
damage and removal of blockages, 
roads are restored beyond the 
extent of the severe damage / 
complete blockage zone caused by 
the initial surge (0-4 km from the 
vent). 
 
The previous total road length in 
this area was 305 km. 
 
Rail stations: 
 Onehunga and Te Papapa stations 




 Line between Penrose and Onehunga 
remains destroyed or severely 
damaged by initial base surge. 
 
Note. Demand to reconstruct the 
infrastructure required to reopen the 
above section of the line is expected to 
be low. The stations and line may be 
decommissioned or relocated based on 
rebuild activities. 
Although the nearby branch is now 
deemed to be restored at this time, 
demand may be too low for this to occur 
with the previous damage incurred, and 
possible closure of storage and 
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Appendix E6. Full Time-Series Maps Showing Physical Damage to the Road 


















Appendix E – Additional publications and supplementary material for Chapter 7  
 323 
Appendix E – Additional publications and supplementary material for Chapter 7  
 324 
Appendix E7. Full Time-Series Maps Showing Physical Damage to the 
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Appendix E8. Detailed Level-of-Service Descriptions for Auckland’s Road, Rail and Airport Transportation over the Course 













Note. Some self-evacuation and preparation for 
evacuation may lead to increase in traffic 
congestion (due to increased vehicle journeys) but 




Full service.  
 
Note. Some self-evacuation may lead to increase in 
passengers and delays at stations (due to increased 
boarding time) but the implications are considered 
minor on overall service. 
 
Auckland Airport starts making 
plans for a potential closure and 
issues a Notice to Airmen 
(NOTAM) notifying pilots of 
hazards and conditions on the 
airfield. 
08 March 
08 March PEZ 
implemented 
 
Evacuations occur from the PEZ. Access becomes 
restricted for most entering the zone. However, 
some people such as those assisting with 
evacuation, critical infrastructure staff, hospital staff, 
emergency workers, and those assisting with 
distribution of critical resources, can still enter.  
 
All road transport between north and south 
Auckland is disrupted including sections of: 
 South western Motorway (SH20) including 
Manukau Harbour Crossing 
 Southern Motorway (SH1) between Mt 
Wellington and Ellerslie 
 Ellerslie-Panmure Highway including Panmure 
Bridge 
 South-Eastern Highway including Waipuna 
Bridge 
 Arterial and minor roads to east and south of 
Auckland City area. 
 
Note. As the eruption has not started and no 
volcanic hazards are occurring, all other 
Rail stations: 
 Stations from Onehunga to Penrose, Greenlane to 
Westfield, and Westfield to Orakei become entry 




 Lines between Onehunga and Penrose, Remuera 
and Otahuhu, and line to east of city only operate 
as an evacuation service 
 40 km/h limit is introduced on these lines due to 
the threat of earthquakes and complications such 
as increased chance of obstructions at level 
crossings due to road evacuations. 
 
Note. Cascading effects on the operability of the 
remainder of the suburban electric rail network are 
expected and new timetabling is anticipated for much 
of the scenario from this date. However, this is not 
displayed on the figures. 
 
Some trains are out-stabled from Wiri to Henderson 
Auckland Airport issues NOTAM 
indicating airport closure.  
 
Minor domestic traffic at Ardmore 
Aerodrome. Most domestic traffic 
possibly diverted to Hamilton or 
Rotorua. 
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infrastructure remains fully operational. Traffic 
signals, Variable Message Signs (VMS) and Police 
are used to optimise evacuation flow. Re-
configuration of some motorway lanes may occur to 
increase capacity out of the PEZ, particularly on the 
Southern Motorway travelling south from the PEZ. 
 
784 km road affected by 08 March PEZ. 
 
and Swanson to allow continued operation on the line 
to the west of the city (including some diesel fleet 
from the Papakura to Pukekoe shuttle service). 
 
Relocation of KiwiRail operations and services. 
11 March 
11 March PEZ 
implemented 
 
No access to roads affected by the initial PEZ on 08 
March except emergency workers and critical 
infrastructure maintenance staff. 
 
Evacuations occur from a new PEZ section in the 
Mangere area. Access is restricted for most 
entering this zone. However, some people such as 
those assisting with evacuation, critical 
infrastructure staff, hospital staff, emergency 
workers, and those assisting with distribution of 
critical resources, can still enter. New roads 
affected include: 
 South western Motorway (SH20) south to 
Puhinui Road (SH20B) 
 George Bolt Memorial Drive (SH20A) 
 Puhinui Road (SH20B). 
 
Note. Traffic signals, VMS, Police, and lane re-
configuration are used to optimise evacuation flow 
where necessary. 
 




 Stations from Onehunga to Penrose, Greenlane to 
Westfield, and Westfield to Orakei are now closed 
following evacuations 
 Otahuhu and Middlemore stations on the become 




 Lines between Onehunga and Penrose, Remuera 
and Otahuhu, and line to east of city are now 
closed to all rail services 
 Branch and sidings near Westfield are closed 
 Line between Otahuhu and Papatoetoe only 




Diesel freight through-traffic ceases. Increased 
shipping between Port of Tauranga and Ports of 
Auckland Waitemata seaport is expected in response. 
Also unloading of some freight at Wiri depot ready for 
distribution by road. 
 
New timetabling comes into effect on lines not 
affected by evacuation or closure. 
Auckland Airport issues NOTAM 
indicating that the airport is within 
evacuation zone. 
12 March 
12 March SEZ 
implemented 
No service (roads closed) in area covered by 11 
March PEZ. 
Rail stations:  
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Evacuations occur from SEZ, based on the 
probable vent location and extending up to 2 km 
from the 11 March PEZ in places. Access becomes 
restricted for most entering this zone. However, 
some people such as those assisting with 
evacuation, critical infrastructure staff, hospital staff, 
emergency workers, and those assisting with 
distribution of critical resources, can still enter. New 
roads affected include: 
 Southern Motorway (SH1) through narrowest 
point of Auckland isthmus 
 South western Motorway (SH20) section to north 
west of already affected section. 
 
Although no critical infrastructure staff are allowed 
in the PEZ, it is expected that other infrastructure 
remains operational. VMS and traffic signals remain 
functional to optimise evacuation flow from the SEZ. 
 
1415 km road is now affected by evacuation zones 
(11 March PEZ and 12 March SEZ). 
 
 Stations from Onehunga to Penrose, Greenlane to 
Middlemore, and Westfield to Orakei are closed 
following evacuations 
 Remuera, Papatoetoe and Puhinui stations 
become entry only (no exit from stopping trains 
due to evacuation zone). 
 
Rail lines: 
 Lines between Onehunga and Penrose, Remuera 
and Papatoetoe, and line to east of city are closed 
to all rail services 
 Branch and sidings near Westfield remain closed 
 Line between Papatoetoe and Homai, and 
Remuera and Newmarket, only operate as an 
evacuation services (with 40 km/h limit). 
 
Notes. 
No diesel freight through-traffic remains.  
 
New timetabling continues on lines not affected by 










No service (roads closed) in area covered by 11 
March PEZ and 12 March SEZ. 
 
Minor reduction in service is possible on roads 
impacted by ground shaking from earthquakes. This 
may include roads in: 
 Auckland City 
 Northern Motorway (SH1) between city and 
Auckland Harbour Bridge 
 North western Motorway (SH16) west of city 
 South Auckland ~5 km from PEZ and SEZ 
 
Rail stations: 
 Stations from Remuera to Puhinui, and all those 
on lines to Onehunga and east of city are closed. 
 
Rail lines: 
 Onehunga Line, Eastern Line, and Southern Line 
between Newmarket and Homai are closed to all 
rail services. 
 Southdown branch and Westfield sidings remain 
closed. 
 Remainder of electric suburban electric rail 
network experiences rolling outages (for hours) 
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No diesel freight through-traffic remains.  
 
New timetabling continues on lines not affected by 
evacuations or closure between outages due to 







km from vent and 
some damage 4-6 







from 2 to 3. 
 
LoS in morning remains the same as 13 March due 
to the same evacuation zones and continuing 
earthquakes. (Damage to parts of the network 
occurs due to base surge but closures are already 
in effect.) – NO MAP 
 
Note. Impact on electricity transmission and 
distribution may affect road LoS for the entire 
Auckland region, particularly due to potential traffic 
signal and VMS failure, and fuel station pump 
failure. 
 
Service remains the same as on 13 March due to the 
same evacuation zones and continuing earthquakes. 
– NO MAP 
 
Damage to parts of the network occurs due to base 
surge but closures are already in effect. Tephra does 
not cause additional LoS reduction at this stage. 










from 3 to 4. 
 
Clean-up outside 
of SEZ begins (for 
~1 day). Some 




Tephra in afternoon causes reduced LoS (due to 
reduced traction, impaired visibility and covered 
road markings affecting driving) on some arterial 
and minor roads to west of vent. 
 
16 March  
11 March PEZ 
and 12 March 
SEZ lifted. 
 
16 March PEZ 
and 16 March 
Road service restored on roads beyond new 16 
March PEZ and SEZ extents. 
 
Southern (SH1) Motorway and Ellerslie-Panmure 
Highway to east are reopened through PEZ and 
SEZ during daytime to restore critical road links 
Rail stations: 
 Sylvia Park Station, stations from Remuera to 
Middlemore and those on Onehunga Line remain 
closed. 
 
Auckland Airport issues NOTAM 
indicating it is no longer in 
evacuation zone but that airport 
remains closed. 





VAL 2 (after 
reducing to 3 on 
15 March). 
 
between north and south with hazard thresholds 
established for immediate re-closure: 
 50 km/h advisory speed limit is implemented 
 Regular road sweeping occurs on this road to 
keep tephra deposits to a minimum. However, 
reduced traction, impaired visibility and road 
marking coverage  is expected from remobilised 
ash 
 Exit ramps from SH1 within evacuation zone are 
purposefully blocked (other than Ellerslie-
Panmure Highway). 
 
No service on all other roads within PEZ and SEZ. 
 
Rail lines: 
 Onehunga Line and branch near Westfield 
remains closed 
 A non-stopping service between Newmarket and 
Papatoetoe through the new SEZ comes into 
effect restoring the north-south link on the rail 
network (with hazard thresholds for immediate re-
closure established). As this route passes through 
outer surge deposits (between Remuera and 
Middlemore), a 40 km/h limit is in effect and rolling 
outages occur due to ash infiltration, associated 
component failure and required inspections. 
 
Notes. 
Limited diesel freight services are restored from Wiri 
to north of Auckland and from Wiri to Waitemata Port. 
However, there are restrictions due to the relocation 
of railhead (and lifting equipment capacity) from 
Westfield. Some freight at Wiri is distributed to the 
north by road.   
 
New timetabling occurs on line to west and line south 
of Papatoetoe. A limited service may be restored from 
Britomart to Panmure although low demand may 
deem this unnecessary at this stage. 
 
21 March  





VAL 4 (after 
increasing to 3 on 
18 March). 
No service (roads closed again) through PEZ and 
SEZ due to threat from surge and tephra fall. 
 
Tephra deposition causes reduced service on roads 
to north west of SEZ including sections of: 
 Southern Motorway (SH1), extending onto the 
Northern Motorway (SH1) over the Auckland 
Harbour Bridge 
 Northern section of South western Motorway 
(SH20) 
 North-Western Motorway (SH16) west from 
Auckland city 
Rail stations: 
 Sylvia Park Station, stations from Remuera to 




 Onehunga Line and branch near Westfield remain 
closed. 
 A non-stopping service between Newmarket and 
Papatoetoe through the new SEZ (with rolling 
outages due to surge and accumulating tephra, 
Volcanic eruption resumes. No 
air traffic in or out of Auckland. 
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 Arterial and minor roads in Auckland City and to 
the west and north. 
 
and 40 km/h limit) continues. 
 Rolling outages occur from Britomart to Sturges 
due to tephra deposition and possible ash 




Limited diesel freight services continue from Wiri to 
north of Auckland and from Wiri to Waitemata Port. 
 
New timetabling remains on the line to west of city, 
and line south of Papatoetoe. A limited service 
remains possible between Orakei and Panmure. 
 
Initial outages on line to west are expected to be 
short-lived (until late on 22 March). However, further 





VAL reduces to 3. 
 
Clean-up outside 
of PEZ and SEZ 
begins (for ~1 
week). Some 
critical routes also 
cleaned through 
PEZ and SEZ. 
 
LoS remains the same on roads to north west 
affected by 21 March tephra fall with ash 
remobilisation. 
 
Road sweeping recommences on SH1 and 
Ellerslie-Panmure Highway to re-established critical 
routes from north to south (same restrictions as 16 
March). 
 
Only critical infrastructure staff are permitted access 
within the SEZ (up to the extent of the outer initial 
surge deposit) to attempt infrastructure repairs. 
 





Tephra fallout to 
south east. 
 
Full service is restored to roads beyond SEZ that 
were affected by 21 March tephra fall. 
 
Service within PEZ and SEZ remains the same as 
22 March except on two east-west critical routes 
which are reopened through the zones during 
daytime (with hazard thresholds established for 
immediate re-closure). Therefore, four critical routes 
have been partly re-established through the 
evacuation zones (with same restrictions as 16 
March). 
 
LoS is the same as 21 March except services (with 
new timetabling) are restored on the line to west 













In addition to the critical routes re-established on 30 
March, others are restored (with same restrictions 
and reduced service due to reduced traction, 
visibility impairment and road marking coverage). 
This includes sections of: 
 South western Motorway (SH20) 
 Route extending circularly around the east 
through the initial 4-6 km base surge area from 
Rail stations: 
 Onehunga and Te Papapa stations remain closed. 
 
Rail lines: 
 Onehunga Line and branch near Westfield remain 
closed 
 Some service is restored on all other lines (with 40 
Auckland Airport issues a 
NOTAM indicating it remains 
outside of the evacuation zone 
with new evacuation orders in 
place. 
 
Airport is re-opened with minimal 
service. Some airlines request 
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lifted SEZ begins 
(for ~1 month). 
 
 
the airport to Newmarket 
 Other arterial roads to north. 
 
Only reduced service due to tephra deposits remain 
on some roads beyond the outer initial surge. 
 
Very limited access occurs on roads affected by the 
initial surge deposit up to the extent of the PEZ. 
 
No service (roads closed) within PEZ. 
 
km/h limit between Newmarkert and Middlemore 
until minimal remobilisation of ash occurs). 
 
Notes. 
Diesel freight services, including the railhead at Wiri 
are restored with some delays.  
 
New timetabling remains across much of the 
suburban electric rail network. 
 
Out-stabling of trains and relocation of KiwiRail staff 
is reconsidered. 
 
daytime access into the no-fly 
zone. 
    
Auckland Airport resumes full 
operations. 
 VAL reduces to 2.   
Auckland Airport issues a 
NOTAM that VAL has decreased. 
01 May 











lifted PEZ begins 
(for ~1 month). 
 
Full service is restored to all roads beyond 4 km 
from the vent. 
 
Very limited access occurs 2-4 km from the vent. 
 
No service (roads closed indefinitely) 0-2 km from 
the vent including the Manukau Harbour Crossing 
and a section of the South western Motorway 
(SH20), which are permanently destroyed / buried. 
 
Full service is restored to all stations and rail, with the 
exception of the Onehunga Line and Onehunga and 
Te Papapa stations which remain closed for the 
coming months. 
Auckland Airport partially re-
opened. 
01 June VAL reduces to 0.   Auckland Airport re-opens. 
15 June    
Auckland Airport fully open, 
although some airlines and/or 
routes may take a while to re-
establish. 
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Appendix E9. Full Time-Series Maps Showing Level-of-Service for the Road 
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Appendix E10. Full Time-Series Maps Showing Level-of-Service for the 
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